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In this thesis methodologies for modelling risk on ageing systems are developed. In the first stages of the 
thesis, two systems on an underground railway are used to demonstrate the modelling approach. In the 
latter stages of this thesis the modelling approach is expanded further, presenting a method for optimisation 
of a phased maintenance strategy, an inclusion of uncertainty in model outputs and an approach to model 
size reduction.  
Initially, a Petri net modelling approach is proposed to predict the derailment caused by component failures 
on a Switch and Crossing (S&C). A holistic methodology is adopted such that components of the system 
are divided into subsets of interconnected modules at a system level. Degradation within each module is 
idealized through a sequence of discrete states of wear until final failure occurs. Monte Carlo analysis is 
used to numerically evaluate the resulting Petri net. Through this methodology, different maintenance 
strategies, such as partial replacement, complete replacement, and opportunistic maintenance, are tested, to 
evaluate their influence on the final risk of derailment and predicted system state over time. This work 
includes a more in-depth modelling approach for S&C than that available in literature. This improves on 
the state of the art by removing assumptions of perfect maintenance and inspection. In addition, the 
approach includes modelling of dependencies between components, that are introduced through shared 
maintenance actions. 
Secondly, a Petri net modelling approach is applied to an automatic fire protection system to assess the 
probability of system failure, throughout the system life. Components are modelled with individual Petri 
nets, which are connected by a phased asset management strategy. The model is solved numerically via 
Monte Carlo simulation and component failure probabilities are combined using logic developed through 
Fault Tree analysis. For each time period, this application gives the probability of detection, deluge and 
alarm system failure, along with the number of maintenance actions, system tests and false system 
activations. The key contributions from this work include a detailed model for the interlocking fire 
protection systems and the application of a phased asset management strategy. This phased strategy allows 
the modelling of different maintenance approaches that are applied at different times depending on the 
system age. This approach demonstrates an increased functionality in comparison to modelling approaches 
currently available for fire protection systems, 
In addition, the modelling approach is extended further towards an optimal risk-based asset management 
decision making tool. The model for the fire protection systems is used as an application and is extended to 
give a measure of risk and whole-life cost. This extended model forms the basis of a two-stage optimisation 
approach within the framework of a phased asset management strategy. A Simulated Annealing algorithm 
is combined with a Genetic Algorithm to reduce system level risk and whole-life cost. A method for the 
incorporation of uncertainty in predicted model outputs is also presented. Novel aspects within this work 
include: the development of the optimisation approach for a phased asset management strategy and the 
developed algorithm for quantifying model output uncertainty given uncertain input parameters. The 
optimization of a phased system shows improvements on current model optimisation examples as it allows 
different strategies to be applied at different phases of the system lifecycle. It allows these phases to be 
determined in an automatic manner. The inclusion of uncertainty estimates on model outputs improves 
current Petri net modelling approaches, where uncertainty in input parameters is not included, as it allows 
decisions based on modelling outcomes to be more fully informed. 
Finally, a method is presented that can be applied to large system level Petri net models to produce 
equivalent model at a reduced computational cost. The method consists of generating a reduced Petri net 
which approximates the behaviour of its larger counterpart with a shorter simulation time. Parameters in 
this reduced structure are updated following a combined Approximate Bayesian Computation and Subset 
Simulation framework. Novel contributions from this work include: the proposed reduction approach, a 
method for using this reduction approach to improve model optimisation efficiency and the exploration of 
the reduction approach to justify model structure selection. These improve on approaches for model 
reduction available in literature, which are commonly rule based and so less flexible. In addition, model 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
1.1: Background  
Underground railways are currently present in 178 cities across the world and carry approximately 
168 million passengers per day[1].  
The Metropolitan line, which opened in London in 1863, was world’s first underground railway. This 
was a sub-surface line created using a ‘cut and cover’ method, whereby a trench is dug just below the 
ground and then covered to leave an underground space through which a train can pass [2]. A steam 
engine was used to pull the carriages on the Metropolitan line, producing vast quantities of steam and 
smoke. 
Electric trains were introduced to the London Underground network in 1890. Following this, there 
was a reduced need for ventilation, and a second type of underground line was employed, using a 
‘deep level tube’ method of construction. Deep level tube tunnels, created by boring into the earth, 
reduce the need for surface digging [3].  
Currently London Underground has 270 stations and 11 lines, 45% of the lines are underground in 
either cut and cover lines or deep level tube tunnels, with the remaining 55% above ground. The trains 
on the London Underground network are powered by an electrified third rail. 
Table 1.1 gives a summary of the features of each of the London Underground lines including the 
usage, length of line and the number of delays in the 2016/17 Transport for London (TfL) reporting 
period. Data for this is taken from the TfL Performance data almanac [4]. In this recording period 
1.38 billion passenger journeys were made on the Underground [5]. The table displays track failures 
and delays and cancelations of scheduled trains across all lines.   
Worldwide there are several further examples of historic underground railways: 
 The New York Subway was opened in 1904 and in 2018 had 665 miles of track, 472 miles of 
which are underground [6][7]. In 2018 there were 1.68 billion passenger journeys along the 
21 routes that make up the network, the trains are driven manually and powered by a third 
rail.  
 The Paris Metro was first opened in 1900. The Paris Metro has 14 lines, 127miles of track, 
and 303 stations and had 1.56 billion passenger journeys in 2018 [8][9]. Since 1999, a major 
renovation programme has been implemented to update and improve the Paris Metro.  
 The Moscow Metro was opened in 1935; the network consists of 15 lines and is almost 
entirely underground. The network contains over 204 miles of track and has 269 stations [10]. 
There are deep tunnels that run under the river Moskva. In 2017 there were 2.37 billion 
passenger journeys on the Moscow Metro [1]. 
 The Tokyo Metro opened in 1927 and has 9 lines, both over ground and underground. In 2017 
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7,582,137 16 21.3 40 27 98.0% 
Table 1.1: A table giving information about each of the lines on the London Underground network. 
In addition, there are numerous underground railway networks utilised worldwide. Figure 1.1 shows 
the growth of the number of systems worldwide, by decade, broken down by continent [1]. In the 
most recent decade, the Asia-Pacific continent showed the largest growth in the number of networks. 
In addition, between the years of 2012 and 2017 the global number of passenger journeys on 
underground railway networks increased by 8,717 million, representing a 19.3% growth. Figure 1.2 
gives the 10 networks worldwide that have the largest number of passenger journeys, as of the end of 
2017. The growth was seen largely in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) with a 58% 




Figure 1.1: The number of underground railway systems worldwide, showing the growth in number with each decade 
 
Figure 1.2: The 10 busiest underground railway networks worldwide, when compared by the annual passenger journeys in 
2017 
At the end of 2017 there were 642 lines installed worldwide, with a total combined length of 
13,903km and a total of 11,084 stations across these lines. In addition, 1,901km of new infrastructure 
was put into service between the start of 2015 and the end of 2017. This represents a 15.8% increase 
in the total length of underground railway infrastructure worldwide. Figure 1.3 gives the 10 longest 
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Figure 1.3: The 10 longest underground railway networks worldwide, as of data taken at the end of 2017 
UITP, the International Association of Public Transport, predicts that the length of installed 
underground railway system networks will grow by over 50% before 2022, in comparison to the 
length of installed lines worldwide at the end of 2017. This comes with the expected construction of 
200 new lines and extensions across most regions. There is also an expected increase in the number of 
fully automated lines worldwide.  
The ‘International Benchmarking report’ by TfL compares the London Underground to other 
Underground railways worldwide. The report notes that the operational cost per car km is higher than 
average for London Underground. Despite a reduction in maintenance cost by 6% since 2010/2011, 
London Underground’s maintenance cost is 19% higher than the average. This is attributed to high 
labour costs, asset condition and age. More specifically, maintenance costs for infrastructure and 
station facilities were higher than average [12]. In addition, customer risk of fatality was also higher 
than average. This was largely attributed to a relatively high number of fatalities due to suicides as 
opposed to accidents caused by failures within the London Underground network. This thesis explores 
potential methods for reducing the maintenance cost while considering the risk of systems in the 
network. 
1.2: Historical Accidents on Underground Railways  
The Kings Cross Fire occurred on the London Underground network resulting in multiple fatalities. 
The findings of the investigation into the fire had a significant impact on the risk assessment methods 
employed by London Underground. Developments were made from a largely reactive risk 
management approach to a predictive approach, and so, details of this accident are presented here, 
followed by examples of more recent accidents. The fire occurred on the 18th November 1987 and 
killed 31 people, injuring many more. The incident triggered an investigation into the accident to 
explain how the fire started, why there was a flashover and why there were fatalities. The report 
“Investigation into the King’s Cross Underground Fire”, by Desmond Fennel, details the findings 
[13].  
The report investigated the start of the Kings Cross Fire. The report states that the fire started on a 
wooden escalator when a match fell between the skirting board and treads. Gaps were observed two 
weeks before the disaster, but no preventative action was taken. In addition, there was an 
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been cleaned. The report states that the fire started around 19.25, and between 19.43 and 19.45 there 
was a flashover which caused to fire to erupt into the ticket hall. 
The report also states that the fire was reported to a member of staff, by a passenger, at 19.30. The 
member of staff had received no fire training and did not inform the station manager or line controller. 
Also, there was no existing evacuation plan in place. Two police officers were, by chance, present and 
at 19.34 they made the decision to radio the fire brigade, with one police officer coming above ground 
so their radio would work and evacuate passengers through the ticket hall. There was no plan of the 
underground station available for the emergency services.  At 19.43 the London Fire Brigade arrived 
in the ticket hall but were too late to prevent the flashover.  
In addition, at 19.44, Piccadilly and Victoria line trains were ordered not to stop at the station. It was 
concluded that the continued movement of trains provided air flow to the fire. At 19.46 a Victoria line 
train was waved down and the passengers on the station were evacuated. The fire was not fully under 
control until 21.48. 
There were several management issues identified in the report, including a lack of formal risk analysis 
process, a lack of evacuation procedure, inadequate staff training and poor maintenance of the 
escalator. Following the Kings Cross fire changes to the management of risk were implemented on the 
London Underground through the introduction of systematic evaluation of risks for several hazardous 
events. Currently the London Underground Quantitative Risk Assessment (LU QRA) is used to assess 
risks [14]. However, there have been several major accidents on the London Underground network 
since. These are detailed in Table 1.2. 
Name  Category Date  Consequences Description 
Chancery Lane 
derailment 
Derailment 25/01/2003 32 injured A motor from one of the train vehicles 
detached as the train approached the 
station. This caused the following 
vehicles to derail. The derailed vehicles 
collided with the tunnel walls. [15]  
Hammersmith 
Derailment 
Derailment 17/10/2003  The last carriage of a train derailed due 
to a broken rail. The passengers were 
evacuated via a second train. [16] 
Camden town 
derailment 
Derailment 19/10/2003 7 injuries A train derailed as it passed over a 
Switch and Crossing due to wheel/rail 
interface issues. [16] 
White city 
derailment 
Derailment 11/05/2004  A train derailed as it passed over a 
Switch and Crossing. Controls were not 
implemented correctly, especially 
concerning the design of switch 
apparatus with curved approaches. [17] 
Accident at 
Archway 
Derailment 02/06/2006  A train derailed due to a broken switch 
rail, caused by a fatigue crack. Degraded 






Derailment 05/07/2007 21 Injured A train derailed after striking a roll of 






01/11/2007 1 Injured  A passenger’s coat was trapped in the 
train door as it was leaving the station. 
The train was stopped by a passenger 
emergency alarm.[20]  





17/11/2009 3 Injured An inter-car barrier swung loose from 
the train as it departed and struck 




Derailment 12/05/2010 1 injured  An engineering train derailed due to a 
track gauge error. [22] 
Passenger dragged 
at Holborn Station 
Platform/ train 
interface issue 
03/02/2014 1 injured A passenger was dragged 10 metres after 
their scarf got caught in closing train 
doors.[23] 
Passenger dragged 




12/03/2015 1 injured  A passenger fell beneath a train after 
being dragged by their coat, which was 




Derailment 02/03/2016  An incorrect position of the switch rails 
resulted in a derailment of a slow 
moving train as it passed over a Switch 
and Crossing. [25] 
 
Table 1.2: A summary of the major accidents that have occurred on the London Underground since the Kings Cross fire. 
The table demonstrates several derailments, resulting in passenger injuries. Of these, derailment 
commonly occurred at a Switch and Crossing. This suggests that further study in this area could be 
beneficial in order to attempt to reduce major accidents on the underground railway. In addition, the 
high number of fatalities caused by the Kings Cross Fire highlights the need for the consideration of 
fire safety in underground stations and tunnels.  
In addition to these major incidents, passenger injuries and accidents occur much more frequently. In 
the 2016/17 period, 4,497 passenger injuries were reported of which 80 were classified as ‘major’, by 
London Underground. In the timeframe, there were also 15 train accidents on the London 
Underground and 3 Potentially Higher Risk Train Accidents, all of which were derailments [26]. 
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The occurrence of major accidents on underground railways is not limited to London Underground. 
Table 1.3 gives several examples of major accidents that have occurred on underground railways 
worldwide, in the time period since the Kings Cross fire [27]. These accidents demonstrate the high 
number of fatalities, or injuries, which can be associated with major accidents on underground 
railways worldwide. These accidents demonstrate derailment hazards, fire hazards and collisions.  
Name Date City Consequence Description 
Nicoll Highway 
Collapse 
20/4/2004 Singapore 4 fatalities, 3 
injured 
A retaining wall for a ‘cut and cover’ 
tunnel evacuation collapsed, causing a 
road to collapse. [28] 
D.C Metro Red 
Line Crash 
3/11/2004 Washington 20 injured An empty train rolled backwards and 
collided with a stationary passenger 
train. The driver did not apply the 
brakes and there was no rollback 





22/6/2009 Washington 9 fatalities, 52 
injured 
A moving train collided with the back 
of a stationary train. Failures in the 
track circuit meant that the stationary 
train was undetected. [30] 
Paris Metro 
Derailment  
29/8/2010 Paris 24 injured  A derailed train fell onto a 
neighbouring track section as it 
approached a station. The suspected 
cause was over-speeding and a track, 
or wheel, defect. [31] 
Union Square 
Crash 
29/08/1991 New York 5 fatalities, 200 
injured 
A train derailed at a Switch and 
Crossing, due to a driver passing a red 
at high speed. The train was travelling 
too fast for the trip arms at work. [32] 
Russsell Hill 
subway accident 
11/08/1995 Toronto 3 fatalities, 140 
injured 
A commuter train collided with a 
stationary train after the driver ran 
through three red lights. The signalling 
system regularly displayed false red 
signals and the trip arms failed. [33] 
Baku Fire 28/11/1995 Baku 337 fatalities, 200 
injured 
A train caught fire due to an electrical 
spark in the wiring under one of the 
cars. The trains were not made of 
flame resistant material. Many people 
died of carbon monoxide poisoning as 
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the carriages caught fire. [34] 
Nakameguro 
train disaster 
08/03/2000 Tokyo 4 fatalities, 31 
injured 
The last carriage of a train derailed 
and collided with a train travelling in 
the opposite direction [35].  
Brooklyn 
derailment 
20/06/2000 New York 84 injured Derailment of two of the train 
carriages as the train was pulling away 
from a station. [36]  
Daegu 18/02/2003 Daegu 192 fatalities, 151 
injured 
An underground station fire spread 
between two trains that were 
stationary in a station. It was 
suspected that the fire started by arson. 
[34] 
Table 1.3: A summary of some of the major accidents that have occurred worldwide since the Kings Cross fire 
These accidents highlight the importance in preventing accidents on underground railways, in order to 
ensure the safety of passengers, staff and members of the public. Risk assessment can be used to 
prevent accidents such as these, by providing a framework to understand the systems across the 
network and identify areas where improvements are needed. Changes in design, operation and 
maintenance can be used to control risks to an acceptable level. Quantified Risk Assessment methods 
are commonly used to highlight areas of weakness so that preventative measures can be taken to 
reduce the likelihood of accidents occurring.  
1.3: Basic Concepts  
1.3.1: Risks and Hazards 
For safety critical systems, such as an underground railway, it is important to minimise risk as 
accidents can lead to multiple fatalities. The Health and Safety authority (HAS) defines a hazard as 
[37]: 
“A Hazard is a potential source of harm or adverse health effect on a person or persons” 
They also define risk as: 
“The likelihood that a person may be harmed or suffers adverse health effects if exposed to a 
hazard.”  
Risk,  , is defined quantitatively as the product of the consequences,  , of an undesired event and the 
frequency of its occurrence,  . This is given in Equation 1.1: 
               (1.1)  
The risk of a hazardous event can be reduced by either reducing the frequency of occurrence or by 
reducing the consequences, should the hazardous event occur. 
1.3.2: Ageing Systems 
For an ageing system with components operating up to and beyond their intended life, there is a cycle 
of replacement and repair to maintain operation. As components age their hazard rate commonly 




 Burn in: Initially there is a high hazard rate for the components. This is commonly due to 
manufacturing defects or poor installation of the component.  
 Useful life: The component has a constant hazard rate due to random failures.  
 Wear out: As the component reaches the end of its life its hazard rate increases due to 
processes such as corrosion, fatigue, or wear.  
Testing of components after installation can be used to identify the expected high level of early life 
failures. As components enter the wear out phase, failures are more likely and components must be 
maintained, or replaced. Component failure can be revealed or unrevealed. In the unrevealed case, 
inspection or testing of the component is required to identify the failure. Risk assessment can be used 
to identify which combinations of failures can result in a hazardous event. As components in a system 
age, and failure becomes more likely, without effective maintenance there can be an increase in the 
risk associated with the system. 
 
1.4: Risk assessment on an underground railway 
Risks to passengers, staff and members of the public on an underground railway can be lowered by 
either reducing the frequency of hazard occurrence, or reducing the severity of the consequences. By 
identifying the contributing factors to the occurrence of a hazard and the severity of potential 
consequences, areas of weakness can be identified. Improvements can be made in these areas.  
Using London Underground as an example of the type of hazards present on an underground railway 
gives an insight into the sort of events that are currently considered in the risk assessments applied in 
the underground railway industry. In the LU QRA, major hazards are identified on each line and the 
risk of fatality of each is evaluated. Based on the similarity of the outcomes the major hazards are 
grouped. Each of these groups of major hazards is referred to as a ‘Top Event’. Hazards can be 
identified though methods such as checklists or a hazard and operability study (HAZOP). 
London Underground has identified 18 Top Events which form the basis of their risk management 
strategies [39]. In practice these Top Events often contain distinct hazards that have been grouped 
under a single heading for presentation purposes. However, during quantitative analysis of the top 
event, the hazards are treated as distinct. The Top Events are:  
 
Figure 1.4: The Reliability Bath Tub Curve 
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Ventilation Hazard  
In the ‘deep level tube’ tunnels ventilation is provided by ventilation shafts. On ‘cut and cover’ lines 
ventilation is provided by natural draughting. The movement of trains helps to move air through both 
types of tunnel. If a train is immobilised in a section of track, rising temperature and a lack of fresh air 
can pose a threat to passengers. There may also be incidents related to smoke or fumes. The 
ventilation hazard Top Event includes risks posed to passengers due to poor ventilation leading to 
heat, smoke or fumes in underground track sections.  
Train Fires  
Train fires can start under the floor of the train, in the saloon car or spread to the car from an external 
source. This Top Event includes any fires that occur on a train, including those started by malicious 
action.  
Escalator Incidents  
The escalator incidents Top Event includes any falls, or injuries, gained while using an escalator 
within a London Underground station. High levels of congestion can contribute to the severity of 
these incidents as, if one person falls, then it can cause others to fall. It is more likely that a fall may 
occur if the escalator stops suddenly. Large items of luggage can contribute to this group of incidents 
because they may topple and fall.  
Flooding  
There are a number of ways that flooding could occur. There may be flooding from the Thames due to 
a rupture in a tunnel running under the river, or flooding due to failure of the Thames barrier, leading 
to water entering at street level. Flooding may also be the result of broken pipes or sewers. In some 
areas of the tube water ingresses at a slow rate from the surrounding ground, pumps work to remove 
this water. Failure of these pumps could also lead to minor flooding.  
Power Failure  
The power failure Top Event includes loss of power from the National Grid, or loss of power from 
faults in the supply points. Total power failure to the network can result in stranded trains which can 
give rise to ventilation hazards, due to the fan failure and lack of train movement, or flooding hazards 
due electric pump failure. There is emergency lighting available in stations. 
 Derailment  
The derailment Top Event includes all scenarios where a train leaves the track due to an unplanned 
event. This can occur for multiple reasons. Contributory factors include track related faults, Switch 
and Crossing failures, obstructions on the track or over speeding.  
On train incidents  
This Top Event includes the risks to passengers after they have boarded the train, such as 
unauthorised use of inter-car doors and train door opening between platforms. 
Collision between trains  
This Top Event includes collisions between passenger trains, or between a passenger train and non-
passenger trains. These collisions can be end to end, side on, or ‘swipe’ collisions, which is where two 
trains moving in opposite directions graze past each other. For an end to end collision to occur there 
must be two trains in the same section of track and they must fail to brake in time. Signalling systems 
aim to prevent two trains being in the same section of track by displaying a red light if the previous 
section is occupied. However, if a signal shows red, ‘Trip and Proceed’ may be implemented. This is 
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a process by which drivers may pass a red signal, at a low speed, if it is believed that the signal has 
failed. This could lead to a collision if there was actually a train in the following section.  
Explosion  
This Top Event considers explosions occurring from malicious action or from accidental build-up of 
flammable material or gasses. This can be especially dangerous in a tunnel, due to: confinement 
within the vicinity of the explosion, difficulties with evacuation and limited access for the emergency 
services.  
Station Fires  
This Top Event considers station fires occurring in both public and non-public station areas, and 
includes fires around lifts, escalators and machine rooms. There are automatic heat and smoke alarms 
to give advanced warning of a fire and in deep stations there are fire suppression systems fitted. 
Collision Hazard  
The collision hazard Top Event covers any event where a train impacts a fixed object. Examples of 
fixed objects that could be involved are: tunnel walls, platform edges, tunnel terminals and floodgates. 
Failure of the brakes and emergency brakes, on the train, can contribute to this Top Event.  
Arcing  
Arcing is a phenomenon by which a large amount of current passes between two conducting 
materials, through a non-conductive media, such as air. There is visible light emission and high 
temperature. The trains on the Underground are electrified with a live power rail and an electrical 
pickup on the train, hence, arcing can occur.  
Structural Failures  
The Structural Failure Top Event includes any collapse or failure of infrastructure on the network and 
covers bridges, stations, tunnels and shafts.  
Lift incidents  
The lift incident Top Event includes any event that occurs in or around the lift, such as passengers 
becoming stuck in the lift, falling down the lift shaft or uncontrolled lift movement.  
Tunnel Fires  
This Top Event includes any fire that occurs on track sections outside a station vicinity, either in a 
tunnel, or in an open section of track. The severity of the consequences of tunnel fires can be severe 
due to the smoke produced by the fire. Build-up of grease, dust and debris in tunnels can catch fire. 
An ignition source can come from electrical faults, arcing or deliberate action.  
Stairs and Assaults  
Stair hazards include any falls on stairs within stations. This Top Event also includes any assaults on 
customers in stations, or on trains. High levels of congestion can contribute to this Top Event.  
Unauthorized Access to Track  
This Top Event includes and hazardous situations arising due to the presence of unauthorised persons 
on or around the track. They may have come from a platform or another entry point. This is not only 
dangerous to the trespasser but could endanger passengers, for example, sudden braking may cause 




Platform Train interface  
The Platform Train interface Top Event includes a number of incidents that could occur and endanger 
a customer on the platform when a train is approaching, stationary or leaving the platform. The main 
scenarios include; a customer being struck by an approaching train while they are on the platform, a 
customer falling from a platform or between a train and the platform, a customer getting crushed in 
the train doors and a customer being dragged along the platform by being caught in a closed door. 
Within the LU QRA, Fault Tree analysis is carried out to estimate the frequency of occurrence for the 
hazards grouped within these Top Events. Event Tree analysis is performed to estimate the risk, by 
considering potential consequences, of the hazards within each Top Event over a range of different 
outcomes. Following this introduction to current risk modelling methods and the hazards present on 
an underground railway, the next section presents the project aims and objectives. 
1.5: Aims and Objectives 
Changes in design, operation and maintenance can be used to control risks to an acceptable level. Risk 
assessment methods are commonly used to highlight areas of weakness so that preventative measures 
can be taken to reduce the likelihood of accidents occurring.  
Therefore, the aim of this project is: 
To develop a method that can be used to comprehensively model risk on an ageing and increasingly 
utilised underground railway. 
This will be achieved through the following objectives: 
1. Develop a modelling capability that incorporates the following features of systems in an 
underground railway: 
i) Increasing failure rates as a system ages; 
ii) Allow dependencies between different failure events, that can combine to result in a 
hazardous event; 
iii) Include complex asset management strategies, which incorporate phased and 
opportunistic approaches, to deliver maintenance to the parts of the system at the time in 
their life that they most need it; 
2. Provide a framework for a risk-based asset management optimisation tool. 
3. Include a measure of uncertainty in the predicted value of risk. 
4. Validate the modelling capability by application to real systems and hazard scenarios.  
5. Ensure that the computational efficiency enables the modelling capability to be incorporated 
effectively.   
1.6: System Application 
In this thesis, the proposed modelling approach is explored through application to two separate areas 
of study. The first area of study is train derailment due to a Switch and Crossing (S&C) failure and the 
second area of study is fire risk on underground stations. The application of S&C derailment was 
chosen due to the contribution it has made to past derailment accidents. Since the Kings Cross Fire in 
1987, multiple major accidents have been caused by S&C failure, as detailed in Table 1.2. The fire 
risk on underground stations was selected for the second area of study due to the high number of 
fatalities demonstrated by the Kings Cross Fire and the fire at Daegu. A review of models available in 
literature for these applications is presented in Section 2.6 of this thesis. This review demonstrates 




1.7: Key Contributions 
Chapter 2 presents a literature review and provides the justification of the research direction within 
this thesis. There are several contributions made within this thesis to the wider body of literature. 
Firstly, an approach to hazard or risk modelling that builds on existing methodologies applied in 
industry is presented in Chapter 3. This extends currently implemented methodology to allow more 
detailed modelling of components with complex degradation, maintenance and inspection strategies. 
Two models have been created to demonstrate the proposed methodology. The first, which is applied 
to S&C derailment, goes into further depth than S&C models available in literature. The model 
improves on the state of the art as it removes assumptions of perfect maintenance and inspection and 
allows dependencies to be introduced through maintenance actions. In addition, the system state is 
predicted. This work is presented in Chapter 4. The second developed model considers a fire 
protection system and uses a combined modelling approach for deluge, detection, and alarm sub-
systems. This model also includes areas of novelty, in comparison to models available in literature, 
for fire protection systems. Key areas of this include: the incorporation of a phased asset management 
strategy, modelling of probability of unrevealed failure, modelling false activation and the 
combination of all three sub-systems. The inclusion of phased asset management strategy modelling 
improves the state of the art as it allows exploration of strategies that can change throughout a system 
lifecycle. This work is presented in Chapter 5. 
In addition, a novel approach for the optimization of a Petri net model, with a phased asset 
management strategy is presented. The approach is beneficial as it allows different strategies to be 
applied at different phases of the system lifecycle. A method for studying the convergence of the 
model is also applied; this improves on current convergence checks for Petri net models, where the 
convergence is plotted on a linear scale. In addition, a novel approach for estimating the uncertainty 
of the model outputs, given uncertain model inputs is presented. This improves on the state of the art 
for predictions, where the uncertainty in the output of the Petri net model is usually unstated, and 
uncertainty in model input parameters is not considered. A more informed decision can be made 
based on model outputs, if an estimate of uncertainty is provided for each model output. These 
methods can be found in Chapter 6. 
Finally, in Chapter 7, a new Petri net reduction methodology is presented. This work includes 
research into comparison metrics that quantify the difference between outputs of separate Petri net 
models. The proposed reduction methodology is a more flexible approach than those currently 
available in literature, which are commonly rule based. Novel research exploring the proposed method 
is presented, including its use to improve current optimization methods using an approximate 
solutions space. Also, the use of the approach to justify the choice of reduced model structure is 
explored. This improves on the state of the art for model selection, where Petri net models are usually 
user defined, as the approach provides a quantitative measure to back up choice of model structure. 
1.8: Summary 
This chapter has provided a brief introduction to underground railway networks worldwide and 
provided background of several historical accidents on underground railways. There have been a 
number of occasions where accidents have occurred on the London Underground railway, and other 
underground rail systems across the world. These accidents can be attributed to component failures, 
design flaws or human error. In addition, controls that are designed to prevent accidents, such as trip 
arms, have been found to be insufficient. Accidents such as the Moorgate Disaster, Union Square 
Crash and the Kings Cross Fire, highlight the need for risks to be fully understood in order to identify 
areas where improvements are needed. These areas form the basis of applications used throughout this 
thesis, for demonstration of the methodology developed. Aims and objectives and an overview of the 
thesis contributions are also presented. 
14 
 
A structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 presents a review of methodologies for risk 
assessment, or asset management, applied in industry to underground and over ground railways, or 
proposed in literature. Chapter 3 presents the methodology proposed in this thesis. Chapter 4 focusses 
on modelling and testing complex asset management strategies for ageing systems, with an applied 
model presented for the derailment occurrence at a Switch and Crossing. Chapter 5 develops 
modelling of phased asset management strategies and is demonstrated with a model for fire protection 
system unavailability. In Chapter 6, methodologies are developed for risk-based optimisation of 
phased asset management strategies and for the consideration of convergence and uncertainty in the 
modelling approach. The developed methodologies are applied to the model presented in Chapter 5, 
for fire protection systems. Chapter 7 presents a new method for the reduction of model size via 




Chapter 2 Literature Review  
This chapter provides a review of current risk, hazard and asset management modelling 
methodologies in the railway industry, along with alternative methodologies reported in literature. 
Within each section of this chapter any gaps in existing approaches are discussed, in order to inform 
the research direction of the thesis. This forms the basis for the justification of the approaches 
proposed for application throughout this thesis.  
In the first part of this chapter, a review of risk modelling methods currently implemented in the UK’s 
underground and over ground railway is presented. Following this, in Section 2.2, a general review of 
system failure and risk modelling methods is given. A review of: Fault Tree analysis, Event Tree 
analysis, Petri net modelling, Markov modelling and Bayesian Networks is provided in context of 
modelling system failure, ageing or risk. In Section 2.3 a review is given of work surrounding the 
optimisation of asset management of a system, including methods that focus on risk-based 
optimisation. Section 2.4 presents a review of methods for incorporating uncertainty in model 
predictions. Section 2.5 gives a review of methods for reducing model complexity, with the view of 
improving the computational efficiency of large system models.  
Within this thesis two system models are developed, the first considering derailment at a railway 
S&C, and the second considering underground fire protection systems, as discussed in Section 1.6 of 
this thesis. In this chapter a review of current S&C condition modelling methods is presented in 
Section 2.6. Likewise, a review of underground fire protection modelling is given in Section 2.6. 
These system specific reviews highlight any missing functionality in the models currently available 
for each system. Finally, the discussion and conclusion sections are given. These summarise any areas 
identified in this review for further development and give an outline of where these areas are 
addressed in this thesis. 
2.1: Risk modelling in the UK railway industry 
2.1.1: Underground Railway 
The London Underground Quantitative Risk Assessment (LU QRA) uses a combined Fault Tree and 
Event Tree approach to quantify risk. First hazards are identified and divided into 18 categories 
identified as ‘Top Events’, which group similar hazards together [39]. Descriptions of these events 
can be found in Section 1.5 of Chapter 1 of this thesis.  
A Fault Tree is constructed for each Top Event to identify any potential causes and predict the Top 
Event frequency of occurrence. Event Tree analysis is carried out to consider any consequences 
following the occurrence of the event. Here, different eventualities following an initiating event 
occurrence are evaluated, and any associated consequences for each eventuality are included. This 
evaluation includes any mitigating actions, a measure of passenger loading and the predicted severity. 
The predicted loss of life for each eventuality is then used as the measure of consequence, finally 
giving an estimate of the risk for each Top Event. A simple weighting factor is used to adjust for 
injuries. The risk of the whole London Underground network was estimated at 6.8 fatalities/year for 
the 2014 reporting period [39].  
London Underground’s model is focused on loss of life to members of the public and passengers[40]. 
The risks on each underground line are considered separately in the LU QRA, however, it is a line 
based model and so does not have a high level of resolution for consideration of different conditions 
present across each line, and the risks associated with them. 
Hazardous events can occur which are related to human error, for instance, a driver ignoring a red 
signal. Currently HEART (Human Error And Reduction Technique) can be used, or expert 
judgement. HEART uses experimental evidence from studies such as nuclear power control room 
simulation studies; hence this may not be directly transferable to the railway industry [41]. The LU 
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QRA does not consider human factors and abnormal operations in much depth. However, the 
likelihood of detection and mitigating actions by staff, passengers or the public is included, allowing 
risk reducing methods to be modelled in some capacity. 
The combined Fault Tree and Event Tree method used in the LU QRA has a graphical representation 
which can aid in the communication of the method to stakeholders. It is also an adequate method for 
dealing with events that are independent. The current method gives a pessimistic prediction for the 
overall risk on the underground network when compared to the accident statistics each year. This can 
be attributed to the contribution of rare events to the predictions made by the model. These rare events 
can have high fatality levels which increase the value of predicted risk each year. However, since they 
are infrequent in occurrence, the accident statistics may be lower year-on-year in comparison to the 
prediction. 
Since the introduction of the LU QRA the predicted risk made by the model has been steadily 
decreasing. The initial value generated by the model was considered highly pessimistic and changes to 
the model to bring this value more in line with reality, along with risk reduction measures applied to 
the London Underground network, have led to this decrease. 
The current model is based on historical data, consequence analysis and expert predictions. The data 
used may be incomplete due to poor recording, or outdated due to changes to the network. It is also 
possible for the model to consider events that have yet to occur, as there may be no data or current 
knowledge of the possibility of their occurrence. London Underground updates a few models in the 
LU QRA every year, this has the potential to distort the overall picture of the risk by introducing 
inconsistencies in relative risk values between the Top Events. In addition, there is no quantification 
of the uncertainty in the final predicted value of risk.  
The combined Fault Tree and Event Tree approach used assumes a constant failure rate, which is 
acceptable for a system in its ‘useful life’. As a system ages and enters the ‘wear out’ phase the 
component failure rates may not remain constant and so the model can become increasingly 
inaccurate. With the current approach it is also difficult to consider complex maintenance strategies; 
only a constant repair rate is included. The combined Fault Tree and Event Tree method used assumes 
that events are independent. In reality events are often dependent on each other due to the operational 
strategy or maintenance strategy. The model also does not consider the time ordering of events [42]. 
This can be important where initiating and enabling events are concerned. 
There are areas in which the Fault Tree method encounters difficulties, including those surrounding 
dependence between basic events, time dependence, sequencing of basic events and difficulty 
handling components with multiple degraded states. Although the Fault Tree method is not limited to 
components with a constant failure rate, the LU QRA assumes a constant failure rate. 
2.1.2: Over Ground Railway 
The Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) uses the RBBS Safety Risk Model (SRM) to 
quantitatively analyse risk on the over ground railway. This model also uses a combined Fault Tree 
and Event Tree approach and is similar in many ways to the London Underground QRA. The first 
version of the RSSB SRM was released in 2001 and has been regularly updated and extended since 
then [14]. The purpose of the SRM is to give an overall estimate for risk and allow identification of 
areas that require improvement. The SRM quantifies risk at system level before breaking down this 
risk to route and operator level. 
The SRM considers a larger number of hazards than the LU QRA. The SRM considers not only 
hazards that can result in fatalities but also hazards that can result in different severities of injury for 
passengers and public. The severities of injury considered are: major injury, minor injury, shock and 
trauma. Hazards that may affect the work force are also considered along with suicides that occur on 
the railway network. This provides a more detailed picture of the injuries sustained in an accident 
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when compared to the LU QRA by considering high frequency low consequence events, such as non-
fatal trips and falls, as well as low frequency high consequence events, such as derailments [43].   
In the SRM, 131 hazardous events are considered which are grouped into accident categories 
including: train accidents, movement accidents, non-movement accidents and trespass [44]. Some 
examples of the hazardous events considered in the SRM are: road traffic accident, platform edge 
incident, assault and abuse, on-board injuries, and slips, trips and falls. The frequency of each event is 
estimated through Fault Tree analysis, following this Event Tree analysis is used to consider the 
consequences should the event occur. The results of this analysis are an estimate of the frequency of 
each event occurring along with a predicted number of casualties should each event occur. 
In the SRM, the depth of the Fault Tree analysis stops where no more evidence is available, this 
means that the SRM has fewer lower Fault Tree levels and less reliance on expert opinion when 
compared to the LU QRA. The model is also updated fully every 18 months which ensures that all of 
the event predictions are proportionate to each other. This also allows the effects of any changes that 
have been made to be analysed. The model predicts a slightly pessimistic value for risk when 
compared to the accident statistics each year, however, this can be attributed to the contribution from 
rare events. This type of event may happen infrequently but can have severe consequences and so 
increases the predicted risk value.    
The SRM has similar downfalls to the LU QRA. The data used in the model may be incomplete or 
inaccurately recorded and, for some cases, there is little data available and so there are difficulties in 
gaining a high level of confidence in the predictions. There is also the possibility that a rare event 
could be missed from the analysis. In addition, there are limited asset management strategies or time 
dependence incorporated into the model. Also, the failures are assumed to occur with a constant 
failure rate and therefore their times to occurrence follow an exponential distribution. This is 
explained further in Section 3.3 of this thesis. There is currently no measure of uncertainty in the 
model predictions and hazards in yards, depots and sidings are not included.   
2.1.3: Summary 
This section has given a review of methods currently implemented in underground and over ground 
railway systems to model risk. As this project aims to improve currently applied methods, this 
provides context to the work in the remainder of this thesis.  
The current method used in the UK railway industry combines Fault Tree and Event Tree models to 
predict risk. It has several areas of weakness, especially in a situation where components are ageing 
and have a non-constant failure rate or there are dependencies between component failures. In 
addition, the approach does not model different asset management strategies and impact on the risk. 
Uncertainty is also not provided on the estimates gained from the analysis.  
This review informs the research direction by highlighting the weaknesses in the approaches currently 
implemented in industry. There are areas for improvement surrounding risk modelling methods that 
can incorporate changing failure rates as a system ages and allows dependencies between failure 
events. In addition, modelling of the asset management of systems within this framework can be 
developed further. The next section of this chapter details some of the developments in literature 
surrounding different approaches to modelling risk and system failure. 
2.2: Risk Modelling in Literature 
There are developments and applications in literature for risk models or component failure models 
that move away from a combined Fault Tree and Event Tree approach currently employed in industry. 
Examples of these alternative approaches are Markov models, Petri nets models and Bayesian 
Networks. These approaches often aim to consider dependencies between events and time dependence 
and can have the ability to cope with non-constant failure rates. In addition, there are further 
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developments to the Fault Tree and Event Tree methods available in literature, which extend their 
functionality. This section describes some methods proposed in literature and considers their 
suitability to modelling risk for an ageing system, namely modelling a changing failure rate as the 
components age, a selection of maintenance and inspection strategies and the incorporation of 
dependencies between components due to operational or maintenance strategies.  
2.2.1: Fault Tree Analysis 
A full explanation and an example of the Fault Tree methodology can be found in Section 3.1 of this 
thesis. However, there are several developments of the Fault Tree method which aim to solve some of 
the problems associated with Fault Tree based models. This section further describes some of the 
weaknesses identified in the Fault Tree method and some of the extensions that have been added to try 
and combat these weaknesses. 
The Fault Tree Handbook, released in 1981, by the U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission details the 
synthesis and analysis of Fault Trees [45]. The handbook also gives some of the problems and 
difficulties encountered with Fault Tree analysis: 
 Since Fault Tree analysis only considers a top event resulting from complete failures it is not 
easy to use Fault Tree analysis to model situations that arise from incomplete failures, such as 
those where capacity is reduced.  
 The method is not exhaustive because only a limited number of top events are considered. 
 Fault Tree analysis is an expensive and time consuming method and it is difficult to make 
changes to a Fault Tree based model. 
 In many Fault Trees parameters are considered as fixed values for ease of calculation, this 
may not be the case in real life, for instance failure rates may change with time.  
 Quantification of a Fault Tree requires that the basic events are independent. This may not be 
the case due to a common causes leading to the occurrence of more than one basic event. The 
common causes can only be indicated by identifying minimal cut sets and manually looking 
for common causes within each cut set. For Fault Trees with a large number of minimal cut 
sets, approximations are made which ignore higher order minimal cut sets. However, if there 
is a common causes in the discounted minimal cut sets the probability of occurrence for the 
cut sets may still be significant, leading to an incorrect prediction for the top event when they 
are discounted.  
 Measures of uncertainty and the effect of changing a variable can be carried out manually by 
changing the variable that is being tested and observing the effect on the top event. Monte-
Carlo Simulation can also be used where multiple trials are carried out with a changing value 
for the variable, to measure the effect. These methods are time consuming for a large Fault 
Tree.  
 Often uncertainty is not included in a Fault Tree model. 
The paper, published by Dugan, Bavuso and Boyd, 1992, introduces dynamic Fault Trees that can 
model sequence dependent failures and use of components in standby [46]. Several gates are defined 
in this paper, these include: 
 The ‘Functional-Dependency’ gate which contains a trigger event and events dependent upon 
it. When the trigger event occurs then the dependent events also occur and the fault 
propagates up the Fault Tree. 
 The ‘Cold Spare’ gate which is used in situations where there is a primary operation backed 
up by other operations. For example, a back-up generator that is only used during a power 
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failure. A cold spare gate considers the degradation of the back-up operation while it is not in 
use. 
 The ‘Priority AnD’ gate requires all of the input events to occur and they must occur in the 
given order.  
 The ‘Sequence Enforcing’ gate can be used to model situations where the input events can 
only occur in a set order.  
The dynamic Fault Tree is converted to a Markov chain for numerical analysis, for ease of 
formulation of a Markov model and to extend the functionality of a Fault Tree. The method makes 
several assumptions that are common with Fault Tree analysis; it is assumed that the basic events are 
random and independent, the failure rate is constant and the lengths of time are short so few failures 
will occur in the time interval. The assumption is also made that repairs cannot be made while the 
system is in use.  
As the size of the dynamic Fault Tree increases, the size of the Markov model increases 
exponentially, hence it is costly and time consuming to analyse the dynamic Fault Tree quantitatively. 
A method described in the paper by Gulati and Dugan, 1997, [47] breaks a dynamic Fault Tree into 
independent subtrees which can be either dynamic or static, where static Fault Trees are those with 
traditional gates. To find a solution to the Fault Tree, each subtree is evaluated separately. Static Fault 
Trees are analysed by Binary Decision Diagrams and dynamic Fault Trees are analysed by the more 
time consuming method of conversion to a Markov chain. The top event in each subtree is replaced by 
a basic event representing the subtree, this process is repeated up the tree. This method makes it easier 
to evaluate the dynamic Fault Tree if only a small section has dynamic properties, as the more straight 
forward Binary Decision Diagram method can be used for a large portion of the dynamic Fault Tree.  
Furthermore, an approach is presented by Magott and Skrobanek, 2012 [48], to extend the Fault Tree 
method to include time dependence. This approach aims to adapt the method further to consider 
measurements such as delay time between event cause and effect, hazard tolerance time and fault 
detection time. Two further gates are defined. These are casual gates which represent the delay times 
between cause and event, and generalisation gates which represent combinations of causes. The Fault 
Tree is constructed and then the time intervals for events and gates are calculated from timed state 
charts. Finding these time parameters can be difficult and so reduction methods for the timed state 
charts are used. However, there is currently no set of reductions that can be applied to every case. This 
makes the method time consuming and complex as there is no way of calculating the delay times 
automatically.  
In order to incorporate durations that lead to critical events, failure sequences and repairable multi-
states, a Fault Tree extension is proposed by Khanh Nguyen, Beugin and Marais, 2015[49]. The 
extended Fault Tree presented here is evaluated by considering the critical events of the Fault Tree 
which are then represented by a Petri Net. A Monte Carlo simulation is carried out to evaluate the 
Petri Nets. This method is applied to a satellite-based railway system, and gives similar results to a 
Petri Net simulation of a Fault Tree considering all events. However, the method is complex and 
requires approximation for the distribution function for each critical event. The method also only 
considers failures that occur with an exponential distribution with a constant failure rate.  
The introduction of dynamic Fault Trees aimed to create a method that is “flexible enough to capture 
the dynamic aspects of the system, but which is (almost) as easy to use as a fault tree” [46]. A major 
strength in the Fault Tree model is that it is clear and easy to use to provide a framework for analysis 
of failure modes of the system. The method can be easily understood, explained and quickly 
evaluated. There has been a large amount of research into solving some of the limitations of Fault 
Tree analysis, including introducing time dependence, event dependencies and order to basic events. 
These methods are time consuming and difficult to apply and often do not incorporate non-constant 
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failure rates of components. For an ageing system in particular, a method must be found that copes 
well with a non-constant failure rate.   
2.2.2: Event Tree Analysis 
This section gives a review of the Event Tree methodology. A full explanation and an example of the 
Event Tree methodology can be found in Section 3.2 of this thesis. Traditional Event Tree analysis is 
detailed in the “US Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Reactor Safety Study”, published in 1975 [50]. 
Here, chains of events and their consequences, following an initiating event, are analysed with an 
Event Tree structure. Quantitative analysis can be undertaken by assigning probabilities at each 
branching point of the Event Tree and propagating these values through the Event Tree, under the 
assumption that the events are independent. Time dependence is not included in the model. In 
addition, there is no incorporated measure of uncertainty. Event Tree analysis struggles to represent 
how the state of the system, and the environment, influences the sequence of events, due to a lack of 
time dependence and limitations of event sequencing in the method.  
In order to more represent an Event Tree structure as a matrix of probabilities, with the aim of 
improving the ease of analysis of the model, the paper by Kaplan, 1982 provides a methodology [51]. 
A probability matrix is created from the Event Tree model that represents the likelihood of moving 
between system states, within the Event Tree, which are a result of different event sequences. The 
method employs the combination of ‘sub-event trees’, which have a matrix representation and can be 
combined through matrix multiplication. The resulting matrix for the whole Event Tree relates the 
entry states of the system to the exit states of the system. Intermediate system states, which represent 
the system condition on the partial completion of a chain of events, can also be considered. For each 
intermediate system state present in the Event Tree, a set of triplets can be defined that represents the 
risk of the state. These triplets contain the possible exit states, the probability and a measure of the 
consequences, of each exit state. The paper presents an alternative method for the analysis of an Event 
Tree and for the representation of risk within partially completed event sequences. However, the 
method assumes both a fixed value for each event probability and for the consequences of each chain 
of events.   
There are several weaknesses identified with Event Tree analysis surrounding time dependence, static 
event ordering, and dependencies between events. In addition, there are difficulties in finding accurate 
input values for analysis and incorporating uncertainty into the outputs of the model. A number of 
papers can be found that attempt to address these issues.  
Further advances in Event Tree analysis are in the area of Dynamic Event Tree Analysis, which aims 
to allow the quantification of risk in dynamic event sequences. The report, “Dynamic Event Tree 
Analysis Method (DETAM) for Accident Sequence Analysis” presents an analysis method to this aim 
[52]. The methodology presented here simulates accident scenarios through dynamic branching of an 
Event Tree, governed by defined rules. There is a focus on dynamic responses of operators, and the 
system, during an accident. The method is suggested as an improvement to the static nature of 
traditional Event Tree analysis. The dynamic Event Tree method presented allows branching to occur 
at different points in time to create alternate Event Tree structures, depending on the conditions at that 
time point. The dynamic branching is governed by a set of branching rules and sequence expansion 
rules, and a set of variables included in a branching set and plant state. The branching set gives the 
variables that determine the new Event Tree sequences at any node in the Event Tree. The plant state 
is the set of variables that influence the frequency assigned to each branching. The branching rules 
determine when branching should take place and the sequence expansion rules limit the number of 
sequences possible. A quantitative tool is also defined, which can be used to compute state variables 
and branching frequencies. The approach presented in the paper accounts for ordering and timing of 
events and allows the human interactions with the system to be specifically modelled under different 
conditions. However, a dynamic Event Tree is more difficult to construct and analyse than a 
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traditional Event Tree due to the number of extra system definitions required. For a large system this 
method could become extremely computationally expensive due to the multiple branching scenarios. 
The method also does not provide a framework for estimating the parameters governing the events 
and consequences in the model. A paper by Rutt et al., 2006, details work on a system software 
infrastructure for the analysis of Dynamic Event Trees, towards making a useable tool for industry 
[53]. However, it is stated that there is a large body of work to be completed before an end product is 
available.    
This section has highlighted some of the limitations of Event Tree analysis, especially when 
modelling non-independent events, time dependent events or events where the sequence of occurrence 
impacts the outcome. The Dynamic Event Tree method may give interesting results as event 
sequences can be time dependent, however, requires further research and development to allow the 
method to be solved computationally for complex systems. Furthermore, several approaches have 
been proposed to propagate uncertainty through an Event Tree model. In addition, the Event Tree 
method is widely applied in the railway industry. 
2.2.3: Bayesian Networks 
Bayesian Networks have been proposed as a methodology to improve the RSSB SRM, by allowing 
the Event Trees used across the network to be generalised to a smaller collection of flexible models. 
Approaches with this objective are given in Marsh and Bearfield, 2008, and Bearfield and Marsh, 
2005 [54][55]. The main aim of the work is to address the issue that repeat analysis of Event Trees is 
required, for each location with different attributes. In the work a Bayesian Network framework is 
proposed in order to extend the Event Tree method, used in the RSSB SRM. The proposed approach 
allows the same model to be used in multiple locations, despite the presence of different attributes at 
each location. The method identifies the factors and conditions that influence the events under 
consideration, and these are included within a Bayesian Network structure. An example application 
for an Event Tree for a derailment is presented. In this example, the location attributes identified 
include factors and conditions such as: track curvature, if the track is enclosed, train speed and rolling 
stock type. The Bayesian Network representation of the Event Tree, which includes these location 
specific attributes, is simulated for numerical analysis. In this method, with an increase in factors the 
Bayesian Network becomes increasingly large, escalating the computational cost and the quantity of 
data required for the model. Hence, the model can become complex with a heavy reliance on accurate 
data for the railway network. This method could be expanded to build a universal model for the risk 
analysis of the railway network, but this may result in an unfeasible level of model complexity.  
There are several examples where the flexibility of Bayesian Networks is further demonstrated. The 
paper by Andrews and Fecarotti, 2015, incorporates Bayesian Networks into a modelling approach 
that considers maintenance of assets that are in use beyond their originally intended lifetime, in order 
to optimise the maintenance strategy used, to minimise whole life costs while maintaining the high 
level of safety [56]. Independent modules are identified in the system. A Petri Net approach is used to 
model independent parts of the system and a Bayesian Network is used to combine these subsystems 
to give a picture of risk for the whole system. The method is applied to an overpressure protection 
system on a wellhead platform. In this approach, failure rates change with time and dependencies 
between basic events are considered. The approach splits the life-time of components into discreet 
phases from working, through stages of degradation, and finally failure. The model is evaluated by 
Monte Carlo simulation, where delay times are taken from suitable statistical distributions. The 
approach allows analysis of diverse maintenance strategies which focus on different components at set 
times, as well as the impact of alternative system designs. Another benefit is that all of the potential 
failure modes of the system are included in a single model. However, for a large Petri Net with many 
dependencies the simulation of the model can be computationally expensive due to the nature of 
Monte Carlo simulation, where a large number of runs are needed for convergence of results. 
22 
 
In a contrasting approach, Bayesian Networks are proposed by Oukhellou, Côme, Bouillauta, and 
Aknina, 2008, for use in real time for the diagnosis of rail defects, which requires efficient 
computation to give current results without an observable time-lag. The method aims to find a 
solution to classify singularities detected by rail inspection [57]. Singularities can be detected in the 
rails for multiple reasons, including typical track structures introduced by installation or maintenance 
and rail defects. The model aims to distinguish between singularities that are a result of broken rails 
and singularities such as: fishplated joints, switch joints and welded joints. The state of the rail at a 
location is modelled by a Bayesian Network. Several Bayesian Network structures are considered in 
the paper, where different combinations of neighbourhood states, such as the state of the opposite rail 
or the surrounding rail section, can impact the rail state at any given point. Sensor data and a labelled 
track state database are used to train the model. The model outputs the probability that the current 
location is in each of the model states, where the states can include varying singularity conditions. 
The data used to train and test the model does not include broken rails, and so rail breaks are 
randomly inserted into the dataset. This introduces modelling bias and deviates from the natural rate 
of rail breaks. The paper states that if natural rail break occurrence is adhered to then there are too few 
broken rails to train the model. If this is common over any potential training dataset then it makes it 
difficult to implement the method, especially if a large quantity of high-quality data is not available. 
The model gives a good detection rate of rail breaks for the synthetic data used, but commonly 
classifies a fishplated joint as a broken rail. Improvements are suggested using hierarchical 
combinations of Bayesian Networks, resulting in a misclassification of 10.4% of the fishplated joints 
as broken rails.  
Bayesian Networks can be used to infer relationships between underlying influences on an outcome. 
The paper by Wang, Xu, Tang, Yuan and Wang, 2017, uses a Bayesian Network to model the impact 
of weather conditions on S&C failure [58]. The Bayesian Network used in the approach is built from 
real data and expert opinion. In the model weather conditions are grouped by an assigned duration of 
one week, and classified as ‘snow’, ‘rain’, ‘thunder’ or ‘fine’. This is done under the assumption that 
only snow, rain and thunder impact weather related S&C failures. Thresholds can be assigned for the 
severity of the weather classification, based on the number of days of the weather type under 
consideration, for the week in question. For each of the ‘snow’, ‘rain’ and ‘thunder’ classifications 
there are two severity levels included in the model, all other weather is classified as ‘fine’. The 
optimal thresholds for each weather type level are discovered via an Entropy Minimization Based 
Discretization. Two levels of air temperature are also included in the model, classified as: high 
temperature and low temperature. The number of parameters required for the model is reduced using a 
casual noisy MAX model, and the parameters required for the model are derived through this process. 
Monte Carlo simulation of the Bayesian Network can be performed. This is done for a sample dataset 
and a comparison in made between predicted results to observed results. The model predictions show 
some agreement when compared to the observed values from the training dataset but less agreement 
when compared to a test dataset. A small dataset is used for the application of the model given in the 
paper, which can impact the accuracy of the model predictions.  
Finally, an example of a Bayesian Network to incorporate the impact of human factors on accident 
occurrence, with system-based variables, is given by Castillo and Grande, 2016. Here, a Bayesian 
Network is implemented to analyse the probability of several incidents of different severities, given a 
number of variables [59]. These variables include: the type of driver assistance system, the 
infrastructure of the railway line, the rolling stock, the train speed, the signal state, the line terrain, any 
technical failures and driver factors, such as tiredness, attention and decisions. The driver’s tiredness 
is modelled deterministically with a dependence on time. The driver’s attention is modelled with a 
continuous Markov model. The modelling of human errors in risk analysis of railway lines is 
considered further by a paper by Castillo et at., 2016, via the same Bayesian Network methodology 
[60]. The remaining parameters used in the model are gained from expert opinion. Different items that 
may be present on a railway line are considered and a Bayesian Network is created, that is dependent 
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on these items for each line. Line items included in the approach are: tunnels, S&Cs, signals, 
announcements and curves. The approach results in a large Bayesian Network, with a sub-net for each 
item encountered on the line in question. The resulting model cannot be easily solved due to its size, 
and so is partitioned into a sequence of sub-nets which are solved independently. The computational 
time increases linearly with the number of subnets. The method allows backward analysis to explain 
the causes of an incident; however, the method relies on expert opinion to give most model 
parameters instead of discovering parameters automatically from data. 
In summary, Bayesian Networks have been demonstrated to have the ability of combining results 
from other models to give risk at a system level, this can be used to combine multiple Petri Net 
models for sub-systems. They can also be used to replace the Event Tree stage of analysis, such that 
one Bayesian Network can represent multiple Event Trees of a similar structure. In addition, they can 
be used for analysis of data to make predictions of failures or future trends. Similarly, to the Petri Net 
approach, as the model becomes large, simulation tools can be required, and these can be 
computationally expensive.  
2.2.4: Petri net modelling 
Petri Nets are proposed as an alternative approach for modelling failure analysis in the paper by Liu 
and Chiou, 1997, [61]. A full description of the Petri Net method, with an example, is given in Section 
3.4 of this thesis. The paper demonstrates that Petri Nets have a strong ability to model dynamic 
behaviour, and so can be applied to systems with multi-state repairable components. The method 
presented in this paper uses a Fault Tree approach to model the failure modes of the system and then 
converts the Fault Tree into a Petri Net for analysis, changing each gate to an equivalent Petri Net 
structure. A matrix is used to represent the transitions available to a token in each place, and to 
evaluate the Petri Net to discover minimal cut sets. The use of the Petri Net allows sensors to be 
added to the model so that a failure will not propagate if it’s detected. Maintenance can also be 
incorporated into the model where a marked place can represent the system under repair after 
detection of failure by the sensor. There is also no incorporation of time dependence in the application 
of the method. The method also assumes that it is possible to solve the Petri net model analytically to 
give an exact solution; this may not be possible as the size of the model grows. A value for 
uncertainty is not included in the final estimated value.  
Petri nets are also used to model dynamic behaviour across multiple subsystems in the paper by 
Ghazel, 2009 [62]. A method is proposed to model the risk at level crossings, with automatically 
controlled barriers, that arises when a train collides with a car at the level crossing. A scenario is 
considered where a traffic jam on one side of the level crossing means that cars move into the area in 
between the barriers before there is an escape route available. If a train approaches, the barriers come 
down and the car can be trapped in the path of the train. A model is created that is split into three 
subsystems: the road traffic system, the rail traffic system and the automatic control system. A 
stochastic Petri net is used to model each subsystem where firing times or probabilities are assigned to 
each of the transitions. Once the individual subsystems are modelled interaction between the 
subsystems are identified, for instance, a red light from the control system directs the traffic flow to 
stop. These interactions are used to connect the subsystems into a network that represent the whole 
system. The model aims to represent the position of the cars and the trains and evaluates the risk 
presented by them both being in the same section at the same time.  
The firing times in the Petri net are determined in one of three ways. Firstly, they can be known set 
values, such as an instantaneous transition. Alternatively, a truncated normal distribution can be used 
if the value for transition time is known to fluctuate around an average, for example the time that the 
train arrives. Finally, the transition time can be modelled by a suitable statistical distribution that fits 
with data gathered, for instance the traffic flow. Monte Carlo simulation is carried out to evaluate the 
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Petri net. This predicts when the trains and cars will be in the same section at the same time. The 
assumption is made that the control system does not fail.  
Coloured Petri Nets allow a more concise representation of model structure and are proposed to model 
the safety of signalling systems where more than one train is in the same track section, by She, Zhao 
and Yang, 2014 [63]. Here, there are 3 conditions for the system to be in a safe state and a Petri net 
model is built for each. The first condition is that the system must function correctly when there are 
no faults, the second condition is that the system must be safe in the case of random or systematic 
internal faults and the third is that the system must function safely under external influence. Coloured 
Petri nets follow the same principles as Petri nets but tokens also contain information, this enables a 
more concise model as different tokens can move through the same Petri net simultaneously and 
retain their individual meaning. In the model an extra place in introduced, known as a counter place. 
This place is linked to transitions that represent faults in the system, it limits the number of faults that 
the system can experience. The counter place can also represent the influence of an external condition 
leading to a fault. System states corresponding to hazards are represented by the makings of certain 
places in the coloured Petri net, this method finds the reachability of each of these system states under 
different conditions giving an analytical solution. There is no measure of uncertainty carried through 
the model. 
In addition, Petri Nets have been applied for asset management modelling. The paper by Andrews, 
2012 [64] considers the state of the track ballast and how this changes over time. Poor track geometry 
can lead to faster aging of the other assets, such as rails and sleepers, as well as a geometry failure 
resulting in a derailment. The model incorporates a non-constant rate of change between asset states. 
There are several methods for maintenance of track ballast included in the model, these include: 
tamping, stone blowing or manual intervention. This maintenance does not always return the ballast to 
its original state as some of the ballast can be destroyed in maintenance activity hence the condition of 
the ballast is dependent on the previous maintenance activity as well as its age. Due to this it is 
important to optimise the condition of the ballast so that the resources used for maintenance or 
renewal can be as effective as possible.  
To model ballast degradation and maintenance, data is first gathered that represents the deterioration 
rate of the ballast and also the times at which different repair strategies are used. The data is split into 
phases that occur between each maintenance activity. The data is then analysed to show trends and a 
Weibull distribution is used to fit a curve to the data. A Petri net is then used to model the system 
which is solved by Monte Carlo simulation. There are three transitions introduced to the Petri net 
model for this system: the reset transition, the conditional transition and the convolution transition. 
The reset transition returns the Petri net to a specific state, for example after a maintenance activity. 
The conditional transition is dependent on the number of tokens in a different part of the network, for 
instance ballast degradation is dependent on the past maintenance activities. The convolution 
transition is used if the transition times are related to the same base condition. The firing times are 
sampled at random from the distributions that have been taken from the data and as more runs are 
completed the average results should start to converge. Whole life costs can be calculated and the 
maintenance strategy can be optimised to balance maintenance and renewal strategies with condition 
of the ballast. This method allows non-constant failure rates and multi-state components, therefore is 
applicable for ageing components with non-constant failure rates. However, this method requires 
custom made software to analyse each Petri net due to the custom transitions.  
The literature reviewed in this section has demonstrated the flexibility of a Petri Net modelling 
approach, especially in application to complex degradation and maintenance processes on the 
component and sub-system level. There is also flexibility in the method surrounding the addition of 
model specific transition types. However, the size of the Petri Net model can quickly become large 
resulting in an inefficient and computationally expensive analysis by Monte Carlo simulation. For 
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network level large systems, this may make the Petri Net method difficult to apply. The use of 
Coloured Petri Nets can reduce the size of large models with repeated modules. At the current time, 
there are limited software packages for solving Petri Net models, especially when a high level of 
customisation is required.  
2.2.5: Markov Models 
Markov models have been applied for the optimisation of inspection and maintenance procedures, 
with the consideration of system safety, in the paper by Podofillini, Zio and Vatn, 2006 [65]. The 
approach presented here considers crack formation in track rails that can result in rail breakage. To 
prevent rail breakage, track is inspected periodically by ultrasonic measurement cars to detect cracks 
in the rails. The aim of the method presented in the paper is to find an optimal strategy for use of the 
ultrasonic measurement cars, along with an accurate picture of risk and a method for testing different 
maintenance strategies. A crack in the rail is considered to have several states, where the maintenance 
activity required depends on the state. A crack will not be immediately detectable but as the crack 
worsens the likelihood of detection increases. In the model, there is the option for opportunistic 
maintenance where a crack in a non-critical state, where it is monitored for a period of time with the 
expectation that other similar cracks will develop. In this paper a non-homogeneous Markov model is 
used. The inspection is considered periodic, at a set time interval. The state of the crack is split into 
discreet phases and transition rates between the phases are assigned, to fit with data. In this model, in 
order for a crack to develop into a rail break, it must be undetected or have falsely identified severity. 
The probability of non-detection is dependent on the state of the crack and systematic failures. The 
probability of misidentification of the severity is taken from expert opinion. Transition matrices are 
defined which describe the degradation, inspection and maintenance processes. Common cause 
failures are then identified, such as the systematic miscalibration of the ultrasonic measurement car. A 
Genetic Algorithm is used to optimise the model for both cost and safety to find a relationship 
between inspection intervals and maintenance waiting times, and the risk of derailment. Uncertainty is 
not considered in this model. The approach applied in this paper uses a fixed inspection interval which 
does not allow a time dependent maintenance strategy. 
In addition, a prediction of the condition between maintenance actions can be made using a Markov-
based model. The paper by Bai, Liu, Sun, Wang and Xu, 2015, models the deterioration of track 
maintenance units, of 200m in length, where irregularities in the track can arise between maintenance 
actions [66]. In the model the track quality index, which is the sum of standard deviations of local 
geometry parameters, is used to quantify track irregularity for each section under consideration. When 
the track quality index reaches a specific threshold, the condition is deemed unacceptable. In the paper 
the track is considered in 1km sections, with 5 track maintenance units in each. This allows track 
section level maintenance of either: no global action, planned global action or priority global action 
across the units in the section. A Markov model is used to model to deterioration process between 
inspection actions, where the state at each subsequent time is predicted from the previous state. The 
model assumes exponential track degradation at a gradual rate, however, heterogeneous factors are 
included in the modelling of track irregularity development, including: the structure coefficient (the 
proportion of curve in the section) and gross tonnage. The inclusion of heterogeneous factors results 
in a random and uncertain state change in the Markov model used to predict track irregularities. The 
log-likelihood function is used to estimate the Markov transition probabilities. The method provides 
the condition prediction between maintenance actions. A large base of data is required for this 
method.  
In order to consider hazard states for a railway system with a Markov model, Restel and Zajac, 2015, 
presents a methodology [67]. Several system states are defined including various working states with 
disruptions and traffic, unavailable states including those due to maintenance, accidents or serious 
accidents, and hazard states where the system is in use despite failures. The model was trained with 
synthetic data created from theoretical timetables, expert opinion and operational data. The model 
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outputs show a good agreement when compared to this synthetic data, but the model is not validated 
with a test set of data. The model solely considers state changes based on data available and so does 
not provide a framework for testing underlying contributions to the states within the model. Also, an 
exponential distribution is assumed for state transitions within the model.  
In addition, a Markov model has been demonstrated to give predictions of future track condition, 
given current maintenance strategies. The paper by Prescott and Andrews, 2015, employs a Markov 
model for the track geometry condition, and maintenance, over time [68]. Within this model is the 
possibility for maintenance actions to impact the future degradation of the ballast. In the model it is 
assumed that track geometry is measured over a 1/8
th
 mile track section, with varying maintenance 
actions over time for each track section. The degradation of the track geometry is modelled with 
revealed and unrevealed states in a Markov model module, with an individual module of this type 
created following every maintenance action. Here, the degradation rates used in each repeated module 
depend on the history of maintenance actions for the track section. There are four track geometry 
condition classifications included in the model: a good condition, a critical condition where 
maintenance is required, a condition where speed restrictions are required and a condition where line 
closure is required. Application of the proposed approach results in a set of differential equations 
which are solved numerically using the fourth order Runge-Kutta algorithm. For the application 
presented in the paper, 80 differential equations are generated. The track geometry degradation rates, 
used in the model, are taken from the reciprocal of the time taken to reach each degraded state, and so 
are assumed constant within each state. This may not be the case for aging systems. Different asset 
management strategies are tested in the application given in the paper. These strategies include: the 
level of degradation that triggers track maintenance, the mean time to perform normal maintenance, 
the inspection interval and the renewal period. The model can be extended to consider hazardous 
states by considering the time that the track is in a state where there are unknown speed restrictions, or 
line closures, required. The method results in a large model, especially if complex processes are 
required, due to the repeated structure following each maintenance action. This could lead to 
difficulties with analysis of the resulting model.  
The generalisation of a Markov model application to a network level problem has also been 
demonstrated in the paper by Yang and Frangopol, 2018. A method is provided to rank the 
maintenance priority of bridges, based on the financial risk associated with their structural 
degradation [69]. The method combines a reliability analysis, in the form of a Markov model, with 
consequence modelling for bridge failures. The degradation of the bridges is modelled with a Markov 
chain approach. The transition probabilities for this are determined from historic data, which is 
updated using random field theory to consider the spacial correlation of bridge failures across the 
network. The consequences modelling includes individual bridge cost and incorporates network 
analysis to consider the indirect impact of a bridge failure on the whole system. This indirect network 
level impact includes the extra travel time, extra travel distance and increased travel cost, for all users 
across the network, due to a bridge failure. A Monte Carlo simulation method is used to predict the 
potential consequences of a bridge failure. The bridges in the network are ranked based on their 
financial risk of failure. The method allows the network impact of bridge failure to be considered, 
alongside special correlation of bridge failures due to potential underlying factors such as loading and 
weather impacts. However, the method relies on the accuracy of historic data for reasonable model 
predictions. Also, the impact of different maintenance actions on the network is not modelled. Hence, 
this method does not provide a framework for the optimisation of different asset management 
strategies.  
Markov Models provide an efficient framework for modelling the state of components and associated 
inspection and maintenance strategies. However, the state transitions are usually limited to cases 
where there is a constant failure rate, such that an exponential distribution of their residence times is 
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assumed. In addition, a resulting state is predicted from the previous state only, which can make the 
consideration of underlying dependencies difficult.   
2.2.6: Summary 
This section has given a review of methods applied in literature for modelling risk, or system failure. 
The review is not limited to railway systems. This gives relevant information on the benefits and 
drawbacks of different existing modelling approaches, in order to inform the methodology steps 
applied in the remainder of this thesis.  
There are weaknesses within each of the different methodologies. With the Fault tree approach 
extensions to the traditional method have been proposed to address issues with sequencing of events, 
time dependencies and dependencies between events. However, a constant failure rate is assumed, and 
modelling the maintenance of the system is limited. Markov models also assume a constant failure 
rate, and struggle to model underlying dependencies. Dynamic Event Trees are proposed for 
considering time dependence, event sequencing and component dependencies but these models 
quickly grow in size making analysis difficult. Bayesian Networks can be applied to combine 
independent systems. Finally, Petri nets have flexibility when modelling different failure rates and 
complex asset management strategies. However, larger models can have a large computational cost 
for quantitative analysis if they are solved using Monte Carlo simulation. In addition, uncertainty is 
not included. 
This review informs the choice of methods for the development of the combined modelling approach 
applied in the remainder of this thesis. This is discussed further in Section 3.5 of this thesis, where a 
combined Petri net, Fault Tree and Event Tree approach is proposed. This proposed approach is 
demonstrated with two models across Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. In addition, this section 
informs areas for further research such as the inclusion of uncertainty, addressed in Chapter 6, and 
efficiency of model simulation, addressed in Chapter 7.  
2.3: Asset Management Optimisation  
This section provides a review of the work available in literature for the optimisation of maintenance 
of a system. There are examples in literature of optimisation approaches for asset management 
strategies, with a focus of cost, and examples where the optimisation also considers risk, condition or 
failures within the system. In this section, a review of methods where cost is the focus is given first, 
followed by a review of methods where risk, condition or failures within the system are included with 
cost considerations. 
2.3.1: Optimisation for cost 
The paper by Dekker, 1996, provides a review of early works on maintenance optimisation models 
and outlines a framework for future optimisation methods [70]. The framework suggested involves 
initial identification and definition of the system, followed by modelling of the system to provide a 
range of possible maintenance options to decision makers, alongside a representation of their 
suitability. The onus is then on the decision makers to choose the most appropriate strategy. The paper 
states that generic methods for modelling the system can fall into deterministic and stochastic 
categories. The optimisation frameworks reviewed assume that the objective function of the 
optimisation follows a set of equations that can be solved numerically. This approach may not be 
applicable to complex processes, for instance, systems with incomplete repair or sub-system 
dependencies, due to difficulties in representing the processes in a mathematical equation form. The 
approach also has a heavy reliance on historic data. In addition, decision making processes for 
maintenance optimisation are assumed post-analysis, as opposed to part of an integrated asset 
management decision making tool.  
A qualitative approach to asset management optimisation, with some quantification of system 
degradation, is presented in the paper by Rausand, 1998. The methodology presented in the paper 
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aims to reduce the maintenance cost of a system by focusing maintenance resources on key system 
areas, and by removing any unnecessary maintenance actions [71]. The approach considers a system 
in operation with the aim of reducing personnel injuries, environmental damage, production loss and 
material damage. Data is collected for the system and a distribution modelling the degradation of the 
system is defined. The Weibull distribution is stated as the preferred distribution in most cases. 
Analysis is completed using an FMECA to find the reliability of the system. Various maintenance 
actions are then selected based on their suitability, governed by a set of defined qualitative rules 
detailing their impact on the dominant failure modes found via the FMECA. Maintenance intervals 
are tuned while the system is in operation through a trial and error approach. The approach does not 
tackle complex system level maintenance strategies, such as opportunistic maintenance, and leaves 
much of the decision making to the user, with the rule based selection of different maintenance 
actions. The trial and error approach to maintenance intervals does not allow the testing of different 
strategies prior to implementation of the chosen strategy.  
Optimisation of a system with a stochastic degradation is considered in the paper by Grall, Bérenguer 
and Dieulle, 2002 [72]. However, the models only consider the maintenance and inspection for a 
single unit system with a stochastic degradation governed by a gamma distribution. This degradation 
model is applicable to components in their useful life phase, where the deterioration rate between two 
consecutive times can be assumed constant. Maintenance is assumed to be condition-based such that 
the system is repaired on failure, or when it reaches a critical threshold, identified through inspection. 
The method aims to optimise the critical threshold and the inspection interval of the system in 
question. There are several assumptions made within the methodology: maintenance returns the 
component to the perfect state, inspection always successfully reveals the state and failures are 
immediately detected. However, the method does allow for non-periodic inspection. The system 
running costs are represented by mathematical equations that are minimised through numeric 
integration. This may not be applicable to multi-unit systems or those with complex maintenance and 
inspection processes, or to systems that have complex degradation processes, such as those with 
components operating past the end of their useful life.   
Tabu Search is combined with a Genetic Algorithm in a methodology proposed by Di, Si and Ze, 
2012, which is applied for optimization of a scheduling Petri net [73]. Here, each proposed solution is 
screened via a Tabu Search before inclusion into a Genetic Algorithm. The optimization methodology 
is applied to a simple Petri net to demonstrate the searching capability.  
Simulated Annealing algorithms have also been applied to Petri net models. Zimmerman, Rodriguez 
and Silva, 2001, applied a Simulated Annealing algorithm to optimise a Petri net modelling a 
manufacturing system [74]. The optimisation is applied to maximise the profit by allocating resources 
in an optimal way. A two-phase optimization strategy is also applied in order to decrease the 
computational cost of the optimisation method. Here, the approximate solution is found by 
numerically calculating upper and lower bounds on the throughput of the transitions in the Petri net, 
along with the mean number of tokens in the steady state. This approximation is then used as the basis 
for a more thorough search with a Simulated Annealing algorithm. This two-stage approach saves 
computational time but the approximation method is currently intractable for the complex Petri net 
modelling, with additional extensions, used in this thesis.  
Another application of a Simulated Annealing algorithm is given in the paper by Jain, Swarnkar and 
Tiwari, 2003 [75]. The authors present an optimisation method applied in conjunction with a 
stochastic Petri net model. In the approach, a Simulated Annealing algorithm is applied to optimise 
policies for fabrication. The mean cycle time and tardiness are used as performance measures in a 
scalar objective function for the optimisation. In this paper the Simulated Annealing algorithm and 
Petri net modelling approaches are applied to the problem separately, as opposed to combined in a 
tool to integrate the modelling and scheduling of the system. However, the results of Simulated 
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Annealing algorithm showed good performance in comparison to those gained by rule based 
scheduling.   
2.3.2: Optimisation including risk, condition or failure 
In addition, there are works available on the optimisation of safety risk, reliability or condition of a 
system. Safety risk based optimisation is explored in the paper by Apeland and Aven, 2000, who uses 
a Bayesian and semi-Bayesian approach to classify the risk of a critical component failure [76]. A 
semi-Bayesian approach combines a classical assumption of the existence of a true value with a 
Bayesian representation of model inputs. The method allows uncertainties in the data, used to make 
predictions, to be included in the analysis. This is suggested for situations where a lack of data makes 
a classical approach difficult to implement and potentially inaccurate. In the method the Bayesian, or 
semi-Bayesian, representation of the critical component failure is propagated through a risk analysis 
using a Fault Tree and Event Tree approach. The process is repeated with alternative sets of strategies 
for the critical component, to predict the risk of the system under each different strategy. The method 
allows the decision maker to choose the best strategy based on this analysis. The method incorporates 
uncertainty which can aid in situations where data is rare, and the risk analysis is based on expert 
opinion. However, the method only considers independent strategies for critical components, as 
opposed to system level maintenance strategies or strategy optimisation over multiple components.  
Arunraj and Maiti, 2007, gives a review of risk based maintenance methods that aim to maximise 
availability and efficiency of a system, by controlling the rate of deterioration and minimising the 
total cost of operation [77]. Several risk analysis methodologies are presented including qualitative 
and quantitative methods, with a common difficulty identified across methods in incorporating 
uncertainty. There is no recommendation made as to the most suitable method for risk analysis. The 
risk based maintenance methods reviewed follow a framework whereby the system risk is calculated 
via a risk analysis approach, reverse Fault Tree analysis is completed to back-propagate the risk from 
the system level to each component level and then the component strategy is adjusted to give the 
required risk.  This approach is difficult to implement for complex systems due to the inherent 
flexibility in the back-propagation of risk values that is included in the method. In addition, the 
strategies for each component are treated independently, with no modelling of maintenance strategies 
applied on a system level. The approach requires a reliable risk modelling methodology and the 
correct identification of the system level Fault Trees. In addition, the back propagation of the failure 
probabilities to a component level is open to interpretation of the user. 
The maintenance of series system of non-homogeneous components is optimised by Faddoul, Raphael 
and Chateauneuf, 2018, with the consideration of reliability constraints [78]. In the modelling 
approach, all components must be connected in a linear manner such that any component failure can 
cause a system failure. A Lagrangian relaxation technique is used to split the system into smaller sub-
modules. In the method, the assumption is made that the reliability of the system is equivalent to the 
product of each of the component reliabilities. This allows the logarithm of the system reliability to be 
taken, to express it in terms of the summation of the logarithms of each component reliability. Each 
component is modelled with a Markov chain, with several states for each component. It is assumed 
that there is a dependence between the component state and its reliability, but that no other 
dependencies exist. An objective function is minimised subject to: the cost of the system under a 
given strategy minus the weighted sum of the logarithm of each component reliability under the given 
strategy. In this way, a high failure probability penalises the objective function. The optimal strategy 
given the weightings of each reliability are found through dynamic programming. The optimisation 
allows for a choice between several intervention actions and allows the maintenance to be optimised 
within different time periods of the system. The series system assumption is core to the method as it 
allows the reliability to be expressed explicitly in terms of each component. For safety critical 
systems, components are often in standby and so this method is not directly applicable.  
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Yang, Remenyte-Prescott and Andrews, 2015, [79] use a multi objective Genetic Algorithm, NSGA-
II, to find a maintenance and rehabilitation strategy to minimise cost and maximise road condition 
within a time period. The optimization technique is implemented in both a simple deterministic and 
probabilistic model; 80 different variables were optimized in the application demonstrated in the 
paper.  
The thesis titled, ‘Modelling railway bridge asset management’ by Le, 2014, presents an optimisation 
framework using a Markov and Petri net bridge model [80]. The optimisation of the Petri net model is 
completed based on the results obtained by the optimisation of the Markov model, to reduce the 
search space. Several variables were optimised including: the inspection period, if opportunistic 
maintenance is enabled, the maintenance schedule, intervention options and servicing. In addition to 
this the minor repair, major repair and renewal delay time was included. A Genetic Algorithm is 
applied in this case for optimisation.  
A further approach is given by Yianni, 2017, in the thesis titled ‘A Modelling Approach to Railway 
Bridge Asset Management‘. The work presents an optimisation approach whereby a Genetic 
Algorithm is applied to a Petri net model for railway bridge asset management [81]. A ‘surrogate 
model’ is introduced that is used to find the approximate region of interest followed by a fine tuning 
effect of optimization on the full model. This ‘surrogate model’ is found by converting transitions to a 
single type to speed up simulation via a GPGPU and by simplifying some of the structure in the full 
model, such as removing branching behaviour. This results in different model outputs that are similar 
enough to be used in a 2-level Genetic Algorithm approach. The inspection procedure for the model is 
optimised, where the inspection frequency can have one of 3 values depending on condition.  
Su and De Schutter, 2018, present a method to optimise the maintenance scheduling for a network 
where there is one or more available maintenance teams [82]. The network is split into segment, and 
each segment is assigned a probability distribution to govern condition and a measure of importance, 
for example the number of trains that pass over the section or the total tonnage. The maintenance 
scheduling of the network, given these quantifications of the segments, is optimised. The objective 
function for the optimisation includes a penalty for operating unsafe sections, a penalty associated 
with the loss of use of components that are replaced while still in their useful life, the component 
maintenance cost and maintenance team travel cost. The paper uses an enhanced Genetic Algorithm 
with roulette wheel selection and 200 members in each population. The enhancements of the Genetic 
Algorithm include: an initial population that is uniformly distributed, a variation operator and an 
elitist strategy to ensure that the best solution is not discarded and evolution is always based on the 
best solutions. These enhancements improve the results given by the algorithm. The approach does 
not have the capability to model complex maintenance strategies or inspection frequencies of the 
network sections.  
A Genetic Algorithm to optimise the design of a deluge system subject to system performance 
parameters such as unavailability, lifecycle costs and spurious trip occurrence in work by Andrews 
and Bartlett, 2003 [83]. A Fault Tree model is used to give the system unavailability, which is 
analysed with a Binary Decision Diagram. A House Event is constructed for each possible design 
alternative. The optimisation aims to reduce the unavailability of the system within defined 
constraints. Constraints are placed on the lifecycle cost, cost of system testing, and the cost of 
preventative maintenance or corrective maintenance. If these constraints are violated during the 
optimisation then a penalty is applied. In addition, a spurious trip penalty is included. The 
optimisation of the system design aims to find optimal solutions for the number of each component, 
the choice of component and materials, and the maintenance test interval, and for some components, 
the quantity of preventative maintenance.  An initial example of the method is given in the paper 
‘Optimal safety system performance’ [84]. In this earlier paper, the method is applied to a simple high 
pressure protection system.  
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Accident cost is considered in an approach by Podofillini, Zio and Vatn, 2006 [85]. The paper models 
defects of railway track in two stages. In the first stage the defect becomes detectable and in the 
second state failure occurs due to the defect. A non-homogeneous Markov model is used to predict the 
failure probability of a rail section, with different maintenance and inspection strategies, under the 
assumption of periodic inspection. The model is analysed through numerical integration. A multi-
objective Genetic Algorithm is used to optimise the inspection interval for the track and the time 
delay for maintenance of non-critical detected track defects. The optimisation objective function is 
based on the predicted maintenance and accident costs of the model.  
2.3.3 Summary 
This section has given a review of system optimisation methods available in literature. The first 
examples give methods that consider the cost of the system operation. The second examples include 
the cost with some measure of the system state, such as risk, reliability or accident cost. One of the 
objectives of this thesis is to develop a risk based asset management tool. 
One identified gap in the literature is an applied optimisation process that combines safety risk and 
life-cycle cost for a Petri net based model. Secondly, this project aims to model complex asset 
management strategies. This includes phased asset management strategies, whereby different 
strategies are applied to the system depending on its age. The optimisation of phased strategies has 
been identified as a novel area for research, based on this review. 
This review also informs the choice of methods for application to a phased optimisation problem. 
Across the literature reviewed in the section Genetic Algorithms are demonstrated to show good 
optimisation results where there are numerous parameters to be optimised. They also demonstrate a 
high level of flexibility. The Simulated Annealing algorithm has also been used with some success 
and can be seen as a more efficient search tool where there are fewer parameters to be optimised. 
Based on this review of literature, a combined Simulated Annealing and Genetic Algorithm method is 
proposed for a phased optimisation of the system. This approach is presented in Chapter 6. 
2.4: Modelling Uncertainty  
This section gives a review of methods present in literature for the incorporation of uncertainty in 
model outputs. This review is presented to align with the objectives of the project, whereby an 
estimate of the uncertainty on the risk values output from the model should be explored. 
2.4.1 Modelling Uncertainty Literature Review 
Arunraj, Mandal and Maiti, 2013, consider stochastic uncertainty and subjective uncertainty when 
modelling risk [86]. Stochastic uncertainty is attributed to the random nature of failures. Subjective 
uncertainty is due to factors such as a lack of knowledge, measurement error and subjective 
judgement. The paper proposes a method whereby the likelihoods of failure are represented as fuzzy 
numbers. Monte Carlo analysis is used to generate fuzzy cumulative distribution functions for failure 
probability, using different α-cut values. The DSW algorithm is used to combine these functions with 
fuzzy consequences of failure to give a representation of the risk and the associated uncertainty. The 
method is not applied within a Petri net framework and instead considers the combination of several 
distributions.  
A method to combine Monte Carlo simulation with fuzzy calculus to allow the use of both 
possibilistic and probabilistic measures of uncertainty in the same computation of risk, is proposed by 
Guyonnet et al., 2003 [87]. The method uses a double loop approach with the probabilistic measure 
sampled in the outer loop and the α-cut cuts taken in the inner loop. The smallest and largest risk 
values are assigned to the upper and lower limits, within each iteration. The paper suggests the use of 
a minimisation or maximisation algorithm within the inner loop, when the functions are complex or 
not monotonic, however no algorithm is suggested.  
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There have been several works that have aimed to consider the impact of uncertain input values on the 
output values of a Petri net. Fuzzy Set theory can be used to consider the impact of the uncertainty of 
the input parameters on the final uncertainty presented by the Petri net. An overview of applications 
of Fuzzy Set theory to Petri nets is given by Cardoso, Valette and Dubois, 1996, and Fuzzy logic has 
been applied to estimate the uncertainty by Sadeghi, Fayek and Pedrycz, 2010[88] [89]. 
In an attempt to address issues when applying Event Tree analysis with limited quantitative data, the 
paper by Kenarangui, 1991, proposes a method to represent qualitative possibilities within an Event 
Tree with a fuzzy set [90]. In the proposed method, assigned fuzzy possibilities are propagated 
through the Event Tree to give fuzzy possibilities of each outcome. The fuzzy sets are defined based 
on a choice of qualitative categories, for example, the probability of a component failure may be 
ranked as high, medium or low. The consequences of each outcome, in the Event Tree, can also be 
estimated to give fuzzy sets for the risk of each outcome, which can be combined to give the risk of 
the initiating event under consideration. The fuzzy risk predictions for each outcome can be ranked 
using a maximising set. The method presented in this paper allows detailed Event Tree analysis and 
risk ranking in situations where there is limited data available for quantitative analysis through 
traditional quantitative methods. This is particularly applicable in cases where the analysis is based on 
expert opinion. There is reliance on the user to quantify the ranges assigned to each qualitative 
category and on the definition of each fuzzy set. This framework incorporates a representation of 
uncertainty in the knowledge used to analyse the Event Tree and does not assume the fixed values 
required for traditional quantitative Event Tree analysis. 
Furthermore, Baraldi and Zio, 2008, present an attempt to combine possibilistic uncertainty measures, 
such as those presented in fuzzy set theory, and probabilistic measures of uncertainty, that may co-
exist within the set of input parameters of Event Tree model [91]. Probabilistic representations are 
suggested for cases where there is sufficient data to create a probability density function, to represent 
the probability of each event, such as events considering component failures. Possibilistic 
representations, incorporating a fuzzy set method, are suggested for cases where there is scarce 
quantitative data available and estimations are based on expert opinion, such as in cases where events 
are rare or due to human errors. The method uses a Monte Carlo simulation and the extension 
principle of fuzzy set theory for analysis of the Event Tree. Here, a sample from the probabilistic 
representation is taken, alpha-cuts are used to select from the possibility distributions and these are 
combined through fuzzy interval analysis. This process is repeated for each alpha cut, before returning 
to the first step and repeating for a new sample from the probabilistic representation, hence, forming a 
double loop. The process returns a probability weighted average of the possibility measures associated 
with each fuzzy output interval. The process allows the likelihood of an Event Tree output value 
passing a certain threshold to be calculated. However, there is some difficulty in accurately estimating 
the confidence intervals of the Event Tree outputs. In addition, the method relies on a double loop 
analysis which could be computationally expensive for a large Event Tree. In this method, it is 
assumed that there is an independence between events represented by probabilistic measures. It is also 
assumed that the possibilistic representations all have the same confidence level, representing a strong 
dependence between information sources for these variables.  
2.4.2: Summary 
This review has presented methods in literature for modelling the uncertainty on a Petri net model 
output, or an Event Tree model output. A review of these specific methods has been completed 
because these methods are the ones implemented in this research. The Fault Tree method is also used 
in this thesis; however this is in the capacity of informing the logic of the system as an initial step, as 
opposed to modelling the system risk. 
The modelling of the systems in this thesis is largely completed within a Petri net framework. For 
considering uncertain model inputs, this results in a looping behaviour sampling different values for 
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the model inputs, in order to estimate the uncertainty on the outputs. One gap identified by this review 
is the use of a suitable algorithm to improve the efficiency of this approach, for complex systems. 
This informs the research, presented in Chapter 6, where a novel approach for approximating 
uncertainty on model outputs is proposed. Here, a Simulated Annealing algorithm is implemented to 
approximate the uncertainty on model outputs due to Monte Carlo simulation of the model, and due to 
uncertain model inputs. 
2.5 Model Reduction 
This section gives a review of methods for reducing Petri net model complexity, in order to improve 
the efficiency of simulating a large model structure. The challenge of computational efficiency for 
model simulation was identified in Section 2.2.4 of this literature review. This review of model 
reduction is included here as it informs the work presented in Chapter 7 of this thesis, where an 
approach is proposed for the reduction of model size. 
2.5.1 Model Reduction Literature Review 
There have been a number of studies into the reduction of Petri net complexity. The methods 
presented in literature tend to define a set of rules to reduce specific sub-structures commonly found 
in Petri nets. Table 2.1 gives a summary of examples of alternative methodologies for the reduction of 
Petri net complexity. In the examples in this table several approaches have been used which fall into 
the following categories:  
 
1) Comparison between Petri nets (or Petri nets and sequences) based on a sequence of events. 
These sequences of events are generated by the firing occurrence of highlighted transitions. 
2) Comparison of signal outputs of Petri net structure with data signals, and using this to 
approximate parameters in the Petri net.  
3) Folding of Petri nets whereby limited rules are specified for the stepwise reduction of Petri 
nets.  
4) Replacement of self-contained sections within a Petri net to reduce the model size.  
5) Decomposition of Petri nets by splitting the Petri net into sub-Petri nets and then reducing, if 
possible, following set rules.  
Notably the paper "To aggregate or to eliminate? Optimal model simplification for improved process 
performance prediction" gives a methodology whereby the reduced structure of the Petri net is 
selected via an optimization algorithm, that considers the error of each reduction and the improved 
computational cost [92]. Specific reduction rules, known as foldings, are developed and the time for 
the transitions replacing these foldings is pre-assigned. This approach has the benefit of automatically 
producing the structure of the reduced Petri net while defining the parameters governing the transition 
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Petri net with 
an event 
sequence. 
Presents a method for 
obtaining the time 
parameters for two 
normal transitions in 
conflict to match a pre-
known event sequence. 
The optimization 
algorithm shows good 
convergence for 
simple event 
sequences.   
Assumes a normal 
distribution for the 
distributions, limited 
application due to the need 
for an event sequence. A 
large event sequence leads 
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A set of rules are given 
whereby the Petri net 
can be reduced by 
grouping transitions 
together.  
Allows for the easy 
reduction of some 
Petri nets as the 
reduced firing times 
are already defined. 
There are limited 
applications due to the 
assumptions required, the 
method also does not 
quantify the error 
introduced through the 
reduction and the method 
is less reliable when 
applied to large Petri nets.  
[96][97] 
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specified rules.  
A set of rules are given 
for the reduction of the 
Petri net by grouping 
transitions, an error and 
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improvement is assigned 
to each reduction and 
these are optimised. 
Provides a method for 
automatically 
reducing the structure 
of Petri net. A 
measure of the error 
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given.  
Times for the transitions 
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given empirically so may 
not reproduce the best 
result for the new 
structure. Petri nets can 
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Uses a semi-Markov 
method to reduce a 
section of a Petri net.  
Presents a method for 
reducing the size of 
the Petri net. 
This method relies on 
exponential transition 
firing times. There is no 
description on how to 
assign firing times or the 
increase in performance.  
[98] 
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The Petri net is split into 
sub-nets. These are 
either reduced and 
solved in isolation or 
reduced and recombined 
before solving.  
The splitting of the 
Petri nets leads to a 
faster solution, also if 
the sub-nets are 
recombined their 
parameters can be 
tuned.  
The manual reduction of 
the sub-net structure is 
limited to established 
rules. There can be large 
dependencies between 
sub-nets resulting in a 
poor approximation due to 








This review has presented methods that have been implemented in literature to reduce Petri net model 
structure, and hence improve the efficiency of simulating large models, as outlined as an objective of 
this project.  
There are gaps present in the research surrounding this topic for cases where reduction is required but 
there are not specific sub-structures present in the Petri net. This is because reduction methods are 
commonly rule based. Alternative approaches suggest splitting the model into independent sub-
structures. However, this removes any modelling of existing dependencies.   
This review informs the research direction of this thesis by highlighting an area for further research, 
namely the development of a reduction method that is flexible for different model structures and 
governing distributions. The novel approach proposed in Chapter 7 defines the structure of the 
reduced Petri net and allows the parameters governing the transitions within it to be automatically 
discovered. This approach has been chosen as it does not limit the reduction of the Petri net to specific 
structure rules or distributions governing the transition delay times.  
 
2.6: Specific System Modelling Reviews 
As discussed in Section 1.6 of this thesis, two systems are used for novel model development, and 
demonstration of the methodology proposed in Section 3.5 of this thesis. The first model is applied to 
a railway S&C and the second model is applied to an underground fire protection system. This section 
provides a review of current modelling approaches and research for these systems, to highlight areas 
where the specific models developed in this thesis can make improvements on the state of the art for 
each system. 
2.6.1: S&C Review  
Liu, Saat and Barkan, 2012, perform a review of the major causes of train derailment from safety data 
available in the Track Safety Data Base [101]. Derailments were found to be the most common type 
of accident, of which derailments over S&C were a contributing factor. Also, an interaction was 
identified between derailment speed, and the frequency and consequences of the derailment. The 
paper recommends the development of an integrated framework to optimize cost and minimize risk. 
Dindar and Kaewunruen, 2018, looked in more detail at immediate, casual and contributory factors to 
derailment at an S&C [102]. The study identifies several causes of derailments at S&C, these include 
infrastructure failures, interaction failures such as obstruction and flange climb, environmental 
factors, operational factors, malicious action and human causes such as over speeding and vandalism. 
Data was taken from the Rail Accident Investigation Branch data source. The data indicates that if 
there is a larger number of trains, or trains are traveling at a higher speed, then there can be a higher 
level of derailment occurrence and a greater severity of consequences. Derailments were the most 
common train accident type in the UK, with an S&C infrastructure failure contributing most to 
observed derailments, causing 39% of all derailments for the period of 2006-2016 in the UK. Of the 
S&C infrastructure failures, 56% were attributed to switch defects, 17% were attributed to stretcher 
bar failure, 11% were attributed to geometry failures, 11% were attributed to broken rails and 6% 
were attributed to poor ballast condition.  
Contributory and casual factors were also analysed. Of the derailments, 20% were deemed to have 
had inadequate maintenance, or inspection, to the level where it was classified as a contributory factor 
and 32.6% had maintenance deficiencies to the level of classification as a casual factor. Casual factors 
are defined as an omission that if corrected would prevent the fatality, for example, false inspection. 
Contributory factors are defined as a behaviour that sets the stage for an accident, for example, poor 
maintenance culture.   
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For S&C, maintenance action priority is ranked in work by Ishak, Dindar and Kaewunruen, 2016, 
based on the operational risk of each associated failure mode [103]. In addition, the paper states that 
dynamic wheel-rail interaction and imperfect contact can cause detrimental impact loads, leading to a 
higher rate of deterioration. The paper also states that S&C derailments contribute to almost half of 
the track system failure fatalities and weighted injuries in the UK, for the years 2009-2014. The study 
introduces a risk-based maintenance approach to assess the rail degradation process. Factors 
influencing the degradation process were identified. Following this, hazard identification, 
consequence prediction, likelihood estimation, risk assessment, risk acceptance, residual risk 
monitoring, maintenance planning and recovery and contingency planning were carried out. There 
were several approaches used for these tasks, including: Event Tree analysis, Fault Tree analysis, 
reverse fault analysis, expert opinion and uncertainty analysis. A summary of the methods used can be 
found in the paper. The operational risk of each failure mode and the safety risk of each failure mode 
was given a ranking. Maintenance priority was assigned based on these rankings in a qualitative 
manner.  
Zwanenburg, 2007, considered both the maintenance of S&C and conditions that can lead to a 
derailment [104]. The paper states that on plain track, a wheel can pass over a broken rail and not 
necessarily lead to a derailment, however, a broken switch rail will lead to a direct derailment. The 
study also suggests that degradation of S&C components depends on many properties. These include 
train properties such as: axle loads, train speed, total load and train condition. Additionally, track 
properties contribute to degradation. Track properties include: condition of the sub-base, materials 
used, quality of installation, track geometry and track condition. It is expected that track material and 
track geometry interact, with one in a poor condition likely to lead to the faster degradation of the 
other.  
The paper also states that components are frequently replaced prior to reaching the end of their useful 
life. This is attributed to over-cautious inspection, timetabling restrictions and equipment or personal 
availability. Financial losses can be made through this early replacement. The most commonly 
replaced individual components identified in the study are the switch rails, crossing nose, check rails, 
intermediate rails, sleepers and ballast. Identified maintenance processes for the S&C include 
welding, along with rail grinding and tamping.  
The thesis ‘Failure analysis of railway switches and crossings for the purpose of preventive 
maintenance’, by Hassankiadeh, 2011, collated the total number of failed S&C components in 2009 in 
the UK [105]. Switch rails accounted for 45% of the failed components and slide chairs accounted for 
30% of the failed components. Ballast, Schiwag Roller, Stretcher bars and Stock rails made up 20.9% 
of failed components together. Crossing, Fishplate, Back drive, Sleepers and Spacer Blocks 
comprised less than 4% of failed components combined.  
The circumstances of the failure modes of the S&C were also collated in the thesis. Obstructed switch 
corresponded to 40% of failures, dry chairs contributed to 17% of failures, cracks and breaks 
contributed to 9% of failures and poor ballast condition contributed to 7% of failures. Contamination, 
plastic deformation and adjustment each contributed to 5% of the failures, followed by wear and 
missing fastenings which each contributed to 3% of the failures. The thesis highlighted the impact of 
weather on S&C failure, with more failures observed in autumn and winter.  
An FMEA was carried out to rank S&C failure causes by a risk priority number. The ranking resulted 
in the following in descending order of priority: switch obstruction, dry chairs, cracks and breaks, 
voiding ballast, adjustment, contamination (leaves), plastic deformation, wear, missing nuts, squat and 
rolling contact fatigue, creep, track gauge variation and finally wet bed. Depending on the risk priority 
number the components can be grouped with the suggestion of higher priority given to preventative 
maintenance of the most critical components. This research was qualitative but based on some 
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quantitative evidence. There are no numeric methods presented for testing different maintenance or 
inspection options.  
Further analysis of weather conditions on the failure of S&C is given in the paper by Dindar, 
Kaewunruen, An and Gigante-Barrera, 2017, which provides a high level Fault Tree for the 
derailment of a train at an S&C [106].  
This literature review has highlighted the importance of considering S&C derailments and some of the 
issues surrounding the efficient management of the S&C assets. In the current literature, there are 
limited tools for the modelling of S&C asset management strategies, especially with the aim of 
considering their impact on derailment.  
2.6.2: Fire Protection System Literature Review 
The article entitled ‘Tunnel safety, risk assessment and decision making’ gives a summary of a project 
commissioned by the European Parliament on the assessment of tunnel fire safety on rail and road 
tunnels [107]. Recommendations are made, including the development and use of acceptable models 
that can aid tunnel fire safety design.  
There are several approaches to fire safety assessment, proposed in literature, for underground stations 
or tunnels. Roh, Ryou, Park and Jang, 2009, combine fire simulation with evacuation simulation to 
assess the impact of platform screen doors on passenger safety, on an underground station [108]. The 
simulations detailed in the paper show that the time required for evacuation of the particular 
underground station under consideration, with platform screen doors, is approximately 6 minutes. 
This kind of analysis could be applied as part of the risk assessment of a specific station. In addition, 
the paper concludes that there is an improvement in ventilation with the addition of platform screen 
doors.  
A conference paper by Taranda and King, 2009, discusses the use of passive fire protection methods 
in rail and road tunnels [109]. These passive fire protection methods include panels and coatings that 
can be applied to the tunnel, to reduce the structural damage if a fire should occur. The paper also 
recommends the use of water deluge systems in tunnels to control the spread of fire. The paper 
recommends a cost-benefit analysis backed up by quantitative risk assessment, to inform decisions on 
the use of active or passive fire suppression systems, however, no method for this is provided.  
An Event Tree is proposed by Poon and Lau, 2007, to consider the risk posed by underground station 
and tunnel fires [110]. The paper states that a combination of sprinkler systems, hydrants, and water 
mist suppression systems are used in stations. From the Event Tree, critical chains of events are 
identified. A sensitivity analysis is carried out on the event parameters to test their impact on the end 
outcome. It is assumed that stations are fitted with suppression systems that are successful between 
50% and 90% of the time, but tunnels are not fitted with active suppression systems.  The analysis 
indicates that fires occurring in tunnel sections are more likely to lead to higher numbers of fatalities. 
A sensitivity analysis of 12 tunnel designs is presented. The design variable with the highest impact 
on human safety is found to be the lack of active suppression systems in tunnels. However, there is a 
lack of information about the source of the data, or estimates, used for quantitative analysis of each 
event or design. 
Howarth, Kara-Zaitri and Chakib, 1999, present a scoring metric that is used to compare fire safety in 
a variety of passenger terminals, where a passenger terminal is designated as a building with two or 
more linked transport systems and facilities such as retail outlets [111]. These terminals included 
those with sub-surface stations. The metric introduced in the paper includes a representation of fire 
safety management, fire risk and passenger density. Here, fire safety management and fire risk are 
scored based on the analyst’s opinion. A high-level review of the regulations in place reveals that 
there are more stringent guidelines for underground stations than the other passenger terminals 
considered in the paper. There are limited recommendations to improve fire safety management such 
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as, reducing passenger density or improving fire management systems. The method provides a tool for 
the assessment of compliance with guidelines, but, there are few practical recommendations made in 
the paper for the improvement of the systems used to manage fire safety.  
The conference paper by Pan, Lo, Liao and Cong, 2001, describes a test carried out on an 
underground station platform to assess the effectiveness of water mist systems [112]. It was found that 
the water mist system can reduce the consequences of fire by reducing temperature, smoke levels, 
carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide concentrations. 
It may also be relevant to consider research which has addressed the failure of fire protection systems 
in settings outside of underground stations, or tunnel environments. The paper by Andrews and 
Bartlett, 2003, uses a Genetic Algorithm to find the optimal design of a fire water deluge system for 
an offshore platform [83]. Constraints are applied that limit the system design and maintenance 
actions according to financial cost. This includes the initial cost of each component and the cost of 
inspecting and maintaining the component. The cost of a false activation of the system is also 
included. A Genetic Algorithm is used to optimize the design, with respect to the unavailability plus 
an imposed penalty if the constraints are violated. The unavailability of the system is found via Fault 
Tree analysis, as is the false activation occurrence. A Fault Tree, using a house event to model design 
alternatives, is constructed and then converted to a Binary Decision Diagram for incorporation into 
the Genetic Algorithm. 
A review of information and models available to study sprinkler system performance is given by 
Frank, Gravestock, Spearpoint and Fleischmann, 2013 [113]. Two approaches to model sprinkler 
effectiveness are discussed, the first focusing on component-based information and the second based 
on fire incident data. Comparisons are made between both modelling approaches. The majority of 
failures reported at a system level were due to the system being falsely shut off, which was deemed 
difficult to incorporate into modelling approaches at the component level. Current component models 
were also binary, with components only residing in the working or failed state, and with no 
dependencies between component states. In addition, due to the rare nature of fires, system-based 
studies were difficult to apply to specific systems in any detail. The paper highlights that historically 
there has been a lack of information or research into the reliability of fire suppression systems, and 
there is also a lack of data available. Previous methods for analysing fire risk include Event Tree 
analysis. However, it is difficult to determine the probabilities used for each event and how the 
probability should be modified based on changes to the system. Within this review, it is proposed that 
sprinkler performance may depend on: the sprinkler system design, age, deterioration, inspection, 
testing, maintenance and water supply, along with the building design and ventilation. The review 
does not consider the potential for sprinkler systems to fail when there is no fire present, leading to 
surplus activation.  
The paper by Boyd and Locurto, 1986, uses a reliability block diagram to model a fire protection 
system for a high-rise building [114]. Reliability issues are discussed including the lack of redundancy 
in the system design. Namely, a water supply failure, a water pressure sensor failure, a power switch 
failure or a pump failure, resulting in a system failure. It is suggested that the introduction of 
component redundancies within the system structure can improve the reliability, for instance the 
addition of a back-up pump. It is also highlighted that the addition of redundancies to the system 
should be considered carefully to avoid common cause failures. The paper looks at the system that 
supplies electric power to the pump. This includes the diesel generator, circuit breaker, automatic 
transfer switch and utility line. A Fault Tree is created for this system and from this, the reliability of 
the system is calculated. There are weaknesses in this approach, including those of assumed 
independence between failures and constant component failure rates. The paper suggests the use of 
FMECA or Quality Assurance to test the impact of inspection, maintenance and testing on the failure 
rate of the components.  
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This literature review highlights the need for methods to assess the safety of underground stations 
with respect to a fire hazard, and to look for areas of improvement where fire protection systems can 
be used to reduce the risk of fatalities. There are deficiencies in the models present in literature, when 
concerning complex maintenance strategies, non-constant failure rates, dependencies between 
component failures and phased maintenance strategies.  
2.6.3 Summary 
This review has given examples of approaches available in literature for modelling the systems 
chosen for application in this thesis. These systems are railway S&C and underground fire protection 
systems. This is relevant to the thesis topic as it provides the background for the developed models 
and highlights areas where the developed models can improve on the state of the art. The S&C model 
is presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis. The fire protection system model is presented in Chapter 5 of 
this thesis. 
This review has highlighted that for S&C modelling there is scope to develop models that consider the 
derailment at an S&C, and how the management of the S&C can contribute to this. The review also 
further justifies the selection of the S&C as an application due to the expected derailment should the 
S&C fail. This informs the research direction for the model presented in Chapter 4, by demonstrating 
areas for further research. These areas involve detailed modelling of the S&C condition, along with 
the contribution of casual and contributory factors, such as insufficient maintenance, failed inspection 
or unsuccessful maintenance such that the component is not returned to the ‘as good as new’ state. 
This review has also highlighted the limited body of literature surrounding modelling of fire 
protection system condition. This is especially the case when attempting to model complex 
maintenance strategies, non-constant failure rates, dependencies between component failures and 
phased maintenance strategies. This informs the development of the model presented in Chapter 5, for 
the assessment of fire protection systems, which addresses these deficiencies to predict the system 
unavailability over time. Chapter 6 develops this model further to predict and optimise safety risk of 
the system. 
2.7 Discussion 
To fulfil the aim of this project a method should be developed that can model complex systems with a 
variety of degradation and asset management processes. The approach should be able to model multi-
component systems, where there is inbuilt redundancy in the system. The method must also have the 
potential for incorporation into a risk-based asset management optimisation tool. This is likely to be 
simulation based due to the complex nature of the system, and hence the computational efficiency of 
the approach must be considered. In addition, consideration of uncertainty on predictions from the 
model should be explored. The review within this chapter has considered works in industry and 
literature surrounding these topics. 
This review of literature has identified areas where further study can be completed. The method 
currently used in the UK underground and over ground railway industry has several areas of 
weakness, namely modelling non-constant failure rates, complex asset management strategies and 
uncertainty. Various methods have been reviewed for their suitability, with a Petri net approach 
selected for the modelling of the system condition and asset management. One identified gap in the 
literature is an applied optimisation process that combines safety risk and life-cycle cost for a Petri net 
based model. This is especially the case for complex asset management strategies, such as phased 
strategies, whereby different strategies are applied to the system depending on its age. Another area 
where further study can be completed is in the consideration of uncertain model inputs, and their 
impact on model outputs. Finally, for development of a Petri net based approach, there are gaps in 
literature for a flexible model reduction approach, in order to improve model simulation efficiency. 
These areas are identified in this review for further research, within this project. 
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In addition, the modelling available in literature for S&C and underground fire protection systems was 
presented. This review has highlighted gaps in S&C modelling surrounding the impact of factors such 
as imperfect maintenance or failed inspection on S&C condition, system state and derailment 
occurrence. This review has also highlighted the limited body of literature surrounding modelling of 
fire protection system condition. This is especially the case when attempting to model complex 
maintenance strategies, non-constant failure rates, dependencies between component failures and 
phased maintenance strategies. This part of the review has informed the modelling direction for the 
specific system models developed in this project. 
The research presented in this chapter has also informed the choice of any existing methodologies for 
use in this project. The combined risk modelling approach proposed in this thesis should have several 
stages. The first stage of the methodology should develop the failure logic of the system to the 
component level. The second stage of the methodology should model the component condition and 
system level asset management strategies and give resulting system level metrics. The third stage of 
the methodology should take these system level metrics and provide a risk measure for the system, in 
terms of the predicted number of fatalities. As a result of this literature review, the following methods 
are suggested for use in development of a risk modelling methodology within this thesis: 
 A Fault Tree approach is proposed to give system level failure logic in terms of component or 
sub-system level failure. This choice of approach can improve integration with current risk 
modelling methodologies in industry. The method can also be used to gain system metrics 
from component level failure, in a computationally efficient manner. The Fault Tree method 
is also chosen as an initial step to gain the system logic as it allows the user to easily explore 
combinations of events that can cause a system failure. 
 A Petri net approach is suggested to model the component or sub-system state and failure, 
with component or system level asset management strategies included. This choice of 
approach gives a high level of flexibility and can model complex degradation and 
maintenance processes. The approach can also be used to gain system level logic. The Petri 
Net method is selected because it can be applied to systems with complex inspection and 
maintenance strategies and is flexible at modelling component failure rates. This allows 
different failure rates to be modelled for a component, including failure rates that change with 
increased maintenance actions.  
 Monte Carlo simulation is suggested for numerical analysis of Petri Net models. Monte Carlo 
simulation is selected because it converges to the true solution and can be used where an 
exact analytical solution cannot be found, due to a complex model structure. The error 
associated with the convergence of the model can also be analysed, so that a sufficient 
number of runs are completed such that the final solution closely approximates the true 
solution. 
 An Event Tree approach is suggested to gain risk estimates, in terms of the predicted number 
of fatalities, from the system metrics output from the Petri net model. Again, this gives an 
efficient method that can improve integration into current risk modelling methodologies in 
industry. Event Tree analysis is chosen since it is a clear graphical method to combine event 
frequency, with the probability of failure of enabling event and consequence analysis in order 
to predict risk. 
The existing methods, detailed here, are combined to give a stepwise modelling approach that can be 
found in Section 3.5 of this thesis. Finally, a combined Genetic Algorithm and Simulated Annealing 
approach is suggested for the optimisation of a system. This is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
41 
 
Methods such as Bayesian Networks and Dynamic Event Trees could be valid alternatives to the 
Event Tree stage of the proposed methodology. However, since these approaches also come at a 
higher computational cost, integration with an optimisation approach could be intractable. Further 
study can be completed in this area but is outside the scope of this thesis.  
2.8 Conclusion 
The first part of this literature review has considered the risk modelling methodologies implemented 
in the UK railway industry. Several limitations of the method were identified. These limitations 
include: a lack of the modelling of ageing components with non-constant failure rates, modelling 
complex maintenance and inspection strategies, dependencies between failures and considering 
uncertainty in the values predicted by the models. There are also challenges faced in modelling risk 
across the railway network in a whole network model, due to the size and complexity of the network. 
The second part of this chapter has reviewed risk modelling and asset management methodologies 
proposed in literature. Several methods have been reviewed including: Fault Trees, Event Trees, Petri 
nets, Markov models and Bayesian Networks. These methods were reviewed considering their 
application to complex ageing systems. This review informs the choice of methods for further 
development in this project and identifies areas of weakness with them. Notably, within a Petri net 
framework, areas that consider the uncertainty of the model predictions and the computational 
efficiency of simulating the model were highlighted as areas for further exploration. 
In the third part of this chapter works available in literature for system optimisation are presented. 
This section informs the choice of optimisation methods for combination in Chapter 6, namely 
Genetic Algorithms and Simulated Annealing algorithms. This section also highlights where further 
study can be completed in this area, this includes the optimisation of a system level phased asset 
management strategy.  
The fourth part of this chapter addresses the inclusion of uncertainty in model outputs, given 
uncertainty in model inputs. This review section highlights areas for further study, including the 
exploration of an algorithm to improve the costly analysis of varying model inputs. The fifth part of 
this chapter explores methods for model reduction, to address costly simulation times. This review 
section justifies exploration of a flexible approach to Petri net model reduction, which is not reliant on 
specific sub structures within the model and can handle different distributions governing firing times. 
The final review in this chapter gives work available in literature for S&C and fire protection systems. 
This review highlights where new models can be developed to improve current modelling application. 
The review also further justifies the choice of model application in this project.  
Following the review of literature presented in this chapter the following chapters address the areas 
identified for further study, in the risk and hazard modelling field, where improvements can be made: 
 Chapter 3 gives a proposed methodology that can be applied in industry and allows: 
modelling of non-constant failure rates, complex maintenance and inspection strategies and 
dependencies between failures. This is given in Section 3.5 of the chapter. Prior to this, an 
introduction to the existing methodologies, that are implemented in the proposed approach, is 
presented in the early parts of the chapter. 
 Chapter 4 gives a new model for a railway S&C. This model predicts derailment frequency 
and includes modelling of failed inspection, imperfect maintenance and opportunistic 
maintenance strategies. The model also predicts the overall state of the S&C, and includes 
any dependencies between this state and derailment occurrence. The model also outputs the 
number of times each maintenance action is completed.  
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 Chapter 5 gives a new model for a fire protection system. This includes modelling an 
interlinked deluge, detection and alarm system and the human interaction with the system. A 
phased asset management strategy is modelled here.  
 Chapter 6 further expands the model in Chapter 5 to give a time-dependent risk estimate for 
the system and a life-cycle cost for the system. An optimisation method is proposed for a 
phased asset management strategy and this is applied to the model. Chapter 6 also presents a 
study into the convergence rate of the model and a novel method for estimating model output 
uncertainty given uncertain inputs. 
 Chapter 7 presents a novel Petri net reduction method. The method is flexible for application 
to different model structures and governing distributions. The method is explored with four 
applications. The first two are simple examples to demonstrate the methodology. The third 
example includes the method within a two-stage optimisation procedure. The final example 
explores the use of the method in more depth, including the use of the method to justify 




Chapter 3 Proposed Methodology 
Firstly, this chapter gives an overview of any existing methods that are applied in this thesis. This is 
intended as an aid to the reader. The methodologies for Fault Tree analysis, Event Tree analysis, 
Monte Carlo Simulation and Petri nets are presented. A discussion of each method is given at the end 
of the relevant section. Section 3.5 gives the methodology proposed in this thesis for risk and hazard 
modelling, which is implemented and expanded further in the remaining chapters of this thesis. 
This chapter also gives a description of the software developed as part of this project, including any 
additions that were included in order to improve the computational efficiency of the software. This is 
included in Section 3.6 of this chapter. 
3.1: Fault Tree analysis  
Fault Tree analysis is used to determine system level logic and to provide justification for the risk 
models developed[115][116]. A Fault Tree is a deductive approach to risk assessment where a 
catastrophic event or failure, known as a top event, is the starting point. A top down analysis is used 
to break down the causes of the top event into various deeper intermediate events using Boolean 
operators [117]. This analysis stops when the limit of resolution is reached. The events at this point 
are classed as basic events.  
3.1.1: Fault Tree symbols 
A Fault Tree is constructed of a set of gates connected to events. An event below the gate is known as 
an input event and the event above the gate is known as the output event. The gates show the 
relationship between input events to cause an output event. There are several gates types that can be 
used in Fault Tree analysis, Figure 3.1 illustrates an OR gate and an AND gate and Table 3.1 gives 
further gate examples and an explanation of the logic they represent. 
An AnD gate requires all the input events to occur for the corresponding output event to occur. An 
OR gate requires at least one of the input events to occur in order for the output event to occur.  
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Name Symbol Explanation 
Inhibit Gate  The output only occurs if the input occurs and a conditional event 




 The output occurs if any of the input events occur but not if more 




 The output event occurs only if all of the input events occur in order 
from left to right 
Voting Gate  
 
If there are n input events to the gate, k of them must occur in order 
for the output event to occur.  
Table 3.1: Example gates for Fault Tree analysis 
Different symbols can also be introduced for different types of event within a Fault Tree. Table 3.2 
gives these symbols.   




 An event that will be broken down further into either 
intermediate events or basic events. 
Basic Events   
 
An event that is considered a root cause within the scope of 
the model. 
Undeveloped Event   An event that is not developed further but is not a basic 
event. It may be that there is no more information available.   
Conditional Event   
 
Used with an inhibit gate to give a condition. 
House Event  
 
An event that is considered either to be TRUE of FALSE. 
 
Transfer Symbol  
 
Used when the fault tree is large and the linked section is 
developed elsewhere.  




3.1.2: Qualitative analysis of Fault Trees 
Qualitative analysis of the Fault Tree can be carried out to identify minimal cut sets. A cut set is a 
collection of basic events that, if they occur, will lead to failure of the system. A minimal cut set is a 
cut set that contains the smallest number of basic events such that if they occur then the Top Event 
will occur. A top-down or bottom-up approach can be used to find the minimal cut sets. Both methods 
require the idempotence, distributive and absorption laws of Boolean algebra to reduce the 
expressions generated. These laws are described below for basic events     and   [118]. 
Idempotence Law: 
                (3.1) 
                (3.2) 
Distributive Law: 
                          (3.3) 
                          (3.4) 
Absorption Law: 
                                     (3.5) 
Where   represents conjunction and  , represents disjunction.  
In the top-down approach, the starting point is the top event. Each intermediate event at each level is 
then substituted into the expression using the logic described by the relevant gate until the expression 
for the top event contains only basic events. This expression is then reduced to the minimal sum-of-
products or disjunctive normal form to give the combinations of minimal cut sets that cause the top 
event. In the bottom-up approach, basic events are combined using the Fault Tree logic and 
substituted into increasingly higher-level intermediate events, which are, in turn, combined using the 
Fault Tree logic until the Top Event is reached. Again, the expression is reduced to give minimal cut 
sets.  
For large Fault Trees, computer programs can be used to generate the minimal cut sets. However, the 
number of minimal cut sets can increase exponentially with the number of gates [45]. Approximations 
can be made which disregard higher order cut sets. Here, minimal cut sets containing a number of 
events, above a certain threshold, are discarded as they are assumed to have a low likelihood of 
occurrence. An approximation such as this reduces the computational cost of analysis of large Fault 
Trees. However, this can influence the accuracy of the results gained from the Fault Tree, especially if 
there are undetected common cause failures for the basic events in the discarded minimal cut sets.  
3.1.3: Quantifying Basic Events 
In order to quantitatively analyse the Fault Tree, probabilities can be assigned to the basic events. This 
section gives methods for describing the performance of a component in terms of availability and 
reliability. Here, it is assumed that there are only two states for each component; it is either in a failed 
state or a working state. 
The availability of a component has several different interpretations: 
1) For components in standby the availability is the probability that the component works on 
demand. For instance, the availability of a back-up generator is the probability that it works 
when the main generator fails. Normally this sort of component fails in an unrevealed way, 
and hence, requires inspection to identify any potential failures.  
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2) For continuously operating component with revealed failures, the availability at a time is the 
probability that the component works at that time.  
3) Where the productivity of a component over a period is required, the availability can be 
interpreted as the fraction of total time that a component can perform its required function.  
Reliability is the measure of the probability of non-occurrence of a failure in a component or system 
over a defined interval. It is a useful measure when failure cannot be tolerated in a system such as in 
safety critical systems. The unreliability is the probability that the component will fail within an 
interval.  
Equation 3.6 denotes the unreliability, which is the probability that a component has failed in the 
interval [0,t]: 




           (3.6) 
Different distributions for      can be substituted into this Equation to fit the data available.  
For a constant failure rate,        where   is constant and independent of time. Substituting into 
Equation 3.6 gives the commonly used exponential distribution for unreliability. Equation 3.7 gives 
this distribution. 
                    (3.7) 
For a repairable component with failures that are revealed and for constant failure rate,  , and repair 
rate,  , Equation 3.8 gives the unavailability.  
     
 
   
                     (3.8) 
For a repairable component, with unrevealed failures and a constant failure rate,  , that is inspected 
periodically with a defined time interval,  , Equation 3.9 gives the average unavailability.  
      
 
  
                (3.9) 
3.1.4: Quantitative analysis of Fault Trees 
The Fault Tree can be analysed quantitatively to give a numerical value for the Top Event probability. 
The basic events must be independent for this analysis.  
If there are no repeated events in the Fault Tree, then the top event probability can be calculated by 
propagating the probabilities of the basic events in the Fault Tree and combining the probabilities at 
each gate following the Boolean logic of the Fault Tree. This approach cannot be applied if there are 
repeated events. Instead, the minimal cut sets of the Fault Tree must be identified, and Top Event 
probability calculated using the Inclusion-Exclusion expansion.  
The Inclusion-Exclusion expansion is defined in Equation 3.10, where    is each minimal cut set and 
   is the number of minimal cut sets. The elements of each minimal cut set are substituted into 
Equation 3.14 and simplified where possible.   
                                          
   
   
   
   
  
   
   
   
  
   
  
   
                              (3.10) 
For a Fault Tree with many minimal cut sets, this calculation is computationally intensive. The 
Minimal Cut Set Upper Bound can be used to estimate the value of Top Event probability.  
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The Minimal Cut Set Upper Bound is defined in Equation 3.11. This can be used to find an estimate 
of the Top Event probability. The value for the Minimal Cut Set Upper Bound will always be greater 
or equal to the value calculated using the exclusion inclusion expansion. 
                 
  
           (3.11) 
Top Event Frequency 
The Top Event frequency can also be calculated from a Fault Tree. The Top Event frequency         
is the probability that the Top Event occurs, per unit time. To find this, consider a small interval of 
time,           , the probability of an event occurring in this interval is the event frequency 
multiplied by the length of the interval (       ). For the Top Event to occur in the interval, there 
must be the completion of one or more minimal cut sets in the interval. For this to happen, all but one 
event in a minimal cut set could occur before the interval and then the final event occurs in the 
interval, leading to system failure. Hence, the probability of Top Event occurrence in the interval, due 
to the final event in its minimal cut set, is the probability that the system is in a critical state for that 
event          , multiplied by the probability of the event occurring (       ). There may be 
multiple minimal cut sets with the same final event which means they would be completed at the same 
time. The sum is taken, over all basic events, to calculate the total probability of occurrence of the 
Top Event within a time interval          . Equation 3.12 shows this relationship which can be 
simplified to Equation 3.13 to give the Top Event frequency. Here,           is Birnbaum’s 
importance measure defined later in Equation 3.19. 
                                 
 (3.12) 
                              (3.13) 
The concept of initiating and enabling events can be introduced into a Fault Tree model to consider 
situations where the time order of events is important [38]. Initiating and enabling events are defined 
as follows: 
Initiating events are events that perturb system variables and place a demand for a response from 
protection, control or safety systems. 
Enabling events are inactive control or protection systems. By occurring they permit initiating event 
to cause the top event. 
The initiating event must occur in a finite amount of time in which the enabling events have also 
occurred. If initiating and enabling events are not considered, then it can lead to an over estimation of 
Top Event probability, or frequency, as contributions that come from sequences of events that may 
not actually lead to the Top Event are included.  
Importance Measures 
Once a numerical quantification for the Top Event occurrence has been found, it is useful to perform 
further analysis of the Fault Tree to identify areas of weakness within the system in question. 
Importance measures can be used to assign a numerical value to the contribution of the basic events of 
minimal cut sets to the Top Event so comparisons can be made. The critical states of a system are 
needed to calculate importance measures. A critical system state, for a basic event, is a system state 
such that if the basic event occurs then the whole system will fail; there may be multiple states where 
this may occur for each system. Importance measures can either be deterministic or probabilistic.  
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A deterministic importance measure does not account for the probability of failure of the system and 
so can be useful if there is limited, or unreliable, data available. An example of this is the structural 
measure of importance     which is defined by Equation 3.14. 
  
                                                  
                                                     
     (3.14) 
Probabilistic measures of importance also consider how likely a component failure is to occur.  
Examples include Birnbaum’s importance measure, criticality measure of importance and the Fussell-
Vesely measure of importance. Birnbaum’s importance measure,        , for a basic event can be 
found from the partial differentiation of the expression for the system failure probability        with 
respect to the failure probability of the occurrence of the basic event      as shown in Equation 3.15: 
[119]  
      
     
   
          (3.15) 
The criticality measure of importance considers the probability that the system is in a critical state for 
a basic event and the probability that it has occurred. It is defined in Equation 3.16 and is weighted by 
the unavailability of the system. 
   
             
          
          (3.16) 
Similarly, the Fussell-Vesely measure of importance can be used to rank the basic events, by 
considering the contributions of minimal cut sets, containing the basic event of interest on the system 
failure. It is defined as the probability of the union of the minimal cut sets, containing the basic event 
in question, given the system has failed. The Fussell-Vesely measure of importance is defined in 
Equation 3.17. 
   
           
          
           (3.17) 
Similarly, the minimal cut sets can be ranked using the Fussell-Vesely measure of minimal cut set 
importance. This is defined as the probability of occurrence of the minimal cut set in question, given 
the system has failed. This is given in Equation 3.18. 
   
     
          
           (3.18)  
The Barlow-Proschan measure of initiator importance can be used to consider initiating events in a 
situation where the order of events is important. Equation 3.19 gives the Barlow-Proschan measure of 
importance where event   causes the failure of the system in a time interval      . 
   
                               
 
 
      
        (3.19) 
The sequential contributory measure of importance considers enabling events for system failure in an 
interval, given an initiating event. This is shown in Equation 3.20. The index   runs over initiating 
events, contained in a cut set,   , with the enabling event,  . This is an approximate expression. 
   
                                           
 
  
   
       
      




Both measures of importance allow the events to be ranked by their contribution to Top Event 
occurrence, as either an initiating or enabling event.  
3.1.5: Discussion 
Fault Trees provide a framework for quantitative and qualitative analysis of risk by considering a set 
of Top Events. Basic events are combined using Boolean logic, which is demonstrated by the Fault 
Tree structure, to represent the combinations of events that result in the Top Event. There are several 
benefits to Fault Tree analysis, these include: 
1. A Fault Tree based model allows focus on a top event and a systematic method for analysing 
potential causes.  
2. A Fault Tree is a clear method for communicating risk to those outside the field as it is easily 
explained and interpreted.  
3. Fault Trees facilitate both qualitative and quantitative analysis which can be used to make 
informed decisions.  
4. Repairable, revealed and unrevealed component failure can be modelled.  
On the other hand, there are several areas where Fault Tree analysis encounters difficulties: 
1. The method is not exhaustive as only specific Top Events are considered.  
2. For exact quantitative analysis of a Fault Tree, the basic events must be independent; this 
may not be the case due to maintenance strategies, dependencies between components or 
common cause failures.  
3. It is difficult to incorporate non-constant failure rates into a Fault Tree based model. 
4. It is difficult to model complex asset management strategies, unless the system is non-
repairable.  
In an underground railway there are repairable components that will fail at different rates depending 
on different factors such as the age, usage or quality. The rates of failure are also likely to change over 
time. In addition, there are continuous variables involved in the risks of an underground railway 
system, such as speed in derailment risk. There are also likely to be dependencies between different 
component failures, for example, due to opportunistic maintenance strategies. However, Fault Trees 
have a capacity to link component failure events to give a Top Event and this is the capacity with 




3.2: Event Tree analysis  
Event Trees are a method of analysis uses in system risk assessment. They are an inductive method 
that allows multiple sequences of enabling events, and their consequences, following an initiating 
event, to be considered [120]. Initiating events are those that can start an event sequence that can 
cause a hazard and place a demand on the system for a response. Enabling events are those that 
propagate and incident sequence and can reduce or escalate hazard consequences, given that an 
initiating event has occurred. Quantitative analysis of an Event Tree can be completed by assigning a 
probability of occurrence to each enabling event and combining these with an initiating event 
frequency, to give the frequency of each sequence of events. The consequences of these sequences of 
events can also be included to provide a framework for the calculation of the risk of the system in 
question. Event Tree analysis does not imply independence in events and so allows common cause 
failures or dependencies to be considered. 
3.2.1: Event Tree structure 
Figure 3.2 shows an illustrative Event Tree. An Event Tree analysis starts with the occurrence of an 
initiating event. In Figure 3.2, the initiating event,   , can be seen on the left hand side of the Event 
Tree. 
The enabling events run from left to right, across the Event Tree. For the Event Tree Figure 3.2 there 
are five enabling events which can occur, in ascending order. Branching of the event tree occurs at 
specified points related to each of the enabling events. Often the branches are binary, meaning that 
there are only two branches created at each branching point that represent either occurrence, or non-
occurrence, of the enabling event. However, partial failures can be considered as well as non-binary 
branching, if the branches cannot occur at the same time [121]. Figure 3.2 shows binary branching. 
For each sequence of events in an Event Tree, further branching can be terminated if an event ends the 
incident sequence. Here, the branching in that sequence ends at the final logical point and this is 
represented by a horizontal line from the final event in the sequence to the end of the Event Tree. This 
can be seen in several cases for the Event Tree in Figure 3.2, for example for the sequence of events 
starting with Event 1,   , followed by Event 3,   , there is no further branching of that specific 
sequence of events. In addition, branching can be omitted if it is illogical, for example one enabling 
event ensures occurrence a subsequent enabling event. This is demonstrated in the Event Tree in 
Figure 3.2 for example for the sequence of events starting with Event 1,   , there is no branching 






















3.2.2: Quantitative Event Tree analysis 
Initiating event frequency, enabling event probabilities and consequences for each chain of events can 
be assigned to the Event Tree [120]. This is demonstrated in Figure 3.2. When events with the Event 
Tree are independent, the frequency of each chain of events can be found by multiplying the initiating 
event frequency with the probability of each event outcome in the chain of events. The risk for each 
chain of events can then be found by taking the product of the corresponding frequency and 
consequences. The total risk of the system can be calculated by summing the risk for each chain of 
events. Equation 3.21 shows this, where    is the frequency of each sequence,    is the consequence 
of each sequence and   is the number of sequences. 
          
  
             (3.21) 
The probability of occurrence for the enabling events that make up the branch points can be calculated 
via other methods such as Fault Tree analysis. 
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Figure 3.2: A sample Event Tree 
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Dependencies may exist between events in an Event Tree. These can be total or partial. Where 
dependencies exist, the sequence probability cannot be found by simply multiplying the branch 
probabilities together, as you can with independent events.  
If a total dependency exists between two events, the second event is either certain or impossible 
following the first event. These dependencies can be incorporated into the Event Tree structure. 
However, partial dependencies are those where enabling events, at branch points, have basic events in 
common. Hence, the same basic event may be in the minimal cut set for more than one of the enabling 
events. Two methods can be used to analyse Event Trees with partial dependencies are: extraction of 
the common factor and non-coherent analysis of the branch output events. 
In the first method for analysis of an Event Tree with partial dependencies, the basic events in 
common, across the minimal cut sets of each enabling event, are identified [45]. Subsequently, the 
Event Tree is modified so that each of these identified basic events forms a separate branching point 
in the Event Tree structure. In addition, these basic events are removed from the minimal cut sets of 
each of the original enabling events, to avoid multiple inclusion in the analysis of the Event Tree. This 
results in an Event Tree structure with independent branching for quantitative analysis, but can lead to 
a large Event Tree structure if there are many partial dependencies between the enabling events.  
The second method uses non-coherent analysis for quantification an Event Tree with partial 
dependencies. Here, the minimal cut sets for each enabling event are also required. These can be 
negated in order to gain the logical combinations of basic events, and their negations, for each output 
at each branching point of the Event Tree. In this method, prior to quantification of the Event Tree, 
each event sequence in the Event Tree is described in terms of these basic events and their negations. 
The inclusion-exclusion expansion can be used for this, followed by a simplification of the resulting 
expression through Boolean algebra. For quantitative analysis, the values for each basic event 
probability can be substituted into the final expression for each of the event sequences to give the 
probability of each of enabling event sequences. Finally, this can be combined with the initiating 
event frequency and the consequences of each chain of events to calculate the risk of each chain of 
events. This calculation can be lengthy if there are many partial dependencies in the Event Tree 
enabling events. To avoid this lengthy calculation the coherent Event Tree approximation can be 
made. Here, it is assumed that enabling events do not usually occur, and hence the probability of their 
non-occurrence is approximated to one. This removes many terms when implementing the inclusion-





There are several advantages to Event Tree analysis: 
 Event Tree analysis can highlight areas of weakness in a system and allows the identification 
of where there may be a lack of controls. 
 An Event Tree is a visual description that is clear and easily understandable which can aid in 
the communication of risk. 
 Event Tree analysis allows the consequences for chains of events to be considered. 
 Event Trees can be quantified by incorporating probability into each branch and combining 
this with the frequency of the Top Event and the consequences of each branch. 
There are also several disadvantages to Event Tree analysis: 
 Only one initiating event is considered in each Event Tree, this can lead to many Event Trees 
for a large system.  
 There is no time dependence in the Event Tree and probabilities of branch events are 
considered as fixed discreet values.  
 It is difficult to approximate the consequences of the event branches because there may be 
many unknown variables or unexpected factors that could influence the consequences.  
Event Trees facilitate forward logic to consider what may happen following a major event or failure. 
For an underground railway they are useful as they allow the identification of areas of weakness as 
well as predictions of risk. Event Trees are used within this thesis to calculate the risk over a system 
life-cycle, given different system states predicted by a model. This risk measure can then be used as 
the basis of an optimization of the asset management strategy for the system, for instance by 





3.3: Monte Carlo simulation 
Monte Carlo simulation is used in this thesis to gain a numerical result for models that cannot be 
solved analytically. Monte Carlo simulation refers to a range of algorithmic methods that can be 
applied to problems in order to gain a numeric result. Monte Carlo simulation can be seen as a 
statistical experiment where multiple runs are performed and each run is equivalent to an observation. 
After many runs the average of the outcome should converge. 
Monte Carlo simulation can be used to model many different systems. To use Monte Carlo simulation 
to model risk, the system logic is required as well as failure and repair distributions. For each trial run, 
a value from these distributions is sampled at random. A further description of the Monte Carlo 
method including sampling methods for a range of distributions can be found in the book “Essentials 
of Monte Carlo Simulation: Statistical Methods for Building Simulation Models” [122].  
3.3.1: Generating random numbers  
Random numbers can be generated by simple experiments such as tossing dice, flipping a coin or 
drawing cards at random. This is difficult for situations where many random numbers are required. 
Pseudo-random numbers behave in a similar way to random numbers as they are independent and 
have a uniform distribution. 
Recursion formulae can be used to generate pseudo-random numbers. Recursion formulae requires a 
‘seed’ value to start the sequence. This seed value should be changed with every simulation for a 
variation in the pseudo-random numbers generated. However, keeping the same seed value is useful 
for identifying issues with a computer code, as each simulation will produce the same result if the 
seed is kept constant. 
A commonly used pseudo-random number generator is the linear congruential generator. Equation 
3.22 gives the recursion formula that is reliant on the previous value in the sequence. Equation 3.23 
shows how each random number is generated following Equation 3.22. [3] 
                         (3.22) 
   
  
 
            (3.23) 
Here    is the seed and       are integer constants, which are chosen to give a large cycle length and 
   is the generated pseudo-random number. 
This is the pseudo-random number generator implemented in this thesis, through the inbuilt ‘rand()’ 
function in C++ coding libraries, to generate random numbers to solve the models described. The seed 
value is initiated to the physical time of the simulation at the start of the running of any model. This 
avoids the same random number sequence being generated if there are two models running in series 
within the software. The cycle length for this random number generator is 4,294,967,296 which was 
deemed sufficient for the modelling completed in this thesis. Further random number generators can 
be found in the book “Random Number Generation and Monte Carlo Methods” [123]. 
3.3.2: Generating event times from distributions 
Probability distributions can be assigned to component failure times. Various techniques can be used 
to sample a time at random, from these distributions. In this project, three probability distributions are 
assigned to components within the models developed. These are: the 2-Parameter Weibull 
distribution, the negative exponential distribution and the normal distribution. The techniques for 
sampling from these distributions are given in this section. Care must be taken when using the normal 
distribution due to the possibility of sampling a negative time value. Despite this, the normal 
distribution has been used throughout this project due to its common use in practical applications, but 
some restrictions have been applied. Firstly, if a negative time is sampled this value is approximated 
to a zero time. Secondly, when the normal distribution is implemented it must be in a scenario where 
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there is a rare probability that a negative value will be sampled so as not to change the representation 
of the distribution in simulation, by this rounding up of negative values.  
The inverse transform technique 
The inverse transform technique can be used to sample a value, for the time to failure, from a 
probability density function. This requires the existence of the inverse of the cumulative distribution 
function. The cumulative distribution function is denoted by      and is the integral of the probability 
density function over the interval      . The cumulative distribution function is the probability that 
the failure has occurred in the interval      . Hence, over all time the cumulative distribution function 
is in the range        a random number can be generated in the same interval.  
The inverse transform technique can be used for a probability density function with a constant hazard 
rate, which yields the negative exponential distribution. 
For a component, assume that the failure data follows an exponential probability density function with 
a constant hazard rate λ. [3] Such that the probability density function is given by Equation 3.24. 
                    (3.24) 
Figure 3.3 shows a graph of this probability density function with different values of  .  
 
Figure 3.3: A graph showing the negative exponential probability density function. 
Integrating the probability density function yields the cumulative distribution function as shown in 
Equation 3.25.  





      (3.25) 
Since      is in the interval       we can equate it to a random number,   in        and rearrange the 
result to yield the time to failure given this random number. This method allows times to be sampled 
from the distribution. Equation 3.26 shows the random number equated to the cumulative distribution 
function. 
                      (3.26) 
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Rearranging Equation 3.27 so that time is the subject, gives Equation 3.31. 
   
        
 
          (3.27) 
Since       is also a random number in [0,1] this expression can be simplified to give Equation 
3.28. 
   
      
 
          (2.28) 
The time found in Equation 3.28 is a time randomly sampled from the negative exponential failure 
distribution.  
The inverse transform technique can also be used if the probability density function follows a 2- 
Parameter Weibull distribution. The 2-Parameter Weibull distribution has a shape that is dependent on 
parameter values. The 2-Parameter Weibull distribution is particularly useful in situations where there 
may be changing hazard rates. The failure density function for this distribution is described in 
Equation 3.29 [3]. Figure 3.4 shows the 2-Parameter Weibull probability density function for different 
parameter values. 
     








                       (3.29) 
For the 2-Parameter Weibull distribution   is the shape parameter, it has the following interpretations:  
    : Increasing hazard rate 
    : Constant hazard rate 
    : Reducing hazard rate 
  is the scale parameter which is the value for   where the probability of a component failure prior to 
this time is approximately 2/3.  
 
Figure 3.4: The 2- Parameter Weibull distribution for several different parameter values. 
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Integrating the probability density function yields the cumulative distribution function as shown in 
Equation 3.30: 
            



















     (3.30) 
Setting this equal to a random number X, in [0,1], as before, rearranging and simplifying, gives a time 
randomly sampled from the 2-Parameter Weibull distribution. Equation 3.31 gives the formula for 
this. 
           
 
          (3.31) 
In some instances, the cumulative distribution function cannot be analytically inverted, therefore this 
method is not valid. An example of where this method fails is with the normal distribution. The next 
section describes how the Central Limit Theorem can be used to sample a time to failure for a 
situation where the probability density function follows a normal distribution. This distribution is also 
applied to maintenance and inspection times in this thesis, which are sampled in the same manner. 
Central Limit Theorem and Sampling from the Normal Distribution 
The normal distribution is commonly used as it describes natural variance around a mean value. The 
probability density function for the normal distribution is given in Equation 3.32. 
     
 
     
 
 
      
            (3.32) 
Where the mean is   and the standard deviation is  . Figure 3.5 shows the normal distribution for 




Figure 3.5: The Normal distribution for different values of the mean and standard deviation 
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Since the inverse transform technique cannot be applied to the normal distribution another method is 
needed to sample times from the normal distribution. The Central Limit Theorem can be used [3]. 
Consider a set of   independent random variables,            , that are identically distributed with 
a mean of   and a variance of   . Next consider the sum of these random variables, as given is 
Equation 3.33. 
                     (3.33) 
The Central Limit Theorem states that the difference between the sample average and the mean of the 
distribution, when multiplied by the root of the sample size, converges to the normal distribution with 
a mean of 0 and variance of   .  
Hence, the Central Limit Theorem gives the result in Expression 3.34 where,      is the mean if the 
random variables. 
   
  
 
   
                
                     (3.34) 
Assume that   becomes sufficiently large that the limit is close to equality in expression 3.38. 
Transforming the normal distribution to have a variance of 1 and rearranging gives a random 
variable  , that is asymptotically normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, 
this is given in Equation 3.35. 
   
     
   
          (3.35) 
A random number,     can be taken from a uniform random distribution between [0,1], this 
distribution has a mean of 0.5. A finite   can be chosen so that the normal distribution can be 
approximated,      is a convenient choice. Hence, the uniform random distribution that the    
values are taken from, has        and    
 
  
 .  Substitution of these values into Equation 3.35 
gives Equation 3.36. 
                          (3.36) 
Let   be a random variable found by summing 12 values from a uniform random distribution. As 
shown in Equation 3.37,   is normally distributed with a mean of 6 and a standard deviation of 1.  
         
  
                    (3.37)  
So          is approximately normally distributed with a mean of   and a standard deviation 
of  .  
Hence, failure times with a normal distribution can be approximated by Equation 3.38. 
                   (3.38) 
3.3.3: Performing the simulation and convergence 
In this thesis a distribution is assigned to each event in the model in question and the time to the event 
sampled via the methods described above, with a new event time sampled in each instance. Each run 
of the simulation is performed, and the outcomes are recorded. After many runs the average outcome 
should converge due to the law of large numbers and the Central Limit Theorem. A discussion of this 
can be found in the book “Exploring Monte Carlo Methods”[124]. It is at this point that no further 
simulations are required. A computer program can be written to run the simulation; however, this 
method can be time consuming if a large number of runs is required before the outcome converges. In 
this thesis a Monte Carlo simulation is used to obtain convergent numeric results for the models 




There are several advantages to Monte Carlo simulation:  
 Monte Carlo simulation does not assume independence between failures or constant failure 
rates. 
 It is possible to model the system in any level of detail. 
 Monte Carlo simulation is a flexible method that can be applied to many situations and 
produce many different outputs. 
 It is possible where an analytical solution cannot be found. 
 A model with statistical distributions can be solved via Monte Carlo simulation.  
 Monte Carlo simulation can account for the random nature of failures. 
On the other hand, there are some disadvantages of Monte Carlo simulation: 
 Monte Carlo simulation of a model may require large computational power because many 
simulations may be needed before convergence is reached.  
 A large quantity of random numbers must be generated. 
 Solutions are an approximation. 
Monte Carlo simulation is a powerful tool that can be applied in situations where there are non-
constant failure rates or dependences between failures. This is applicable to an ageing underground 
railway where the failure rate may be changing with time or there are dependencies between 
component failures.  
3.4: Petri nets 
Petri nets are used in this thesis to model component ageing, failure, inspection and maintenance and 
the impact of this on system level failures. System level asset management strategies are also 
modelled with a Petri net approach.  
A Petri net is a digraph with two types of node, known as places and transitions, and objects called 
tokens which can move in a certain way following the ‘firing rule’. [117] The tokens in a Petri net 
have no assigned meaning, this means that Petri net modelling is flexible and can be applied to a large 
number of situations. Delay times can be assigned to the transitions in the model in what is known as 
a Timed Petri net. A probability model can also be associated with the transitions in the Petri net in 
what is known as a Stochastic Petri net. In this thesis Stochastic Petri nets are implemented. In a 
Stochastic Petri net any distribution of times to failure or repair events can be used. This section gives 
a basic description of the stochastic Petri net methodology as well as a simple application.  
3.4.1: Petri net symbols 
Transitions  
Transitions represent an event or process and are drawn as a rectangle in a Petri net. They often have 
an associated delay time. 
Places 
Places represent conditions needed for the transition to occur such as the available resources or a state 
of the system. They are represented by a circle in a Petri net. The transitions are connected to places 
by arcs. 
Figure 3.6 shows an example of a transition with three connected places, where the transition has a 
delay time associated with it. There are many different meanings that can be assigned to places and 
transitions. One application could be, input places representing the resources needed, the transition 
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representing a task and the output place representing the products produced. In another application, 
the input places can represent the initial state of a component, the transition represent the ageing of 
the component and the output place represent the end state of the component [125]. This flexibility in 
the modelling approach allows it to be applied to a wide range of scenarios.  
Tokens 
Places can be marked by tokens which are denoted by a small black circle. When a place is marked it 
represents a truth in the condition. For instance, if a place represented a component state, when it is 
marked the component is in this state. Tokens can have different meanings depending on their 
location in the Petri net. For instance, in another location a token may represent a completed 
inspection or maintenance action. A transition is activated for firing when all the input places are 
marked by tokens. Figure 3.6 shows several places linked by a transition where the place P1 is marked 
by a token. Petri net models have an associated initial marking which determines the initial state and 









3.4.2: The Firing rule 
The firing rule occurs at transitions and allows tokens to ‘move’ through a Petri net by creating and 
destroying tokens. For the firing rule to occur all the input places must be marked. In a Timed Petri 
net, or a Stochastic Petri net, this firing is not instantaneous and occurs after a delay time. Once the 
period of the delay time is complete all input places will lose a token and all output places gain a 
token. After firing, the delay time is reset. 
The arcs may be weighted, in this case the number of tokens destroyed in the input places is equal to 
the weight of the arc. Similarly, the number of tokens created in the output place is equal to the weight 
of the arc.  
Figure 3.7 shows a transition before and after the firing rule where the arcs are not weighted, and the 



























An inhibitor arc can be used to represent the situation where a transition cannot fire unless a condition 
is fulfilled. This is represented by a small circle and a line connecting the place to the transition; in 
this case the transition will not fire unless the place connected by the inhibitor arc is empty. Figure 3.8 











A further discussion on Petri net synthesis can be found in the book “Petri nets Picture Book” [126]. 
There are also several extensions to the typical transitions used in a Stochastic Petri net, which are 
incorporated in the models presented in this thesis. These include Partial Reset Transitions, Full Reset 
Transitions, Probability Transitions and Conditional Transitions [64]:  
 On the firing of a Partial Reset Transition, certain specified places are returned to their initial 
marking.  
 On the firing of a Full Reset Transition, all places, except for those that are identified as 
counting actions or time, are returned to their initial marking.   
 Probability Transitions represent situations where there can only be one result out of several. 
In these transitions there are several Output Places, each with an assigned probability to 
represent the likelihood of each situation occurring.  
 Conditional Transitions have several distributions associated with them and a connected 
Place, known as a Conditional Place. Each time the Conditional Transition becomes active the 
distribution is chosen for each firing occurrence, based on the number of Tokens marking its 
Conditional Place.  
These extensions are applied to the Stochastic Petri net models created in this thesis, an explanation of 
how they are implemented is given in in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, where they are used.  
3.4.3: Analysis of Petri nets 
Stochastic Petri nets are implemented in this thesis due to their ability to handle various probability 
distributions, which can be used to govern failure and repair times for components. There are various 
methods for the analysis of Petri nets such as the reachability graph method and the matrix-equation 
approach [127]. However, for large and complex Stochastic Petri nets these methods are intractable 
[128]. Monte Carlo Simulation of the Stochastic Petri net can be applied for quantitative analysis of 
the models developed in this thesis [64].  









In Monte Carlo simulation of a Stochastic Petri net, the delay times are sampled randomly, from the 
probability distributions associated with the model, each time that firing of the transition in question is 
enabled. The tokens are then created and destroyed following the firing rule. The number of tokens 
arriving at significant places, or the duration that they remain in specific places, can be monitored. On 
many runs of the simulation, the average marking, or duration of marking, for these places will 
converge to an average value and this average value can be used to give information about the system. 
A computer program can be written to carry out this analysis.  
Figure 3.9 shows a typical graph of Petri net convergence. This shows how the average metric 
converges with the increasing number of runs of the model. 
 
Figure 3.9: A graph showing how the average metric value converges with the number of runs. 
Here, the average metric value is 10.55 units after 3000 simulations. The location where the model 
has reached a sufficient level of convergence can be found. At this point, the average mean value of 
the outputs only changes within a desired tolerance, with an increased number of runs. In this thesis, 
the reduction of the 95% confidence interval on the model outputs to a desired tolerance, is used to 
check for convergence. In addition, a method is presented to find the rate of convergence of the 
model. Here, the error on the mean value, with each run, is approximated as the difference between 
the upper and lower 95% confidence limit, and the rate of change in this error, with an increasing 
number of runs is found using a logarithmic approach. This is presented in Section 6.4 of this thesis. 
This method is used to allow a quantification of any uncertainty introduced into the model through its 
simulation, and to allow the user to calculate the required number of runs to reach a given tolerance.  
3.4.4: Discussion 
There are several advantages to a Petri net based modelling approach: 
 A Petri net based model is often modular in nature. This allows different components to be 
grouped together. 
 Ageing components can be modelled easily as any distribution can be assigned to the time to 
failure of the components. 
 Petri nets have the potential to model complex maintenance and inspection strategies. 
 Petri nets are a graphical description of the system and allow the analyst to logically consider 
how components interact. 
 A Petri net based approach is flexible and not restricted to independent events.  
There are also several disadvantages to a Petri net based modelling approach: 
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 Purpose build software may be needed to analyse the Petri net based model. 
 The analysis of a large Petri net based model can be computationally heavy due to the large 
number of transitions and runs needed for a convergent answer. 
 A Petri net based model is more abstract than a Fault Tree or Event Tree based model, 
making it a difficult tool to describe risk. 
A Petri net based model is a flexible approach for modelling component failure, maintenance and 
inspection. It can overcome many of the difficulties encountered in a Fault Tree based model such as 
the incorporation of different failure rates. A Petri net based model is also useful for components that 
are maintained and inspected as it allows many different maintenance strategies to be applied. For an 
underground railway, with ageing components that have non-constant failure rates and complex 
inspection and maintenance strategies, this method of is suitable. In this thesis a Stochastic Petri net 
based modelling approach is used to model component and system level ageing, failure, inspection 
and maintenance.   
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3.5: Proposed Methodology 
The existing methodologies presented in this chapter are combined to give a proposed methodology 
that is applied to model two systems in this thesis: a railway switch and crossing (S&C), in Chapter 4, 
and a fire protection system, in Chapter 5. The steps of the methodology proposed in this thesis are as 
follows: 
1. Use a Fault Tree to analyse the failure modes of the system. This facilitates the decomposition 
of failure modes to basic events, which can be related to component state, informing more 
detailed modelling of the system at the component level. This method is selected as the initial 
step as it allows the user to explore Boolean logic expressions of events that can cause a 
system failure and allows the approach to build on current Fault Tree analysis methods, 
present in industry. 
2. Split the system into modules, containing individual components, or groups of components if 
components are closely coupled. This gives a framework for the component level models, 
which can include any dependencies in component failures, such as those introduced through 
maintenance actions. This approach is suggested as it allows the model to be structured in a 
logical manner. 
3. Split each component condition into several discreet states to allow the modelling of the 
component throughout its lifecycle. States should be chosen that reflect different real world 
actions associated with the component. For example, there should be different states where 
different maintenance actions, inspection actions or restrictions to component use are 
required. This method is used so that different phases of the component lifecycle can be 
modelled, as it ages.  
4. Define inspection strategies at the component level. These strategies can include imperfect 
inspection and different inspection methods at different times. In addition, states where 
inspection identifies an existing failure can be included. This method is chosen to allow 
modelling of inspection actions at the component level and to enable activation of 
maintenance actions or restrictions on the system use, which are dependent on a discovered 
failure or degraded component condition. 
5. Define the maintenance actions for each component state, either age-based, or condition-
based. Where age-based strategies are incorporated, the component can be replaced after a 
defined time interval from the most recent maintenance action. Condition-based strategies can 
be implemented based on any revealed failures or degraded states found through component 
inspection. This step facilitates preventative maintenance actions and repair actions.   
6. Build a Stochastic Petri net model for each module, incorporating component level ageing, 
failure, inspection and maintenance. This models the component condition, and allows the 
collection of results relating to life-cycle cost. The Petri Net methodology is selected for this 
stage as it can be applied to systems with complex inspection and maintenance strategies and 
is flexible at modelling component failure rates. This allows different failure rates to be 
modelled for a component, including failure rates that change with increased preventative 
maintenance actions.  
7. Define the system level logic, such as combinations of failures leading to a system failure, 
and system level maintenance and inspection strategies. The system level failure logic is 
informed by the Fault Tree method in the initial step of this methodology. The maintenance 
and inspection strategies incorporate the interaction between multiple component inspection 
and maintenance methods, considering their impact at a system level. 
8. Combine the component level modules using the system level logic. This step is implemented 
because it combines the component level modules across the system, to model scenarios 
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where multiple components fail at the same time, causing a system level failure. In addition, 
this step facilitates system lifecycle cost analysis, based on the lifecycle cost of components 
across the system.  
9. Assign distributions to the transitions in the model to represent the system and component 
level ageing, failure, maintenance and inspection. These distributions can be based on 
available data or expert opinion. Any distribution can be applied at this stage, as long as it can 
be inverted, or there is a method to approximate it’s inverse. This step allows the 
quantification of the model, and allows developed models to be adapted to specific systems. 
Different maintenance and inspection strategies can be tested by altering the distributions 
related to these within the model. 
10. Simulate the Petri net model via Monte Carlo Simulation to give the probability or frequency 
of the failure modes of the system. In addition, this step gives information on the number and 
type of inspection and maintenance actions across the system, which can be used for life-
cycle cost analysis. Monte Carlo Simulation is selected for this analysis as it converges to the 
true solution and can be used where an exact analytical solution cannot be found due to a 
complex model structure. The error associated with the convergence of the model can also be 
analysed, so that a sufficient number of runs are completed such that the final solution closely 
approximates the true solution.  
11. Event Tree analysis is used to gain a measure of the system risk from these model outputs, by 
combining failure event frequency with estimated consequences. Event Trees are selected at 
this stage to tie in with existing analysis already present in industry. The method includes a 
clear representation of the logic used to combine event frequency, with the probability of 
failure of enabling events and consequence analysis in order to predict risk. 
This methodology is not application specific. In order for this approach to be applied to a system 
the following characteristics of the system are required:  
 Components within the system age and then fail; their condition does not improve with time. 
 System failures are due to component failures and/or human operation failures. Failures 
caused by external factors such as natural disasters or deliberate malicious human actions are 
not included. 
 Component condition within the system can be characterised into states of either the working 
state and failed state, or a number of discreet states from working through to failure. The time 
between these states can be characterised by a distribution.  
 The maintenance and inspection of the components follows some definable logic, however 
consistent random inspection and maintenance can be modelled.  
 For use of the model for life cycle analysis cost of inspection and maintenance actions must 
be quantifiable.  
This methodology is implemented in this thesis to explore its capabilities. In Chapter 4, various 
system level maintenance strategies are applied to demonstrate the capacity of this methodology for 
providing a risk-based asset management decision making tool. In Chapter 5, a phased system level 
maintenance and inspection strategy is developed, such that the system level asset management 
strategy applied depends on the age of the system. In Chapter 6, the model developed in Chapter 5 is 
combined with an Event Tree analysis to provide the basis of a risk-based optimization of the phased 
asset management strategy.  For clarity, the additional methodologies applied to these different 
chapters are described prior to their implementation. The logic of the models presented in this thesis 
was validated through expert opinion and the accuracy of the Petri Net simulation software was 
validated against expected results with test cases. The convergence of the models for sample results 
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was also checked in each implementation. Sample data values are used for demonstration of the 
modelling methodology, with real world data, models developed through this approach can be 
validated further against expected outcomes. 
3.6: Implementation 
A generic software has been written to enable the quantitative analysis of the models developed in this 
thesis. Figure 3.10 gives a flowchart of the developed code. The software was validated with unit 
testing, including validation of the model state following firing of each transition type. Initially, the 
structure and parameters of the models are stored in spreadsheets in Excel. For each model there is a 
spreadsheet containing the data for the places in the model and a spreadsheet containing the data for 
the transitions in the model. The spreadsheet for the places contains information on: the individual 
identifier of the place, its initial marking, whether it is used to count outputs of the model and if it is 
returned to its initial marking on full reset of the model. The transition spreadsheet for the model 
contains information such as: the individual identifier of the transition, the type of transition, the input 
places, the output places and any places that inhibit the transition. The distributions, or probabilities, 
governing these transitions are also included. Distributions for the transitions that are incorporated 
into the software are: normal, lognormal, exponential or 2-parameter Weibull distributions. The 
software can be extended to include further distributions. There are several categories of transition 
included in the software: 
1) Stochastic transitions with an associated probability distribution, 
2) Timed transitions with a constant delay time, either zero or positive, 
3) Probability transitions where there is a choice of outcomes, each with a probability of 
occurrence, 
4) Partial reset transitions with an associated probability distribution that reset specified places 
within the Petri net on firing, 
5) Full reset transitions, that reset all places within the Petri net, except those that are identified 
as counting relevant outputs of the Petri net, 
6) Conditional transitions that have several associated probability distributions, where the 
probability distribution is chosen based on the marking of an associated conditional place, or 
places, 
7) Global transitions with an associated place, one or more assigned periodic interval, and a 
conditional place that can be used to vary the assigned periodic interval. 
For partial reset transitions, the spreadsheet also includes data on any places that are reset by each 
transition. For conditional transitions, the spreadsheet contains data on the number of conditional 
places and how the marking of these impacts the governing distribution. 
Global transitions are included to decrease the simulation time of the model; they can be used to 
remove short periodic loops within the model which are computationally expensive, such as 
inspection loops. Here, when a linked place is marked, the global time within the simulation is 
extracted to find the firing time for the transition, as given in Equation 3.39. This can be used to find 
the time until the next inspection on the failure of a component. The periodic interval in these 
transitions can also vary depending on the marking of a conditional place, as with a conditional 
transition.  
                            (3.39) 
Where   is the delay time for the transition,         is the global time of the system and    is the 
inspection interval. A reference to the implementation of this can be found in Chapter 4 of the thesis 




Figure 3.10: A flowchart of the developed code for model simulation 
The data from the model spreadsheets is extracted from Excel and stored as ‘.txt’ files which are in-
turn read into a piece of software for the simulation of the Petri net, written in C++. This software 
requests the number of transitions included in the model, and the name assigned to the whole Petri net 
model, and from this reads in the Petri net model data. There are several classes within the software, 
including the different Petri net models which are each assigned an individual identifier. This enables 
multiple models to be simulated separately by the same code if required. Within each Petri net model 
are several other classes incorporating the logic of the Petri net such as the Transition class and Place 
class, and their associated rules. The software requests two further inputs from the user. Firstly, the 
total time required to be simulated for the system in question and the required resolution of the 
solution, such as a requirement to model the system for 40 years with a resolution of solutions to the 
nearest week. Secondly, the software requests the number of runs required for a Monte Carlo 
Simulation of the model.  
There are two types of time that are associated with the simulation of a Petri net model. The first is the 
physical time associated with the model, for instance the period of interest for the system in question. 
The second type is the computational time that it takes for the simulation of the Petri net to be 
completed. Both are presented for each model within this thesis with a discussion of the 
computational time taken for the model simulation made throughout. 
The Monte Carlo Simulation of the Petri net initiates by setting the marking of the places to the initial 
marking and setting the global system time to zero. This is repeated at the start of each run of the 
simulation. The Petri net is then analysed to find any transitions within the model that are active for 
firing. A delay time is assigned to these active transitions and the global time of the run of the 










•Any Places that inhibit firing




•Number of runs of the 
simulation
•Maximum time modeled 
•Output time steps required
Virtual model





•Potential active transitions following 
every firing occurrence
Excel Spreadsheet containing model data
Perform a run of the simulation:
1. Firing time for each active transition 
generated
2. Modelling time adjusted to shortest firing 
event
3. Place markings adjusted and recorded
4. Set of active transitions adjusted for 
changed place marking. 
5. Active transitions are investigated and 
either retain an already existing firing time 
or are assigned a new firing time
6. Repeat steps 2, 3 ,4 and 5 until the 
modelling time exceeds the maximum 
modelling time
Complete the required number of 
runs of the simulation
Post Processing
•Convert the recorded place markings and 
modelling time sequences for each 
simulation run to average place marking at 
each time step 
Result Visualization 
•Import model average markings and 
visualize in MATLAB. 







If, and when, any of these active transitions reach a point where a delay is less than, or equal, to zero, 
then the transition fires changing the marking of the Petri net. Following this firing, the Petri net is 
reanalysed to find any changes to the set of current active transitions within the model. Where current 
active transitions are unaffected by the most recent firing, the delay time is conserved for these 
transitions. In the case where there are multiple transitions that reach a delay time of less than, or 
equal, to zero, at the same time, then the transitions fire in a random order, which is altered at each 
occurrence. The outputs of the defined places are recorded at each time interval for each run of the 
simulation, along with the time stamp for each of the runs of the simulation. This is used to find the 
average outputs.  
There are two techniques used within the code in order to decrease the computational time of 
simulation of Petri net models. Firstly, the global time of the simulation is increased in a non-linear 
manner, resulting in an individual time stamp for each of the runs of the simulation. The time step 
taken at each point is determined by the shortest delay time of the active transitions. This is 
implemented as there are no changes in the Petri net marking between these points. The second 
modification concerns the part of the software that searches the Petri net for any transitions that are 
active for firing. Prior to simulation, the software searches the Petri net to gather information about 
the structure of the model. Associated with each transition, there is a set of further transitions that may 
be impacted if the transition is to fire and these are gathered by the software. Following firing of a 
transition within a run of the simulation, the software checks this associated set of transitions to avoid 
the need to search all transitions in the model. A full active transition search is still completed on 
initiation of a run and on full reset of the Petri net model. This reduces the costly computational effort 
of repeated searching of the whole Petri net model for active transitions.  
Outputs of the model are taken from the marking pattern of the places identified in the place 
spreadsheet. Due to the non-constant time stamp for each run of the simulation, some analysis is 
carried out on the outputs of the model at the end of the runs of the simulation. The marking of each 
place for each run is converted to the marking over the full time for the user defined time steps to 
enable the combination of the results, over different runs, to give an average solution. These outputs 
are stored as ‘.txt’ files, with one file for each average marking pattern.  
Following this, this average marking pattern for each output can be analysed. This is completed in 




3.7: Parameter assumptions 
Since the parameters within the models in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 have been assumed, 
there are some model outcomes in each case that demonstrate a higher sensitivity to assumptions. For 
instance, when modelling rare events, a falsely assumed parameter can influence the outcome of the 
model with respect to the rare event. An example of this could be where a component failure directly 
causes a system failure; the system outcome can be highly sensitive to the parameters governing the 
rate of the component failure. This is discussed further in the summary section of each of the chapters, 
along with the contributions of each approach despite the assumptions. In addition, a discussion of the 
data required for application of each model, in order to remove these assumptions, is given, along 
with suggestions for how this might improve the presented model. An example of how data can be 
processed in order to determine the lifetime distributions can be found in Rama and Andrews, 2013 
[130]. 
3.8: Contributions 
Contributions of this chapter include a novel approach for hazard or risk modelling that can be applied 
to a railway industry. The approach combines existing risk analysis and asset management techniques, 
using a Petri net methodology. This method allows in depth modelling of components with changing 
degradation rates and complex asset management strategies. This is an improvement on current 
methods used in industry, which are more static in nature and struggle with dependencies introduced 
through maintenance actions and with modelling changing failure rates as components age. A bespoke 
research code for the analysis of such models was also developed, with the inclusion of numerous 
modelling options including both different transitions and distributions. 
3.9: Conclusion  
This chapter has introduced the methodology proposed in this thesis to model risk. The approach 
combines the Fault Tree and Event Tree methods with a Petri net modelling technique, solved by 
Monte Carlo simulation. This methodology has a focus on modelling ageing assets and considering 
maintenance and inspection strategies which are used to manage their operation. A description of the 
bespoke software, written for the analysis of the models in this thesis, has also been provided.  
The methodology described in this chapter is applied to two example systems in this thesis to consider 
the impact of maintenance and inspection strategies on system state and risk. The beginning of each of 
the following two chapters contains a system definition and a description of modelling approaches 
applied. This methodology is then extended further in the latter stages of this thesis. Methods are 




Chapter 4 Modelling Derailments on an Underground Railway 
due to an S&C Failure 
4.1: Introduction  
In this chapter, a Petri net modelling approach is presented to predict the derailment occurrence 
caused by failure in a multi-component Switch and Crossing (S&C). A holistic methodology is 
adopted such that components from an S&C are divided into subsets of interconnected modules. 
Degradation within each module is idealized through a sequence of discrete states of wear, until the 
final failure occurs. Monte Carlo analysis is used to numerically evaluate the resulting Petri nets, thus 
obtaining the frequency of derailment using simulations. Through this methodology, different 
maintenance strategies, such as partial replacement, complete replacement, and opportunistic 
maintenance, can be tested to evaluate their influence on the frequency of derailment, as well as the 
whole life cost [131]. This chapter presents the Petri nets proposed for modelling derailment at an 
S&C. In addition, different asset management strategies are implemented for sample model inputs. 
The model outputs are presented for each sample case.  
S&Cs are considered key assets within a railway system, as they enable flexible track operation. They 
allow different railway lines to be connected by guiding trains between different track sections. Figure 
4.1 gives an example of a simple S&C [132]. The S&C can be mounted on an individual concrete 
block or on ballast with sleepers of either wood or concrete. This is placed on a flat layer of the 
subsurface of the track. 
 
Figure 4.1: A diagram of an S&C 
An S&C consists of several different components including moveable switch rails which allow the 
train to change lines [133]. There are two switch rails that are moved together by the Points Operating 
Equipment (POE), until one switch rail comes into contact with a fixed stock rail, allowing the wheels 
of the train to pass in the desired direction. There are stretcher bars that connect the two switch rails to 
ensure that they maintain the same gauge, these stretcher bars are connected to each other and to the 
POE by a supplementary drive. Slide chairs lie under the switch rails to allow them to move into 
position easily. Once the switch rails are in position they are locked via a locking device to ensure that 
there is no movement of the switch rails as the train passes. 
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In addition, intermediate and running rails are used to allow passage before, through and after the 
S&C. Intermediate rails run after the switch rails and inside the stock rails and running rails sit before 
and after the S&C. The crossing nose allows space for the wheel flange to pass at the point where the 
diverging rail paths cross. This S&C multi-component structure gives rise to a non-constant running 
surface and higher stiffness, in comparison to plain track. The non-constant running surface, and 
higher stiffness, can lead to the S&C experiencing higher rates of deterioration due to the resulting 
higher impact loads [134] [135]. In addition, there is an increased likelihood of derailment, due to the 
non-constant wheel rail interface through the S&C, if a failure is to occur [136].  
Maintenance costs are high due to the need for specialist equipment. Hence, a clear understanding of 
the S&C derailment risk is required alongside a method for testing different maintenance strategies to 
allow safety standards to be maintained while minimizing the whole life costs. 
The research presented in this chapter gives a new model that can be used to predict the frequency of 
derailment caused by a failure in an S&C. Within the model, different maintenance and inspection 
strategies can be tested to consider their effect on the derailment frequency predicted by the model. 
The results of this model can be used in conjunction with a traditional Fault Tree and Event Tree 
based approach, giving overall predictions of risk on an underground railway. 
In order to discover the type of failures that have historically caused derailments at S&C, data was 
taken from the Federal Railroad Administration ‘Track Safety Data Base’, to give an analysis of the 
causes of derailments at S&C and the impact that these had [137]. All railway selections were 
included across all regions. The time frame was set from January 1975 until August 2018 and 
considered all derailments related to S&C or Track Appliances. There were 12,306 derailments in this 
category, following the removal of elements not related to S&C failure. In this period there were 290 
non-fatal casualties recorded and 2 fatal casualties recorded. Although this data does not directly link 
to S&C failure on an underground railway, it can be used to identify common trends in the type of 
S&C failure that can result in a derailment and for that purpose it is included in this section of the 
chapter.  
Figure 4.2 gives the proportion of derailments by cause. Figure 4.3 gives the proportion of financial 
cost of a derailment by cause. Figure 4.4 gives the number of non-fatal accidents by cause.  
 
Figure 4.2: Causes of Derailments at S&C 
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Figure 4.3: The reported financial cost of derailment by cause, at an S&C 
 
Figure 4.4: The number of non-fatal casualties by cause of a derailment at an S&C 
For the data recorded there were two fatal casualties: one resulting from a worn or broken switch rail 
and one from a non-specific S&C defect. This data demonstrates that there are several component 
failures that can lead to a derailment. Firstly, failures related to the switch rails, including break or 
wear of the switch rail and damage or misalignment of the switch rail contribute largely to S&C 
derailment. Another large contributor is the stretcher bar and supplementary drive condition. Other 
contributions come from stock rail failure or crossing nose failure. 
The model presented in this chapter has a focus on modelling complex degradation and asset 
management strategies. It explores the capability of the modelling approach proposed in this thesis to 
accommodate different degradation processes and associated maintenance actions for a component, 
along with multiple inspection methods that have a probability of failure. This chapter also focuses on 
incorporating imperfect maintenance options and the impact that this has on the system state. In 
addition, system level strategies are included such as opportunistic maintenance and full system 
renewal. 
4.2: Method 
4.2.1: Modelling Application 
A modular Stochastic Petri net-based approach is proposed in this chapter to model the derailment 
occurrence caused by component failures. This chapter presents models for component condition, 
inspection and maintenance strategies. Following this, the models for the derailment occurrence are 
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Figure 4.5 gives a Fault Tree for a derailment occurrence at an S&C, this Fault Tree analysis was 
completed as part of the work presented in this chapter. This analysis has been based on past studies 
and the failure data presented earlier in this chapter. Here, the derailment can occur through either 
over speeding or through a failure of the S&C system. In the latter case, for a derailment to occur, the 
train must cross the S&C with sufficient speed to cause a derailment and there must be a hazardous 
failure on the S&C. The S&C system failure states that can cause a derailment are split into four 
scenarios: the first is a poor geometry of the S&C, the second is wear on the S&C, causing the wheel 
to climb the rails, the third is a discontinuity in the rails on the S&C, and the fourth is an incorrect 
position of the switch rails. Each of these scenarios has contributing component failures, which are 
shown in the Fault Tree and expanded on later in this chapter.  
There are two scenarios by which a train can pass over a failed S&C at a sufficient speed to cause a 
derailment. Firstly, the failure may not have been detected, hence the train passes over at full speed. 
Secondly, a speed restriction may be in place, but the speed restriction may be insufficient to prevent 
the derailment, due to further degradation of the system following the application of the restriction. 
For the models presented in this chapter, it is assumed that if there is a closure of the S&C then no 
train will pass through. 
 
Figure 4.5: A Fault Tree for a derailment at an S&C 
There are several methods by which a failure can be detected to prevent a train passing over the S&C 
either completely, or at full speed. Firstly, a failure may be detected through inspection and testing of 
the components of the S&C. Secondly, for some components the failure may be detected 
automatically. For instance, the switch position detector may reveal a failure in the switch position. 
Finally, in some cases, the failure can be detected by the driver, for example a complete rail break. 
These are included in the Petri net models presented in this chapter.  
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This Fault Tree is used as a starting point for the Petri net models presented in this chapter, which 
expand on this system level failure logic to model the S&C in a dynamic way. For the models 
developed in this chapter, the structure of this Fault Tree is used to inform the logic that combines 
component level failures, and the overall state of the system, to model events where a failed condition 
has occurred, and the train has crossed the S&C at a speed sufficient to cause a derailment. The failed 
condition events can be found in the third intermediate layer of the Fault Tree in Figure 4.5. The 
events that feed into these intermediate events are modeled within the Petri net framework for each of 
these failure events. Hence, the combination of the following risk scenarios with an OR logic, 
recreates the logic of the Fault Tree. Hence, the Petri net models developed give the following risk 
scenarios: 
1. There is a hazardous switch position and the train has crossed the S&C at a speed sufficient to 
cause a derailment; 
2. There is a rail break and the train has crossed the S&C at a speed sufficient to cause a 
derailment; 
3. There is a geometry failure and the train has crossed the S&C at a speed sufficient to cause a 
derailment; 
4. There is wear with the potential to cause wheel flange climb and the train has crossed the 
S&C at a speed sufficient to cause a derailment ; 
5. Over speeding causes derailment through the S&C. 
Each of the basic events in the Fault Tree is modelled. These events are combined within a Petri net 
structure, which follows the logic of the Fault Tree. Where these basic events are at the component 
failure level, the condition of the component is modelled with Petri nets, which include the 
degradation of the components involved, the inspection and maintenance, and the strategy for the 
application of any closures or speed restrictions, due to the component condition. In the combination 
of these lower level Petri nets, consideration is given to any applied restrictions or closures, to give 
the derailment occurrence for each of the risk scenarios detailed above. In this Chapter, Section 4.3.1 
gives the component level Petri Net models. Section 4.3.2 gives the system level component 
inspection strategy model. Section 4.3.3 gives the system level maintenance scheduling model. 
Section 4.3.4 gives the models that implement the component level models, along with any 
restrictions applied to the S&C and a consideration of over-speeding, to recreate the risk scenarios 
detailed above. 
In the models presented in this Chapter, the geometry failure intermediate failure event includes 
contributions from the condition of the ballast, sleepers and clips. The rail break intermediate event 
includes breaks in the switch rails, running rails, stock rails, crossing nose or check rails. The wear 
intermediate event includes wear on the switch rails, running rails, stock rails or crossing nose. The 
hazardous switch position intermediate event includes incorrect alignment, switch rail obstruction, 
signal failure, locking device failure, stretcher bar or supplementary drive failure, POE failure and dry 
slide chairs.  
4.2.2: Non-traditional Petri Net Transitions used in the Models: 
There are several extensions to the typical transitions used in a Stochastic Petri net, which are 
incorporated in the models presented in this chapter. These have also been cited in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis. These include Partial Reset Transitions, Full Reset Transitions, Probability Transitions and 
Conditional Transitions: [64] 
 On the firing of a Partial Reset Transition, certain specified places are returned to their initial 
marking. These transitions are used to represent replacement or maintenance actions. For 
example, a partial reset transition, modelling the replacement of a rail, returns the marking of 
all places that model the condition of the rail to the initial marking. Where this initial marking 
corresponds to the ‘good as new’ state for the rail.  
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 On the firing of a Full Reset Transition, all places, except for those that are identified as 
counting actions or time, are returned to their initial marking. These transitions are used to 
represent full system replacement. For example, on the full replacement of the S&C, all 
components are assumed to return to the ‘good as new’ state. When the full reset transition 
fires, modelling this action, all places corresponding to the system state are returned to their 
initial marking. Where the initial marking corresponds to the ‘good as new’ state. 
 Probability Transitions represent situations where there can only be one result out of several. 
In these transitions there are several output places, each with an assigned probability to 
represent the likelihood of each situation occurring. On the firing of a probability transition, 
only one output place is marked, and the choice is weighted by the assigned probability. This 
is used for situations where there is a probability that an action will either be a success or 
failure. For example, a probability can be assigned to the success or failure of an inspection 
action. A probability transition can model this such that either the place corresponding to the 
success, or the failure, is marked following firing of the transition.  
 Conditional Transitions have several distributions associated with them and a connected 
place, known as a conditional place. Each time the conditional transition becomes active the 
distribution is chosen for each firing occurrence, based on the number of tokens marking its 
conditional place. These transitions are used where maintenance actions do not return a 
component to the ‘good as new’ state. For example, if repeated tamping actions impact the 
future degradation rate of the ballast, a conditional transition can be used to model the 
degradation, with a conditional place that counts the number of tamping actions between 
ballast replacements. The firing time of the conditional transition, that models the 
degradation, can then vary depending on the marking of the conditional place.  
 Global Transitions can be used to replace inspection loops. The transition is assigned a 
periodic time interval, and if the transition is enabled then the firing time is determined by the 
remainder of the total simulation time when divided by multiples of the periodic time interval. 
These transitions are used in the sleeper and clip model, to model component inspection, 
where there are multiple repeated unit models, to improve the efficiency of the model. 
4.2.3: Component Level Model Specification  
In the models developed in this Chapter, the components of the S&C are modelled. The condition of 
the components across the system can impact the system state and combined failures can result in the 
occurrence of one of the intermediated failure events detailed in the previous section. This section 
gives a summary of the component models presented in this Chapter and details the process for 
deciding the number of states modelled for each component. 
The components in each Petri net module were identified from past studies [133][138]. In the 
proposed model, the degradation of each component is represented by the discretization of the 
component condition into states ranging from the ‘‘as good as new’ state’ to the failed state. Different 
components have different numbers of assigned states, based on the existence of measurable metrics 
to quantify degraded states of the component in question. The number of defined states is chosen 
based on the existence of measurable quantities to define these states and their associated maintenance 
actions. For instance, if a component can have the same maintenance action, but applied with two 
different condition dependant scheduling delays, then two degraded states are included. Likewise, if a 
component can have two different maintenance actions, depending on the type of degradation, then 
two states are included. Where intermediate degraded states exist for a component, the states are 
categorized by measures of each component condition. For example, the vertical track alignment can 
be used as a measure of ballast condition [139]. The measure used for the condition of each 
component can vary depending on the model application and data available, however, it must be 
consistent and provide a good representation of the condition of each component. Threshold values 
must be assigned to define the upper and lower limits of each discreet state, where they exist.  
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In the models presented in this chapter, where there are multiple degraded states for a component, the 
relevant maintenance actions are completed after a time delay which is specified for each detected 
degraded state. For example, more severely degraded states have a maintenance action scheduled 
following a shorter delay than less degraded states. The latter states can also trigger the application of 
speed restrictions or closures. Where condition monitoring of the component is not quantifiable, age-
based maintenance, and application of restrictions such as system closure or speed restrictions, has 
been modelled.  
A full description of each model and the associated Petri net is given in Section 4.3 of this thesis. 
Each component can have a number of states depending on the condition and the type of defect. 
Figure 4.6 details the options for the assigning of the states to each component defect. The figure 
shows the four different interventions that are modelled for each component defect: early preventative 
maintenance, routine preventative maintenance, priority maintenance with speed restrictions and 
priority maintenance with closure. There are two options for the number of modelled states of each 
component defect:  
1) Option 1: component states can be quantified by a numerical measure for the defect, five 
states are modelled such that each intervention is triggered if the component defect 
reaches the corresponding state. Interventions link to the states as follows: 
i) If the component is in state s1, do nothing,  
ii) If the component is in state s2, early preventative maintenance can be applied if 
opportunistic strategies are implemented.  
iii) If the component is in state s3, apply routine preventative maintenance.  
iv) If the component is in state s4, apply priority maintenance and speed restrictions.  
v) If the component is in state s5, apply priority maintenance and closure.  
2) Option 2: component states cannot be quantified by a numerical measure for the defect, 
only the working and failed states are modelled, but interventions are applied based on 
age-based intervals. Interventions link to states and age-based times as follows: 
i) If the component has been in use less than the first defined time, do nothing,  
ii) If the component has been in use for the first defined time, early preventative 
maintenance can be applied if opportunistic strategies are implemented.  
iii) If the component has been in use for the second defined time, apply routine 
preventative maintenance.  
iv) If the component has been in use for the third defined time, apply priority 
maintenance and speed restrictions.  
v) If the component is in state s5, apply priority maintenance and closure.  




Figure 4.6: A figure describing component state modelling options 
In the models five states are preferred, if the condition of the defect in the component can be 
quantified, in order from working through failed. So that each state can correspond to a different 
system requirement as follows: no maintenance, opportunistic maintenance, routine maintenance, 
priority maintenance with speed restrictions and priority maintenance with closure.  
The model also considers cases where a component can have different types of defect, where the 
maintenance action applied depends on the type of defect present for the component. In this case, each 
type of defect is modelled with either two or five states, depending on if the states can be quantified. 
Hence, the different maintenance actions are applied depending on the severity and type of defect. For 
instance, if a component had two measurable defects, where each defect had a different associated 
maintenance action, then five states would be used for each defect type. This allows the model to 
consider cases where a maintenance action improves one aspect of the component condition, but not 
another aspect of the component condition. Section 4.2.4 discusses the system states further, for cases 
where the states can be quantified by a numeric measure.  
An overview of each component model, and the features for each, follows: 
Ballast 
It is assumed in this chapter that the ballast condition contributes to the vertical track geometry, but 
that the remaining elements of the track base remain in a good condition throughout. The model can 
be extended to incorporate the extra elements if required. The ballast is modelled with five discreet 
states of degradation, each of which can be detected by considering changes in the vertical track 
geometry. This is explained further in Section 4.2.4 of this thesis. Ballast tamping and undercutting 
actions are included in the model. It is assumed that ballast tamping has a negative impact on future 
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Five discreet states, intervention is applied depending on state, for example, if it is found that the 






Working and failed states modelled only, intervention is applied based on age of the component or if a 
failed state is identified, for example, if a component has been in use for a defined time threshold then 
priority maintenance and speed restrictions are applied. 
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Sleepers and Clips  
In the models presented in this chapter, each of the sleepers and clips are modelled individually. To 
demonstrate the methodology, ten sleepers with ten associated pairs of clips are modelled. This was 
deemed sufficient to demonstrate the methodology; the number should be extended to the true number 
in a physical system during application. Each of the sleepers or pairs of clips are modelled with two 
states: the working state and the failed state. Hence, there is a working sleeper state, a working clip 
state, a failed sleeper state and a failed clip state. A failed state can be discovered by considering 
changes in the horizontal track geometry. The behaviour of the population of sleepers and clips is also 
considered in this model. There are two failure modes assumed for the population of sleepers and 
clips. If there are two consecutive sleepers, or clips, in the failed state or three sleepers, or clips, in the 
failed state across the S&C, then the overall condition is deemed to be in the first failed state. It is 
assumed that in this state speed restrictions are required. If there are three consecutive sleepers, or 
clips, in the failed state or four sleepers, or clips, in the failed state across the S&C, then the overall 
condition is deemed to be in the second, more severe, failed state. It is assumed that in this state 
closure of the S&C is required. These thresholds for defining each failed state can be adjusted when 
applying the model to a specific S&C. In this chapter, individual sleeper or clip replacement is 
modelled, where the replacement of the sleepers also includes the replacement of the clips on the 
sleeper in question. Conversely, clips can be replaced in isolation. In addition, replacement of the 
population of sleepers and clips is modelled.  
Rails  
The fixed rails in the S&C, including the running rails and stock rails, are modelled in the same Petri 
net in this chapter. There are three degradation mechanisms modelled for the rails relating to: sub-
surface cracking, loss of railhead material and surface cracking, rolling contact fatigue and wear. For 
each degradation pathway there are five discreet states, from the working state through to the failed 
state. These states are discussed further in Section 4.2.4. The categories are detailed further in 
Appendix 1, along with suggested state quantification methods. Depending on the discovered 
condition of the rails, including the level of degradation and the category of the defect, different 
maintenance actions are applied. In this chapter, rail grinding, or rail replacement is modelled. The 
chosen action depends on the category of the defect. For instance, rail grinding is applied for low level 
surface defects. From these rail models, two failure modes are gained, one relating to a rail break and 
one relating to a critical level of wear. The failure mode is dependent on the defect type that caused 
the failure. For instance, in this model, wear and subsurface cracking are both modelled, if the wear 
reaches a critical point then a wear failure event is triggered and if the cracking reaches a critical point 
then a rail break failure event is triggered.  
The switch rails are modelled separately. The model for the switch rails also includes a pathway 
representing the alignment of the switch rails to the stock rails, and a corresponding maintenance 
action representing the adjustment of the switch rail alignment. Consequently, a third failure mode is 
gained from this model, which represents a failure in the switch rail alignment.  
Crossing nose 
Three degradation pathways are modelled in this chapter for the crossing nose. These are surface 
cracking, sub-surface cracking and deformation. Each of the degradation pathways has five discreet 
states and depending on the discovered condition of the crossing nose, including the severity and the 
category of defect, different maintenance actions are applied. In the model, replacement, grinding and 
welding actions are included. Two failure modes are gained from this part of the model, one 





In this chapter, two degradation pathways are modelled for the check rails. These are deformation of 
the check rail and lateral cracking. Five discreet states are modelled for each degradation pathway. 
Depending of the discovered state and category of any detected defects, grinding or replacement of 
the check rails is applied. Two failure modes are gained from the model, one representing a break in 
the check rail and one representing a critical level of deformity in the check rail. 
Stretcher bar 
The stretcher bar model has five discreet states from the working state to the failed state. These states 
represent the degradation of the stretcher bar at worsening levels. This degradation includes cracking, 
bending or corrosion of the stretcher bars. The replacement of the stretcher bars, with an urgency 
dependant on the severity of the state, is modelled in this chapter. One failure mode is gained from 
this model, representing a failure in the stretcher bar such that the switch rails do not maintain the 
correct gauge.  
Slide chairs 
In this chapter, two degradation pathways are modelled for the slide chairs, each with five discreet 
states. The first pathway represents cracking, wear or corrosion of the slide chairs. The second 
degradation pathway represents deterioration in the lubrication of the slide chairs. In addition, a 
transition is included that represents a blockage of the slide chairs by an external source. Two 
maintenance actions are included in the models. The first is replacement of the slide chairs and the 
second is clearing and lubrication of the slide chairs. These are applied depending on the severity and 
category of a discovered slide chair defect. One failure mode is gained from the model, representing a 
condition of the slide chairs such that the switch rails are prevented from moving correctly, due to 
either a blockage or dry slide chairs.  
POE and locking device  
Five discreet states of the POE are modelled in this chapter, from the working state through to the 
failed state. Replacement of the POE is included, depending on any detected degraded states. A 
failure mode is gained whereby the POE fails to move the switch rails into full contact with the stock 
rails.  
Two states are modelled for the locking device: the working state and the failed state. Replacement of 
the locking device upon the discovery of a failure is modelled, along with age-based maintenance at 
three adjustable time intervals. A failure mode is gained whereby the locking device fails to lock the 
switch rails in place. 
Switch position detector 
Two states for the switch position detector are modelled: the working state and the failed state. 
Replacement of the switch position detector, on the discovery of a failure is modelled. In addition, 
three age-based maintenance actions, at adjustable intervals, are included. A failure mode is gained 
where the switch position detector is in the failed state and hence cannot reveal a failed switch 
position.  
External signal failure 
An external signal failure is also modelled in this chapter. There are two failure modes for the signal 
failure. The first represents a failure when the switch rail is falsely unlocked. The second represents a 
safe failure when the switch rail remains locked in place. This model can be expanded to model the 




The next section of this chapter gives a description of the quantification method for the different 
system states described in this section, where the states of the component can be identified by a 
measurable quantity.  
4.2.4: Quantification of system states 
For the Petri net models presented in this chapter, the condition of some of the components is 
discretized into five different states, as described in Section 4.2.3. In these cases, the condition of the 
component is classified by a measurable value ( ), which lies between threshold values that define 
boundaries of each state (  ,   ,   ,   ,   ,   ). Each component can have different maintenance 
actions, or maintenance scheduling delays, depending on the severity of the components’ state. Five 
possible states are included in this model to enable five discreet action sequences on the component, 
depending on the component condition. These five resultant action sequences are described in Table 
4.1. The model can be adjusted to include extra states if there are further associated action sequences, 
at the expense of increasing the model complexity.  
 Action sequences modelled 
State I Regular inspection of component 
State II Optional opportunistic maintenance and regular inspection 
State III Maintenance and regular inspection 
State IV Maintenance, speed restrictions and regular inspection 
State V Maintenance and closure 
Table 4.1: The component condition dependent action sequences for the model 
This discretization into five states, governed by a measurable threshold, is applied in several areas of 
the model, with the following measures suggested for the value of  . As an example of this 
quantification, the ballast states can be quantified by a measured difference between the track position 
and ideal position. Here   is this measured distance, and the boundaries (  ,   ,   ,   ,   ,   ) are 
thresholds on this distance, such that different interventions are deemed necessary for the ballast. This 
discretization is also applied to the rail components in the model, Appendix 1 details quantification 
methods for different defects within the rails.  
For some components in the model, for example those where maintenance is completed based on age 
instead of condition and hence the extra states hold no extra relevant information to the model, the 
component condition is discretized into fewer states to improve the efficiency of the model. The 
description in Section 4.2.3 details where this is applied. 
For a successful application of the model, the measure of the component condition and the threshold 
values must accurately represent the component condition, the safety regulations, and the maintenance 
procedures. The states given in Table 4.1, for each relevant component, can be defined as: 
 State I: The component is in the ‘good as new’ state           . The condition of the 
component is such that it does not impact normal operation. 
 State II: The component is in a ‘used’ state           . The component condition is still 
within the threshold for safe operation and classified as within its useful life, however, it can 
be maintained, or replaced, through opportunistic maintenance or an early replacement 
strategy. 
 State III: The component is in a ‘worn’ state           . The component condition is still 
within the threshold for safe operation but has reached a point where routine replacement, or 
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corrective maintenance, is required due to the component approaching the end of its useful 
life. 
 State IV: The component is in a ‘degraded’ state           .  The component condition 
is outside the threshold for safe operation. Speed restrictions need to be applied and priority 
replacement, or corrective maintenance, is required. 
 State V: The component is in a ‘dangerous failed’ state        . The component condition 
can cause derailment if a train passes over the S&C. Closure of the S&C and emergency 
replacement, or corrective maintenance, is required. 
Historic data can be collected for the S&C type under consideration and this can be compared to past 
studies, expert opinion, or data collected from similar S&Cs to determine the state threshold values 
and transition delays between states [130]. These distributions are used to govern the degradation of 
components in the model. Distributions can also be assigned for inspection intervals and the different 
delays for scheduling and completing maintenance activities. These delays can be found from 
historical records, based on the current asset management strategy, or in the case of testing different 
strategy effectiveness, can be chosen from a selection of possible asset management strategies. The 
quantification of each of the states for each component is dependent on the component in question. A 
suggestion for this quantification is given for each of the relevant components in Section 4.3.1 of this 
chapter.  
In some cases, the corrective maintenance of a component does not return the state of the component 
to the ‘good as new’ state. This results in faster rates of degradation following the maintenance action; 
this is assumed in this model for the tamping of ballast or grinding of track rails [140] [141].  In these 
cases, the rate of ageing of the component is dependent on the number of previous interventions. To 
incorporate this, Conditional Transitions are used, where several distributions are assigned to each 
Conditional Transition and the distribution used each time the transition fires is chosen based on the 
number of previous maintenance actions [139]. 
4.3: Model Descriptions 
In this section, the Petri net models for the components degradation, inspection and maintenance are 
given. The models presented in this section contain places representing the revealed and unrevealed 
degraded, or failed, states of each of the components. If a components state is unrevealed, then 
carrying out an inspection is necessary to reveal it [142]. In each case, there is a probability associated 
with the failure of the inspection to correctly identify the state of the component. Once the state is 
revealed, appropriate maintenance activities and protection measures are applied. At the end of this 
section, Petri net models are presented for the overall maintenance strategy of the S&C and 
derailment occurrence by cause.  
For each component, or group of components, there is a degradation, inspection and maintenance 
model. Each model is split into two layers, with each layer split into two further sections. Figure 4.7 is 
an example of the first layer in a model. The first layer of each model contains the unrevealed states 
of the components in the top section, this section is shaded orange, as in Figure 4.7. The first layer of 
each model also contains the inspection strategy and the revealed states of the components in its 
bottom section, this section is shaded blue, as in Figure 4.7. Figure 4.8 is an example of a second layer 
of a model. The second layer of each model includes the maintenance activities in the bottom section, 
shaded green, as in Figure 4.8. The second layer also includes the implementation of speed 
restrictions or closure of the S&C, either for maintenance or due to a hazardous condition, in the top 
section, shaded in red as in Figure 4.8.  
Delays due to maintenance activity are included and represent maintenance scheduling and the time 
taken for the maintenance to be completed. These scheduling delays are dependent on the severity of 
each state. For every component, its replacement is modelled. In addition, for some components, there 
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are multiple maintenance options. Across the whole system, the following maintenance options are 
modelled: 
 Component replacement  
 Whole system replacement 
 Ballast tamping 
 Undercutting 
 Rail grinding 
 Rail re-alignment 
 Welding 
 Lubrication and clearing 
Replacement of a component is assumed to return that component to the as ‘good as new’ state for all 
modelled defect types. Reset transitions are used for this. Other maintenance options are assumed to 
only impact certain aspects of the component condition and so only partially reset the condition of the 
relevant component’s degradation. For example, rail grinding is assumed to improve the condition of 
the rails in terms of surface cracking and rolling contact fatigue, but it is also assumed that this action 
will not improve the condition of the rails in terms of sub-surface cracking.  
In the following section, for each component model, first, the component degradation and 
maintenance models are presented. Following this the system level inspection and maintenance 
strategy models are presented and finally the risk scenario models are presented. 
The overall state of the S&C is also modelled in this chapter. Five system level states are modelled: 
the open state, the state with speed restrictions, a closed state for maintenance, a closed state due to 
condition and a closed state following a derailment. The final state is assumed to last a short time only 
and is included to prevent repeated derailments at the same instance. If the system is in any of the 
closed states, a derailment cannot occur. If the system is in a speed restricted state, it is assumed that a 
derailment can occur, only if a component within the S&C reaches a hazardous failed state while the 
restriction is applied. These system states are applied depending on the condition of the components 
across the model. When certain places are marked, this alters the state of the system from the working 
state to another state as detailed in Table 4.2. These places allow the system state, over time, to be 
output from the model. The results for this can be seen in Section 4.4 of this chapter.  
Places Interpretation 
X1 There are speed restrictions applied to the S&C due to condition  
X2 The S&C is closed for maintenance  
X3 The S&C is closed due to poor condition 
X4 The S&C is closed due to a derailment  
Table 4.2: The interpretation of each of the system state places used in the models in this chapter 
There are also several common places used across the models to govern system level maintenance 
strategies. The places govern the system level activation of different maintenance actions. For 
instance, these ensure that if similar maintenance actions are required at the same time, then they are 
completed in the same visit. If opportunistic maintenance is enabled across the model, then when a 
team visits the S&C for a component that requires maintenance, opportunistic maintenance of any 
further components in the S&C, which are not in the working state and have similar maintenance 
actions, are also completed. There is a delay time associated with that time that this opportunistic 
maintenance is available to other components, which can be varied according to application. This is 
discussed further in Section 4.3.3 of this thesis. The opportunistic maintenance behaviour, and 
maintenance availability in general, is governed by the marking of the places in Table 4.2. These 
places are implemented further in Section 4.3.1 and Section 4.3.3 of this chapter, where models for 
maintenance activation across the system are presented. The models presented there link the 
component models through system level maintenance strategies. The places given in Table 4.2 are 




Om1 Opportunistic maintenance is enabled 
Ot1 Opportunistic ballast tamping is enabled 
Ou1 Opportunistic ballast undercutting is enabled 
Og1 Opportunistic rail grinding is enabled 
Ym1 Maintenance is enabled 
Yt1 Tamping is enabled 
Yu1 Ballast undercutting is enabled 
Yg1 Rail grinding is enabled 
Table 4.3: A table of the system level maintenance places 
4.3.1: Component degradation and maintenance models 
In this section components are modelled in detail to allow: 
 Unsuccessful inspection of components to be considered, so that hazards arising from 
undetected failures are modelled.  
 Multiple maintenance actions to be applied to a component, where these actions may only 
improve certain aspects of the component condition, and hence fail to return the component to 
the ‘as good as new’ state.  
 Maintenance actions to be modelled that impact the future degradation rate of components. 
 Different maintenance scheduling delays to be modelled, where these delays are dependent on 
the severity of the component condition.  
 System wide opportunistic maintenance strategies, where components can be replaced early if 
maintenance resources are already allocated to the S&C.  
 The modelling of a population of identical components, to consider their interactions, as is 
applied in the sleeper and clip model.  
This detailed modelling allows decision makers to consider different condition-based and system level 
maintenance decisions, and removes typical assumptions of perfect maintenance and inspection. The 
latter is of particular importance when modelling hazard occurrence, to prevent assumptions that the 
component is in a better state than reality. These assumptions could lead to insufficient prevention 
action and increase the likelihood of the hazard occurring.  
Opportunistic maintenance is also included in the models. Here, components can be replaced early, 
based on either age or condition, if there are already maintenance resources allocated to the S&C. A 
penalty can be included into the model to account for the loss of useful life for early replaced 
components, however in this model this is deemed to be accounted for within the physical cost of 
more frequent component replacement over the life-cycle. For example, if a component is always 
replaced early, accounting for a higher number of replacement components over the lifetime, then 
there is an inherent increased life-cycle cost, attributed to the larger number of components required 
over the life-cycle. Each of the component models are presented in the following sections. 
Condition of the track geometry due to ballast sleeper and clip condition 
This section presents models for the ballast, sleepers and clips and models the impact that these can 
have on the track geometry, such that a derailment may occur. The first models presented concern the 
modelling of the ballast. The first layer of this model includes the condition of the ballast, where the 
ballast condition is modelled with five states, from working through to a failed state that causes 
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sufficient risk of derailment. The state of the ballast can be quantified by the impact that the ballast 
condition has on the track geometry. The second layer of this model includes the maintenance and 
application of system level speed restrictions or closure.  
Figure 4.7 gives the first layer of the model which includes modelling of the degradation of the 
ballast, along with inspection. Figure 4.8 gives the second layer of the model, this includes the 
maintenance of the ballast and the application of system level state changes. Table 4.4 gives a 
description of each of the places in these two layers.  
In the model in Figure 4.7, the orange shaded region models the degradation of the ballast, with the 
good state on the left (State I), represented by place C1, through to the failed state on the right (State 
V), represented by place C6. The intermediate degraded states lie between these, represented by 
places P1, P2 and P3 and correspond to State II, State III and State IV for the ballast condition, 
respectively. These states, in the orange shaded region, are unrevealed. The transitions between these 
states, t1, t2, t3 and t4, are conditional on the number of previous ballast tamping actions since the 
most recent replacement or undercutting action. The place C7 counts the number of such actions, so 
that transitions t1, t2, t3, and t4 have distributions governing their firing times that are dependent on 
the number of tokens in place C7.  
The blue shaded region, in Figure 4.7, models the inspection of the ballast. Manual inspection is 
enabled when Place P4 is marked. Automated measurement, such as that carried out with a track 
recording vehicle, is enabled when Place P7 is marked. The marking of Place P5 or Place P8 
represents a failure in each inspection method respectively. The discovered states of the ballast are 
also shown here by places C2, C3, C4 and C5. Place C2 corresponds to a discovered degraded state 
corresponding to the unrevealed degraded state represented by place P1. Place C3 corresponds to a 
discovered degraded state corresponding to the unrevealed degraded state represented by place P2. 
Place C4 corresponds to a discovered degraded state corresponding to the unrevealed degraded state 
represented by place P3. Place C5 corresponds to a discovered failed state corresponding to the 
unrevealed failed state represented by place C6. 
 
Figure 4.7: A Petri net model for degradation of the ballast. 
After the identification of an imperfect state of the ballast, different maintenance actions can be used 
to improve the track geometry and component condition [143] [144] [145]. There are two 












































 Tamping of ballast to restore the vertical track geometry. This leads to a breakdown of ballast 
stones reducing the ballast condition on repeated tamping actions, which is incorporated 
through conditional Transitions (t1, t2, t3 and t4) in the model;  
 Undercutting of the ballast, to improve vertical track geometry, where ballast condition is 
returned to State I, due to the replacement of the ballast. 
Figure 4.8 gives the second layer of the ballast model. Here, the green shaded region models the 
maintenance of the ballast, with undercutting on the left and tamping on the right. It is assumed that a 
full replacement of the ballast does not happen in isolation, and so only occurs as part of a full system 
replacement. Depending on which maintenance action is enabled, one of tamping or undercutting of 
the ballast is completed. When the places, Yu1 and Yt1 are marked, then undercutting or tamping are 
enabled respectively. The activation of these processes is modelled in Section 4.3.3 of this chapter. 
Depending on the severity of the state, a different scheduling delay can be assigned to either 
maintenance action. For instance, when place P10 is marked the delay for scheduling and 
undercutting begins for a discovered State II defect. Similarly, when place P11 is marked the delay for 
scheduling and undercutting begins for a discovered State III defect. When place P12 is marked the 
delay for scheduling and undercutting begins for a discovered State IV defect. Finally, when place 
P13 is marked a delay for scheduling and undercutting begins for a discovered ballast failure (State 
V). This pattern is mirrored on the right hand side of the green shaded region for places P16, P17, P18 
and P19, but tamping is scheduled instead of undercutting. 
The red shaded region in Figure 4.8 ensures that the correct scheduling delay is assigned. This is done 
through transitions t35-t46. The red shaded region also applies any system level state changes, due to 
the ballast condition, through transitions t47, t48, t49 and t50. Here, place X2 represents a closure of 
the S&C due to a maintenance action, place X1 represents speed restrictions on the S&C, and place 
X3 represents a closure due to a hazardous failure. 
 




















































































C1, P1, P2, P3, 
C6 
The unrevealed condition states of the ballast in ascending order of state from State I to 
State V 
C7 The number of tamping actions of the ballast since the most recent replacement 
P6 Manual inspection is underway 
P5 The number of failed manual inspections  
P9 Automated geometry measurement is underway 
P8 The number of failed automated geometry measurements 
C2, C3, C4, C5 The revealed condition states of the ballast in ascending order of state from State II to State 
V 
P16, P17, P18, 
P19 
Ballast tamping is scheduled following a delay for each state in ascending order of severity 
P10, P11, P12, 
P13 
Ballast undercutting is scheduled following a delay for each state in ascending order of 
severity 
P20, P15 A completed ballast tamp or ballast undercut, respectively 
P21, P14 Counts the number of completed ballast tamp or ballast undercut, respectively 
Table 4.4: A description of each of the places in the ballast module 
The second set of models in this section concern the modelling of the sleepers and clips. These 
models do not follow the same structure as the other component models in this chapter, such that is 
described in the introduction of Section 4.3 of this thesis. This is because the sleeper and clip model 
differs as it considers each sleeper and clip unit separately, and combines these to model the 
population of sleepers and clips. Following this model, the remaining component models in this 
chapter follow the expected structure. 
For illustration of the model it is assumed that there are 10 sleepers across the S&C, with a pair of 
clips attached to each sleeper. This can be extended, if required, to model a specific S&C, following 
the same logic. In this model, a module is used to represent the condition of each sleeper and pair of 
attached clips. Each of the sleepers or pair of clips is modelled with two states: the working and the 
failed state. It is assumed that multiple failures of the sleepers or clips can cause a derailment by 
impacting the track geometry. The behaviour of the population of sleepers, and associated clips, is 
used to determine the risk of the system and the application of any restrictions or closures. There are 
two failure modes modelled for the sleeper and clip units. The first failure mode is modelled when 
there are failures in two consecutive units, either due to the sleepers themselves or the attached clips, 
or there are three failed units across the S&C. In this case speed restrictions are applied. A derailment 
may still occur in this case, but a delay is introduced to model the derailment with a low likelihood. 
The second failure mode is modelled where there are three consecutive unit failures, or four or more 
failed units across the S&C. Here it is assumed that a derailment will occur if a train passes over the 
S&C. 
The model for a unit containing a sleeper and a pair of clips is given in Figure 4.9. The orange shaded 
region models the failure of the sleeper or clips. Place SL1_n represents the working state of the 
sleeper and place CL1_n represents the working state of its attached clips. The failure of the sleeper is 
modelled by transition t1 and the failure of the clips in modelled by transition t4. Place SL2_n 
represents a failed state of the sleeper and Place CL2_n represents a failed state in either of the clips. 
Place MF_n is marked if the sleeper and clip unit is in the failed state due to the clips or the sleepers. 
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Inspection is governed by transition t2 for the sleeper and t5 for the clips. A global transition is used 
here to reduce the computational cost of simulating multiple models, under the assumption that a 
failure in the sleeper or clips is always detected on inspection.  
In the model in Figure 4.9, place SCR is marked if there is a full replacement of all sleepers and clips 
underway this is marked by the model in Figure 4.11. The marking of this place prevents individual 
sleeper or clip replacement when a full replacement is already scheduled. If a failure is detected in the 
sleeper and clip unit, then replacement of the unit is scheduled and the green shaded regions model 
this. In this model if the sleepers are replaced, modelled by transition t3, then it is assumed that the 
clips on the sleeper are also replaced. However, if the clips are replaced, shown by transition t6, then 
the sleeper is not replaced. Places Ym1 and Om1 correspond to those used through the component 
models, such that if a sleeper or clip replacement is underway, other maintenance actions across the 
S&C are also enabled. The red shaded area in the model marks the place corresponding to closure of 
the S&C while maintenance is underway. Table 4.5 describes each of the places in this model. 
 
Figure 4.9: The module modelling a unit of one sleeper and its associated pair of clips 
Places Interpretation 
SL1_n The sleeper is in the working state 
SL2_n The sleeper is in the failed state 
SL3_n The sleeper is in a revealed failed state 
CL1_n The clips are in the working state 
CL2_n The clips are in the failed state 
CL3_n The clips are in the revealed failed state 
C1 Counts the number of sleeper replacements 
C1 Counts the number of clip replacements 
P28 Triggers scheduling of maintenance due to a revealed failed sleeper condition 
P29 Triggers scheduling of maintenance due to a revealed failed clip condition 








































MT10 Prevents duplicate maintenance activities for the same failure, the place is reset on maintenance to 
allow future maintenance actions. 
SCR There is full replacement of the sleepers and clips underway 
Table 4.5: A description for the places in the sleeper and clip module 
This unit module is repeated ten times to give places MF_n, for n in [1,10]. These individual unit 
failures are considered as a population in the model in Figure 4.10. In this model, each of these places, 
from the individual unit modules, can be found from left to right in the un-shaded section of the 
model. The top shaded section marks the place N_SCF with the total number of sleeper or clip units 
that are in the failed state. The middle, shaded section marks the place N_SC2 with the number of 
pairs of consecutive sleeper and clip units that are in the failed state. The bottom shaded section marks 
place N_SC3 with the number of triplets of consecutive sleeper and clip units that are in the failed 
state. These places summarise the behaviour of the population of sleepers and clips across the S&C. 
Table 4.6 gives the description of each of the places in the model. 
 
Figure 4.10: A model combining individual sleeper and clip units to give the population failure modes 
Places Interpretation 
N_SCF There is a failure in a sleeper and clip module 
N_SC2 There is a failure in two consecutive sleeper and clip modules 
N_SC3 There is a failure in three consecutive sleeper and clip modules 
MF_1, MF_2, MF_3, MF_4, 
MF_5, MF_6, MF_7, MF_8, 
MF_9, MF_10 
There is a failure in an individual sleeper and clip module, where these are 
found by the repeating model given in Figure 4.9. 
P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, 
P9, P10 
Prevents double counting of individual sleeper and clip failures 
P11, P12, P13, P14, P15, P16, 
P17, P18, P19 
Prevents double counting of situations where there are failures in two 
sleeper and clip modules at the same time 
P20, P21, P22, P23, P24, P25, 
P26, P27 
Prevents double counting of situations where there are failures in three 
sleeper and clip modules at the same time 
Table 4.6: Place description for the model for the combination of individual sleeper and clip failures 
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The Petri net in Figure 4.11 models the behaviour of the population of sleepers and clips to consider 
the application of system level speed restrictions or closure, due to the sleeper and clip condition. 
Place C8 corresponds to a failure of two consecutive sleeper and clip units, or three non-consecutive 
sleeper and clip unit failures across the S&C. Inspection, modelled by the global transition t32, can 
discover this failure. In this case speed restrictions are applied, modelled by transition t34, and each of 
the failed units are replaced individually. Place C9 corresponds to a failure of three consecutive 
sleeper and clip units, or four or more non-consecutive failed sleeper and clip units across the S&C. If 
this place is marked than a derailment can occur if a train passes over the S&C. If the state is revealed 
by inspection, then place P31 is marked. This triggers replacement of all sleeper and clip units over 
the S&C. This full replacement is modelled by the green shaded region, where transition t35 models 
the closure of the S&C due to poor condition of the sleepers and clips. This full replacement 
maintenance action resets all the sleeper and clip unit models to the ‘as good as new’ state. Table 4.7 
gives the interpretation of the places in this model, where some places can be found in Table 4.5 and 
Table 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.11: A model applying system level actions based on the population behaviour of the sleeper and clip units 
Places Interpretation 
C8 There are two consecutive sleeper and clip unit failures or three non-consecutive sleeper and 
clip unit failures. 
C9 There are three consecutive sleeper and clip unit failures or four non-consecutive sleeper and 
clip unit failures. 
P30 Inspection finds two consecutive sleeper and clip unit failures or three non-consecutive 
sleeper and clip unit failures. 
P31 Inspection finds three consecutive sleeper and clip unit failures or two non-consecutive 
sleeper and clip unit failures. 
P32 Allows scheduling of full system replacement 
Table 4.7: Interpretation of places for the model combining sleeper and clip units to give system level actions 
Rail Components  
This section models several different rail components, whose failure can lead to a derailment [146]. 
The components considered in this section are: the switch rails, the intermediate running rails, the 
stock rails, the crossing nose and the check rails. For each component model there is a first layer that 
represents the ageing and inspection of the component. For each component model there is also a 
second layer that describes the maintenance actions for the component in question and the application 
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of system level speed restrictions or closure. For each component model in this section, visual 
inspection is used to reveal the condition of the rails along with ultra-sonic testing to check for 
weaknesses inside the rails [147]. In this section, the stock rails and intermediate running rails are 
grouped into one model, the fixed rail model, to reduce the complexity of the system model. 
However, if different rates of ageing are available for each of these fixed rails, this fixed rail model 
can be repeated several times for each of the rail types. 
The first model presented in this section is the model for the stock rails and intermediate running rails. 
Figure 4.12 gives the first layer of this model and Figure 4.13 gives the second layer of this model. 
Table 4.8 gives a description of each of the places in this model. 
Figure 4.12 gives the first layer of the Petri net model for the stock rails and intermediate running 
rails. There is a variety of different deterioration mechanisms leading to rail breakage or wear. In this 
model, these are grouped into three categories based on the maintenance and inspection activities 
associated with each, each group is referred to as a degradation pathway. Category 1 contains 
subsurface rail head defects or defects in the rail web or base, Category 2 contains rail head wear that 
results in an unrepairable loss of rail head material and Category 3 contains rail head defects that can 
be managed by rail grinding. The defects included in each category are given in Appendix 1, along 
with suggested methods of quantification of the degraded states of the rails. 
In the first layer of the model presented here, the shaded orange region in Figure 4.12 models the 
degradation of the rails, with each degradation pathway stacked vertically. The states go from the 
working to failed state in the horizontal direction. These states are unrevealed.  
In this orange shaded region, State I through to State IV for Category 1 defects are represented by 
places P1, P3, P6 and P9 respectively. For this category, replacement of the rails is required, and the 
condition of the rails can be inspected visually or by ultrasonic testing. State I through to State V for 
Category 2 defects are represented by places P2, P4, P7, P10 and A10 respectively. For this category, 
replacement of the rails is required, however the condition of the rails is only revealed by visual 
inspection [148]. State I through to State IV for Category 3 defects are represented by places A2, P5, 
P8 and P11 respectively. Rail defects in this category can be rectified or reduced by rail grinding. 
Here it is assumed that replacement of the rails occurs, instead of rail grinding, when the state is 
considered sufficient to cause a derailment. Rail defects in this category can be detected by both 
visual inspection and ultrasonic testing.  
State V for both Category 1 and 3 defects corresponds to a rail break, which is represented by Place 
A9 in the Petri net model. State V for Category 2 defects corresponds to extreme wear on the rails, 
which is represented by Place A10 in the model. Place A1 represents the ‘as good as new’ state for the 
fixed rails, across all categories of defect.  
The blue region in this layer models the inspection of the rails. The discovered states of the rails are 
also contained within the blue region. Places that are filled in dark blue are those that are present 
across multiple modules in the model. For visual inspection and ultrasonic testing there is a 
probability that the state of the rail will not be successfully identified. Place P13 corresponds to the 
activation of visual inspection and Place P21 to the activation of ultrasonic testing. The revealed states 
of the rail are represented by Places A3 through to A8, with Place A12 representing a revealed failure. 
The model also includes the probability of a failed rail being detected by a train driver; this is 




Figure 4.12: A Petri net model for the degradation of the fixed rails. 
The green shaded region in Figure 4.13 models the maintenance of the rails, with replacement on the 
left-hand side and grinding on the right-hand side. Rail grinding is assumed to improve the condition 
of the surface of the rail only, and so this action only resets the places in the bottom degradation 
pathway. Replacement returns the whole degradation model to the ‘as good as new’ state. The blue 
filled places correspond to those in the previous figure. Maintenance actions are implemented 
following a scheduling delay that is dependent on the severity of the state. In this green shaded region, 
transitions t46 through to t49 represent replacement of the fixed rails and Transitions t55 through to 
t57 represent grinding of the fixed rails. For rails with Category 3 defects, it is assumed that repeated 
rail grinding does not return the rail to the ‘as good as new’ state and this is incorporated through 
conditional Transitions t4, t7, t10 and t14, in the Petri net in Figure 4.12. 
The red shaded region in Figure 4.13 has two purposes: the first is to ensure that the correct 
maintenance action is applied, depending on any combined discovered defects and the most severe 
state. This is modelled by transitions t62-t73. The implementation of speed restrictions and S&C 
closure is also considered in this layer of the module with X1, X2 and X3 defined as in the models for 
the track geometry, transitions t74, t75 and t76 model this. 
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Figure 4.13: A Petri net model for the maintenance of the fixed rails. 
Places Interpretation 
A1 The fixed rails are in State I 
P1, P3, P6, P9 The unrevealed states of the fixed rails with Category 1 defects in ascending order 
of state from State I to State IV 
P2, P4, P7, P10, 
A10 
The unrevealed states of the fixed rails with Category 2 defects in ascending order 
of state from State I to State V 
A2, P5, P3, P11 The unrevealed states of the fixed rails with Category 3 defects in ascending order 
of state from State I to State IV 
A9 An unrevealed Category 1 or Category 3 State V defect (a rail break) 
P12, P39 The potential to detect a rail break by a train driver and a failed detection of the 
rail break by a train driver, respectively 
A11 The number of rail grinding actions between rail replacement 
A3, A5, A7 The revealed states of the fixed rails with Category 1 or Category 3 defects in 
ascending order of state from State II to State IV 
A4, A6, A8 The revealed states of the fixed rails with Category 2 defects in ascending order of 
state from State II to State IV 
A12 The revealed state of the fixed rails with any category defect of severity State V. 
P13 Visual inspection of the fixed rails is enabled 
P15 Visual inspection of the fixed rails fails to identify the state 
P14, P17, P18, 
P19, P20 
Successful visual inspection of the fixed rails is underway 
A11/I11 is the number of 
grinding operations
Dark Green transitions 
reset the whole net, 
return the component to 
good as new. R values are 
the sum of the time taken 
for maintenance and also 
the wait that is assigned 
to each maintenance 
type.
Light green transitions are 
partial reset transitions 
and reset the 
correspondingly coloured 
places in the degradation 
net.
S1: resources available 
Blue: number of 
replacements
The conditions are reset 
when replacement or 
grinding occurs.
If worn to the point 
where derailment occurs 
then replace the rails. 
Stock rail or Intermediate Rail (A/I)  maintenance model 
A1












































































P21 Ultrasonic inspection of the fixed rails is enabled 
P23 Ultrasonic inspection of the fixed rails fails to identify the state 
P22, P25, P26, 
P27 
Successful ultrasonic inspection of the fixed rails is underway 
P28, P29, P30, 
P31 
Replacement of the fixed rails is scheduled, with an associated delay, for each 
revealed state in ascending order of severity 
P34, P35, P36 Grinding of the fixed rails is scheduled, with an associated delay, for each 
revealed state in ascending order of severity 
P32, P37 A competed fixed rail replacement action and the number of completed such 
actions, respectively 
P33, P38 A competed fixed rail grinding action and the number of completed such actions, 
respectively 
Table 4.8: A description of each of the places in the fixed rail module 
The second model presented in this section is the model for the switch rails. The switch rails are 
considered in a separate module from the fixed rails in this model, to allow additional modelling of 
their alignment within the S&C. The first layer of the model for the switch rails is given in Figure 
4.14 and the second layer for the switch rail model is given in Figure 4.15. A description of each of 
the places in the switch rail model is given in Table 4.9. 
Similarly to the model for the fixed rails the degradation of switch rails is modelled by the orange 
shaded region in Figure 4.14, with each degradation pathway stacked vertically and states of 
worsening condition from left to right. This region of the model has the same structure as the model 
for the fixed rails, except there is an additional row of states at the bottom of the orange shaded 
region. This additional row, which contains places M3, P47, P51 and P55, corresponds to the 
alignment of the switch rails to the stock rails. The remaining rows within this orange shaded region 
retain the same interpretation as the model for the fixed rails. As with the fixed rails, places in the 
upper pathway represent Category 1 defects, P42, P44, P48 and P52. Places in the second pathway 
represent Category 2 defects, P43, P45, P49 and P53. Places in the third pathway represent Category 3 
defects, M2, P46, P50, P54. Place M1 represents the ‘as good as new’ state for the switch rails for all 
types of defect.  
The inspection of the switch rails is modelled by the blue region in the first layer of this model. 
Similarly, to the model for the fixed rails, ultrasonic testing and visual inspection are incorporated into 
this model to reveal the state of the switch rails, along with detection of a break by the train driver. 
This part of the model has the same structure as the corresponding blue shaded region in the fixed rail 
model, except that there are four additional places, M8, M11, M12 and M14, corresponding to the 




Figure 4.14: A Petri net model for the degradation of the switch rails 
The second layer of the switch rail model is given in Figure 4.15. The region shaded green in Figure 
4.15 models the maintenance of the switch rails, with the replacement modelled on the left hand side, 
grinding modelled in the centre and adjustment of the switch rail alignment modelled on the right 
hand side. This region of the model has the same structure as the green shaded region in the fixed rail 
model, except for the additional transitions and places on the right hand side of the region. These 
additional nodes model the switch rail adjustment, with transitions t147-t155. This adjustment of the 
rails only returns the pathway corresponding to the alignment of the switch rails, modelled in places 
M3, P47, P51 and P55 in the orange shaded region of the model in Figure 4.14, to the ‘as good as 
new’ state. 
The red shaded region in Figure 4.15 applies system state changes with transitions t178, t179, t180, 





























































































































Figure 4.15: A Petri net model for the maintenance of the switch rails 
Places Interpretation 
M1 The switch rails are in State I 
P42, P44, P48, P52 The unrevealed states of the switch rails with Category 1 defects in ascending order of 
state from State I to State IV 
P43, P45, P49, P53, 
M5 
The unrevealed states of the switch rails with Category 2 defects in ascending order of 
state from State I to State V 
M2, P46, P50, P54 The unrevealed states of the switch rails with Category 3 defects in ascending order of 
state from State I to State IV 
M3, P47, P51, P55, 
M17 
The unrevealed alignment states of the switch rails in ascending order of state from 
State I to State V 
M4 An unrevealed Category 1 or Category 3 State V defect (a rail break) 
P56, P40 The potential to detect a rail break by a train driver and a failed detection of the rail 
break by a train driver, respectively 
M16 The number of rail grinding actions between rail replacement 
M6, M9, M14 The revealed states of the switch rails with Category 1 or Category 3 defects in 
ascending order of state from State II to State IV 
M7, M10, M13 The revealed states of the switch rails with Category 2 defects in ascending order of 
state from State II to State IV 
M15 The revealed state of the switch rails with any category defect of severity State V. 
M8, M11, M12, M18 The revealed alignment states of the switch rails in ascending order of state from State 
II to State V 
P57 Visual inspection of the switch rails is enabled 
































































































































P58, P61, P62, P63, 
P64, P65 
Successful visual inspection of the switch rails is underway 
P66 Ultrasonic inspection of the switch rails is enabled 
P68 Ultrasonic inspection of the switch rails fails to identify the state 
P67, P70, P71, P72 Successful ultrasonic inspection of the switch rails is underway 
P73, P74, P75, P76 Replacement of the switch rails is scheduled, with an associated delay, for each revealed 
state in ascending order of severity 
P79, P80, P81 Grinding of the switch rails is scheduled, with an associated delay, for each revealed 
state in ascending order of severity 
P84, P85, P86, P87 Adjustment of the switch rails is scheduled, with an associated delay, for each revealed 
state in ascending order of severity 
P77, P78 A competed switch rail replacement action and the number of completed such actions, 
respectively 
P82, P83 A competed switch rail grinding action and the number of completed such actions, 
respectively 
P88, P89 A competed switch rail adjustment action and the number of completed such actions, 
respectively 
Table 4.9: A description of each of the places in the switch rail module 
The third model in this section considers the crossing nose condition. The first layer of this model, for 
the ageing and inspection of the crossing nose, is given in Figure 4.16. The second layer of this 
model, which considers the maintenance and system level speed restrictions or closure, is given in 
Figure 4.17. A description of each of the places in the model is given in Table 4.10.  
The crossing nose is subject to high lateral forces as a train passes over the S&C. In this model there 
are three ageing mechanisms that can lead to a break or dangerous level of wear in the crossing nose 
[149]. The first mechanism modelled here is surface cracking of the crossing nose. This can be 
quantified by the number or depth of cracks. The second mechanism modelled here is sub-surface 
cracking, which can be quantified by the number or length of cracks. The third mechanism modelled 
here is deformation of the crossing nose, which can be quantified by the measured difference between 
the ideal crossing nose profile and the measured crossing nose profile.  
The degradation processes of the crossing nose are modelled in the region shaded orange in the Petri 
net in Figure 4.16. Each of the ageing mechanisms are stacked vertically, with the states of each 
process arranged from left to right in increasing order of severity. In the orange shaded region of the 
model in Figure 4.16, the first process, represented by places R3, P97, P100 and P103, is surface 
cracking on the crossing nose. The second process, represented by places P96, P98, P101 and P104, is 
sub-surface cracking of the crossing nose. Place R15 corresponds to a State V crack that may have 
originated in either the surface, or sub-surface of the crossing nose. The third process, represented by 
places R4, P99, P102, P105 and R16, is deformation of the crossing nose leading to a failed rail 
profile that can result in wheel flange climb. 
For the first and third process, relating to surface cracking and deformation, respectively, if the 
crossing nose is maintained instead of replaced, it is assumed that the condition does not return to the 
‘as good as new’ state. Hence, future degradation can be faster following a repair action, for instance 
grinding of the crossing nose can remove material, eventually resulting in a break if done repeatedly. 
This is modelled by the conditional transitions, highlighted in orange, in this section of the model. The 
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distributions governing the delay time for these conditional transitions are dependent on the marking 
of place R17, which counts the number of grinding actions, since the last replacement. 
The inspection of the crossing nose is modelled by the blue shaded region. The crossing nose is 
inspected visually, when places P110-P113 are marked, and tested ultrasonically, when places P118-
P120 are marked. This region also contains places that represent the states discovered through 
inspection of the crossing nose. For instance, place R5 is the corresponding discovered state for the 
unrevealed place P97. The pairing of these discovered and undiscovered states can be found by 
looking for the input and output places linked through transitions t196-t213 in this region of the 
model, or by referring to Table 4.10. 
 
Figure 4.16: A Petri net model for the degradation of the crossing nose. 
In Figure 4.17, the green shaded region models the maintenance actions for the crossing nose. The 
maintenance actions in this model for the crossing nose include replacement of the crossing nose, 
welding for low state deformation and grinding for low level surface cracking. These parts of the 
model can be seen within the green shaded region, with replacement on the left, grinding in the 
middle and welding on the right. In the left side of the region transitions t227, t228, t229 and t230 
represent replacement of the crossing nose. In the middle of the region transitions t236, t237 and t238 
represent corrective grinding of the crossing nose. On the right of the region transitions t250, t251 and 
t252 represent welding of the crossing nose. In this model, the grinding and welding of the crossing 
nose is assumed to only improve certain aspects of the crossing nose condition. Welding is assumed to 
improve the deformation in the crossing nose state and grinding is assumed to only improve any 
surface cracking present in the crossing nose [149]. Hence, these maintenance actions only return the 
marking of places corresponding to certain categories of defect in the orange shaded region to an 
improved state. 
The red shaded region of this layer ensures the correct maintenance action is applied, depending on 
the state and the category of defect; this is done through transitions t250-t267. As with the other Petri 
nets presented in this chapter, implementation of protection measures is also included in this layer, 
following the same place definition as the earlier models. Transitions t268-t271 facilitates this. 
Guide rail and Crossing
Cracks are ultrasonic and track patrol
Wear (including mishaping) is track parol
only 
1: Crossing pathways:
-Surface cracking of nose (grinding) both 
inspection.
-Deep cracking of nose (including trasverse
cracks and bolt hold cracks) (replace, both 
inspection)
-Plastic deformation of nose due to strong 




Signalling failure does not reveal crossing 
failure 








































































































Figure 4.17: A Petri net model for the maintenance of the crossing nose. 
Places Interpretation 
R1 The crossing nose is in State I 
R3, P97, P100, P103 The unrevealed surface cracking states of the crossing nose in ascending order of 
state from State I to State IV 
P96, P98, P101, P104 The unrevealed sub-surface cracking states of the crossing nose in ascending order of 
state from State I to State IV 
R15 An unrevealed State V crack in the crossing nose 
R4, P99, P102, P105, 
R16 
The unrevealed deformation states of the crossing nose in ascending order of state 
from State I to State V 
R6, R10, R12 The revealed surface cracking states of the crossing nose in ascending order of state 
from State II to State IV 
R5, R8, R13 The revealed sub-surface cracking states of the crossing nose in ascending order of 
state from State II to State IV 
R14 A revealed State V crack in the crossing nose 
R7, R9, R11 The revealed deformation states of the crossing nose in ascending order of state from 
State II to State V 
R17 Counts the number of grinding or welding operations on the crossing nose between 
replacement 
P106 Visual inspection of the crossing nose is enabled 
P108 Visual inspection of the crossing nose fails to identify the state 
P107, P110, P111, 
P112, P113 
Successful visual inspection of the crossing nose is underway 

















































































































P116 Ultrasonic testing of the crossing nose fails to identify the state 
P118, P119, P120 Successful ultrasonic testing of the crossing nose is underway 
P121, P122, P123, 
P124 
Replacement of the crossing nose is scheduled, following a delay, for each revealed 
state in ascending order 
P127, P128, P129 Grinding of the crossing nose is scheduled, following a delay, for each revealed state 
in ascending order 
P132, P133, P134 Welding of the crossing nose is scheduled, following a delay, for each revealed state 
in ascending order 
P125, P126 A crossing nose replacement is completed, and the number of such actions is counted, 
respectively.  
P130, P131 A crossing nose grinding action is completed, and the number of such actions is 
counted, respectively.  
P135, P136 A crossing nose welding action is completed, and the number of such actions is 
counted, respectively.  
Table 4.10: A description of each of the places for the crossing nose module 
The final model given for rail components considers the check rails. The first layer of this model is 
given in Figure 4.18. The second layer of this model is given by the Petri net in Figure 4.19. A 
description of each of the places is given in Table 4.11.  
As the train wheels pass over the crossing, the check rails ensure that the wheel stays on the correct 
path. Unlike the other rails in the model, the train wheels do not pass over the check rails, however the 
check rails are subject to high lateral forces as they guide the wheel through the crossing.  
The first layer of the check rail model is given in Figure 4.18. In this layer the orange region 
represents the degradation model for the check rails. There are two ageing mechanisms included in 
the model for the check rails. Each of the ageing mechanisms are stacked vertically, with worsening 
states arranged from left to right. The first ageing mechanism is deformation or bending of the check 
rails which can be measured by the difference in rail head shape of the check rail from its initial 
position, represented by Places R18, P142, P144, P146 and R26.  Conditional transitions are included 
here, where grinding of the check rails, if they are discovered to have low level deformation, is 
assumed to impact future degradation rates. The second ageing mechanism is lateral cracking of the 
check rails, represented by Places P141, P143, P145, P147 and R27, and this can be quantified by the 
number or depth of cracks in the check rails. The places in this region represent unrevealed states. 
The blue shaded region in the first model layer considers the inspection of the check rails. There are 
two inspection methods included in this model. Firstly, visual inspection is enabled when places P152 
and P153 are marked. Secondly, ultrasonic testing, in the case of lateral cracking of the check rails, is 
enabled when Place P155 is marked. Places R19-R25 represent discovered degraded or failed states of 





Figure 4.18: A Petri net model for the degradation of the check rails 
The second layer of the check rail model is given in Figure 4.19. In this layer, the green shaded region 
models the maintenance of the check rails, with the replacement on the left-hand side and grinding on 
the right-hand side. Replacement resets the condition of the check rails to the ‘as good as new’ state. 
Grinding only improves any deformation and is assumed to not impact lateral cracking defects. Here 
it is assumed that, for deformation of the rail head in State IV or better, the rail can be ground to 
improve its condition. This is represented by transitions t321, t322 and t323. If the rail is in a worse 
state than State IV, or there is lateral cracking of the rail, then the check rails are replaced. This is 
represented by transitions t312, t313, t314 and t315. 
The red shaded region, in this layer of the model, ensures that the correct maintenance action is 
applied. Transitions t317-t328 ensures this. As with the other Petri nets presented in this section, the 
implementation of system level speed restrictions and closures is also incorporated in this layer of the 
model, through transitions t317-t328. 
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2: Check rails 
-Plastic deformation of check rails (grinding 
and only track patrol)
-longitudinal cracking of check rails (internal) 
(replace)
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Figure 4.19: A Petri net model for the maintenance of the check rails 
Places Interpretation 
R2 The check rails are in State I  
R18, P142, P144, 
P146, R26 
The unrevealed deformation states of the check rails in ascending order of state from 
State I to State V 
P141, P143, P145, 
P147, R27 
The unrevealed lateral cracking states of the check rails in ascending order of state 
from State I to State V 
R28 The number of grinding actions of the check rails between replacement 
R20, R22, R24, R25 The revealed deformation states of the check rails in ascending order of state from 
State II to State V 
R19, R21, R23 The revealed lateral cracking states of the check rails in ascending order of state from 
State I to State V 
P148 Visual inspection of the check rails is enabled 
P150 Visual inspection of the check rails fails to identify the state 
P149, P152, P153 Successful visual inspection of the check rails is underway 
P154 Ultrasonic testing of the check rails is enabled 
P156 Ultrasonic testing of the check rails fails to identify the state 
P155 Successful ultrasonic testing of the check rails is underway 
P158, P159, P160, 
P161 
Replacement of the check rails is scheduled, after a delay, for each revealed state in 
ascending order of severity. 
P164, P165, P166 Grinding of the check rails is scheduled, after a delay, for each revealed state in 
ascending order of severity. 
P163, P163 A replacement of the check rails is completed, and the number of such replacement 
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P168, P167 A grinding action of the check rails is completed, and the number of such replacement 
actions, respectively 
Table 4.11: A description of each of the places in the check rail module 
Components impacting switch rail position  
There are several different factors that can impact the position of the switch rails. If the switch rails 
are in a dangerous position, where they are not locked in contact with a stock rail, there can be a 
derailment at the S&C as the train passes over. The next section of this chapter considers various 
component failures that can result in a dangerous switch rail position. 
In this section, models are presented for the condition of the stretcher bars and supplementary drive, 
POE, locking device, switch position detector and slide chairs. In addition, a model for an external 
signal failure is presented for a scenario where a false signal unlocks the switch rails on the passage of 
a train. A contribution to an incorrect switch position can also be made by the failure of the switch rail 
alignment, which is taken from the models for the switch rail condition given in Figure 4.14, earlier in 
this chapter. 
The first model of this section gives a Petri net model for the cracking of the stretcher bars or 
supplementary drive and a resulting failure. The first layer of this model, which models the 
degradation of the components and their inspection, is given in Figure 4.20. The second layer of this 
model, which models the component maintenance and system level speed restrictions or closure, is 
given in Figure 4.21. A description of each of the places in this model is given in Table 4.12. 
The stretcher bars connect the switch rails together and ensure that both switch rails move at the same 
time. There can be several stretcher bars along the switch rails, depending on the length of the switch, 
connected by a supplementary drive. A failure in the stretcher bars or supplementary drive can lead to 
a derailment as it can result in an incorrect positioning of the switch rails directing the train wheels in 
two separate directions. Alternatively, the train wheels may not make full contact with the stock rails 
or intermediate rails, on failure of the stretcher bars or supplementary drive. The condition of the 
stretcher bars can be quantified by the number of cracks present, a measure of deformation from the 
desired profile or a measure of the length over which corrosion is present. 
In the Petri net in Figure 4.20, the degradation of the stretcher bars and supplementary drive is 
modelled by the section shaded orange. In the Petri net in Figure 4.20, places E1, P1, P2, P4 and E2 
represent the states of the stretcher bars or supplementary drive due to the presence of cracking, 
bending or corrosion in worsening unrevealed states from State I to State V.  
The inspection is modelled by the section shaded blue. In this model, it is assumed that the stretcher 
bars and supplementary drive are visually inspected in a periodic manner to classify their condition. 
When place P9 is marked then an inspection is underway. A measure of the condition may be the 
number or depth of cracks visible or the deviation of the shape of the stretcher bar from the ideal 
position. The blue region also contains the places that represent degraded or failed states that have 




Figure 4.20: A Petri net model for stretcher bar and supplementary drive degradation 
The replacement of the stretcher bars and supplementary drive is modelled by the green section in 
Figure 4.21, transitions t14, t15, t16 and t17 model this replacement. Replacement of the stretcher 
bars or supplementary drive occurs if they are found to be in State III or worse; this is governed by the 
Petri net in Figure 4.21. There is also the option to include opportunistic replacement strategies for 
stretcher bars, or a supplementary drive, found in State II.  
The red section in Figure 4.21 ensures the correct maintenance delay is applied, through transitions 
t23-t28, along with any system level state changes, with transitions t29 and t30. Speed restrictions are 
applied if the stretcher bars or supplementary drive are in State IV and closure is applied if they are in 
State V or undergoing maintenance. 
 
Figure 4.21: A Petri net model for stretcher bar maintenance 
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E1, P1, P2, 
P3, E2 
The unrevealed degradation states of the stretcher bars and supplementary drive, in ascending 
state from State I to State V 
E3, E4, E5, E6 The revealed degradation states of the stretcher bars and supplementary drive, in ascending 
state from State II to State V 
P11 Visual inspection of the stretcher bars and supplementary drive is enabled 
P10 Visual inspection of the stretcher bars and supplementary drive fails to reveal the state 
P9 Visual inspection of the stretcher bars and supplementary drive is underway 
P13, P14, P15, 
P16 
Replacement of the stretcher bars and supplementary drive is scheduled after a delay, for each 
revealed state in ascending order of severity 
P18, P19 Replacement of the stretcher bars and supplementary dives is completed, and the number of 
such actions, respectively.  
Table 4.12: A description of each of the places in the stretcher bar and supplementary drive module 
The second model in this section considers the slide chair condition. The first layer of this model, 
which includes the degradation and inspection, is given in Figure 4.22. The second layer of this 
model, which includes the maintenance and application of system level speed restrictions or closure, 
is given in Figure 4.23. A description of each of the places in the slide chair model is given in Table 
4.13. These models predict situations where the slide chair can fail thus preventing the correct 
movement of the switch rail leading to a derailment. 
In the Petri net in Figure 4.22, the orange shaded region models the degradation of the slide chairs. 
Each ageing mechanism is stacked vertically with the condition of the slide chair material modelled 
with the top pathway and lubrication of the slide chairs modelled in the pathway below. The top 
pathway, which includes places P1, P2, P4, P6 and S3, gives the condition of the slide chairs whereby 
degradation can lead to blockage of the switch path by the failed slide chair material. States can be 
quantified by counting the number of cracks or corroded areas present. The pathway, which includes 
places S2, P3, P5, P7 and S4, gives the condition of the slide chairs in terms of lubrication or blockage 
from an external source. Here, transition t4 corresponds to blockage of the slide chairs from an 
external source. A blockage in the slide chairs can prevent the switch rails from moving into the 
correct position. 
The inspection of the slide chairs is modelled by the blue region in Figure 4.22. The condition of the 
slide chairs is revealed through visual inspection, with a probability of successful state identification 
for each inspection. When places P8 and P9 are marked then inspection is underway. The blue shaded 
region also contains places that represent degraded or failed states that have been discovered by 




Figure 4.22: A Petri net for slide chair degradation and inspection 
The green shaded region in Figure 4.23 models the maintenance of the slide chairs, with replacement 
on the left-hand side and clearing and lubrication on the right-hand side. The transitions with delay 
times R1, R2, R3 and R4 represent replacement of the slide chairs returning them to the ‘as good as 
new’ condition. The transitions with distributions, L1, L2, L3 and L4 represent cleaning, clearing and 
lubrication of the slide chairs. In both cases, manual intervention is required, corresponding to the 
marking of place Ym1 for routine maintenance and place Om1 for opportunistic maintenance. 
Replacement returns the whole degradation model to the ‘as good as new’ state. Clearing and 
lubrication does not impact the state of the slide chair material, and so any markings of places P1, P2, 
P4, P6, S3 and the places corresponding to any discovered failures of this type,  places S5, S7, S10 
and S12 is unaffected by this maintenance action.  
The red shaded region in the layer ensures that the correct maintenance action is applied, through 
transitions t42-t53, and implements any system level state changes, through transitions t58-t61. Speed 
restrictions are implemented if it is found that the slide chairs are in a poor state. Closure is 
implemented if it is found that the slide chairs, or an external blockage of the slide chairs, is 
preventing the switch rails moving correctly.   
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Figure 4.23: A Petri net for slide chair maintenance 
Places Interpretation 
S1 The slide chairs are in State I 
P1, P2, P4, 
P6, S3 
The unrevealed degraded states of the slide chairs, with states in ascending order from State I 
to State V. 
S2, P3, P5, 
P7, S4 
The unrevealed condition of the slide chairs, with respect to blockage or lubrication, with 
states in ascending order from State I to State V 
S5, S7, S10, 
S12 
The revealed degraded states of the slide chairs, with states in ascending order from State I to 
State V. 
S6, S8, S9, 
S11 
The revealed condition of the slide chairs, with respect to blockage or lubrication, with states 
in ascending order from State I to State V 
P12 Inspection of the slide chairs is underway 
P11 Inspection of the slide chairs fails to reveal the state 
P10, P8, P9 Successful inspection of the slide chairs is underway 
P14, P25, P26, 
P17 
Replacement of the slide chairs is scheduled, following a delay, for each revealed state in 
ascending order 
P20, P21, P22, 
P23 
Clearing and lubrication of the slide chairs is scheduled, following a delay, for each revealed 
state in ascending order 
P19, P18 Replacement of the slide chairs is completed, and the number of such actions are counted, 
respectively. 
P25, P24 Clearing and lubrication of the slide chairs is completed, and the number of such actions are 
counted, respectively. 
Table 4.13: A description of each of the places in the slide chair module 
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The third model in this section considers the POE and the switch rail locking device. Figure 4.24 
gives the first layer of the model, considering the degradation and inspection. Figure 4.25 gives the 
second layer of the model, considering maintenance and system level speed restrictions or closure. A 
description of each of the places in this model can be found in Table 4.14. 
In the model layer given in Figure 4.24, the region shaded in orange models the ageing of the POE 
and locking device in worsening states from left to right. The top pathway, in this orange shaded 
region, considers the condition of the POE from the ‘as good as new’ state to failure. The ‘as good as 
new’ state corresponds to Place N1 and the failed state, corresponds to Place N3. The intermediate 
degraded states of the POE are given by places P2, P3 and P4 in order of increasing degradation level. 
These states could be quantified by measuring the time taken for the POE to fully move the switch 
rails. A failure of the POE can lead to the switch rails not being moved into the desired location. The 
lower pathway corresponds to the condition of the locking device with Place N2 corresponding to the 
‘as good as new’ state, and Place N4 corresponding to the failed state. Failure of the locking device 
can cause the switch rails to become unlocked as a train passes over the S&C, leading to a derailment.  
The blue shaded region models the inspection of the POE and locking device. It is assumed in this 
model that inspection of the POE can identify a degraded state. Places N5, N7 and N10 correspond to 
these revealed states in order of increasing degradation level. Places N12 and N11 correspond to a 
detected failure in the POE or locking device, respectively. Included in this model, are age-based 
replacement actions and the application of restrictions for the locking device. The user may specify a 
timeframe for the opportunistic replacement, routine replacement and priority replacement of the 
locking device, based on its expected lifetime. Places N6, N8 and N9 are marked when these defined 
time frames have elapsed, with speed restrictions applied if place N9 is marked. 
 
 
Figure 4.24: A Petri net for POE and points locking device degradation and inspection 
For the model layer in Figure 4.25, the green shaded region models the maintenance of the POE or the 
locking device. Similarly to the previous models in this section, Place Ym1 enables manual 
intervention of the components and place Om1 enables opportunistic maintenance or replacement of 
the components. In the case of the POE and locking device, maintenance is assumed to return the 
component to the ‘as good as new’ state.  The maintenance of the POE is modelled on the left-hand 
side and the maintenance of the locking device is modelled on the right-hand side. Transitions t22, 
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t23, t24 and t25 correspond to replacement or repair of the POE. For the POE, maintenance is 
completed on a revealed degraded state in this model. Transitions t31, t32, t33 and t34 correspond to 
replacement or repair of the locking device. For the locking device, there is only a working and failed 
state modelled, based on the assumption that intermediate states cannot be quantified with a numeric 
measure. Age-based maintenance is included for the locking device, such that the age-based 
maintenance is completed if places N6, N8 or N9 are marked, this can happen through the logic given 
in the first layer of the model. 
The red shaded region ensures that the correct scheduling delay is applied, depending on the severity 
of the state, through transitions t40-t51, and applies any system level state changes through transitions 
t52-t55. Speed restrictions are implemented if it is found that the POE or locking device are in the 
degraded state. Closure is implemented if it is found that the POE or locking devices are in the failed 
state. Closure is also implemented if maintenance of the components is underway. 
 
Figure 4.25: A Petri net for POE and points locking device maintenance 
Places Interpretation 
N1, P2, P3, P4, 
N3 
The unrevealed degraded states of the POE, in ascending order of state from State I to State V 
N2, N4 The unrevealed state of the locking device, corresponding to State I and State V. 
N5, N7, N10, 
N12 
The revealed degraded states of the POE, in ascending order of state from State II to State V 
N6, N8, N9 The age-based estimated states of the locking device corresponding to states from State II to 
State IV, in ascending order 
N11 A revealed failure, State V, of the locking device 
P11 Inspection is enabled for the POE and locking device 
P10 Inspection fails to reveal the state of the POE and locking device 
P9, P7, P8 Inspection of the POE and locking device is underway 
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P13, P14, P15, 
P16 
Replacement is secluded for the POE, following a delay, for each revealed state of the POE  
P19, P20, P21, 
P22 
Replacement is secluded for the locking device, following a delay, for each revealed or 
estimated state of the locking device 
P18, P17 A replacement of the POE is completed, and the number of such replacements is counted, 
respectively.  
P24, P23 A replacement of the locking device is completed, and the number of such replacements is 
counted, respectively. 
Table 4.14: A description of each of the places in the POE and locking device module 
The fourth model in this section considers the switch position detector. Figure 4.26 gives the first 
layer of this model, which includes the condition of the switch position detector and inspection model. 
Figure 4.27 gives the second layer of the model which includes the maintenance model for the switch 
position detector, and the application of any system level restrictions or closures. A description of 
each of the places in the model can be found in Table 4.15.  
In the model layer in Figure 4.26, the orange shaded region models the failure of the switch position 
detector, with the working state on the left-hand side, place W1, and the failed state on the right-hand 
side, place W2. Only two states are included here, under the assumption that intermediate degraded 
states cannot be quantified.  
The blue shaded region models the inspection of the switch position detector, when place P4 is 
marked inspection is underway. This region also models the estimation of age-based states for the 
component. Since intermediate revealed degraded states are not included for this component they are 
instead estimated by the age of the component, transitions t5, t6 and t7 correspond to this age-based 
state estimation. This allows age-based maintenance to be included in the model. This gives three age-
based states, represented by places W3, W4 and W5.  
 
Figure 4.26: A Petri net for switch position detector degradation 
The green shaded region in Figure 4.27 models the maintenance of the switch position detector. 
Transitions t12, t13, t14 and t15 model this maintenance, and are assumed to return the component to 
the ‘as good as new’ state. Here, the marking of the places, W3, W4 or W5, triggers opportunistic, 
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The red shaded region ensures that replacement is carried out following the correct scheduling delay, 
through transitions t21-t26, and applies any system level state changes, through transitions t27 and 
t28. Speed restrictions are also applied based on age, if place W5 is marked. 
 
Figure 4.27: A Petri net for switch position detector maintenance 
Places  Interpretation 
W1, W2 The unrevealed degraded State I and State V of the switch position detector 
W3, W4, W5 The age-based estimated states of the switch position detector corresponding to states from 
State II to State IV, in ascending order 
W6 The revealed failure, State V, of the switch position detector 
P6 Inspection of the switch position detector is enabled 
P5 Inspection of the switch position detector fails to reveal the state 
P4 Inspection of the switch position detector is underway 
P8, P9, P10, 
P11 
Replacement of the switch position detector is scheduled after a delay, based on the revealed or 
estimated state 
P13, P12 Maintenance of the switch position detector is completed and the number of such maintenance 
actions is counted, respectively  
Table 4.15: A description of each of the places for the switch position detector models 
Figure 4.28 gives a model for an external signal failure. A description of each of the places can be 
found in Table 4.16. In this case, it is assumed to occur after a time governed by the distribution 
labelled with T1. Two failure modes are modelled. The first failure mode, represented by place Sf2, 
models a signal failure that causes the switch rails to become falsely unlocked. The second failure 
mode, represented by place P2, models a signal failure whereby the switch rails remain locked in a 
non-hazardous position. There is a probability associated with transition t2 that corresponds to either 
18
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hazardous or non-hazardous external signal failure. It is also assumed that after a delay time, D1, the 
external signal failure will be resolved. 
 
Figure 4.28: A Petri net for external signal failure 
Places Interpretation 
Sf1 There is no external signal failure 
P1 There is an external signal failure 
Sf2 The external signal failure is hazardous 
P1 The external signal failure is not hazardous, the system fails safe 
P3 Counts the number of external signal failures 
Table 4.16: A description of each of the places for the external signal failure model 
4.3.2: System Level Component Inspection Strategies 
The component models presented in Section 4.3.1 of this chapter are connection with system level 
inspection and maintenance models. When any of the transitions fire in the models presented in this 
section, the corresponding places in each of the component models are marked. To clarify, the models 
in this section enable component inspection across all of the component level models presented in this 
chapter. This ensures that components are inspected at the same time.  
Three classification areas were chosen for the component inspection methods on a system level [150]. 
The first was visual inspection tasks. This included visual inspection of the rails and crossing, 
alongside the fastenings, slide chairs, stretcher bars and supplementary drive and ballast. The second 
inspection type included in the model were instrumental inspection tasks. These included ultrasonic 
testing of the rails and crossing and geometry measurements. The final inspection type includes a 
functional test of the POE movement, locking and detection.  
An inspection interval was assigned to each maintenance inspection method, such that the inspection 
method is applied to the whole S&C at the same time. For example, a visual inspection is carried out 
of all the S&C components simultaneously. Figure 4.29 gives the Petri net model that governs the 
intervals for visual inspection, instrumental testing and functional testing of the POE, and switch rail 
locking and detection devices, in order from left to right. Place P1 counts the number of visual 
inspections of the S&C, Place P2 counts the number of instrumental testing actions of the S&C, and 
Place P3 counts the number of functional testing actions of the S&C.  
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Figure 4.29: A Petri net model for the inspection interval for visual inspection, instrumented testing and POE, locking and 
position detector testing in order from left to right 
For each component inspection method, different inspection intervals can be tested to consider the 
impact on the final derailment frequency and overall system state.  
4.3.3: System Level Maintenance activation 
In addition to the models for degradation, inspection and maintenance of the components of the S&C, 
models are included that govern the scheduling of each maintenance action across the component 
level models presented in Section 4.3.1 of this chapter. The models for this are presented in this 
section. The models presented here activate the maintenance actions across all the component level 
models. This is done by marking places that are shared across multiple component Petri net models. If 
maintenance is enabled for a specific component, this enables certain similar maintenance actions 
across all component level models. 
In this model, if it is found that a component is residing in State III, then routine maintenance is 
scheduled following a delay. The length of this delay can be varied. If it is found that a component is 
residing in State IV, maintenance is scheduled as a priority. If it is found that a component is residing 
in State V, the failed state, it is assumed here that maintenance is scheduled immediately following a 
short delay. If a maintenance action is already being carried out on the S&C, and it is found that any 
component is residing in State II, and the maintenance action required for this second component is 
similar to that of the first, then the second component can be replaced at the same time to give an 
opportunistic strategy. Later in this chapter, the effectiveness of this strategy is tested.  
In addition to this, for some components, the maintenance is completed based on the age of the 
component or on the discovery of a failure. As with the revealed failures, routine, priority or 
opportunistic maintenance can be scheduled, based on the components age. 
Finally, complete replacement of the S&C is included in this model. This has been assumed to either 
occur following a set period, or after a derailment has occurred. The time at which this full 
replacement is carried out is also tested later in this chapter, to observe the effects on the system state 
and derailment occurrence. 
In this model, the maintenance actions, with the exception of full replacement, are grouped into four 
categories: ballast tamping, ballast undercutting, manual intervention such as component replacement 
or repair, and rail grinding. If a maintenance action is required, due to a revealed state or estimated 
age-based state, then the corresponding maintenance activity is enabled after a delay. The delay is 
based on the expected availability of resources or a maintenance strategy for testing.  
Figure 4.30 gives a Petri net for the full replacement of the S&C. Here, Transition t1 represents the 
scheduling delay of a periodic full replacement of S&C. Transition t3 represents the scheduling delay 
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and returns the marking of all places in the Petri net to that of the original marking, apart from those 
required to count actions throughout the Petri net model. While the full replacement is taking place, 
the S&C is closed, represented by the marking of Place X2. When Place P1 is marked, then full 
replacement of the S&C is enabled. Place P2 counts the number of full replacements.  
 
Figure 4.30: A Petri net for replacement of the full S&C 
Figure 4.31 gives a Petri net for the scheduling of tamping or undercutting of the ballast. Here, 
Transition t8 represents the choice between each of these maintenance actions and there is an 
associated probability. The maintenance scheduling delay for ballast, residing in State III is given by 
distribution, W1, in Transition, t7. The maintenance scheduling delay for the ballast residing in State 
IV is given by distribution D3, in transition t5. The short maintenance scheduling delay for ballast 
residing in State V is given by distribution D4, in transition t6. Place Yu1 enables undercutting of the 
ballast, Place Ou1 enables opportunistic undercutting, Place Yt1 enables tamping of the ballast and 
Place Ot1 enables opportunistic tamping of the ballast. These relate to the places in the component 
maintenance modules. After a short delay, denoted by D6, the ballast maintenance is disabled in the 
Petri net to prevent repeated unnecessary maintenance actions. 
 
Figure 4.31: A Petri net for scheduling of tamping or undercutting ballast 
Figure 4.32 gives a Petri net for the scheduling of manual maintenance interventions of components in 
the S&C. These interventions include: component replacement, component repair, component 
welding, component clearing, component cleaning and component lubrication. These actions have 
been grouped together, as they have less reliance on large equipment such as track grinders, tamping 
machines or undercutting machines, which may not always be readily available. Transitions t18 –t27 
represent the scheduling of routine manual intervention for components in either revealed, or 
estimated, State III. Transitions t28-t42 represent the scheduling of priority maintenance for 
components in either revealed, or estimated, State IV. Transitions t43-t56 represent the scheduling of 
emergency maintenance for components in State V, following a short delay governed by distribution 
D7 in Transition t58. On the scheduling of a manual intervention, Place Ym1 is marked to enable the 
relevant maintenance actions in the component Petri net models. Additionally, place Om1 is marked, 
to enable any early manual intervention of components across the model that are residing in State II. 
Following a delay of D8 in transition t60, the maintenance is disabled to prevent unnecessary repeat 
maintenance actions. 














































Figure 4.32: A Petri net for scheduling of component replacement or manual intervention 
Figure 4.33 gives a Petri net for the scheduling of rail grinding for the components in the S&C. 
Transitions t61-t64, represent the scheduling of routine rail grinding for rails in the State III. 
Transitions t65-t68, represent the scheduling of priority rail grinding for rails in State IV. When the 
rails reach State V, the failed state, it is assumed in this model that they are replaced. When a rail 
grinding activity is scheduled, Place Yg1 is marked to enable the corresponding maintenance 
activities within the component Petri nets. Place Og1 is also marked to enable opportunistic grinding 
of any other rails in the S&C that are in state II. Following a short delay governed by distribution D10 
in transition t72, the rail grinding maintenance actions are disabled across the Petri nets, to prevent 
repeat unnecessary maintenance actions. 
 
Figure 4.33: A Petri net for the scheduling of rail grinding 
Varying strategies for system level maintenance scheduling can be tested, to consider the output on 
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4.3.4 Derailment Risk Scenarios  
The risk scenarios, as given earlier in this chapter following the Fault Tree in Figure 4.5, are modelled 
by the Petri nets in this section of the chapter. Here, different types of component failure can cause a 
derailment. In each case, Place X1 corresponds to a speed restriction over the S&C, Place X2 
corresponds to a closure of the S&C due to maintenance, and Place X3 corresponds to a closure of the 
S&C due to revealed failure. These places are marked by the discovered latter degraded states of the 
components across the model and can be seen in each component level Petri net model. Place X4 
corresponds to the S&C state after a derailment has occurred. In this model, it is possible for more 
than one train to pass over a failed S&C in quick succession and derail. However, when Place X4 is 
marked and following a short delay, the S&C is closed for full replacement. This has been completed 
under the assumption that a derailment will quickly reveal the failure and extensive damage will be 
done to the S&C during the derailment, such that full replacement is required.  
Figure 4.34 models the scenario wherein there is a hazardous switch position and a train passes over 
the S&C with sufficient speed to cause a derailment. In this Petri net, the switch position detector can 
reveal the failure in the switch position and prevent a derailment. If the switch position detector does 
not reveal the failure, then a derailment can occur. Place P1 corresponds to the system residing in the 
state where the switch is in an unrevealed hazardous position. A derailment may then occur, due to 
either passage of the train with no restrictions or closure on the S&C, or the passage of the train where 
there are restrictions in place on the S&C, but a further failure has occurred since the restrictions were 
applied. This is modelled by transitions t9 and t10, respectively. Place P2 corresponds to a derailment 
caused by a hazardous switch position. Place Dr1 counts the number of this category of derailment. 
 
Figure 4.34: A Petri net modelling the passage and derailment of a train over an S&C with a hazardous switch rail position 
Figure 4.35 gives a model for the scenario wherein there is a geometry failure and a train passes over 
the S&C with sufficient speed to cause a derailment. Place P4 corresponds to a state where there is a 
geometry failure and a derailment can occur if there is the passage of a train. As with the previous 
model, this may occur due to either a lack of speed restrictions or closure or the case where 
restrictions are applied but there is a further failure following the implementation of the restrictions, 
this is modelled by transition t21 and t22, respectively. Place P5 corresponds to a derailment due to a 
geometry failure. Place Dr2 counts the number of derailments due to this cause. 
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Figure 4.35: A Petri net modelling the passage and derailment of a train over an S&C with a geometry failure 
Figure 4.36 models the scenario wherein there is wear causing wheel flange climb and a train passes 
over the S&C with sufficient speed to cause a derailment. Place P7 corresponds to a scenario where 
the S&C is in such a state that if a train passes over it a derailment can occur due to wear on the S&C 
components. This can either occur after a delay due to a lack of speed restrictions or closure, or the 
occurrence of a failure while speed restrictions are applied. Transitions t29 and t30 correspond to this 
respectively. Place P8 corresponds to a derailment due to this cause and Place Dr3 counts the number 
of this category of derailment. 
 
Figure 4.36: A Petri net modelling the passage and derailment, due to flange climb, of a train over an S&C with excessive 
rail wear 
Figure 4.37 presents the scenario in which there is a rail break and a train passes over the S&C with 
sufficient speed to cause a derailment. In this Petri net, Place P10 corresponds to a situation where 
there is a rail break and a derailment can occur a train passes through the S&C. Transition t35 
corresponds to a passage of a train, leading to a derailment under this condition, where there are no 
speed restrictions, or closures, implemented. Transition t36 corresponds to the passage of a train 
leading to a derailment under this condition, where speed restrictions are implemented but a further 
failure occurs while the restrictions are applied. Place P11 corresponds to a derailment due to the 
passage of the train under these conditions. Place Dr4 counts the number of such derailments. 
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Figure 4.37: A Petri net modelling the passage and derailment of a train over an S&C with broken rail components 
Finally, Figure 4.38 gives the Petri net model for a scenario where over-speeding causes derailment at 
the S&C. Here, Place P2 corresponds to the arrival of an over speeding train at the S&C. This arrival 
rate is conditional on any speed restrictions implemented on the S&C. In the application of this 
model, it is assumed that the arrival rate of an over-speeding train is more likely when speed 
restrictions are in place due to the driver ignoring the new speed restriction and travelling at a speed 
above this. This arrival rate is governed by distribution T1 and can be changed for application of the 
model. On arrival of an over-speeding train at the S&C, there is a probability that the derailment will 
occur. This is represented by Transition t2 in this Petri net. Place Dr5 counts the number of 
derailments due to over-speeding through the S&C. 
 
 
Figure 4.38: A Petri net modelling the over speeding of a train at an S&C with either a restricted or unrestricted speed 
control 
4.4: Results for Sample Data Values 
To demonstrate the capability of this modelling approach, sample values for the distributions and 
probabilities were assigned to Transitions within the models [151][152][153][154]. These sample 
values are given in Appendix 2. These values are assumed, using available estimates where possible. 
These sample values can be easily altered based on any available data, or expert opinion, for a specific 
S&C in question. Monte Carlo Simulation, with random sampling from the distributions and 
probabilities governing the system, can be used to generate quantitative results. The number of 
maintenance activities across the system and the probability of the system being in several states 
(working, restricted, closed for maintenance, closed due to a dangerous state or post-derailment) can 
be tracked. This can be done by recording the marking of Places X1, X2, X3 and X4 and the places 
across the model that count each individual component maintenance action.  
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Different maintenance strategies can be tested to investigate their impact on the state of the S&C. The 
models can also form a basis for optimization of the maintenance and inspection strategies to give an 
optimal solution to minimise both cost and derailment occurrence.  
A Monte Carlo Simulations of the model was performed with 1000 runs, and the average number of 
maintenance actions and average system states across these runs were calculated. Two cases were 
applied, the first where opportunistic maintenance across the system was disabled, and the second 
where opportunistic maintenance was enabled across the system. Generalised result trends are 
discussed in Section 4.5 of this chapter. 
4.4.1: Asset Management Strategy 1: No opportunistic maintenance 
In the first simulation of the model, no opportunistic maintenance of the components was included. 
This represents a scenario where components remain in a partially degraded state until it is identified 
that routine maintenance is required. Figure 4.39 gives the probability that the S&C resides in each 
system state for each year over a 30-year period, the full replacement interval was set to 30 years. 
Figure 4.40 gives the average number of each maintenance actions for each year over a 30-year 
period. For 1000 runs of a Monte Carlo Simulation, the result was obtained after 170990.796 seconds. 
It can be seen for this example that the S&C is in the working state for the majority of the 30-year 
time period. The S&C is rarely in the restricted state, but is more commonly closed due to a 
discovered poor condition. This can be attributed to the failure to detect components that are 
degraded. Prior to 10 years, there are limited closures due to the condition. Replacing the whole S&C 
system at the 10-year point would result in a repeat of the behaviour in the first 10 years, improving 
the system state over the 30 year period, due to the total reset transition applied during a full reset, 
which returns the system to the same state as the start of each run of the simulation. 
 




Figure 4.40: The number of each maintenance action for the model without opportunistic maintenance 
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The number of maintenance actions tends to follow two sorts of behaviour. Periodic behaviour in the 
number of maintenance actions in these results can be seen for some of the components. In some 
cases this behavior is more distinct, such as that for the stock rails, suggesting that these components 
have a more defined degradation time and are maintained periodically, often returning them to the ‘as 
good as new’ state. The second behaviour shown by some components is an approximately constant 
number of maintenance actions. This is seen in components with frequent maintenance actions such as 
the slide chair lubrication and clearing, as shown in Figure 4.40. It can also be noted that there is an 
increase in the number of maintenance actions at approximately the 5 year point, which corresponds 
to the first maintenance action for many of the components. Following the 5 year point the behaviour 
levels, this can be attributed to the stochastic nature of the model which can cause time-averaging of 
the results. The sleepers and clips show an increasing level of maintenance as the system ages. The 
long degradation times assigned to the ballast model give rise to maintenance which only takes places 
after 25 years. 
The expected number of derailments, over the 30-year period for this case was 3.088, when the S&C 
is not replaced within the 30-year time period. Taking the number of derailments at each 5 year 
interval, and assuming that full replacement leads to a repeat in the behaviour of the model, gives rise 
to the predictions in Table 4.17. 
 
Full replacement time 
5 years 10 years 15 years 20 years 25 years 30 years 
Failure 
mode 
Switch position error 1.872 1.986 1.984 2.0085 2.0604 2.043 
Geometry error 0 0 0 0.0015 0.0036 0.005 
Rail wear 0.012 0.342 0.426 0.468 0.4896 0.518 
Rail break 0.03 0.384 0.438 0.474 0.4932 0.498 
Over speeding 0 0.006 0.016 0.0195 0.0204 0.024 
Total 1.914 2.718 2.864 2.9715 3.0672 3.088 
Table 4.17: A table of the expected number of derailments, with different system replacement times and no opportunistic 
maintenance 
4.4.2: Asset Management Strategy 2: Opportunistic maintenance included 
Secondly, opportunistic maintenance was included in the model, such that components discovered to 
be in State II are maintained if there is an alternative maintenance action scheduled. The rest of the 
model was kept consistent to the previous results to enable a comparison.  
Figure 4.41 gives the probability that the S&C resides in each system state for each year over a 30-
year period. Figure 4.42 gives the average number of each maintenance actions for each year over a 
30-year period.  
There are similarities between the results for the probability that the S&C is in each state in the cases 
with and without opportunistic maintenance.  It can be seen that when opportunistic maintenance is 





Figure 4.41: The S&C system state for the model with opportunistic maintenance  
For the component maintenance actions, with opportunistic maintenance included, it can be seen that 
the number of maintenance actions at each time is higher for some components, such as the stock rail 
and POE. This suggests that in this case they may be being replaced prior to reaching the end of their 
useful life. For other components, the pattern of replacement is approximately the same, suggesting 
that they are maintained when they reach the end of their useful life in both cases.  
The expected number of derailments over the 30 year period for the second maintenance strategy was 
2.868, demonstrating that the addition of opportunistic maintenance to the model decreases derailment 
occurrence. Taking the number of derailments at each 5 year interval, and assuming that full 
replacement leads to a repeat in the behaviour of the model, gives rise to the predictions in Table 4.18. 
These results are dependent on the parameter values used, hence the analysis should be repeated when 
applying real data. 
 Full replacement time 
5 years 10 years 15 years 20 years 25 years 30 years 
Failure 
mode 
Switch position error 1.638 1.89 1.924 1.973 1.95 1.959 
Geometry error 0 0 0 0 0 0.002 
Rail wear 0.042 0.378 0.472 0.561 0.584 0.595 
Rail break 0.03 0.24 0.232 0.27 0.276 0.277 
Over speeding 0.006 0.009 0.02 0.024 0.0288 0.035 
Total 1.716 2.571 2.648 2.828 2.839 2.868 




Figure 4.42: The number of each maintenance action for the model with opportunistic maintenance 
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4.4.3: Comparison of Derailment Results 
Figure 4.43 gives the convergence of the average number of derailments over the 30-year period for 
each of the asset management strategies tested in this chapter. It can be seen that over the 30-year 
period the average number of derailments seems to converge. The rate of model convergence is 
discussed further in Chapter 6 of this thesis. To look at behaviour at specific time intervals, as 
opposed to over the whole time frame under consideration, will likely require a higher level of 
convergence since this removes averaging introduced intrinsically over time within the system model.  
 
Figure 4.43: A figure showing the convergence of the average number of derailments, at 30 years, for each asset 
management strategy 
The results in Table 4.17 and Table 4.18 show how the different derailment causes are impacted by 
the maintenance strategies implemented in this study. In general, it can be seen that decreasing the 
interval between system replacement reduces the expected number of derailments over the 30-year 
period, as does introducing opportunistic maintenance of components. The probability that there is a 
derailment due to over speeding is the similar for each case, because the over-speeding module is only 
dependent on any applied speed restrictions, which are similar for each strategy. From these results it 
can also be seen that the expected number of derailments due to a fault with the switch position is 
slightly influenced by the introduction of early opportunistic maintenance. The occurrence of a 
derailment due to a rail break is heavily influenced by the introduction of opportunistic maintenance. 
This can be attributed to the faster rates of ageing assigned to components within these modules. In 
contrast, the expected number of derailments due to the wear on rails in the S&C is not improved by 
the introduction of opportunistic maintenance, with approximately the same number of derailments 
for each of the strategies. Finally, derailment due to a geometry error was lower when opportunistic 
maintenance was included, but occurred rarely in both cases. This can be attributed to the slow 
degradation rates assigned to the ballast, sleepers and clips. Further strategies can be tested in the 
same way and a cost analysis can be carried out to numerically evaluate the benefits of each strategy. 
Different costs can be assigned to maintenance actions completed in isolation, compared to those 
completed in the same visit. 
From these demonstrative examples it can be seen that, for the data used as input for the model, the 
addition of an opportunistic maintenance strategy and a shorter time between full replacements can be 
used to reduce the expected number of derailments over the 30-year period, but at an increased 
lifecycle cost. 
These results have demonstrated some of the capabilities of this modeling approach to test the impact 
of different maintenance and inspection strategies. In the same way, the distributions used for 
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scheduling delays for both inspection and maintenance can be varied to study the impact on the 
number of maintenance actions, system states and derailment occurrences.  
4.4.4: Frequency of Derailments 
To obtain the frequency of derailments, the expected number of derailments per year can be found. 
Figure 4.44 gives the frequency of derailments per year for the second maintenance strategy including 
opportunistic maintenance for the 30-year time period, without full replacement.  
The number of derailments that occurred in this model over the 30 year period for the 1000 
simulations is small, thus producing some unstable behaviour in the results. Fewer simulations result 
in more instability on the results. More simulations can be completed to reduce this instability in order 
to gain a more accurate value for the frequency of derailment at each time.  
 
Figure 4.44: The frequency of derailments for the maintenance strategy including opportunistic maintenance  
The frequency of derailment can be combined with a measure of consequence, in each case, in order 
to give the derailment risk of the S&C.  
4.5 General Result Trends 
A number of general trends in the results for this model can be observed, across different components 
and under different conditions. The results for the number of maintenance actions observed for each 
component tend to follow one of three trends: 
1. Initially there is a low level of maintenance, followed by an increase. An example of this can 
be seen in the example on the left of Figure 4.45. This trend is expected for components that 
take a longer time to degrade and fail, such that limited maintenance actions are required, 
especially in the earlier stages of the system life. 
2. The maintenance actions follow an oscillating pattern, with some damping such that there is 
initially a sharper narrower increase followed by a number of peaks with increasing width and 
decreasing height. An example of this can be seen in the central graph of Figure 4.45. This 
demonstrates a cyclic pattern of increased maintenance, then improved component condition 
hence decreased maintenance requirement, followed by decreased component condition and 
then increased maintenance requirement. The damping behavior is expected due to the 
accumulation of differences in the times sampled in each run of the model, with more 
accumulated differences as time progresses.  
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3. The maintenance actions show an initial increase followed by an approximately level rate. 
This can be seen for the switch rail adjustment in the example on the right hand side of Figure 
4.45. This is expected for more frequent maintenance actions, such that the damping behavior 
discussed in the previous example occurs over a short time period to give an approximately 
constant rate. 
 
Figure 4.45: Examples of the different trends seen in the model results 
Another observed trend is, when opportunistic maintenance is enabled in the model, some component 
types show a greater increase in the number of maintenance actions, whereas some components show 
minimal differences. This suggests that the components showing a minimal increase are the ones that 
most commonly trigger the maintenance actions and that the components that show the increase are 
those that are maintained early, in addition to the former. Hence, in these cases any observed decrease 
in derailment frequency can be mostly attributed to early opportunistic maintenance of some, but not 
all, of the components in the model. 
For the application of full system restrictions there are two trends shown in the results. The first is an 
increase in the probability of the restricted or closed state, followed by a level behavior. This is shown 
for the state with speed restrictions and closure, due to the condition. This suggests an initial increase 
due to component ageing, followed by a leveling due to the maintenance actions controlling the 
condition. The second trend is seen for the closures due to maintenance, and is periodic with some 
damping behavior. The trend mimics the periodic pattern seen in some of the component maintenance 
numbers over time. The derailment frequency also follows this pattern, in the example presented here. 
Both these cases link to the interlocking cycle of component condition and maintenance described in 
the second part of the maintenance trend discussion. 
4.6: Discussion  
This chapter has introduced a Petri net model for the components in an S&C and considered how the 
failure of these can be combined with protection measures and train speed to predict the frequency of 
derailments by cause and the probability that the S&C is in different system states at each time. The 
model can be extended to include further components, such as the sub-base, and to offer different 
S&C configurations. In total, the model developed has 780 transitions and 616 places. 
Two maintenance strategies have been tested for sample model inputs, to demonstrate the capacity of 
the method to provide a numeric tool for the analysis of different asset management strategies. These 
strategies look at potential benefits that can be gained by including opportunistic maintenance, where 
components can be replaced prior to reaching the end of their useful life. Further parameters in the 
model can be varied such as: inspection frequency, routine maintenance scheduling delays, full 
replacement scheduling and time between full replacement and opportunistic maintenance. This 
allows multiple strategies to be compared to make an informed decision on S&C management. In this 
analysis a penalty has not been assigned to the loss of useful life for a component. This is under the 
assumption that a repeated loss of useful life will require more new components across the system 
lifetime, hence inherently increasing the physical cost due to this loss of life. 
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These sorts of models can also form the basis of an optimization algorithm to automatically find 
solutions to give a lower risk within a constrained budget. This is discussed further in Chapter 6 and 
applied to the model developed in Chapter 5.  
This method is reliant on a reliable source of data in order to give the degradation rates for the 
different components within the S&C and to validate the results of the model. The method is thus 
limited by the usefulness and reliability of the data available. However, expert opinion or data taken 
from extended life testing studies can be used to make predictions in the absence of historical 
condition monitoring data. There are also several assumptions made within the model as to the 
discretised degradation pathways of each component and the independence between each component 
degradation. The component degradation, inspection and maintenance models can be expanded and 
adjusted if there is data to support component degradation rate dependence, or if further inspection or 
maintenance actions are used. Similarly, additional states can be included for each component if 
required.  
With an increase in model size there is an increase in the amount of time required to simulate the 
model in order to obtain a convergent answer. It is also difficult to quantify the accuracy of the large 
Petri net model for different model structures. Hence, assumptions are made based on the knowledge 
of the modeller. Again, this is discussed later in this thesis, in Chapter 7.  
4.7: Parameter Assumptions and Use of Data 
The examples in this chapter have been used to demonstrate the model, with assumed parameters. 
Some of these parameters can greatly impact the outcomes of the model, especially those parameters 
that can directly impact the derailment frequency. For example, test simulations with a decrease in the 
probability of a successful inspection can lead to a higher occurrence of derailments. 
In this model the predicted number of derailments is most sensitive to assumed model parameters.  
This is due to the rare nature of this outcome. Hence, changes in component related parameters can 
strongly impact the number of derailments. This is especially true in cases where there are not backup 
systems in place. For instance, changing the parameters that govern the locking device such that it has 
a faster depredation rate, a slower inspection rate, a lower probability of successful inspection or a 
slower repair rate, such that it fails frequently in a dangerous way, greatly increases the frequency of 
derailments predicted by the model.  
Two cases can arise due to incorrect assumptions about the model input data. Firstly, the model can 
over predict the derailment occurrence; this can lead to increased cost of maintaining and inspecting 
the system to try and prevent the predicted derailments. Conversely, care should be taken when using 
the predictions of the model in case there has been an underestimate of the frequency of derailment, 
due to assumptions that the component condition, maintenance and inspection are better than true. 
The maintenance cost and system state model outputs are less sensitive to assumed parameter values, 
as they are mostly controlled by multiple more common events such as maintenance actions across the 
model. Of course, if all parameters supplied across the model are unreliable then these outputs will 
also be unreliable. 
However, despite the assumptions for the demonstration of the modelling approach, the model still 
shows how the logic of component maintenance, inspection and failure can be combined to give a 
system level model. The model allows the combination of parameters taken from expert opinion with 
parameters taken from data gathered in the field, or through extended life testing, and parameters that 
can be input by the user to test different maintenance and inspection strategies. Some generic result 
trends have also been extracted from the model, which can be interpreted for different scenarios, to 
consider over or under maintenance of components. The model can be quickly adapted to incorporate 
real data, and then used to make predictions and test different maintenance approaches.  
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Data should be collected for the degradation rate of each component; this can be from extended life 
testing of components or data gathered through condition monitoring. This forms the basis of the 
model and so should be of as high accuracy as possible. The data should be used to find the 
parameters and distributions for the transitions governing the degradation transitions within each 
component level model. This will improve the model as any assumptions about the number of states 
of the model or the effect of imperfect maintenance actions can be adjusted to fit the model more 
closely with the available data.  
In addition, data can be collected for the maintenance and inspection strategies currently applied to 
the system. Such as: the time interval between identifying a failure in each component and the 
components repair, or the inspection interval of each component. This data can feed into the 
maintenance and inspection transitions within the model. This can improve the model by allowing the 
removal of assumptions about the maintenance actions applied to each of the components. Collecting 
this data will allow the model to be used to make an assessment of the current asset management 
strategy. However, the accuracy of these parameters is less crucial to the model success as they can be 
varied in order to test different strategies. 
Data should also be collected for the rate of system level closures, restrictions and derailment 
occurrences. This data can be used to validate the current model predictions and make any required 
amendments to the model structure to bring the model more in line with reality. This can improve the 
model by making it more realistic, hence improving any future predictions.  
4.8: Contributions  
A novel model considering S&C condition, asset management and predicted derailment frequency is a 
key contribution of this chapter. The model improves on the state of the art as it goes into further 
depth and detail in comparison to models available in literature. This includes the modelling of 
individual sleepers and clips, and their combined impact on the system state. The model also includes 
imperfect maintenance actions, such as ballast tamping and rail grinding. The assumption of perfect 
inspection actions is also removed in this model. The approach also includes multiple maintenance 
types and allows for dependencies introduced through maintenance actions. Improvements with this 
approach can also be seen with the inclusion of preventative maintenance actions within a hazardous 
event framework. Hence, the model can be used to inform future maintenance decisions. System level 
restrictions and closures are also modelled, which demonstrates an improvement on current 
derailment risk assessment methods for S&C, which consider only derailment occurrence. 
4.9: Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on developing a modelling tool that can consider the impact of different 
maintenance strategies on the frequency of a derailment at an S&C. An S&C system has been defined 
for the demonstration of the method based on the review of current literature around S&C degradation 
and asset management, given in Chapter 2.  
A Fault Tree for the derailment occurrence is presented. This forms the basis for the models given in 
the chapter. Discreet states are assigned to each component within the S&C system to model the 
condition from the perfect state to the failed state for each component.  
A Stochastic Petri net model is used to model the interaction between the component conditions, the 
maintenance and inspection strategies and the passage of a train through the S&C with the potential to 
cause a derailment. This model is split into various interconnecting sub-modules which are tied 
together through system level inspection and maintenance strategies. A model for the over-speeding 
of the train under various conditions is also included.  The risk scenarios, taken from the Fault Tree in 
the early stages of the chapter, are also modelled in this way, taking outputs from the individual 
component models.  
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Results are obtained from the model via Monte Carlo Simulation for sample input values. The impact 
on the derailment occurrence, S&C system state and maintenance actions of different maintenance 
strategies were tested to demonstrate the capacity of the method. For the input values used here, 
opportunistic maintenance reduces the derailment occurrence, as does a shorter full S&C replacement 
interval. The frequency of derailments by cause is also presented to demonstrate how this model can 
be combined with a consequence analysis to give a risk assessment for different maintenance 
strategies.  
Finally, a discussion of the potential uses of a model such as this is presented, including the capacity 
to use a model such as this for cost analysis and optimization of maintenance strategies over the 
system lifecycle. The limitations of this modelling approach are also discussed, including the 
dependence on reliable input data, the computational cost of simulation of the model and the difficulty 
in quantifying the uncertainty on the outputs of the model. 
In conclusion, this chapter has provided an application of a Stochastic Petri net approach to an S&C 
system to explore the benefits and challenges of such a method. The developed model includes 
imperfect inspection and maintenance, and system level inspection and maintenance strategies, 
including opportunistic maintenance strategies. The work presented here demonstrates that a 
Stochastic Petri net framework can be used to predict hazard frequency and model different asset 
management strategies. The model assumes a consistent maintenance strategy throughout the S&C 
system life, mostly based on the revealed component conditions. The next chapter of this thesis 
presents a Petri net model for the fire protection system on an underground station. This model 
focuses further on age-based preventative maintenance strategies and introduces different time phases 




Chapter 5 Modelling Underground Fire Protection Systems 
5.1: Introduction:  
Fires in underground railway networks can have devastating consequences in terms of economic 
damage and loss of life. This has been demonstrated in accidents such as the King’s Cross fire, the 
Baku fire and the Metro Station fire in Daegu [155].  
The “Fire Precautions Sub-surface Railway Stations Regulations”, 1989 [156], which were updated 
and amended in 2009 [157], provide regulations for sub-surface railway stations in England. The 
regulations outline evacuation requirements in the event of a fire, including removal of obstructions or 
combustible material from escape routes and requirements for the use of fire-resistant materials and 
construction methods. Regulations are also given for the training of staff, maintenance of fire 
protection systems and additional precautions, such as, the banning of smoking on underground 
railway systems. In addition, regulations cover the means for fire fighting and fire detection and 
warning systems.  
Within these regulations, in addition to fire hydrants, extinguishers and access for the fire brigade, an 
automatic suppression system must be installed in machine rooms, storage areas and any area used as 
a shop. The station must also have an automatic fire detection system, including the use of heat 
detectors where possible and smoke detectors otherwise. The detection system must be capable of 
operating via manual call points. A fire alarm and public address system must be installed.  
A model is presented in this chapter to assess the performance of an automatic fire protection system 
to consider the probability that the system will fail to respond on demand, throughout the system life. 
This model can also be incorporated into a model to give an estimate of the system failure risk, this is 
demonstrated in Chapter 6. 
5.2: System Definition 
The models presented in this chapter cover the potential failures of automatic fire protection systems 
in an underground station. This includes an automatic deluge system, a fire detection system and an 
automatic alarm system. Included in this is the interaction of public or staff with the systems. A 
diagram of the fire protection system created for illustration in this chapter is given in Figure 5.1. The 
system modelled is a pressurized ringmain deluge system. Detection of a fire is possible by either a 
circuit containing heat detectors or a circuit containing smoke detectors. Notice of the fire is given by 




Figure 5.1: A diagram of the protection systems modelled in this chapter 
The deluge system is comprised of a ringmain which is kept under pressure when the system is 
inactive. Water is pumped from the water mains into the ringmain to maintain the pressure via an 
electrically powered jockey pump. When there is no need for water flow, the deluge valve is in a 
closed position, preventing water from leaving the ringmain, passing though the pipework and out of 
the sprinkler head nozzles. The pressure of the system is monitored by pressure sensors. 
The fire can be detected by one of two types of circuit. The first circuit consists of a set of smoke 
detectors and manual call points. This type of circuit can be installed in station areas where the 
temperature is regularly high, such as machine rooms. The second type of circuit consists of heat 
detectors and manual call points. In this model it is assumed that the smoke detectors, heat detectors 
and call points are sufficient in number and adequately placed such that if a fire occurs then failure of 
detection of the fire can only be caused by a component failure or human operating error, and not due 
to an incorrect location of the components. On detection of the fire by either type of circuit, a signal is 
sent to the control box. The control box is powered by mains electricity with a battery back-up. On 
detection of a fire, the control box sends a signal to the sounder circuit activating the alarm system. It 
is assumed that the alarm sounders are adequately arranged to inform passengers and staff of a fire. 
The deluge system is triggered when the deluge valve is opened. The deluge valve is connected to a 
water closing circuit which maintains even pressure across the diaphragm of the deluge valve. When 
water leaves the water closing circuit, there is a pressure difference across the deluge valve that causes 
it to open. The water can leave the water closing circuit via either the manual release mechanism or 
following the opening of the solenoid valve, due to a signal from the control box [83].   
Once the deluge valve opens, water flows from the ringmain and out of the sprinkler head nozzles. 
This causes a pressure drop in the ringmain which is detected via the pressure sensors. Following this 
pressure drop, there is a signal sent to the main pumps to compensate for the water loss in the system. 
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In the system modelled in this chapter there are two main pumps, both of which are on standby and 
individually have the capacity to provide enough water to the ringmain. The first pump is powered by 
the mains electricity and the second pump is diesel powered. Both pumps provide water from the 
mains water supply.  
There are several isolation valves in the deluge system. These enable the water flow, or diesel flow, to 
be shut off in the case of maintenance testing or false activation of the system. There are also pressure 
release valves to avoid high pressure in the ringmain, and test valves that can be opened to mimic the 
behaviour of the system on activation. 
This system has been chosen as an illustrative example of the methodology, based on its compliance 
with the regulations implemented for sub-surface railway stations in ‘The Fire Precautions (Sub-
surface Railway Stations) Regulations’[156] [157]. In these regulations, there is no specific 
recommended deluge system. A pressurised ringmain system has been chosen for application in this 
chapter to follow the trend identified in the literature to install deluge systems in underground stations 
[109] [110] [112]. Furthermore, a ringmain-based system has been chosen over a frangible bulb 
sprinkler system due to its robustness and suitability to operate in high temperatures, common in areas 
of underground stations.  
In this chapter, the failure modes of the system presented in Figure 5.1 are modelled in detail to 
illustrate the methodology developed in this thesis.  
5.3: Method 
The following methodology is implemented in order to predict the unavailability of a fire protection 
system on an underground station: 
1. Identify the system failure modes 
2. Perform Fault Tree analysis for each of the failure modes to identify the contributing 
component failures, combination of failures or human factors. 
3. Model the probability of each component failure via a Stochastic Petri net approach, to give a 
distribution for the probability of each component failure with time.  
4. Combine the distributions for the probability of each component failure, or human factor, at 
each time, via the Fault Tree structure obtained in Step 2, to give a distribution for the 
probability of each failure mode with time.  
In Step 3, a Petri net model is built that incorporates the maintenance, testing and inspection of each 
component. The asset management strategies are applied to the system as a whole and hence impact 
components across the system, to represent system level intervention strategies. Through this, the 
method also provides a measure of the number of maintenance or inspection actions to enable life 
time cost analysis for the system. 
In some cases, the failure of one component is not independent from that of a second, due to a 
dependency introduced through maintenance strategies. For instance, if one pressure sensor is 
replaced upon discovery of a failure, then all of the pressure sensors are replaced. When applying this 
method, where dependencies are identified the Petri net model must be designed to incorporate the 
dependencies. The outputs from the Petri net model, in this case, are then used as input to a 
corresponding intermediate event in the Fault Tree to incorporate the dependencies. In the application 
of this method it is assumed that, apart from in certain cases, although the failure of each component 
is dependent on an over-arching maintenance strategy, the individual component failures for any 
given strategy are independent of each other.  
There are other options to avoid this assumption. A Petri net can be built to combine the occurrences 
of component failures to give the system failure modes. This increases the model size and hence the 
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computational cost of simulating the model. This is implemented and discussed further in Chapter 6 
of this thesis. Alternatively, a Bayesian Network can be used to combine the failure of the 
components to give a system level failure [158]. However, this is also costly in terms of computation. 
In review of these options, the combination via a Fault Tree structure was selected for efficiency and 
to fit well with the current Fault Tree and Event Tree methods used in industry. For this system, it was 
deemed reasonable to assume that component failures are independent of each other for any given 
maintenance strategy, due to a low level of interaction between most components in the system.  
This method is applied to a deluge system, detection system and alarm system on an underground 
station. Periodic inspection of the components and testing of the system is included in the model. For 
each component it is assumed that failures can occur at random but that failures occur more frequently 
as the component reaches the end of its useful life. There are three types of maintenance included in 
the model. The first occurs when a component reaches a failed state, the second at a time interval that 
corresponds to the estimated end of its useful life, and the third before it is estimated that the 
component has reached the end of its useful life. These three maintenance options are included to 
allow a three-phase system level asset management strategy. The inspection frequency in this model 
can also vary through the system life for each component. In this model three sample system phases 
are defined to demonstrate the modelling capability. The phase entry times, each component 
inspection interval and the system testing interval can all be varied, for each system phase, to consider 
the impact on unavailability. These phase entry times allow the system level asset management 
strategy to be optimised. This is discussed further in Chapter 6. These different maintenance and 
inspection actions are enabled depending on the phase of the system, which are defined as: 
1) Phase 1: When the system is first installed and for the time this it is expected that the 
components are within their useful life, assume that there are a limited number of failures and 
repair the components when a failure occurs. This phase should incorporate the random 
component failures. Components are inspected less frequently. 
2) Phase 2: As the system ages and some components reach the end of their useful life, it can be 
expected that a number of failures will occur due to the age of the components. In this phase, 
activate replacement of each component when it is expected that it is in a degraded state at the 
end of its useful life, along with replacing the component upon failure. Components are 
inspected at an increased frequency, in comparison to the frequency of Phase 1 inspection. 
3) Phase 3: When the system has reached the end of its expected useful life and is in operation 
past this point, it is assumed that a larger number of failures will occur due to the age of 
components, which can increase the probability of a system level failure. At this time, the 
early replacement of each component is activated, along with the repair of components upon 
failure. Early replacement means the components are replaced before the expected end of 
useful life. The components are inspected at an increased frequency in comparison to the 
frequency of Phase 2 inspection. 
Throughout this chapter, each model is populated with estimated values to illustrate the modelling 
capability, on the analysis of system data these values can be adjusted to model the specific case 
under consideration. These sample values can be found in Appendix 3. It is trivial to alter these 
values, within the custom software developed for analysis of the model, for application of the model 
to a specific dataset. The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: firstly, the failure modes for the 
system are identified and, secondly, Fault Tree analysis is performed for each failure mode. Next, a 
sample maintenance strategy is described for the system. A Petri net for each component is then 
presented along with the results for the probability of failure of each component over time, for the 
given maintenance strategy. A Petri net is presented for the human factor elements of the system. 
Finally, the probability of each failure mode at each time for the given maintenance strategy is 
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presented along with the results for the number of different maintenance actions, system tests and 
false system activations.  
5.4: System failure modes 
Three safety critical system failure modes were identified in this chapter for the fire protection 
system. In addition, spurious failure is also considered. The safety critical failure modes considered 
are: 
1) Insufficient flow at the nozzle head for the deluge system, including a failure to start and a 
failure once active.   
2) No sound made by the alarm system, due to unavailability of the alarm system. 
3) No fire detection signal to the control box, due to unavailability of the detection system. 
These failure modes are selected as they represent the total failures in the automatic suppression 
system, such that the risk of the fire spread is increased on their occurrence. Insufficient flow at the 
nozzle head of the deluge system includes scenarios where the deluge system will fail to control the 
fire for a sufficient length of time to allow for the safe evacuation of passengers and staff in the 
station, and the arrival of the fire brigade. It is desirable for the deluge system to completely 
extinguish a fire to prevent the loss of service time and reduce repairs required following a large fire. 
However, in this thesis accurately modelling the risk to human life is the primary concern and so a 
failure of the deluge system is defined as a scenario that may impact human life as opposed to 
infrastructure. The alarm system failure mode considers scenarios where the alarm and notification 
system does not function when required, to alert passengers and staff of the need to evacuate in a safe 
manner, before the fire has spread to a level where it can impact human life. The detection system 
failure mode includes any scenario whereby a fire is not detected by either heat or smoke detectors, or 
by a member of the public or staff who acts upon the discovery of the fire. This detection must occur 
before the fire is at a level that will impact the safety of human life.  
 
Figure 5.2: A diagram showing the times available for the fire control systems following a fire initiation 
Figure 5.2 shows the actions of the system following the initiation of a fire that has potential to 
endanger human life, the time windows depend of the size of the fire. There must be enough time 
following the initiation of the fire for the public and staff within the station to be evacuated safely. In 
order for this to happen, the fire must be detected and the alarm activated. Following the detection of 
the fire, the deluge system can control the amount of time it takes for the fire to reach a critical size 
where human life is at risk. If the deluge system fails, the fire can reach a critical size faster, resulting 
in less time for the evacuation of passengers and staff. 
In addition to this, the false activation of the deluge and alarm systems are included in this model. 













Fire reaches critical size
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model outputs. In this model, false activation of the system can occur via the following component 
failures [159]: 
 The deluge valve fails to reach a closed position, causing water to flow from the ringmain and 
out of the sprinkler heads and triggering a reaction from the rest of the system as if there was 
a fire.  
 The solenoid, or water closing circuit, fails in a way that lets water escape the water closing 
circuit. This results in a pressure difference across the deluge valve, causing it to open as if 
there was a fire. 
 At least two of the three pressure sensors revealing a false drop in pressure leading to pump 
initiation and excessive pressure in the ringmain. This leads to a pressure difference across the 
deluge valve, causing it to open as if there was a fire.  
 False detection by the smoke alarm circuit.  
 False detection by the heat alarm circuit.  
 False activation of a manual call point.  
In this model, the number of false activations of the system are recorded. False activations can cause 
costly damage and station closures.  
5.5: Fault Trees for the safety critical system failure modes  
Following the method laid out in the book ‘Risk analysis for process plant, pipelines and transport’, a 
Fault Tree for each of the system failure modes was created [160]. When the size of the Fault Tree 
became large, transfer symbols were used to split the Fault Tree over several figures.  
The Fault Trees were developed following several steps. Once the top event is identified it is analysed 
to give any contributing events. These subsequent events are then analysed for any deeper level 
contributing events, and this process is again repeated until component level events are reached. For 
instance, the event for a lack of water flow from the ringmain deluge system is decomposed to 
consider a lack of water flow through relevant components at increasing distances from the sprinkler 
head in the logic of the system, as the Fault Tree levels deepen.  
Each of the basic events in the following Fault Trees has an associated Petri Net model, to give the 
probability that each of the basic events occur at each time. For example, the basic event probability 
corresponding to a smoke detector failure is modelled by a Petri Net that outputs the probability of the 
smoke detector failure at each time, and additionally considers the degradation, testing, inspection and 
maintenance of the smoke detector. This modelling process is applied for each of the basic events, 
resulting in a collection of models for components across the system. In addition, the Fault Trees 
provide the framework for combining the component failure models, to give system level failure 
probability. 
5.5.1: No fire detection signal to the control box 
The first safety critical system failure mode presented in this chapter is a detection system failure 
resulting in no signal from the detection system to the control box. The top event of this Fault Tree is 
also the transfer event, T5, for two Fault Trees given in subsequent sections of this chapter. Zone 1 
corresponds to a non-public area fitted with smoke detectors and Zone 2 corresponds to a public area 
fitted with heat detectors. Here, it is assumed that the fire occurs in either Zone 1 or Zone 2 of the 
station.  
The Fault Tree, for a lack of detection signal to the control box, is given in Figure 5.3. Here Analysis 




Second order minimal cut sets: 
1. {ZNfd1,WIRtf1} – Corresponding to a fire detectable in Zone 1 and a Zone 1 wiring failure 
2. {ZNfd2,WIRtf2} – Corresponding to a fire detectable in Zone 2 and a Zone 2 wiring failure 
Third order minimal cut sets: 
1. {ZNfd1,SKDdf,CPcf1}- Corresponding to a fire detectable in Zone 1, an automatic smoke 
detection failure and a manual call point failure in Zone 1 
2. {ZNfd1,SKDdf,CPof1) – Corresponding to a fire detectable in Zone 1, an automatic smoke 
detection failure and a human error by a staff member to operate a manual call point 
3. {ZNfd2,HTDdf,CPcf2} – Corresponding to a fire detectable in Zone 2, an automatic heat 
detection failure and a call point failure in Zone 2 
4. {ZNfd2,HTDdf,CPof2} – Corresponding to a fire detectable in Zone 2, an automatic heat 
detection failure and a failure of a member of public or staff to operate the manual call point 
in Zone 2 
 




5.5.2: No sound made by alarm system 
The second failure mode of the system that is analysed via Fault Tree analysis is that no sound is 
made by the alarm system. The Fault Tree for this is given in Figure 5.4. The transfer event, T5, 
developed in the previous section, is included in this Fault Tree model.   
 
Figure 5.4: A Fault Tree for no sound made by the alarm system 
Analysis for this Fault Tree, including the incorporation of the transfer event T5, gives three first 
order minimal cut sets, two second order minimal cut sets and three third order minimal cut sets.  
First order minimal cut sets: 
1. {SDRmf} - Corresponding to a multiple sounder failure 
2. {WIRtf3} – Corresponding to a wiring failure 
3. {CBtf} – Corresponding to a control box failure 
Second minimal cut sets: 
1. {ZNfd1,WIRtf1} – Corresponding to a fire detectable in Zone 1 and a Zone 1 wiring failure 
2. {ZNfd2,WIRtf2} – Corresponding to a fire detectable in Zone 2 and a Zone 2 wiring failure 
Third order minimal cut sets: 
1. {ZNfd1,SKDdf,CPcf1}- Corresponding to a fire detectable in Zone 1, an automatic smoke 
detection failure and a manual call point failure in Zone 1 
2. {ZNfd1,SKDdf,CPof1) – Corresponding to a fire detectable in Zone 1, an automatic smoke 
detection failure and a human error by a staff member to operate a manual call point 
3. {ZNfd2,HTDdf,CPcf2} – Corresponding to a fire detectable in Zone 2, an automatic heat 
detection failure and a call point failure in Zone 2 
4. {ZNfd2,HTDdf,CPcf2} – Corresponding to a fire detectable in Zone 2, an automatic heat 
detection failure and and a human error by a staff member to operate a manual call point 
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5.5.3: Insufficient flow at the nozzle heads of the deluge system 
The Fault Tree for insufficent flow at the nozzle heads of the deluge system is given in Figure 5.5. 
The Fault Tree can be analysed to give the minimal cut sets that contribute to this failure mode. There 
are several further transfer events in this model. These are presented in the following figures, prior to 
a summary of the minimal cut sets for this top event.  
 
Figure 5.5: A Fault Tree for insufficient flow at the nozzle heads of the deluge system 
The Fault Tree for Transfer Event T1, representing no supply from the diesel pump test valve, is given 




Figure 5.6: A Fault Tree for no water supply from the diesel pump test valve 
The Fault Tree for Transfer Event T2, representing no supply from the electric pump test valve is 




Figure 5.7: A Fault Tree for no water supply from the electric pump test valve 





Figure 5.8: A Fault Tree for low initial pressure in the ringmain 
The Fault Tree for Transfer event T4, which represents low pressure during water flow, is given in 
Figure 5.9.  
 
Figure 5.9: A Fault Tree for low pressure during water flow 
Following the analysis of the detection system failure mode, the minimal cut sets for the full expanded 
Fault Tree for the failure of water flow at the nozzle head of the deluge system were found. There are 
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nine first order minimal cut sets for the system, twenty-five second order minimal cut sets for the 
system, four third order minimal cut sets for the system and four fourth order minimal cut sets for the 
system. Each minimal cut set, along with a description is given below.  
First order minimal cut sets: 
1. {SPHfb} - Corresponding to a nozzle failure 
2. {PIPnf} - Corresponding to a pipework failure 
3. {DELfc} - Corresponding to a deluge valve failure 
4. {ISOfc1} - Corresponding to an isolation valve failure in the closed position 
5. {RGMnf} - Corresponding to a ringmain failure 
6. {PScom} - Corresponding to a combined pressure sensor failure 
7. {CBtf} – Corresponding to a control box failure  
8. {MWSsf}- Corresponding to a water supply failure from the mains 
9. {ISOfc4} – Corresponding to a failure of the water mains isolation valve in the closed 
position 
Second order minimal cut sets 
1. {SOLna,MAnna} – Corresponding to a solenoid failure and a manual release mechanism 
failure 
2. {SOLna,HFna1} – Corresponding to a solenoid failure and human error in operating the 
manual release mechanism.  
3. {TVLfo1,TVlfo2}- Corresponding to an open testvalve for the diesel pump and an open test 
valve for the electric pump. 
4. {TVLfo1,ISOfc3}- Corresponding to an open testvalve for the diesel pump and a failure of 
the electric pump isolation valve in the closed position 
5. {TVLfo1,EUPtf}- Corresponding to an open testvalve for the diesel pump and an electric 
pump failure 
6. {TVLfo1,MESsf}- Corresponding to an open testvalve for the diesel pump and a mains 
electricity failure 
7. {TVLfo2,ISOfc2}- Corresponding to an open testvalve for the electric pump and a failure of 
the diesel pump isolation valve in the closed position 
8. {TVLfo2,ISOfc5}- Corresponding to an open testvalve for the electric pump and a failure of 
the diesel tank isolation valve in the closed position 
9. {TVLfo2,DPUtf}- Corresponding to an open testvalve for the electric pump and a diesel 
pump failure 
10. {TVLfo2,DPTtf}- Corresponding to an open testvalve for the electric pump a diesel tank 
failure 
11. {ISOfc2,ISOfc3}- Corresponding to a failure of the diesel pump isolation valve in the closed 
position and a failure of the electric pump isolation valve in the closed position 
12. {ISOfc2,EPUtf}- Corresponding to a failure of the diesel pump isolation valve in the closed 
position and an electric pump failure 
13. {ISOfc2,MESsf}- Corresponding to a failure of the diesel pump isolation valve in the closed 
position and a mains electricity failure 
14. {ISOfc5,ISOfc3}- Corresponding to a failure of the diesel tank isolation valve in the closed 
position and a failure of the electric pump isolation valve in the closed position 
15. {ISOfc5,EPUtf}- Corresponding to a failure of the diesel tank isolation valve in the closed 
position and an electric pump failure 
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16. {ISOfc5,MESsf}- Corresponding to a failure of the diesel tank isolation valve in the closed 
position and a mains electricity failure 
17. {DPUtf,ISOfc3}- Corresponding to a diesel pump failure and a failure of the electric pump 
isolation valve in the closed position 
18. {DPUtf, EPUtf}- Corresponding to a diesel pump failure and an electric pump failure 
19. {DPUtf,MESsf}- Corresponding to a diesel pump failure and a mains electricity failure 
20. {DPTtf,ISOfc3}- Corresponding to a diesel pump tank failure and a failure of the electric 
pump isolation valve in the closed position 
21. {DPTtf,EPUtf}- Corresponding to a diesel pump tank failure and an electric pump failure 
22. {DPTtf,MESsf}- Corresponding to a diesel pump tank failure and a mains electricity failure 
23. {PRVfo1,PRVfo2}- Corresponding to a diesel pump pressure release valve failure and an 
electric pump pressure release valve failure.   
24. {DPUtf,PRVfo2}- Corresponding to a diesel pump failure and an electric pump pressure 
release valve failure.   
25. {EPUtf,PRVfo1}- Corresponding to an electric pump failure and a diesel pump pressure 
release valve failure 
 
Third order minimal cut sets 
1. {ZNfd1,WIRtf1,MAnna} – Corresponding to a fire detectable in Zone 1, a Zone 1 wiring 
failure and a manual release mechanism failure. 
2. {ZNfd2,WIRtf2,MAnna} – Corresponding to a fire detectable in Zone 2, a Zone 2 wiring 
failure and a manual release mechanism failure 
3. {ZNfd1,WIRtf1,HFna1} – Corresponding to a fire detectable in Zone 1, a Zone 1 wiring 
failure and  a human error in operation of the manual release mechanism 
4. {ZNfd2,WIRtf2,HFna1} – Corresponding to a fire detectable in Zone 2, a Zone 2 wiring 
failure and a human error in operation of the manual release mechanism 
Fourth order minimal cut sets 
1. {ZNfd1,SKDdf,CPcf1,MAnna}- Corresponding to a fire detectable in Zone 1, an automatic 
smoke detection failure, a manual call point failure in Zone 1 and a manual release 
mechanism failure 
2. {ZNfd1,SKDdf,CPof1,MAnna) – Corresponding to a fire detectable in Zone 1, an automatic 
smoke detection failure, a human error by a staff member to operate a manual call point and a 
manual release mechanism failure. 
3. {ZNfd1,SKDdf,CPcf1,HFna1}- Corresponding to a fire detectable in Zone 1, an automatic 
smoke detection failure, a manual call point failure in Zone 1 and a human error in operation 
of the manual release mechanism 
4. {ZNfd1,SKDdf,CPof1,HFna1) – Corresponding to a fire detectable in Zone 1, an automatic 
smoke detection failure, a human error by a staff member to operate a manual call point and a 
human error in operation of the manual release mechanism 
Here, control box failure includes failures due to a total power failure or control box hardware failure. 
This is included in the control box modelling, and considered when combining the models to get the 
full system failure probabilities.  
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5.6: Component failure and maintenance 
The Fault Tree analysis identified the component failures, or combinations of component failures, that 
can lead to each of the failure modes considered in this chapter. A Petri net model is presented for 
each of the component failure modes, so that the probability that each component fails with time can 
be modelled. These Petri nets are simulated via Monte Carlo Simulation in order to find a quantitative 
estimate for the probability of each component failure.  
In this model, for each component, it is assumed there are two categories of failure, this is represented 
by two competing transitions in each component Petri net model. The first transition represents 
random failures that can occur at any point in the component’s life, and the second transition 
corresponds to an increasing number of failures as the component ages. This is completed under the 
assumption that after installation and the initial burn in period, each component will fail according to 
the shape of the Reliability Bath Tub Curve, with a constant rate of random failures throughout the 
components’ life followed by an increase in failure rate as the component ages. In this model, it is 
assumed that the initial high probability of failure commonly shown in the Reliability Bath Tub 
Curve, often seen due to poor installation or manufacturing defects, is reduced through testing of the 
components on installation. The probability of failure is modelled as approximately constant while 
random failures are occurring, such as those due to accidental damage. As the component ages, the 
probability that it will fail increases due to factors such as wear and corrosion.  
There are several methods whereby a failure in a component can be identified. In some cases, a 
component failure will be immediately revealed, such as in the case where the failure causes a false 
activation of the system. Alternatively, system testing or component inspection can reveal a failure. 
The strategies for the identification of a component failure are discussed for each component 
separately in the following sections. For most components it is assumed that an exact quantification of 
a partial failure is unreliable and so partially degraded states are not included. However, for the water 
pumps, it is assumed that a partially degraded state can be quantified through inspection and testing, 
such as monitoring the flow of water through the pump when activated. This allows condition-based 
maintenance of the pumps prior to failure. For all components in the model, the inspection interval is 
periodic. It is also assumed that the system level testing interval is periodic.  
There are several maintenance options for each component included in the model. Firstly, if a 
component failure is identified then a maintenance action is completed on this component after a short 
scheduling delay. It is assumed that this returns the component to the ‘as good as new’ state. 
Secondly, if there is an identified partially degraded state of the component, such as that included in 
the pump model, then the maintenance of the component is scheduled as a priority. Again, it is 
assumed that the maintenance returns the component to the ‘as good as new’ state. There is also age-
based maintenance included in the component models. Each component can be assigned two age-
based maintenance intervals: one representing early age-based maintenance and one representing 
routine age-based maintenance. These intervals can be assigned based on historic maintenance 
records, engineering judgement or estimated from predictions of the behaviour of each component 
over its lifetime. Alternatively, the method given in Chapter 6 can be extended to optimise the 
intervals. It is assumed that these actions return the component to the ‘as good as new’ state.  In this 
case, the ‘age’ of the component is determined from the time since the most recent maintenance 
action. 
A phased system level maintenance strategy is also included in this model. Here, maintenance phases 
are defined for the system, based on the age of the whole system since installation. The frequency of 
the component inspection or system testing can then be varied based on the maintenance phase. The 
activation of an individual early age-based, or routine age-based, maintenance strategy for each 
component can also be governed by the system level maintenance phase.  
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The model developed here can be populated with input data, found in the field to adapt the model to a 
specific fire protection system. The model provides a framework for analysis of the system given this 
data.  
For application of this model distributions are required for: 
1. The random failure rate of each component throughout its life 
2. The failure rate of each component as it ages  
The strategy for the management of the system also requires the following inputs: 
1. The system level maintenance phase entry times 
2. The inspection frequency for each component within each maintenance phase 
3. The system testing frequency within each maintenance phase  
4. The early age-based maintenance interval for each component  
5. The routine age-based maintenance interval for each component  
In addition to this, in some of the component models, there is a probability associated with different 
component failure modes, for instance if the failure is immediately revealed or not. These should be 
evaluated when applying the model to a specific system. These values are also required as input to the 
models. Input values to the model can be adjusted via an Excel spreadsheet that interfaces with the 
custom made model simulation software. 
For a demonstration of the modelling capability, sample data values are used to give example outputs 
of the models. Here, a uniform distribution is used for each component to estimate the time to a 
random component failure and a 2-Parameter Weibull distribution is used to estimate the time to an 
aged based failure of each component. The sample values used can be found in Appendix 3, a table of 
the failure modes and asset management strategies of each component modelled here can be found in 
Appendix 4. Results for each of the component models for these sample values can be found in 
Appendix 5. 
5.7: Using a Petri net to model component failures 
This section presents the models for each of the component failures that contribute to the system 
failure modes identified in the previous section. The aim of these models is to give the probability of 
each of the component failure modes, for input to the Fault Trees for the system failure modes, and to 
model how these probabilities change with time.  
For demonstration of the model, sample model inputs are used, and results are given for an arbitrary 
phased system-level maintenance strategy, with three system level maintenance phases. For this 
sample application, initially the strategy is in the first phase, whereby components are repaired only 
on the discovery of a failure. Following a 36-month interval, the strategy enters the second phase and 
routine age-based maintenance for each component is enabled. In this phase, components are also 
maintained when they are in a revealed failed state, or a failed state has been discovered through 
inspection or testing. After 156 months from the point of installation, the maintenance strategy enters 
the third phase. Here, early age-based maintenance of each component is enabled as is maintenance 
when they are in a revealed failed state, or a failed state has been detected through inspection or 
testing. Hence, the older the system, the earlier that the preventative maintenance is completed for 
each component. Different phased strategies can be easily tested by altering the input data to the 
model. 
The component inspection frequency and system level testing frequency can also be varied depending 
on the maintenance phase. For demonstration of the model in this chapter, a sample inspection and 
testing strategy is included. Here, in the first system level phase, every component is inspected once 
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every 12 months. In the section system level phase, every component is inspected once every 6 
months. In the third system level phase every component is inspected once every 3 months. In this 
model each component can have an individual inspection frequency for every system phase, this is 
discussed further and optimised in Chapter 6. The system testing in this model can also vary with each 
phase. For demonstration in this section, sample intervals are assigned with one system level test 
every 9 months in the first phase, one system level test every 6 months in the second phase and one 
system level test every 3 months in the third phase. To simplify the modelling it is assumed that the 
test valve will only reside in the open state if there is a system test underway, the opening of both test 
valves is modelled together by the system testing action. 
In this model each component type is modelled separately. In some cases, the model for the specific 
component is unique and in other cases the same Petri net structure can be applied to several different 
component types. There are three component types with a unique Petri net structure in this model, 
these are: the control box, the ringmain pressure sensors and the alarm sounder circuit. There are also 
6 component model structures that are applied to multiple components cases in this model. These 
arise due to the similarities between failure modes and the specific inspection and testing strategy 
applied to each component. An overview of the assumptions made by each component model 
structure, and a description of each model structure, is given in the following sections. Specific 
component data must be input to these model structures when they are repeated for each component in 
the full model.  
The results given in Appendix 5 for each component model, are a sample application with the 
synthetic data values given in Appendix 3. The computational time for Monte Carlo Simulation of the 
full system model was 77807.315s for 2000 runs of the simulation. 
5.7.1: Control box failure 
The Petri net shown in Figure 5.10 models the condition and maintenance of the control box. The 
control box and the control box battery are modelled in this structure, along with a mains power 
failure. The control box is powered by a mains power source with a battery in back up [161]. The 
control box can fail with two competing mechanisms: one due to the age of the control box and one 
due to random failure occurrence. Here, a competing mechanism implies that one mechanism will 
occur first. There are two failure modes for the control box, one revealed by an internal alarm and one 
unrevealed. The control box battery can also fail with two competing mechanisms: one due to the age 
of the control box battery and one due to random failure occurrence. A control box battery failure is 
assumed to be unrevealed. A mains power failure is assumed to occur with a uniform probability 
throughout the lifecycle of the system, and last for a short duration. This power failure does not only 
impact the control box but also other areas of the protection system such as the electric pump, if it is 
operational at the time. A final failure mode is included in the model to represent the probability that 
there is a mains power failure and the backup battery fails. In addition, the failure mode for this mains 
power failure, impacting other areas of the system, is taken from this model.  
A failure in the mains power is immediately revealed, in this model it is assumed that this failure lasts 
for a short delay time. An unrevealed failure of the control box can be identified through inspection of 
the control box or testing of the system by opening the test valve. A failure in the control box battery 
can be revealed by inspection of the control box battery. 
Maintenance of the control box battery is completed on a revealed battery failure. This returns the 
battery to the ‘as good as new’ state. Maintenance of the control box is completed on a revealed 





Figure 5.10: A Petri net for the control box and power failure 
In this Petri net, place P6 corresponds to a working state of the control box battery. Transition t11 
represents random battery failure, for example through damage to the battery, false installation, 
evaporation of the electrolyte due to high temperatures or thermal runaway due to excess charging 
current. Transitions t10 represents battery failure due to the age of the battery, such as chemical 
decomposition of the electrolyte, oxidation of the electrolyte or corrosion of the electrodes. Place P7 
corresponds to a failure of the control box battery.  
Place P8 corresponds to a mains electricity failure, which occurs at random governed by transition 
t17. The electricity failure ends after a delay governed by transition t19. P9 corresponds to a 
combined mains power failure and a battery failure. Transition t12 is a global inspection transition 
and models the inspection of the control box battery to reveal a failure. The inspection interval for the 
control box battery can be defined for the component and can vary depending on the system 
maintenance phase. Place P10 corresponds to a revealed failure of the control box battery.  
When place Pt2O2 is marked, maintenance is possible for the control box battery. Transition t15 
represents maintenance scheduling when there is a revealed failure of the control box battery. When 
place Pt4O2 is marked, routine age-based maintenance of the control box battery is possible. 
Transition t14 corresponds to scheduling of this maintenance. The time until this maintenance is 
scheduled is governed by the component maintenance strategy and counted from the time since the 
most recent maintenance intervention. When place Pt3O2 is marked, early age-based maintenance of 
the control box battery is possible. Transition t13 corresponds to scheduling of this maintenance. 
Similarly, the time until this maintenance is scheduled is governed by the component maintenance 
strategy and counted from the time since the most recent maintenance intervention. The marking of 
places Pt3O2 and Pt4O2, which enable the age-based maintenance of the control box battery, can 
occur at different time, governed by a system level phased maintenance strategy. Transition t16 is a 
reset transition that corresponds to maintenance of the control box battery, it is assumed in this model 
that this returns the control box battery to the ‘as good as new’ state. Place C2 counts the number of 
maintenance actions on the control box battery.  
Place P1 corresponds to a working state of the control box. Transitions t1 represents ageing of the 
control box such as loose wiring or degradation of the electrical components. Transition t2 represents 
add in early life and useful life failures, ut




















The Petri net given in Figure 46 represents the 
condition and maintenance of the control box. The 
net also includes power failure. The power failure 
occurs at random in this model, this is governed by a 
distribution and results in a failure of the control box. 
[57] As it is difficult to measure and quantify the 
condition of the control box, the maintenance is 
based on the age of the control box. The estimate for 
the time to failure of the control box can be gained 
from past failure data of similar control boxes or 
from recommendations by the manufacturer. 
There are 4 states for the control box, these are: the 
working state, the stage 1 degraded state, the stage 2 
degraded state and the failed state. As time 
progresses the control box steps through these 
states. The two degraded states are estimates of 
condition based on past data as opposed to 
measured or revealed states of the control box. 
These are included to allow two maintenance options 
before the control box fails. For the stage 1 degraded 
state the control box is only replaced if it is 
opportunistic to do so due to maintenance occurring 
on another part of the system. When it is estimated 
that the control box has reached the stage 2 
degraded state then the control box is scheduled for 
routine maintenance. If it is identified that the 
control box reaches the failed state then it is 
maintained immediately. 
The control box should be fail safe such that a failure 
in the control box if usually revealed via a notification 
of system failure to the user however, if the failed 
state is not revealed then there are four inspection 
and testing methods above can be used to identify 
the unrevealed failure. These are: testing by opening 
the test valve, visual inspection of the control box, 
observation of sensor readings and testing of the 
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random failure of the control box, for instance due to water ingress or accidental damage. Place P2 
corresponds to a failed state of the control box. On failure of the control box, there is a probability that 
the failed state will be revealed via an internal control box alarm. This is represented by the 
probability transition t4, with place P4 corresponding to a revealed control box failure and place P3 
corresponding to an unrevealed control box failure. 
When place Pt1 is marked the system is under test, by opening the test valve. This can reveal a failure 
in the control box and transition t4 corresponds to this. The marking of place Pt1, and hence the 
frequency of system level testing, can vary depending on the system level maintenance phase, as was 
discussed in Section 5.6. Transition t5 is a global inspection transition that models the periodic 
inspection of the control box, which can reveal a failure. The inspection interval governing this 
transition can be assigned based on the individual component asset management strategy and can vary 
depending on the system level maintenance phase.  
Maintenance is possible for the control box when place Pt2O1 is marked. Transition t6 corresponds to 
maintenance scheduling for the control box on a revealed failure. When place Pt3O4 is marked, 
routine age-based maintenance of the control box is enabled. Transition t8 corresponds to scheduling 
of this. The time at which this maintenance is scheduled is dependent on the component maintenance 
strategy and is counted from the time since the most recent maintenance action on the control box. 
When place Pt3O3 is marked, early age-based maintenance of the control box is enabled. Transition 
t7 corresponds to scheduling of this. Again, the time at which this maintenance is scheduled is 
dependent on the component maintenance strategy and is counted from the time since the most recent 
maintenance action on the control box. Place P5 corresponds to a scheduled maintenance action of the 
control box and transition t9 is a reset transition that models the maintenance of the control box. It is 
assumed that all maintenance actions on the control box return the control box and the control box 
battery to the ‘as good as new’ state. The marking of places Pt3O3 and Pt3O4 can occur at different 
times and be governed by the system level maintenance phase.  
Distributions are required for the probability that there is an age-based failure for the control box and 
the control box battery over time, and the rate of randomly occurring failures. These can be gathered 
from failure data for the components. The probability that the control box failure is revealed by an 
internal alarm is also required for application of the model. In addition, the rate of mains power failure 
and rate of repair to the mains power are required as input to the model. For testing of different asset 
management strategies; the scheduling delays for the age-based maintenance and the maintenance on 
revealed failure can be assigned, either based on current maintenance strategies or a test case. The 
component inspection and system level testing frequencies can also be assigned in this way. 
Initially places P1, P6 and P2 are marked by tokens. The Petri net can then be simulated. The average 
marking of places P3 and P4 gives the probability that the control box is in an unrevealed or revealed 
failed state at each time. The average marking of places P7 and P10 gives the probability that the 
control box battery is in an unrevealed or revealed failed state at each time. The average marking of 
place P8 gives the probability that there is a mains power failure at each time and the average marking 
of P9 gives the probability that there is a combined power failure to the control box. The number of 
tokens in place C1 at each time represents the total number of combined control box and control box 
battery maintenance actions that have been completed. The number of tokens in place C2 at each time 
represents the total number of control box battery maintenance actions that have been completed.  
5.7.2: Pressure sensor failure 
For the system modelled in this chapter, there are three sensors whose failure logic follows that of the 
2/3 voting gate in a Fault Tree. Hence, if there is one reading that is different but two readings that 
match, the system will follow the reading of the two sensors.  
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Three pressure sensors are modelled with the assumption that if any two of the sensors fail, then there 
will be a false reading of the ringmain pressure. Each sensor can fail with two competing 
mechanisms: one due to the age of the component and one due to random failure occurrence. Each 
sensor has three failure modes, the first where the sensor gives a reading that is higher than true, the 
second where the sensor gives a reading that is lower than true and the third where the sensor gives no 
reading. 
Inspection of the sensor readings and system testing by opening the test valve can reveal various 
combinations of failures of the pressure sensors. Firstly, the failure mode where one or more of the 
sensors gives no reading, is revealed on inspection of the readings. If two or more of the sensors fail 
to give a reading, then the deluge system can fail. Secondly, if there is a difference in the readings 
obtained from the sensors, this failure is revealed on inspection of the readings. This failure mode can 
arise if one, or two, of the sensors have failed and are providing false readings. Thirdly, if two, or 
more, of the sensors give a reading that is lower than true, this can activate the pumps to increase the 
pressure in the ringmain. This can cause a false activation of the system by creating a pressure 
difference across the deluge valve. The failure mode is revealed in this case. Fourthly, if two, or more, 
of the sensors give a reading that is higher than true, this can lead to insufficient pressure in the 
ringmain, with the potential to cause a system failure. In the case that all three sensors give a reading 
that is higher than true, the failure is unrevealed and not identifiable by inspection of the sensor 
readings. Testing of the system by opening the test valve can reveal this failure mode. 
In this model, the sensors are maintained on a revealed or discovered failure in any of the sensors. The 
sensors can also be maintained based on the time since the last maintenance intervention. 
Maintenance returns all sensors to the ‘as good as new’ state. 
The Petri net for the combined pressure sensor condition is given in Figure 5.11. 
 
Figure 5.11: A Petri net model for the combined condition of the pressure sensors 
In this model places P1 corresponds to the working state of the first sensor, place P3 corresponds to 
the working state of the second sensor and place P5 corresponds to the working state of the third 
sensor. Transitions t1, t3 and t5 govern the failure of each of the sensors due to their age and 

















































































































corresponds to the failed state of the first sensor, place P4 corresponds to the failed state of the second 
sensor and place P6 corresponds to the failed state of the third sensor. There is a probability included 
in the model that the failure will be of the type where no reading is gained from the sensor. 
Transitions t7, t8 and t9 model this for each sensor in turn, with Place P19 corresponding to a failed 
state where one or more of the sensors is not giving a reading. Place P7, P8 and P9 represent a false 
reading from each sensor in turn. For each sensor this false reading can either be higher than true, or 
lower than true. This is represented in the model by probability transitions t10, t11 and t12 in turn. 
The places P10, P11 and P12 corresponds to a failure mode of each sensor in turn where the reading is 
higher than the true value. The places P13, P14 and P15 corresponds to a failure mode of each sensor 
in turn where the reading is lower than the true value.  
Place P16 corresponds to a failure mode where two or more of the sensors give a reading that is lower 
than the true value, this is assumed to be a failure mode that is revealed by false activation of the 
deluge system. Place F1 counts the number of false system activations by any component in the 
system. Place P17 corresponds to a failure mode where two of the sensors are giving a reading that is 
higher than true, this can cause a failure of the system but is revealed on inspection of the sensor 
readings. Place P18 corresponds to a failure mode of the system cause by two or more of the sensors 
giving a reading that is higher than true. This can also be revealed by testing of the system by opening 
the test valve. Place P24 corresponds to a failure where one sensor gives a false reading, this is 
revealed by inspection of the sensor readings. Place P19 corresponds to a failure where one or more of 
the sensors to fail to give a reading, if two of the sensors fail to give a reading then there can be a 
system failure. This is represented by transition t30. Place P18 corresponds to a failure that has the 
potential to cause a system failure. Place F1 corresponds to a false activation of the deluge system. 
Transitions t21, t32 and t35 model the inspection of the readings from the pressure sensors. These are 
global transitions where the frequency of inspection can be defined for the pressure sensors and can 
vary depending on the system level maintenance phase. Transition t24 models whole system testing 
by opening the test valve, when place Pt1 is marked this testing is underway. The marking of place 
Pt1, and hence the frequency of system testing, can vary with the system maintenance phase. 
In this model maintenance is scheduled for the pressure sensors if there is a discovered failure in any 
of the sensors. Place P21 corresponds to a revealed or discovered failure that has the potential to cause 
a system failure. Place P20 corresponds to a revealed or discovered failure that does not have the 
potential to cause a system failure. The scheduling of maintenance in either case is modelled by 
transitions t25 and t26, for each of the previous failure modes. The pressure sensors can also be 
maintained based on their age following an interval since their last maintenance intervention. When 
place PtK4 is marked then routine age-based replacement is enabled for the pressure sensors, this is 
scheduled following a delay governed by transition t27. When place PtK3 is marked then early age-
based replacement is enabled for the pressure sensors, this is scheduled following a delay governed by 
transition t28. Transition t29 is a reset transition that models the maintenance of the pressure sensors. 
It is assumed that all pressure sensors are maintained at the same time, returning all the sensors to the 
‘as good as new’ state. Place C1 counts the number of maintenance interventions. 
Data is required for the distribution governing the expected failure times of a pressure sensor due to 
age and due to random failure occurrences. The probability that a pressure sensor will fail in a way 
such that there is no reading is also required. In addition, the probability that a pressure sensor will 
give a false reading that is higher than true, or conversely lower than true, is also required as input to 
the model. To apply a specific asset management strategy an estimate is required for the inspection 
frequency of the pressure sensor readings, and the system testing frequency. In addition, the time until 
an early or routine age-based maintenance action, or a distribution representing these times, can be 
included based on historic data or a specific test scenario. The maintenance scheduling delay for a 
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revealed or discovered failure and the time taken for maintenance to be completed can also be 
included for a specific case.  
The initial marking of the Petri net is set with places P1, P3, P5 and Pt2K marked by tokens. The 
model can then be simulated, subject to the system level strategy in place. The average marking of the 
places P18 and P21 can be extracted to give the probability that there is a combined pressure sensor 
failure at each time from installation of the system. The number of tokens in place C1 can be analysed 
to give the number of maintenance actions on the pressure sensors at each time. The number of tokens 
in place F1 can be analysed to give the number of false system activations at each time.  
5.7.3: Alarm failure 
The Petri net in Figure 5.12 gives the model for the alarm sounder circuit. A circuit with a population 
of alarm sounders is modelled. The alarm sounders can fail with two competing mechanisms: one due 
to the age of the sounders and one due to random failure occurrence. A failure in the alarm sounders 
can have one of two modes. In the first failure mode, the failure is insufficient to cause a system 
failure due to an inbuilt redundancy in the number of sounders in the circuit. In the second failure 
mode a failure in the alarm sounders is sufficient to cause a system failure. Both failure modes are 
unrevealed. The circuit connecting the alarm sounders can also fail with two competing mechanisms: 
one due to the age of the circuit and one due to random failure occurrence. This failure is unrevealed 
and assumed to be sufficient to cause a system failure. 
Inspection of the alarm circuit can reveal a failure. Included in this inspection is testing of the circuit 
to ensure that the alarm sounds correctly. The alarm sounder circuit is maintained on a discovered 
failure. The alarm sounder circuit can also be maintained based on the time since the last maintenance 
intervention. Maintenance returns all alarm sounders and the connecting circuit to the good as new 
condition.  
 
Figure 5.12: A Petri net for the alarm sounder circuit 
In this model place P1 corresponds to a good condition of the population of alarm sounders and place 
P2 corresponds to a good condition of their connecting circuit. Failure of the alarm sounders, due to 
age, is governed by transition t1, for example degradation of the piezo element, a loose wiring 
connection or a fault due to an accumulation of dust or water inside the alarm sounder. Random 
failure of the alarm sounders, such as that due to accidental damage is governed by transition t2. 
Alarm failure, net N (changed structure wrt
p rtial failures)
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Failure of the alarm sounder connecting circuit, due to age, is governed by transition t3, this includes 
degradation of the cable sheath resulting in exposure of the cables and a potential short circuit, 
moisture ingress into the cable and corrosion of the cable. Random failure of the alarm sounder 
connecting circuit, such as that due to accidental damage is governed by transition t4, for example 
failures due to accidental mechanical damage to the wiring or damage caused by rodents. Place P3 
corresponds to a failure in the population of alarm sounders. Transition t5 is a probability transition 
that governs the likelihood of such a failure causing a system level failure, due to several alarm 
sounders present in the circuit resulting in inbuilt redundancy in the system. Place P5 corresponds to a 
partial alarm sounder failure that does not have the potential to cause a system level failure. Place P4 
corresponds to a failure that does have the potential to cause a system level failure, either due to the 
condition of the alarm sounders or due to a failure in the connecting circuit.    
Inspection of the alarm sounder circuit, including testing of the circuit, can reveal a total failed state in 
the sounder circuit, or a partial failed state in the sounder circuit. Transition t6 is a global inspection 
transition that models the periodic inspection of the alarm sounder circuit to reveal a partially failed 
state. Place P6 corresponds to a discovered partially failed state. Transition t7 is a global inspection 
transition that models the periodic inspection of the alarm sounder circuit to reveal a total failed state. 
Place P7 corresponds to a discovered total failed state of the system.  
When place Pt2N is marked, maintenance is possible for the alarm sounder circuit. The alarm sounder 
circuit is maintained on a discovered total, or partial, failure. Transition t8 corresponds to maintenance 
of the alarm sounders on a discovered partial failure. This returns the alarm sounders to the ‘as good 
as new’ state but does not return the connecting circuit to the ‘as good as new’ state. Transition t9 
models the scheduling of a maintenance action on a revealed total failure in either the population of 
alarm sounders or the connecting circuit. This maintenance action returns the alarm sounders and the 
connecting circuit to the ‘as good as new’ state. The alarm sounder circuit can also be maintained 
based on their age, governed by the time interval since the previous maintenance action. When place 
Pt4N is marked, routine age-based maintenance of the alarm sounder circuit is enabled. Transition t10 
governs the scheduling of this maintenance, from the time since the previous maintenance action. 
When place Pt3N is marked, routine age-based maintenance of the alarm sounder circuit is enabled. 
Transition t11 governs the scheduling of this maintenance, from the time since the previous 
maintenance action. Transition t12 is a reset transition, and combined with transition t13, models the 
maintenance of the alarm sounder circuit to return the population of alarm sounders and the 
connecting circuit to the ‘as good as new’ state. Place C1 counts the number of maintenance actions 
on the alarm sounder circuit.  
Data is required to gain a distribution for the time to failure of the population of the alarm sounders, 
due to the age of the alarm sounders. A distribution is also required for the expected time until a 
random failure of the alarm sounders. In addition, an estimate of the probability that a failure in the 
alarm sounders will fail the whole alarm system is required. Data is required for the time to failure of 
the connecting circuit, also due to age or random failure. To test a system level asset management 
strategy, distributions are required for the scheduling of early-age-based maintenance, routine age-
based maintenance and maintenance on a discovered failure. A distribution governing the time taken 
to complete the maintenance of the alarm sounder circuit can be included in the model. The frequency 
of inspection, including testing, of the alarm sounder circuit can also be varied.  
Initially places Pt2N and P9 are marked by tokens, following the marking of place P9, places P1 and 
P2 are marked immediately, corresponding to the good state of the alarm sounders and the connecting 
circuit. The Petri net can then be simulated to give outputs of the model. The number of maintenance 
actions at each time can be found by extracting the average number of tokens in place C1. The 
probability that the alarm sounder circuit is in an unrevealed failed state that can contribute to a 
system failure can be found by tracking the average marking of place P4. The probability that the 
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alarm sounder circuit is in the corresponding revealed failed state can be found by tracking the 
marking of Place P7. 
5.7.4: Type A component failures 
The components that have similar behaviours can be modelled with the same Petri net structure, 
which is repeated for each component, with different input values. Type A components are those that 
have the following features: 
 The component can fail with two competing mechanisms: one due to the age of the 
component and one due to random failure occurrence. The failure is unrevealed. 
 System testing by opening the test valve can reveal a failure in the component. Inspection of 
the component can reveal the failure. 
 The component is maintained on a revealed or discovered failure. The component can also be 
maintained based on the time since the last maintenance intervention. Maintenance returns 
the component to the ‘as good as new’ state. 
The model for the Type A components is given in Figure 5.13 and is repeated to model the pipework, 
pressurised ringmain and the diesel tank.  
 
 
Figure 5.13: A Petri net for the pipework condition in the deluge system 
There are two competing types of Type A component failure included in this model. These are 
random failures such as those that occur due accidental damage, and failures of the component due to 
ageing. In this model place P1 corresponds to the working state of the pipework and place P2 
corresponds to the unrevealed failed state of the pipework. Transition t1 corresponds to ageing of the 
pipework leading to a failure and transition t2 corresponds to random pipework failures. 
In this model a component failure is assumed to be unrevealed until inspection of the component or 
testing of the system is completed. When place Pt1 is marked a system test is in action, transition t3 
corresponds to a system test that reveals a failure in the component. The marking of place Pt1 is 
discussed in Section 5.9 of this chapter. Transition t4 is a global transition that represents a periodic 
component inspection that reveals a failure. Place P3 corresponds to a discovered component failure.  
It is assumed here that maintenance of the component returns it to the ‘as good as new’ state. In this 
model place P4 corresponds to a scheduled maintenance action. Transition t8 corresponds to the 
maintenance action that returns the condition of the component to the ‘as good as new’ state. Place C1 
counts the number of maintenance actions. A reset transition is used here to model this behaviour. 
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The Petri net for the pipe work is given in Figure 53. There are several considerations included in the net that can lead a failure 
of the pipework. These include: ageing of the pipework including corrosion and crack development and blockage of the pipes 
[61]. Blockage of the pipes  (and other failures in the working life) is estimated to occur at a time randomly selected from a 
governing distribution with no intermediate states between the working state and the failed state due to these causes. The 
occurrence of this events is modelled as independent of the age of the pipework. The condition of the pipes is difficult to 
determine until a failure occurs resulting in a visible crack. Due to this, maintenance of the pipes is age based with two 
intermediate states introduced between the working and failed state. These states, the stage 1 and stage 2 degraded states, 
are estimated based on the age of the pipes and allow opportunistic and routine maintenance to be scheduled before a failure 
occurs. Early life failures are governed by t14, and are assumed to follow a Weibull disatibution. 
The pipes are inspected periodically to check for the presence of visible cracks, also testing of the whole system by opening the 
test valve will identify any leakages from the pipework. All the pipework in the system is considered in one net, if maintenance
occurs then it is assumed that all of the pip work is returned to the good as new state. Freeze damage is not included in this 
net as it is assumed that the pipework is dry. 
Pt4A
-Early-life period: 1 year, 10% 
failure
-Mid-life period: 0year-60years, 
10% failure
-Late life: 30 years-60 years, 80%
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There are three cases included in this model that can result in a scheduled maintenance action. Firstly, 
a maintenance action can be scheduled when there is a discovered failure. This is governed by 
transition t5 which corresponds to a short scheduling delay. Secondly, a maintenance action can be 
scheduled when it is estimated that the component is close to failure, based on the time since the last 
maintenance action. This is represented by transition t6 in the model. When place Pt4A is marked this 
routine age-based maintenance is enabled. Finally, a maintenance action can be scheduled when it is 
estimated that the component is reaching the end of its useful life, based on the time since the last 
maintenance action. This is represented by transition t7 in the model. When place Pt3A is marked this 
early age-based maintenance is enabled. The marking of places Pt3A and Pt4A is discussed in Section 
5.9 of this chapter.  
A distribution for the probability of an age-based failure at each time is required for transition t1. The 
distribution for the probability of a random failure at each time is required for transition t2. For 
application of the model, the inspection interval of the component and the system testing interval are 
also required. To test different age-based maintenance strategies, estimated distributions to govern the 
early and routine age-based maintenance actions are required. These can be varied to test the impact 
on the probability that the pipework is in the failed state. A short delay for scheduling of maintenance 
if there is a discovered failure and for the time taken for maintenance to be completed can also be 
varied in the model for a specific system. 
Initially places P1 and Pt2A are marked by tokens. A simulation of the Petri net can then be carried 
out. The probability that the pipework is in a failed state is found by recording the marking of the 
places corresponding to a discovered or unrevealed failed state and finding the average number of 
tokens in either place at each time.  
5.7.5: Type B components 
Type B components are those that have the following features: 
 The component can reach the failed state through two competing mechanisms: either through 
age or random failure occurrence. There is also a quantifiable partially degraded state for the 
component, due to age. Both partially degraded state and the failed state are unrevealed.  
 System testing by opening the test vale can reveal the state of the component. Inspection of 
the component can reveal the state of the component.  
 The component is maintained on a revealed or discovered failure or partially degraded state. 
The component can also be maintained based on the time since the last maintenance 
intervention. Maintenance returns the component to the ‘as good as new’ state. 
The model for the Type B components is given in Figure 5.14 and is repeated to model the diesel 




Figure 5.14: A Petri net model for water pump condition 
There are two competing failure mechanisms for the Type B components; one is due to the age of the 
component and one is due to a random failure occurring in the useful life of the component. There is 
an intermediate degraded state for the Type B components, that forms an intermediate step between 
the working and failed state. When both of places P2 and P9 are marked this corresponds to the 
working state of the component. Two places are included here to allow the component to fail due to a 
random event when it is either in the working or degraded state. Places P4 and P6 are marked 
simultaneously and correspond to a working but degraded state of the component. Place P5 
corresponds to a failed state of the component. Transitions t3 and t4 are reset transitions that prevent 
the place P5 being marked more than once, by removing the tokens in places that correspond to the 
alternative mechanism than the one that caused the failure. 
For Type B components it is assumed that periodic inspection of the component can reveal the failed 
or degraded state and the system testing can reveal the failed state. Transition t6 is a global inspection 
transition that corresponds to an inspection action that reveals a degraded state of the component. 
Place P7 corresponds to a identified degraded state of the component. Transition t7 is a global 
inspection transition that reveals a failed state of the component. Place P8 corresponds to a discovered 
failed state of the component. When place Pt1 is marked a system test is underway, transition t5 
corresponds to a discovery of a component failure at this system test.  
In this model the component can be maintained in four different scenarios. Firstly, the component can 
be maintained on a discovered failure, transition t10 corresponds to the scheduling of this. Secondly, 
the component can be maintained on an identified degraded state, transition t8 corresponds to this. 
Thirdly, the component can be maintained when it is estimated that the component has reached the 
end of its useful life, based on the time since the previous maintenance action, transition t9 
corresponds to the scheduling of this. This is activated when place Pt4B is marked. Finally, the 
component can be maintained early, before it is estimated that the component has reached the end of 
its useful life, transition t11 corresponds to the scheduling of this. This is activated when place Pt3B is 
marked. When place P9 is marked then maintenance is scheduled, this maintenance is completed after 
a short delay, modelled by transition t12. Place C1 counts the number of maintenance actions. It is 
assumed that maintenance returns the component to the ‘as good as new’ state. 
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The Petri net given in Figure 50 models the condition for the pump and emergency pump. 
There are several faults in a pump that can lead to failure. These include [59]: 
Captivation (bubbles in fluid that can collapse leading to damage to blade wheels). 
Gas in the fluid (pressure drop leading to gas presence and separation over lower head). 
Dry run (lack of liquid leading to overheating). 
Wear (erosion, corrosion, damage to bearings, plugging of relief bore holes and sliding ring 
seals and an increase in split seals). 
Deposits of material. 
Oscillations (unbalance of rotor). 
These faults can be diagnosed by several different measurements including: flow rate, inlet 
and outlet pressure, temperature and vibration [60]. In this model both the pumps are in 
standby and inspection of the pumps, including these tests, occurs periodically in this model 
with a probability that the method used successfully reveals the fault. In this model there is 
one pathway for each pump to follow from working through to failure with four states in 
total. These are the working state, the stage 1 degraded state, the stage 2 degraded state and 
failed state. These states are classified by the measurements taken from the pump used to 
diagnose faults. For the pump to be in the working state the reading for the flow rate, 
pressure, temperature and vibration must all be within thresholds defined for good 
operation. For the pump to be in the stage 1 degraded state, one or more of the 
measurements must be outside the threshold for good operation but within the threshold for 
safe operation, the pump is replaced if maintenance is already scheduled for the system. For 
stage 2 degraded state, one or more of the measurements much be outside the threshold for 
safe or reliable operation. Maintenance is scheduled for the pump. The pump is classed as 
failed when it cannot pump sufficient water into the system for successful operation. 
The pump is repaired on the discovery of a fault and so the condition returns to the good as 
new state. Different ageing pathways and maintenance activities can be also be included in 
the model if there is data available. The structure of the net is the same for both pumps 
however the time to failure is different for the main and emergency pump. If both pumps are 
in the failed state when required it can lead to a catastrophic failure of the system. If the 
failure of the pumps is not discovered then testing of the whole system by opening the test 
valve can identify a failure in the pumps. 
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Data is required for the rate of random failures of the component and for the time for the component 
to reach the degraded state from the working state, and from the degraded state to the failed state. The 
thresholds that define each state can be defined when applying the model, for example the point at 
which condition monitoring data suggests that the component should be replaced can be used to 
define the threshold for entry to the degraded state. The inspection intervals of the component are also 
required, along with the scheduling delays for each of the maintenance actions.  
Initially places P1 and Pt2B are marked by tokens. The marking of places Pt3B, Pt4B and Pt1 are 
governed by a system level strategy, explained in Section 5.9. The number of maintenance actions 
over time can recorded by tracking the number of tokens in place C1 at each time. The probability that 
the component is in the unrevealed failed state can be found by tracking the marking pattern of place 
P9 and the probability that the component is in a discovered failed state can be found by tracking the 
marking of place P5. 
This Petri net is repeated in the model for each of the pump types with the corresponding input data 
for each pump type. For each pump random pump failures include those resulting from captivation, 
whereby bubbles in the fluid collapse leading to damage, pressure drops leading to large gas presence, 
and dry runs of the pump whereby the pump overheats due to a lack of fluid. Ageing failures include 
those such as erosion, corrosion, damage to bearings, material deposits and damage by oscillations 
[162]. Pump faults can be diagnosed by several different measurements including: flow rate, inlet and 
outlet pressure, temperature and vibration [163] [164]. In this example, the failure of the pump is 
classified as any pump failure scenario such that the pump cannot provide adequate water to the 
deluge system.  
5.7.6: Type C Components  
Type C components in this model are those that have the following features: 
 The component can fail with two competing mechanisms: one due to the age of the 
component and one due to random failure occurrence. The failure is unrevealed. 
 Inspection of the component can reveal a failure. Testing of the system, by opening the test 
valve, does not reveal the failure. 
 The component is maintained on a discovered failure. The component can also be maintained 
based on the time since the last maintenance intervention. Maintenance returns the component 
to the ‘as good as new’ state. 




Figure 5.15: A Petri net for the Type C components  
There are two competing failure mechanisms for this model. The first corresponds to failures of the 
component due to ageing, transition t1 models this. The second failure mechanism corresponds to 
randomly occurring failures. Transition t2 models this. In this model, place P1 corresponds to a 
working state of the component and Place P2 corresponds to an unrevealed failed state of the 
component.  
A failed state of the component can be discovered by periodic inspection of the component. Transition 
t3 is a global inspection transition that models this. Place P3 corresponds to a discovered failed state 
of the component.  
Maintenance for the component is modelled as occurring when there is a discovered failure in the 
component, transition t4 corresponds to the scheduling of this. Age-based maintenance, measured 
from the time since the most recent maintenance action, is also modelled. Transition t5 corresponds to 
the scheduling of age-based maintenance when it is estimated that the component has reached the end 
of its useful life. Transition t6 corresponds to the scheduling of early age-based maintenance, prior to 
the component reaching the end of its useful life. When Place P4 is marked maintenance is scheduled. 
Maintenance is modelled after a delay governed by the reset transition t7. Place C1 counts the number 
of maintenance actions. It is assumed that maintenance returns the component to the ‘as good as new’ 
state.   
Data is required for the rate of random failure and the time to failure due to the age of the component. 
Data is also required to govern the inspection interval and the time until each age-based maintenance 
action. The marking of places Pt3C and Pt4C, which activate the age-based maintenance strategies, 
are described in Section 5.9.  
Initially, places P1 and Pt2C are marked by tokens. The model can be simulated for quantitative 
analysis. The marking of place C1 can be extracted to give the number of maintenance actions on the 
component at each time. The average marking of place P2 gives the probability that the component is 
in the unrevealed failed state at each time. The average marking of place P3 gives the probability that 
the component is in the discovered failed state at each time.  
5.7.7: Type D Components  
Type D components within this model have the following characteristics: 
 The component can fail with two competing mechanisms: one due to the age of the 
component and one due to random failure occurrence. The failure is unrevealed but can lie in 
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one of two states. The first failure state does not have the potential to cause a system failure. 
The second failure state does have the potential to cause a system failure. 
 System testing by opening the test valve can reveal a failed state that has the potential to 
cause a system failure. Inspection of the component can reveal either of the failed states. 
 The component is maintained if it is in either discovered failed state. The component can also 
be maintained based on the time since the most recent maintenance intervention. Maintenance 
returns the component to the ‘as good as new’ state. 
This model is repeated for the isolation valves and pressure release valves. 
 
Figure 5.16: A Petri net model for the Type D components 
There are two competing failure mechanisms included in this model: one due to the age of the 
component and one due to random failures. Place P1 corresponds to a working state of the 
component. Transition t1 corresponds to a failure of the component due to age. Transition t2 
corresponds to a randomly occurring failure. Place P2 corresponds to a failed state of the component. 
On failure there are two failure modes included in the model, the first, modelled by place P3, 
represents a failure that will not cause a system level failure, and the second, modelled by place P4, 
represents a failure that will can cause a system level failure. On failure of the component, one of 
these states is entered in this model, this is represented by the probability transition t3. In this model 
both failed states are unrevealed.  
Both failure modes can be revealed by periodic inspection of the component, in this model. 
Transitions t5 and t6 are global inspection transitions that model this for each of the failure modes. 
Place P5 corresponds to a discovered failure that has the potential to cause a system level failure. 
Place P6 corresponds to a discovered failure that does not have the potential to cause a system level 
failure. When place Pt1 is marked, a system test is underway. Transition t4 models the revealing of a 
component failure, which can cause a system level failure, through this system testing. 
In this model maintenance is completed when there is a discovered failed state of either type. This 
maintenance is scheduled after a short delay, modelled by transitions t9 and t10, for each failure type. 
Also included in this model is the option for early or routine age-based maintenance. When place 
Pt4D is marked then age-based maintenance is enabled when it is estimated that the component has 
reached the end of its useful life, based on the time since the previous maintenance action. Transition 
t8 corresponds to the scheduling of this. When place Pt3D is marked then early age-based 
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maintenance is enabled, prior to the component reaching the end of its useful life. Transition t7 
corresponds to this. When place P7 is marked then maintenance is scheduled for the component. 
Transition t11 is a reset transition that models the maintenance of the component, it is assumed here 
that this returns the component to the ‘as good as new’ state. 
Data is required to govern the time until a failure due to the age of the component and for the rate of 
random failure occurrences. Data is also required for the maintenance scheduling delay on failure of 
the component and the time taken for the maintenance to be completed. Different inspection intervals 
and age-based maintenance intervals can be used as input to the model to test the impact of these on 
the system failure modes.  
Initially place P1 and place Pt2D are marked by tokens. A simulation of the model can then be 
competed for quantitative analysis. The number of tokens in place C1 can be recorded to give the 
number of maintenance actions on the component over time. The average marking of places P4 or P5 
can be recorded to give the probability that there is a component failure that has the potential to 
contribute to a system level failure, at each time, for the unrevealed and discovered failed state 
respectively.  
5.7.8: Type E Components:  
In this model, Type E components are those with the following shared features: 
 The component can fail with two competing mechanisms: one due to the age of the 
component and one due to random failure occurrence. There are two failure modes of the 
component. The first failure mode triggers a false activation of the system and is revealed. 
The second failure mode of the system is unrevealed and has the potential to cause system 
failure. 
 Inspection of the component can reveal a failed state. System testing, by opening the test 
valve, does not reveal the failed state. 
 The component is maintained on a revealed or discovered failure. The component can also be 
maintained based on the time since the last maintenance intervention. Maintenance returns the 
component to the ‘as good as new’ state. 
In the system model, the model for Type E components is repeated for the deluge valve, solenoid and 
water closing circuit and the manual start device. Figure 5.17 gives the Petri net that is repeated for 
each of the Type E components.  
 
Figure 5.17: A Petri net model for type E components  




Add in early life 
and random 
failures, to 






































-Early-life period: 6 months, 5% 
failure
-Mid-life period: 0year-6years, 10% 
failure
-Late life: 8 years, 85%
159 
 
In this model place P1 corresponds to the working state of the component. The component can fail for 
one of two reasons in this model. The first reason is that the component fails due to age, this is 
modelled by transition t1. The second reason is a random failure of the component has occurred, this 
is modelled by transition t2. There are two failed states of the component, one where the failure 
causes a false activation of the system and one where the failure is unrevealed and has the potential to 
prevent the system from responding on demand. Place P3 corresponds to a failed state that causes a 
false activation of the system and place P4 corresponds the unrevealed failure.  
Transition t4 models the false activation of the system due to the component failure, place F1 counts 
the number of false system activations and place P6 corresponds to a revealed failure due to this false 
activation. Transition t5 is a global inspection transition that can reveal the failed state of the system, 
represented by place P4. Place P5 corresponds to a discovered failed state where the failure can lead 
to a lack of response from the system due to the component failure. 
Maintenance of the component is scheduled on a revealed or discovered failure of either state. 
Transitions t8 and t9 correspond to the scheduling of this. Maintenance can also be completed based 
on the age of the component, measured by the time since the most recent maintenance action. When 
place Pt4E is marked then routine age-based maintenance is enabled. The scheduling of this is 
represented by transition t7. When place Pt3E is marked then early age-based maintenance is enabled. 
The scheduling of this is represented by transition t6. When place P7 is marked, then maintenance is 
scheduled for the component. This is completed after a short delay, modelled by the reset transition 
t10. Place C1 counts the number of maintenance actions and it is assumed that maintenance returns 
the component to the ‘as good as new’ state. 
Data is required for the transitions governing the failure of the component due to age and random 
failure occurrence. Other inputs to the model are also required, these can be varied to test different 
strategies, including: the inspection interval, the maintenance scheduling intervals and the time taken 
for maintenance to be completed. 
Initially place P1 and place Pt2E are marked by tokens. A simulation of the model can be completed 
for quantitative analysis. The marking of place C1 can be tracked over time to give the number of 
maintenance actions for the component. The average marking of places P4 and P5 can be extracted to 
give the probability that the component is in a failed state that can prevent the system from 
responding. The number of tokens in place F1 can be extracted to give the number of false system 
activations at each time. 
5.7.9: Type F components  
Type F components in this model are those with the following features: 
 This model structure models a population of the same component. The components can fail 
with two competing mechanisms: one due to the age of the components and one due to 
random failure occurrence. There are three failure modes included in the model. The first 
failure mode causes a false activation of the system and is revealed. The second failure mode 
is an unrevealed failure that does not have the potential to cause a system failure, due to 
inbuilt redundancy. The third failure mode is an unrevealed failure that has the potential to 
cause a system failure. If the model is in the second failure mode, a further failure can occur 
to result in the model residing in the third failure mode. This second failure can arise due to 
further ageing of the components or a random failure. 
 Inspection of the population of components can reveal the second or third failure mode. 
 The population of components are maintained on any revealed or discovered failure. The 
population of components can also be maintained based on the time since the last 
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maintenance intervention. Maintenance returns the population of components to the ‘as good 
as new’ state. 
In this model this module is applied to the smoke detectors, heat detectors and manual call points. 
 
Figure 5.18: A Petri net model for the smoke or heat detectors 
In this model a population of components are modelled. Place P1 corresponds to the working state of 
the population of components. A failure in the population can occur due to either the ageing of the 
components, represented by transition t1, or a random failure of the components, represented by 
transition t2. When place P3 is marked a failure has occurred in the population of components due to 
the age of the components. When place P2 is marked a failure has occurred in the population of 
components due to a random failure. For each of these failures, in this model there is a probability 
associated with the failure type to cause a system level failure, this is represented by either of 
transitions t3 or t4. When place P6, or place P10, is marked the failure is partial and insufficient to 
cause a system failure and when place P4 is marked the failure is enough to cause a system failure. 
While the population of components is in a partially failed state, further failures due to age or random 
occurrences are modelled by transitions t8 and t9 respectively, where transition t8 is a conditional 
transition whose distribution is dependent on if the previous failure of age related.  
For either a partial failure or full failure in the population of components, there is a probability that the 
failure will be immediately revealed by activating a false alarm of the system. This is represented by 
the probability transitions t5 and t10 for the full and partial failures respectively. Place F1 counts the 
number of false system activations. An unrevealed failure in the population of components can be 
revealed by periodic inspection and testing of the components. The global inspection transitions t6 
and t11 model this. Place P9 corresponds to a discovered failed state of the population of components 
that has the potential to cause a system level failure and place P13 corresponds to a discovered 
partially failed state of the components.   
In this model maintenance is completed in this model when there is either type of revealed or 
discovered failure. Transition t17 corresponds to the scheduling of maintenance when there is a 
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discovered partial failure. Transition t16 corresponds to the scheduling of maintenance when there is a 
discovered failure that can cause a system level failure. Maintenance is also completed based on the 
age of the population of components, measured from the most recent maintenance action. When place 
Pt4F is marked then routine age-based maintenance is enabled, this occurs after a delay governed by 
transition t15. When place Pt3F is marked then early age-based maintenance is enabled, this is 
governed by transition t14. When place P16 is marked then maintenance has been scheduled, 
maintenance is modelled by the reset transition t18. Place C1 counts the number of maintenance 
actions on each population of components. It is assumed that maintenance returns the population of 
components to the ‘as good as new’ state. 
Data is required for the transitions governing the random failure rate in the population of components 
and the failure of the components due to age. Data is also required for the transition governing the rate 
of a second ageing failure event, given that is a current failure in the population due to age. To test 
different asset management strategies the scheduling delays for each of the maintenance actions can 
be varied, along with the marking of the place Pt3F and Pt4F on a system level. Different inspection 
intervals can also be used as input to the model. These values can be adjusted for each application of 
the model and to each component population type. 
Initially place P1 and place Pt2F are marked by tokens. The model can then be repeated for each 
component type population and simulated as part of the whole system model, via Monte Carlo 
simulation. The number of tokens in place C1 over time can be extracted to give the number of 
maintenance actions for each population of components. The marking of places P8 and P9 can be 
extracted to give the probability that there is a failure in the population of components that can cause a 
system level failure. The number of tokens in place F1 can be extracted to give the number of false 
system activations at each time.  
5.8: Discussion of component model results 
Full results for the probability of each component failure at each time can be found in Appendix 5, for 
sample data values given in Appendix 3. There are several key characteristics that are common across 
the results for each component; the results tend to fit into one of the three categories.  
The first characteristic seen in the results occurs in cases where there is a long time to failure, such 
that it takes some time for any number of failures to be observed within the model. This is seen in the 
results for the pump models, where a degraded pump condition can be identified and rectified prior to 
failure. An example of this profile for the output for the model is shown in Figure 5.19. After an 
initial period where failures are highly unlikely, the probability of an unrevealed failure increases 
before continuing at a steady rate. At this point in the sample application, the system model is in the 
third maintenance phase and so age-based preventative maintenance is enabled for components across 





Figure 5.19: The probability that the jockey pump is in a failed state at each time 
The second characteristic seen in the results is a case where there are decreases in the probability of 
failure, after each of the system phase changes. When the system is in the first phase maintenance is 
only condition-based. When the system is in the second phase, age-based maintenance is enabled. 
When the system is in the third phase then the interval governing the age-based maintenance is 
decreased, so that it occurs more frequently. For components with more common failure probabilities, 
where the component can fail in a shorter time, decreases can be seen in the probability of failure that 
correspond to the phase change points. An example of this pattern of behaviour can be seen in Figure 
5.20, where the phase changes occur after 3 and 13 years in this example. 
 
Figure 5.20: The probability that the deluge valve is in a failed state at each time 
The third characteristic seen in the results is a steady increase in the probability of failure from the 
start time, followed by a levelling in the behaviour. This is especially seen for the Type F component 
models, where a population of components is considered and where the components are maintained as 
a population if there is a discovered degraded or failed state of one of the components. This levelling 
behaviour can be attributed to the age-based preventative maintenance introduced in the later phases 




Figure 5.21: The probability that there is a call point failure at each time 
Finally, more variable behavior can be observed when there is a lower probability of component 
failure. Trends can be observed within some of these rare failures that mimic the more common 
patterns: a decrease at the phase transition points, a steady rate and a gradual increase as the 
component ages. Examples where there is a lower probability of failure tend to show more variation 
year on year, relative to their value, due to their rarity of occurrence within the simulation. 
5.9: Incorporating system level phased maintenance strategies 
The component Petri net models, presented in the previous section, were linked together by 
overarching maintenance strategies, with different preventive and reactive maintenance strategies 
activated in each system-level phase. Where multiple types of component were modelled by the same 
Petri net structure, the structure was repeated with data for each specific type of component. The 
number of system tests and the inspection frequency of each component also depends on the system 
phase. The Petri net in Figure 5.22 governs these system level strategies.  
In this Petri net, when place P2 is marked, the system is in the first system level maintenance phase. 
After the firing of transition t3, place P3 is marked. This models the system as residing in the second 
system level maintenance phase. Place P4 corresponds to the third system level maintenance phase, 
this is marked when transition t4 fires. Transitions t3 and t4 add a token each to the conditional place 
Cp1 on firing, which is initially unmarked.  
Transition t1 represents the interval between full system tests, where the system is tested by opening 
the test valve, and transition t2 represents the time taken for a full system test to be completed. 
Transition t1 is conditional on the marking of place Cp1, which records the phase of the system. The 
distribution governing the firing of transition t1 is dependent on the number of tokens in place Cp1. 
Place C1 counts the number of full system tests. The number of full system tests is governed by the 
delay time in transition t1. In this application of the model, the inspection interval can be different for 




Figure 5.22: Petri nets for testing of the system and full system maintenance strategies 
The activation of system level early preventative maintenance is enabled by marking place Pt3 and the 
activation of system level routine preventative maintenance is enabled by marking place Pt4. This 
structure could be simplified using a Coloured Petri Net, which would be beneficial for models of a 
larger size as it would prevent repeating model structures. 
In the second and third system maintenance phases, aged-based maintenance is carried out after an 
interval of time from which the previous component maintenance action was undertaken, or from 
when the component was installed. The interval is specific to each component and is described in the 
component model sections presented earlier in this chapter. 
In Figure 5.22, as each new phase is entered, tokens are created to indicate the activation of each 
corresponding component maintenance action. For example, when place Pt4 is marked, places Pt4A, 
Pt4B, Pt4C etc. are all also marked. Similarly, when place Pt3 is marked, places Pt3A, Pt3B, Pt3C etc. 
are also marked. In this figure, the marking of these corresponding places is represented by the shaded 
and dotted structure in the Petri net, representing the repeating of the same module to mark all Pt4i 
places, for some i in the set of all the Petri nets for component models. Transition t4 removes the 
marking of place Pt4, however, if an age-based maintenance action is scheduled in the previous phase, 
this scheduling remains by retaining any current marking of the Pt4i places. 
In addition, these phases can be used to govern the inspection strategy of each component. For each 
individual component, an inspection interval can be assigned for each system level maintenance 
phase. For example, during the first phase, inspection can be carried out with less frequency. 
Following this, as the system enters the second and third phases, the inspection interval for each 
component can be decreased so the inspection is carried out on a more frequent basis. The aim of an 
inspection strategy such as this, is to focus the resources towards the end of the system life where it is 
more likely that there will be multiple component failures, which can result in a system-level failure. 
This is included in the Petri net model through conditional transitions. During each phase change, the 
marking of the conditional place, Cp1, is increased by one token. Within each component level Petri 
net model, the transitions corresponding to the inspection and testing of the component are conditional 
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on the number of tokens marking this conditional place. The model then selects the correct inspection 
interval based on the marking of place Cp1. 
The distributions Ph1 and Ph2 can be varied to test the impact on the maintenance cost and risk 
caused by component failures. An optimization based on the varying of these phases is performed in 
chapter 6 of this thesis. For the transitions corresponding to the preventative maintenance of each 
component, the lognormal distribution is assigned to govern the transition firing time.  
Sample Application 
For the sample values, given in Appendix 3 and used to illustrate the models throughout this chapter, 
the outputs relating to maintenance actions across the system were collated. Figure 5.23 shows the 
maintenance of the diesel tank, electric pump, diesel pump, jockey pump and the ringmain. The 
jockey pump has the highest number of maintenance actions per year, corresponding to the faster rate 
of ageing assigned in the input data. Across the component a higher level of maintenance can be seen, 
as the components age. This corresponds to the increase in preventative maintenance as the system 
level maintenance phase increases, and a higher number of maintenance actions due to component 
failures. 
 
Figure 5.23: The maintenance actions for the diesel tank, pumps and ringmain 
Figure 5.24 gives the maintenance actions for the sprinkler heads, isolation valves, pressure release 
valves and pipework. For the isolation valves and pressure release valves, these results represent the 
total number of maintenance interventions on a valve of that type within the system. For example, 
there are five isolation valves in the system and at approximately 20 years, three interventions will be 
carried out over these five valves. Similarly, there are two pressure release valves modelled in this 
case. These components can be modelled individually, to consider opportunistic maintenance 
strategies across similar components, by repeating the model structure used in this chapter and adding 
dependencies in maintenance actions. This gives a higher number of maintenance actions for the 
isolation valves and pressure release valves. A low level of pipework maintenance can be seen here 
corresponding to the low probability of failure and low level of preventative maintenance. A cyclic 
behaviour can be seen in the other components, which relates to periodic age-based maintenance 




Figure 5.24: The maintenance actions for the sprinkler heads, isolation valves, pressure release valve and pipework 
Figure 5.25 gives the maintenance actions for the deluge valve, manual start device, pressure sensor 
and solenoid. For components with shorter times to failure due to age, or more frequent random 
failures, it is expected that the maintenance actions will begin sooner and occur more regularly due to 
the higher probability of a random failure and a shorter age-based maintenance period.   
 
 
Figure 5.25: The maintenance actions for the deluge valve, call point, pressure release valve, pressure sensor and solenoid 
Figure 5.26 gives the maintenance actions for the alarm sounder circuit, the call point, heat detector 
and smoke detector. Due to the short ageing time of the call point and the higher rate of random 




Figure 5.26: The maintenance actions for the alarm sounder circuit, call point, heat detector and smoke detector 
Figure 5.27 gives the number of maintenance actions for the control box, the control box battery and 
the wiring. Here it can be seen that there is a higher level of control box battery maintenance actions, 
corresponding to the faster aging of the battery in comparison to the other components. Control box 
maintenance begins soon after installation and increases as the component ages, this maintenance can 
be attributed to the assigned random failure rate and the revealed failure of the control box. Wiring 
maintenance begins towards the end of the 40 year period, this can be attributed to the long ageing 
time, low random failures and scheduled preventative maintenance. 
 
Figure 5.27: The number of maintenance actions for the control box, control box battery and the wiring 
Figure 5.28 gives the number of false activations of the fire protection system and the number of 
system tests, by opening the test valve. An increase in the number of system tests as the system enters 
the second and third system maintenance phases can be clearly seen at 3 years and 13 years. As the 
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system ages past 8 years there is no notable increase, and some decrease, in the number of false 
activations of the system each year. This is due to the increased maintenance reducing the number of 
component failures. This suggests that the maintenance strategy applied in this case can also control 
the number of false activations of the system, despite the ageing of the system.  
 
Figure 5.28: The number of false system activations and system tests 
5.10: Human Interaction with the system  
There are two cases in the system failure modes presented in this chapter, where the action of a 
member of staff or the public can prevent a system failure mode. The first action is the manual 
activation of the deluge system by a staff member. The second action is the operation of a call point 
by a member of the public, or staff member. Petri net models are used to give the probabilities that 
these actions have been carried out successfully, at each time from fire initiation. 
5.10.1: Manual activation of the deluge system 
The first Petri net, which models the manual activation of the deluge system, is given in Figure 5.29. 
This Petri net models the probability that a staff member will operate the system as time progresses 
from the initiation of the fire.   
 
Figure 5.29: A Petri net to model a failure of manual activation of the deluge system 
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In this Petri net model, place P1 represents the presence of staff in the station. Place P2 corresponds to 
the arrival of a staff member at the manual activation device. Place P3 corresponds to a successful 
activation of the system by the staff member, and place P4 to an unsuccessful attempt to activate the 
system. An unsuccessful attempt could be due to a lack of specific operational training, or a lack of 
communication and assumption of a false alarm. Transition t1 represents the arrival rate of staff to the 
activation device. Transition t2 represents the probability of a successful activation.  
The results for the simulation of this Petri net for sample staff arrival times and probability of 
successful activation, are shown in Figure 5.30. Two different staff arrival distributions are used for 
illustration of the model. The first is a normal distribution with a mean value of 5 minutes and a 
standard deviation of 2 minutes. The second is a normal distribution with a mean value of 15 minutes 
and a standard deviation of 5 minutes. A sample probability value of 0.6 for successful activation by 
each staff member is included in both cases.  This model combines the rate of arrival of staff from the 
point that the fire occurs, with the probability of successful activation of the system. This means that 
even if the automatic system fails, then the manual activation can still occur. This is included in the 
modelling in this chapter and Chapter 6. 
 
Figure 5.30: A graph showing the probability that the manual detection device is activated over time for sample arrival 
rates 
Here, the time from the initiation of the fire is given along the x-axis and the probability that the 
manual activation of the deluge system has occurred is given on the y-axis. With an increase in time 
from the initiation of the fire, the probability that the deluge system has been activated manually 
increases. 
5.10.2: Operation of a call point upon the manual detection of a fire 
The second Petri net in this section models the successful operation of a call point by a member of the 
public or staff upon the manual detection of a fire. This Petri net is given in Figure 5.31. This Petri net 
can be used to give the probability that the alarm and deluge system will are successfully triggered by 




Figure 5.31: A Petri net model for the call point operation failure 
In this Petri net, place P1 represents the presence of members of the public or staff in the station. 
Transition t2 governs the arrival rate of a staff member or member of the public at a call point. Once a 
member of staff or public arrives at the call point, there is a probability that they will have identified 
the fire and act appropriately by triggering the call point. Place P3 corresponds to the activation of the 
call point by the member of the public or staff, and place P4 corresponds to a failure to activate the 
call point successfully.  
As a demonstration of the model sample values were assigned to the arrival rate and probability of 
activation for two different cases. Figure 5.32 gives the results for two separate sample arrival rate 
distributions; one normal distribution with a mean of 5 minutes and a standard deviation of 2 minutes 
and one normal distribution with a mean of 0.7 minutes and a standard deviation of 0.3 minutes. A 
sample probability value of 0.8 was assigned for successful activation of the call points in both cases.  
 
Figure 5.32: A graph showing the probability that a call point is operated at each time for sample arrival rates 
In this figure, the time from the initiation of the fire, in minutes, is presented along the x-axis. The 
probability that the call point has been activated is located on the y-axis. In all cases, as the time 
increases from the initiation of the fire, the probability that the call point has been activated increases. 









P5, P6 and P7 are the station 
type (A,B or C), the time of the 
fire (Rush hour, daytime or 
nightime) and the fire location 
(public/non-public). 
p1 is for type 1 people, p2 is 
for type 2 people who will act 









Rush Hour 0.05,0.001 0.1,0.001 0.2,0.001
Daytime 0.2,0.001 0.7,0.001 1,0.001
Nighttime 0.5,0.001 1,0.001 3,0.001







Rush Hour 5,1 8,1 10,1
Daytime 7,2 10,1 15,5
Nighttime 10,2 20,5 30,10
Mean time to arrival and sd for a non-public area (normal distributions, in minutes)
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A suitable timeframe must be identified to extract the probability that the detection system is activated 
by a manual call point, and the deluge system is manually activated, before impacting the 
consequences of a fire. The time frame that is suggested is the time between the initiation of the fire 
and the time at which evacuation must begin in order to enable all people to leave the station before 
the fire reaches a critical size.  
5.11: Overall failure  
The probabilities of each component failure at each time can be used to provide data for the basic 
events present in the Fault Trees derived earlier in this chapter. The structure of the Fault Trees can be 
analysed to give the Boolean logic for a total failure of the deluge system, the failure of the detection 
system and the failure of the alarm system. The probability of each of these system-level failure 
modes can be found by combining the probability of failure of each of the components at each time, 
following the structure of the Fault Tree.  
Sample Application 
The analysis proposed here was completed for the sample values given in Appendix 3, taking the 
probability of component failure from the models presented in Section 5.7 of this chapter.  
 
Figure 5.33: The probability that there is a system failure over time 
Figure 5.33 gives the probability that each protection system will be in the failed state over time, with 
the component models combined following the logic of the Fault Tree models presented earlier in this 
chapter. In these results, a decrease in the probability of system failure can be seen at 13 years and 3 
year. This corresponds to the change in system level maintenance phase resulting in an increase in 
inspection frequency and system testing at these points, meaning that each component spends less 
time in the failed state, and so reducing the probability that a system-level failure will occur. There is 
an increase towards 13 years corresponding to the ageing of the components as well as limited 
preventative maintenance. The reduction following 13 years can also be attributed to the enabling of 
preventative maintenance strategies. After approximately the 13-year point, preventative maintenance 
keeps the probability that each system is in a failed state at a relatively constant level, despite the 
ageing of the system. There is some uncertainty in the solutions, introduced through the Monte Carlo 
Simulation of the model, and this is shown by the variation in the results with each step.  
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
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Figure 5.34, Figure 5.35 and Figure 5.36 show these results for each system separately and are 
grouped per year, with the maximum and minimum value for that year displayed as an error bar. 
These error bars can be reduced in size by performing more runs of the simulation. It can be noted 
that the more common failure events have a smaller error bar in proportion to the average. This 
corresponds to the proposal that rare events require more runs of a simulation to reach convergence. 
These results demonstrate that increased inspection frequency has a positive impact on the probability 
of a system failure, when concerning the more commonly failed state of components in the deluge 
system. Also, preventative maintenance can be used to keep the probability that the system is in a 
failed state at an acceptable level, despite the ageing of components within the system. For the 
detection and alarm system the probability of failure is lower and increases with time. This suggests 
that the system fail less frequently and has components with slower ageing rates, such that there are 
limited failures prior to the entry onto the third system level maintenance phase.  
 
Figure 5.34: The probability that there is a deluge system failure over time 
 




Figure 5.36: The probability that there is a detection system failure over time 
5.12: Discussion  
The model presented in this chapter demonstrates the capability of a Petri net approach to model 
component-level ageing and failure, alongside system level phased maintenance, inspection and 
testing strategies. Component failures are combined through Boolean logic under the assumption that 
an individual component failure, or group of component failures in some cases, are independent from 
the remaining component failures in the model. Although every component condition is dependent on 
underlying system level maintenance strategies, this is deemed a suitable approximation as there is be 
no interaction modelled here between components ageing across different modules. Where stronger 
dependencies are introduced through opportunistic maintenance strategies, these components are 
modelled in one Petri net to incorporate the dependency. The approach improves computational 
efficiency as it avoids the need for repeat simulation of the same component, where there are multiple 
in the system, and keeps the Petri net structure to a minimum.  
There are some assumptions made in this model. Firstly, it is assumed that the setup and placement of 
the components of the fire protection systems are sufficient that when in the working state the systems 
will function correctly. For example, the sprinklers are set up such that they are placed at regular 
intervals and have the capability to stop a fire. In other words, this model assumes adequate system 
design. 
The application in this chapter has one smoke detector and call point circuit, one heat detector and call 
point circuit and one sounder circuit. This model can be applied to a more complex fire protection 
system by repeating the relevant Petri net modules and expanding the Fault Tree structure. The human 
factors model presented in this chapter is also illustrative. More complex underlying behaviours such 
as panic or overcrowding and the flow of people in an emergency can be incorporated into this model, 
if desired. In total, the model developed has 307 transitions and 194 places. 
For each of the results in this section, there is a large amount of variation at each time, giving a large 
range in the probability of component failure each year and some discontinuity in the predicted 
probability year-on-year. This can be attributed to the low numbers of component failures in each case 
resulting in a rare event simulation. By increasing the number of runs of the Petri net in the Monte 
Carlo simulation, this noisy behaviour can be reduced, at the detriment to computational efficiency.  
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Methods should be given to gain a measure of the risk from modelling approaches such as this one. 
This is addressed in the next chapter of this thesis. Also, this chapter has highlighted some areas of 
study where further analysis of a Petri net model of this type can be completed. The first area of 
interest is a conversion of the Fault Tree structure into a Petri net model for comparison of the results 
obtained and to provide a framework for incorporation of further dependencies within the system. 
Secondly, an automatic optimisation method of the phased maintenance strategy presented in this 
chapter could have useful applications to ageing engineering systems. Finally, a consideration of the 
convergence and uncertainty of the predictions made by this modelling approach can further validate 
this methodology. These areas of study are addressed in the following chapter.  
5.13: Parameter Assumptions and Use of Data 
In this chapter, a sample application of the model has been presented to demonstrate the modelling 
capability. In this sample application, parameters governing component failure rates have been 
assumed. Assuming faster failure rates increases the probability of system failure; similarly assuming 
slower failure rates decreases the probability of system failure. In addition, the parameters governing 
the maintenance, inspection and testing transitions have been assumed. If the parameters governing 
the maintenance interval are altered so that the interval between maintenance actions is shorter then 
there is a reduction in the probability of each system failure. Sample system maintenance phases have 
also been assigned, but these can be varied to test the system under different phased strategies. 
Since the probability of each system failure is small, this outcome of the model is most sensitive to the 
assumptions of the parameters governing the component conditions. This is especially notable for 
parameters that govern the state of components contained within the lower order minimal cut sets. In 
this case, since there are fewer entries in the minimal cut set, if one parameter is falsely assumed it is 
more likely to impact the probability of system failure. 
Despite the assumptions in the model parameters used to give an example application of the model, 
the approach demonstrates the modelling of the logic of the three sub-systems: the deluge, detection 
and alarm systems. The parameters within the model can be easily altered within the excel 
spreadsheet containing the model logic. Furthermore, the sample results presented in this chapter have 
been extrapolated to non-specific parameter values to show the trends present in some of the results.  
In order to improve the model and validate the results further, data should be collected for the time to 
failure for each component. This data can be used to inform the distribution choice and parameter 
values for each of the transitions within the model that govern the degradation rate of each 
component. This can improve the model by bringing each component model more in line with reality. 
If any adjustments to the modelling of the degradation of each component are required, the model can 
also be improved, using the collected data. Data should also be collected for testing and inspection 
strategies, to inform the parameters governing the transitions related to these within the model. Also, 
this can be used to adjust the model structure, if required, in order to include different strategies 
present in reality, or remove existing strategies that are not present in reality.  
In order to validate the model, data should be collected on the system failure over time, and the 
circumstances that caused the failure. The model can then be validated and adjusted, such that the 
model more closely recreates reality. This would improve the model further to increase its accuracy, 






This chapter presents a novel model for a combined deluge, detection and alarm system. The model 
improves the state of the art as it applies the Petri net approach to a fire protection system model, 
modelling the system in a higher level of detail. The modelling of the systems together also allows 
dependencies between the systems and in the final risk prediction. In addition, a new approach 
incorporating phased asset management strategies is presented. This is beneficial as it allows different 
maintenance strategies to be applied at different times, notably as the system ages. This improves 
current models where the maintenance is based solely on individual component state. Here 
maintenance can be scheduled based on the time since the last maintenance action. Other areas of 
novelty include the use of both the probability that the systems are in an unrevealed failed state, and 
the occurrences of false activation of the system. This improves the functionality of traditional 
methods for risk modelling of fire protection systems, as it allows consideration of other factors. 
5.15: Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the application of an integrated Fault Tree and Petri net based modelling 
approach to the automatic fire protection systems on an underground station. Initially, an introduction 
to the type of systems present on underground stations is given. The work follows from the literature 
review in Chapter 2, which highlights a deficiency of modelling approaches that can be used to 
predict system unavailability where complex maintenance strategies are included. The methodology 
demonstrated in this chapter is applied to an automatic detection, alarm and ringmain based deluge 
system. A definition of the system is given in the early stages of the chapter.  
A definition of the method applied in this chapter is given in Section 5.3, in addition a sample phased 
system level maintenance, inspection and testing strategy is described. Following this, the system 
failure modes are identified and a Fault Tree, with associated minimal cut set analysis, for each safety 
critical system failure mode is presented. Values for the basic events in these Fault Trees are obtained 
from a Petri net model, with repeatable modules for each component type. The phased system level 
maintenance strategy and human interaction with the system are also modelled with a Petri net 
framework. Sample results from the Petri net modelling framework are presented throughout the 
chapter.  
The modelling framework within this chapter gives the unavailability of each of the deluge, detection 
and alarm systems at each time over a time period from installation of the system. In the sample 
application, clear differences in the unavailability can be seen when the system enters each different 
maintenance phase. This demonstrates how a higher level of preventative maintenance, inspection and 
testing can reduce the unavailability of the systems, despite the ageing of the systems. The modelling 
framework also gives the frequency of false system activations, system tests and the number of 
maintenance actions at each time. There is further analysis possible on this type of model including 
the risk based optimisation of phased maintenance strategies, this is discussed further in the next 
chapter.  
This chapter has demonstrated the flexibility of a Petri net-based approach to model complex systems 




Chapter 6 Modelling Risk 
6.1: Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a Petri net methodology was applied to an automatic fire protection system to 
give the probability of each component failing, at each time, for a given maintenance strategy. These 
component failures were combined using Fault Tree logic, under the assumption that the component 
failure modes, which result in the system failure, are independent of each other. In addition to this, it 
was assumed that there was no uncertainty in the parameters used as input to the model. Ranges in the 
values obtained by Monte Carlo simulation of the model were given for each model output at each 
time. The chapter presented the results for a single phased maintenance strategy. 
The system failure modes, given in the previous chapter, can be combined with an estimate of the 
frequency of fire occurrence and the consequences, for each possible combination of events, to give a 
value for the fire risk on an underground station.  
This chapter explores further possible analysis methods within the Petri net framework demonstrated 
thus far in this thesis. This includes, the conversion of a Fault Tree structure into a Petri net model, 
and a comparison of the outputs in each case. Also, a risk based optimization method is presented in 
this chapter, for a Petri net modelling framework. Within this optimisation methodology a method for 
estimating the system risk is given. The optimisation method is used to find an optimal solution for 
the phased maintenance and inspection strategy, presented in the previous chapter, given a constrained 
budget. Also in this chapter, an analysis of the rate of convergence of the model and the uncertainty 
introduced through Monte Carlo simulation of the model is presented. Finally, a method for 
encompassing the uncertainty in the model outputs, given uncertain inputs, is presented.  
For exploratory analysis of the methods presented in this chapter, the models presented in Chapter 5 
are used as a sample application, with results presented throughout. The methods are not limited to 
this sample application and can be generalised to different Petri net structures. The failure modes used 
in the sample applications correspond to those presented in Chapter 5. The models for the component 
failure used are also the same. The Petri net for the phased maintenance of the system is also the same 
as that used in Chapter 5.  
6.2: Converting the Fault Tree structure to an Petri net 
The Fault Tree structure, used in the previous chapter, was converted to a Petri net model. This was 
completed to allow dependencies between components to be incorporated into the model, to enable 
real time system level solutions to be obtained from component models and to extend the model to 
incorporate repeats of the same component so that opportunistic maintenance strategies can be 
employed.  
In the previous chapter, it was assumed that each basic event in the Fault Tree was independent, 
which enabled the use of Boolean algebra to combine the component failure events following a Fault 
Tree structure. Variation in the component model results can be present due to the rare nature of some 
component failures. A high computational effort can be required to reduce this variation in order to 
achieve convergence for the results of each component failure. 
In Chapter 5, the probability of failure for repeated components, such as the isolation valves, was 
modelled with one Petri net and the result obtained from this was repeated in the Fault Tree structure. 
To convert a Fault Tree structure, such as that presented in Chapter 5, to a Petri net, can be achieved 
by duplicating the Petri nets for these repeated components and recreating the logic of the Fault Tree 
in Petri net format. This is demonstrated in this section. 
For the human factors impacting the function of the protection systems, a probability transition can be 
included in the overall Petri net structure. The probabilities taken from the human factor models, as 
given in Chapter 5, can then be used as an input to these transitions. For each run of the simulation, 
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the transition is fired immediately and the linked places remain in the resultant marking for the 
remainder of the run. With sufficient runs of the simulation, this results in a behaviour that 
approximates the probabilities included in Chapter 5. The probabilities used in these cases, was kept 
consistent with those applied in Chapter 5. 
Figure 6.1 gives a Petri net to combine the component level failures that can result in a lack of 
detection signal to the control box. The unrevealed and revealed failed states of each component, 
taken from the component models, are located along the top of the Petri net. These places feed into a 
place below representing a failure in each component. The meanings of each of these places are 
annotated on the model. The component failures are combined following the logic from the previous 
chapter, and using probability transitions to represent the contributions to the system failure by human 
factors or the fire location. Maintenance actions within the model must remove the marking of the 
resultant states in this Petri net, and so these places are included in the maintenance reset transition for 
each of the component Petri net models.  Similarly, Figure 6.2 gives a Petri net for an alarm system 
failure, again following the same structure. Here the probability that there is no detection signal, 
which was found via the Petri net in Figure 6.1, is included in the model as a contributing factor to the 
alarm system failure.  
Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 give the probability that there is no supply from the diesel pump test valve, 
and the electric pump test valve, respectively. As with the previous Petri nets, the revealed and 
unrevealed contributing component failures are connected to a place corresponding to either of these 
failures. A description of the places is given in the figures. The logic from the previous chapter is then 
used to combine these component failures. In this case, the occurrence of a water mains failure is 
included. In the previous chapter this was assumed as a constant probability of failure. Here, the 
occurrence of water mains failure is modelled with a delay time sampled from a uniform distribution, 
in Transition t55, with an associated delay for the length of time that the failure is likely to occur for, 
in Transition t76. Transition t76, removes the corresponding system failures and re-marks place P33 
to enable further water mains failures.  
Figure 6.5 gives a Petri net combining the component failures that result in a low initial pressure in 
the system. Figure 6.6 gives a Petri net for the combinations of component failures that result in low 
pressure during water flow of the system.  
Figure 6.7 combines component failures and human factors that can result in the deluge valve residing 
in a failed closed position. There is a probability associated with the lack of manual activation of the 
deluge system. For each run of the simulation the transition governing this fires once, and the result of 
either success or failure remains through the run. The probability used in this transition is governed by 
the human factor Petri net, as in Chapter 5. With multiple simulations this transition approximates the 
behaviour of the constant probability assigned in the Fault Trees in the previous chapter.  
Figure 6.8 gives a Petri net model combining the failures that can result in insufficient flow from the 




Figure 6.1: A Petri net to combine the failures that result in a lack of signal from the detection systems 
 
Figure 6.2: A Petri net model for no notification by the alarm system 
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Figure 6.5: A Petri net model for low initial pressure 
 
Figure 6.6: A Petri net model for low pressure during water flow 
No water from deluge system- no supply 
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Figure 6.7: A Petri net model for no water flow through the deluge valve 
 
Figure 6.8: A Petri net model for insufficient water flow to the deluge valve 
 
Figure 6.9: A Petri net model for insufficient water flow at the sprinkler head 
This overall Petri net structure links the component models together to give the system failure modes. 
A simulation of this Petri net was carried out. The resulting model was larger in size than the model in 
Chapter 5, due to the additional transitions and the repeated component models. The structure of this 
system level Petri net is such that the tokens summarise the behaviour of the tokens in the component 
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models. The resulting model had 560 transitions and 316 places. This simulation took 200599.259 s 
for 2000 runs.  
Figure 6.10 gives the maintenance actions at each time for each component, for the models presented 
in Chapter 5, combined with the whole system Petri net presented in this section. Figure 6.11 gives 
the corresponding probabilities that each protection system fails to respond at each time.  
 
Figure 6.10: The number of maintenance actions for each component for the models presented in Chapter 5, combined with 
the model representing system logic presented in this chapter 
The results following this methodology closely recreate the results seen in the previous chapter. This 
is as expected due to the same logic present for the combination of events in both of the approaches. 
There is an increase in the simulation time for this method due to the increased size of the Petri net, 
however, there are other benefits such as the separate modelling of each of the similar components. 
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This modelling approach also has the benefit of including all the system logic in the simulated model 
and hence forms a better facilitating model for the optimization of the asset management strategies. 
For instance, changes to the system can be analysed immediately during simulation.  
 
Figure 6.11: The probability that each protection system is in the failed state at each time, from the component models 
presented in Chapter 5 and the system logic model presented in this chapter 
6.3: Optimization of system level asset management strategies 
This section presents a methodology for the risk based optimisation of complex ageing systems over 
their life-cycle. Phased asset management strategies are included to allow the maintenance strategy of 
the system to evolve as the system ages. This optimization can reduce underground safety risk of the 
system by optimising the system management over both a system level and a component level, given 
the system phase.  
6.3.2: Method 
The optimization methodology proposed in this chapter aims to reduce the life-cycle risk of a system, 
whilst considering the life-cycle cost. This life-cycle cost can include factors such as: the maintenance 
cost of the components, the inspection cost of each component, the cost of system testing, a cost 
assigned to spurious trip occurrence and initial installation cost. The optimisation methodology 
proposed in this chapter has several stages: 
1. Define a phased system level asset management strategy and component level asset 
management strategy, for each system level phase.  
2. Use a Petri net modelling approach to gain system performance metrics, such as life-cycle 
cost and sub-system failure probability.  
3. Model the risk of the system using an Event Tree Framework, ensuring that event branching 
within the Event Tree Framework is independent. 
4. Use a constrained Simulated Annealing algorithm to find the optimal phase entry times for 
the system level asset management strategy, by considering the risk and life-cycle cost of the 
system. 
5. Use a Genetic Algorithm to optimise the component level asset management strategy, given 
the system level phases found in the previous step, by considering the risk and life-cycle cost 
of the system. 
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6. Interpret the results to give an optimal strategy for the asset management of the system over 
the life-cycle under consideration.  
At each optimisation state, the parameters within the Petri net are updated within the optimisation 
framework in use.   
For the first stage of the optimisation procedure a Simulated Annealing algorithm was selected 
because the method avoids local minima, generally gives a good solution for arbitrary cost functions 
and can handle constraints on the optimisation. There is also statistical guarantee of global 
convergence to the optimal point. Simulated Annealing algorithms are suited to low dimension 
optimisation problems, however the method becomes increasingly computationally expensive with 
higher dimensions. For this reason a Simulated Annealing algorithm is suggested for the first stage of 
the optimisation method presented in this chapter, where there is a two dimensional search space. In 
addition, the algorithm requires minimal assumptions about the problem under investigation and does 
not implement gradient decent methods, which makes it suitable for optimisation of complex systems, 
which may have a complex cost function landscape.  
For the second stage of the optimisation a Genetic Algorithm was selected because the methodology 
can search a number of potential solutions. In the second stage of the optimisation methodology 
presented in this chapter there are a number of inspection intervals for every component in the model. 
Hence, there are a large number of potential combinations, with limited information about the 
relationship between the cost and benefit of changing each parameter. The Genetic Algorithm allows 
the exploration of numerous points in this high dimensional problem. Typically Genetic Algorithms 
perform well in noisy environments, such as the one implemented for the second stage of the 
optimisation methodology presented here. 
Both methods were combined in this approach as the Simulated Annealing algorithm reduces the 
number of parameters required for tuning the Genetic Algorithm, increasing the efficiency. In 
addition, the most crucial part of the optimisation, which gives the maintenance phase times for the 
system is performed by the Simulated Annealing algorithm, which has a strong ability to avoid local 
minima.  
6.3.3: Optimisation tools applied in this approach  
The Simulated Annealing Algorithm 
The Simulated Annealing algorithm works by defining what is known as a cooling schedule where 
temperatures start high and reduce through the algorithm [165]. Here, solutions are proposed moving 
away from a starting point. For each temperature, different configurations of the models are explored 
by taking a step away from the previous configuration. Initially, the higher temperature allows more 
configurations that do not show an improvement to be accepted. This prevents the algorithm from 
becoming stuck, in a local optimal solution, and allows it to search more of the solution space with the 
aim of finding the global optimal solution. At each temperature the best configuration is stored and 
forms the starting point for the next temperature. As the temperature reduces, it is less likely that a 
solution will be accepted if it does not give an improvement. This causes the algorithm to condense to 
an optimal region.  
In the proposed methodology the Simulated Annealing algorithm, used in stage 4 of the optimisation 
procedure, is allowed to explore some solutions that are outside of the maximum constraint applied to 
the total system life-cycle cost. This is done to allow the algorithm to fully explore the solution space. 
However, these solutions are only used as in interim step during the algorithm and are not recorded as 
the best solutions available.  
In this optimisation method, the average risk of the system over a defined time period is used to allow 
quantification of the risk of the system. This time period can be set to the system lifetime allow the 
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allocation of resources to the system in an optimal way over its whole lifetime, as opposed to only 
considering the immediate future. If an optimisation over a shorter time is required, then the 
timeframe over which the optimisation is performed can be reduced to the desired timeframe. Risk 
values at given points, instead of averages, are not used in the optimisation framework, as this can 
lead to non-representative results. For example, if a risk value used for optimisation happens to lie in a 
trough in the predicted risk values over time, an optimisation can be performed that ignores the 
surrounding higher values.  
To apply a Simulated Annealing algorithm, to find the optimal solutions, the following must be 
established:  
1) The energy of the system must be defined, in this case it is the average risk of the system over 
the simulation time period. 
2) Either a maximum or minimum valve for the energy can be found, in this case the algorithm 
seeks to find the minimum energy value corresponding to the lowest risk. 
3) A method to alter the configuration of the system must be defined, in this case the 
configuration changes by altering the maintenance phase entry times of the system. 
4) The temperature and initial configuration must be set. In this case, the initial configuration is 
set to give a maximum risk and the temperature is set to decrease incrementally to give a 
sufficient cooling schedule for the Simulated Annealing algorithm.  
 
A pseudocode for an unconstrained Simulated Annealing algorithm is given below: 
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode implementation for Simulated Annealing 
Inputs 
  : Initial temperature 
 : ‘Cost’ function, in this case the average risk of the system 
  : Initial configuration 
                 : Cooling schedule for   temperatures 
     : A function to find the neighbour of configuration    
Algorithm 
for        do 
      
             (or    in first initialisation) 
 for        do 
              
                    
  if      then 
            
   if                
             
   end if 
  else if   
   
              then 
            
  end if 
 end for 
end for 
return       
 
Constraints can be added to this algorithm. In this case, a constraint on the budget for the system 
installation, maintenance and inspections can be included. This physical cost is not to be confused 
with the ‘cost’ function of the Simulated Annealing algorithm. Where a constraint is added, the 
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proposed configuration at each point is accepted if the value is within a defined threshold for the 
constraint function. The ‘best’ configuration is only accepted if it is within the final budget for the 
constraint function. The constrained Simulated Annealing algorithm applied in this chapter allows the 
configuration to move outside of the budget during the algorithm, by a small quantity. This allows 
configurations to be reached that may require the budget to first move outside of the limit in order to 
find a global optimum solution that is within the budget constraint.  
A pseudocode for a constrained Simulated Annealing algorithm is given below [166]:  
Algorithm 2: Pseudocode implementation for constrained Simulated Annealing 
Inputs 
  : Initial temperature 
 : ‘Cost’ function, in this case the average risk of the system 
  : Initial configuration 
                 : Cooling schedule for   temperatures 
     : A function to find the neighbour of configuration    
 : Constraint function 
    : Maximum budget 
  : Threshold for the budget 
Algorithm 
for        do 
      
             (or    in first initialisation) 
 for        do 
              
                    
          
  if  (                   then 
            
   if                           then 
             
   end if 
  else if   
   
              then 
            
  end if 
 end for 
end for 
return       
 
 
The Genetic Algorithm 
Genetic Algorithms were proposed in 1975 in application to an optimization problem with the initial 
framework of Binary-coded genetic algorithms demonstrated in 1989 [167] [168]. Genetic algorithms 
can be more efficient than conventional searching algorithms and can be applied to solve multi-
objective optimization problems.  
A Genetic Algorithm begins with an initial population [169]. The strength of each of these is then 
assessed with the fittest individuals conserved in each level of the algorithm. These fittest individuals 
are then combined to give other potential solutions. The Genetic algorithm is applied for the 
component level asset management strategies, given the fixed system phases found with the 







A Pseudocode of a Genetic Algorithm is given below: 
Algorithm 3: Pseudocode implementation of a Genetic Algorithm 
Inputs 
      
    
     
  : The initial population of   vectors, where   
  is a vector of length   
 : Fitness function, in this case the risk of the system and cost of interventions calculated via Monte 
Carlo Simulation of the Petri net model 
 : Number of iterations 
    : Selection operator, based on the fitness of the solution 
        : Crossover operator 
    : Mutation operator 
Algorithm 
for            do 
      (set the population at each iteration) 
 for        do 
           
 end for 
        =     , where R is the number of parents following selection 
              
 for          do 
                 =           
(Where       are vectors from the parent population and each parent are is only used once) 
                        
end for 
              
end for  
return        
 
At each level of the algorithm the weakest 50% are removed and replaced by a new generation of 
solutions, which are found by combining strong members of the current generation, known as parents. 
The members of the population selected to form parents in the new generation are chosen based on 
their fitness. The selection of parents for the population is weighted by the fitness of the parent using a 
roulette wheel selection. Here, parents are selected based on their fitness with a higher probability of 
selecting parents that have a lower value of risk and cost. 
Following selection of two parents, they are cross bred. A random number generator is used to select a 
point in each pair of parent parameter vectors for this mixing. The parent parameter vectors are split at 
this point. The two parents are mixed such that one child is formed with the first part of the first 
parent and the second part of the second parent and a second child is formed with the second part of 
the first parent and the first part of the second parent. The Petri net is simulated for each of the child 
vectors to find the risk and the cost for each. This is repeated for further parent pairs until enough 
child vectors are produced to replace the discarded population from the previous level. The resulting 
child population members are combined with the top 50% of parents, which had the lowest risk from 
the previous level. This process is repeated until a convergent population is found.  
Mutations can be added to the Genetic Algorithm. Here, values within the child parameter vectors are 
switched at random prior to simulation of the Petri net. Figure 6.12 gives a representation of the 
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chromosomes with the Genetic Algorithm and demonstrates the crossover and mutation processes. In 
this application of a Genetic Algorithm, each chromosome entry contains a value for the input 
parameters to the model, for instance, the inspection interval of an individual component.  
 
6.12: A diagram of the crossover and mutation of chromosomes within a Genetic Algorithm 
Hyper-parameters within the optimisation methodology can be tuned in order to explore the solution 
space in the most efficient manner. The aim of this tuning methodology is to balance the efficient 
convergence of the model, with a sufficient exploration of the solution space to prevent the algorithm 
from becoming stuck in a local minimum. In the application presented in this chapter a 50% selection 
of parents from the population is implemented, along with a 1% mutation rate, these values 
demonstrated a good convergence to an optimal solution, for a population of 100 chromosomes. 
Decreasing the percentage of selected parents, or the mutation rate, increases the likelihood of the 
algorithm locating a local, instead of global, minimum. Increasing the percentage of parents selected, 
or the mutation rate, can result in a poor convergence of the model. The tuning of these hyper-
parameters should be considered when applying this methodology to new examples. 
Within the Genetic Algorithm optimisation, parents are selected at each generation based on the 
reciprocal of their fitness value. A schematic to demonstrate this method for a population of 4 
individuals is given in Figure 6.13; for sample data values selected from the model given to 3.s.f in 
Table 6.1, where   is a random number in [0,1]. 
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Figure 6.13: Weighted selection sampling of parents within the Genetic Algorithm for sample values given in Table 2 where 
each entry corresponds to the population member ID number 
Here, it can be seen that population member 1 has the highest probability of being selected, 
corresponding to the largest proportion of the roulette wheel and range for selection. This arises as 
population member 1 also has the lowest value for the objective function meaning that it is the most 
desirable parent, since the optimisation aims to minimise the objective function. Likewise, population 
member 4 has the highest value for the objective function, and hence is the least desirable parent. This 
selection method assigns a lower probability of selection to this population member, represented by a 
lower proportion of the roulette wheel and range for selection. This method is generalised to the 
population of 100 members in the optimisation methodology such that the more desirable parents, 
with a lower objective function, are more likely to be selected. For every crossover operation, the 
parents are selected via this method independently of any previous selections. This means that the 
fittest individuals are likely to form members of the crossover pairs multiple times in the same level of 
the algorithm. 
This sampling method results in a faster convergence to an optimal solution in comparison to uniform 
parent selection. This is because parents with a lower fitness function are used more frequently in the 
creation of the next generation. For the model presented in this chapter, twenty generations of the 
Genetic algorithm were applied. 
6.3.4: Sample Application 
A sample application of the optimisation methodology was applied to the fire protection system 
models developed in Chapter 5 of this thesis and Section 6.2 of this chapter.  
Stage 1: Definition of asset management strategies for optimisation 
The phased system level asset management framework, given in Chapter 5, was used for the sample 
application of this optimisation methodology. Here, there are three possible system level maintenance 
phases. Each phase has a different set of maintenance strategies that are applied to components across 
the system. Each phase also has a different system testing frequency. 
The component level asset management strategy used for this sample application assumes that the 
maintenance intervals for each component are determined by the system level maintenance phase. The 
component inspection intervals within each phase are allowed to vary in order to optimise the 
management of the system. It is possible to extend this definition in order to optimise the maintenance 
intervals within each phase, of every component of the system. However, this increases the 
computational cost of the optimisation methodology.  
 
 
1 2 3 4 
189 
 
Stage 2: Develop a Petri net to gain system metrics: 
The system metrics chosen for the optimisation of the asset management strategies, were the average 
risk of fatalities of the system over the life-cycle and total-lifecycle cost. The total lifecycle cost 
included the cost of each component maintenance and inspection action, the cost of a system test, the 
cost of initial installation and the cost of false system activation.  
The Petri nets developed in Chapter 5 of this thesis and Section 6.2 of this chapter were used to gain 
system metrics for this implementation of the optimisation methodology. The model inputs were kept 
consistent with this earlier work. Some changes were made to the models to give independence in the 
sub-system failure probabilities, this is described further in Stage 3 of this section.  
Sample costs were assigned to the system initiation and the subsequent maintenance and inspection 
actions, to allow the methodology to be demonstrated. An initial full system cost of 100,000 units is 
assigned within the model, this represents the initial cost of the system. The average costs assigned to 
each of the inspection and maintenance actions is given in Table 6.2. 
Intervention Average maintenance cost (arbitrary units) 
Pipework intervention 3000 
Pipework inspection 100 
Electric water pump intervention 1000 
Electric water pump inspection 50 
Diesel water pump intervention 1000 
Diesel water pump inspection 50 
Jockey pump intervention 1000 
Jockey pump inspection 50 
Diesel tank intervention 500 
Diesel tank inspection 50 
Ring main intervention 2000 
Ring main inspection 75 
Sprinkler head intervention 200 
Sprinkler head inspection 25 
Isolation valve intervention 400 
Isolation valve inspection 75 
Pressure release valve intervention 400 
Pressure release valve inspection 75 
Deluge valve intervention 600 
Deluge valve inspection 75 
Solenoid intervention 300 
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Solenoid inspection 75 
Manual release mechanism intervention 300 
Manual release mechanism inspection 25 
Pressure sensor intervention 800 
Pressure sensor inspection 75 
Smoke detector intervention 1500 
Smoke detector inspection 25 
Heat detector intervention 1500 
Heat detector inspection 25 
Wiring intervention 3000 
Wiring inspection 100 
Call point intervention 100 
Call point inspection 25 
Alarm intervention 800 
Alarm inspection 50 
Control box intervention 1500 
Control box inspection 50 
Control box battery intervention 200 
Control box battery inspection 25 
System testing by opening the test valve 100 
False activation 500 
Table 6.2: The average maintenance and inspection costs assigned to components in the model 
Stage 3: The Event Tree Framework for risk calculation 
The risk calculation, over which the optimizations take place, follows that of an Event Tree structure, 
as shown in Figure 6.14. The risk of the system is calculated for the combined probabilities of each 
protection system either failing, or working, the estimated frequency of fire occurring and the 
estimated consequences. The aim of both levels of the optimization are to reduce this risk. The models 
presented in the earlier section of this chapter combined with the component models presented in 
Chapter 5 give rise to the probability that each of the fire protection systems are in the failed or 
working state. 
In this chapter the method is illustrated with sample consequence and fire frequency values. These 
illustrative values are assigned to the Event Tree in Figure 6.14. The methodology demonstrated in 
this section can be easily generalised to any fire frequency and consequence values by simply 





Figure 6.14: An Event Tree for the fire protection systems 
In order to apply this method, the branches of the Event Tree must be independent. Up to this point, 
the probability of a deluge system failure, or an alarm system failure, have been modelled as 
dependent on the condition of the detection system. The full system Petri net model can be altered to 
give independent branches of the event tree. This is done by removing the contribution of the 
detection system to the failure of the deluge and alarm systems, by removing transition t34 and t125 
in the full system Petri net model, present in Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.7. 
In the Event Tree it is assumed that a lack of fire detection will result in a failure of both the alarm 
and deluge system and a high level of consequences. The probability for this can be found by tracking 
the marking of place P18 in Figure 6.1. For the remaining branches it is assumed that the detection 
system is in the working state and so the fire is detected, and hence cannot contribute to the alarm or 
deluge system failure. These models can then be used to give the probability of alarm or deluge 
system failure by recording the marking of place P26 and place P79, in Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.9 
respectively, given that the detection system is in the working state.  
Incorporated into the state of both the alarm system and deluge system, is the state of the control box. 
If there is a control box failure, then there will be a failure of both systems and hence a dependency in 
the branching of the Event Tree. To adjust for this dependency, the control box failure is extracted in 
the Event Tree structure to form an independent branch. This gives independent branching in the 
Event Tree for the Petri net models presented in this chapter. This corresponds to removing the 
transitions t33, t53, t74, t92, t119 and t142, in the full system Petri net model presented in this 
chapter, in order to give the probability that the alarm and deluge system are in the working, or failed 
state, given that the control box is in the working state. The marking of places P25, P32, P42, P50, 
P61, and P74 in the Petri net model can be used to give the probability that the Control box is in the 
failed state. However, due to these duplicate places that no longer impact the Petri net model, it is 
advisable to retain one place and corresponding transitions, to contribute to the solution and then 
remove the duplications to improve efficiency. In both cases, in these Petri net models, if the control 
box is in the failed state then this leads to a failure of both the alarm and deluge systems and this is 
incorporated into the Event Tree structure. This is given in Figure 6.15. Following this, there are no 
further direct dependencies between the branches in the Event Tree.   
Overall event tree
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Hence, the risk of the system at any time for the illustrative values given in this chapter is defined as 
in Equation 6.1, where the probabilities of system failure at each point can be taken from the Petri net 
models developed in this chapter and Chapter 5. These values can be adjusted if required prior to 
applying the optimization methodology. 
                                                             
                       (6.1) 
 
 
Figure 6.15: An Event Tree for the system with independent branching 
The optimization methods used here aim to reduce the risk over the whole lifecycle of the system. To 
enable this, the average risk for the system is calculated and used as the basis of optimization. This is 
found by calculating the risk at each time via the method described in Equation 6.1 and taking the 
average over the 40 year time period. However, it is trivial to switch this value with the risk at a 
certain point in time by selecting the probability that each component fails at a given time as opposed 
to finding the average.  
Stage 4: Optimising a phased system level asset management strategy 
The first level of the optimisation method, applied in this case, aims to find the best time at a system 
level for the entry to the second or third maintenance phase of the system. These phases dictate when 
routine and early replacement strategies begin to be employed for each component. To find the 
optimal solution for these phases a Simulated Annealing algorithm has been implemented. This was 
chosen due to a relatively smooth relationship between the entry of each phase and the risk of the 
system. For example, if there is a longer time between the system entering the second phase from the 
first phase, then there will be fewer preventative maintenance options, a higher probability of 
component failure and a higher risk to the system. The Simulated Annealing algorithm is also quick to 
converge and works well with the small number of parameters, such as those sought to be optimized 
at this stage. 
The phase times possible, during the optimization, ranged in one yearly intervals between zero and 
forty years. The Simulated Annealing algorithm was set up to find the lowest possible risk given a 
cost constraint. The life time system cost is made up of the cost of each intervention and the initial 
Overall event tree
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cost of the system and this is constrained within the algorithm. The algorithm returns a near optimal 
time for the phase entry times.  
In the initial stage of the optimisation, the inspection intervals for each component were set to: 12 
months for the first phase, 6 months for the second phase and 3 months for the third phase. Within the 
first stage of the optimization, with the use of the Simulated Annealing algorithm, a start point is set 
such that the system remains in the first phase for the full simulation time period. This corresponds to 
a situation with minimal inspection and no preventative maintenance. Two parameters are optimized 
in this stage, corresponding to the mean of each of the phase change transitions that govern when the 
system enters each maintenance phase. At each point the parameters are changed by a fraction of the 
total lifetime in consideration. One parameter is selected at random and this is changed to give a new 
potential solution to the algorithm at each trial. A constraint is added on the life time system cost and 
the risk of the system over the simulation time period is optimized. The mean of the phase transitions 
is found to the nearest year.  
A constraint is applied to the algorithm whereby if the total cost over the systems life goes above a 
defined threshold value, then the solution is deemed impossible. The algorithm optimizes for the 
reduction of risk of the system which is calculated via the Event Tree in Figure 6.14.  
It is easy to switch the objective function to optimize for the risk at a certain time, or within a certain 
time period. This can be done by finding the average probability of system failures within a small 
range or at a point in the system lifetime, as opposed to the average over the simulation period. 
In this application, 6 temperatures of the Simulated Annealing algorithm are applied in this case with 
20 trial values within each temperature. The algorithm searches for the two best maintenance phase 
entry times, given within a 40 year period with a value to the nearest year for each. The neighbouring 
configuration is defined adaptively based on the temperature of the algorithm. Initially, steps of 10 
years are taken in both parameter values at the first temperature. At the second temperature, steps of 5 
years are taken in both parameter values. At the third temperature, steps of 3 years are taken in the 
parameter values and at the fourth and fifth temperature steps of 2 years are taken. Finally, at the sixth 
temperature, steps of 1 year are taken. Each parameter is initiated at the highest value of 40 years and 
decreased at each point. The new proposed values within each simulation are found by changing one 
parameter at a time, with a random selection made at each point.   
A reduction in the maintenance phase entry times reduces the risk but increases the cost of 
interventions. There is a 5% variation assigned in the intervention cost constraint, to allow the 
algorithm to explore slightly outside the maximum cost within each temperature only. The maximum 
cost constraint, used as a sample value for illustration of the method, was 400000 cost units. The 
value of each of the parameters, within each temperature, that results in the lowest risk value and has 
system cost within the constraint, are carried through at each temperature. In the next temperature, 
these values are again reduced to try and find a lower risk value within the cost constraint.  
The Simulated Annealing algorithm applied first resulted in a phase entry time of 12 years for the 
second phase of the system and an entry time of 30 years for the third phase of the system, following 
entry into the second phase of the system. This implies an entry time into the third system phase at 42 
years after installation. Figure 6.16 shows how the phase entry intervals evolved with each iteration of 
the Simulated Annealing algorithm. It can be seen that after the 6
th
 iteration that no new solution was 
proposed inside the algorithm that contributed both a reduction in risk and was within the constrained 
budget. This is demonstrated through the lack of change in the final four iterations of the algorithm.  
This optimisation shows that for the constrained budget applied and within the 40 year period under 
consideration, that the system should not enter the third system phase. This suggests that the early 
replacement of components, although shown earlier in this chapter to reduce the probability of system 




Figure 6.16: The evolution of the maintenance phase entry times for each iteration of the constrained Simulated Annealing 
algorithm 
Stage 5: Optimisation of the component level asset management stategy 
The second level of the optimisation method, applied in this case, aims to find inspection intervals for 
each component within each phase of the system. This was completed to give a further reduction in 
risk for the resources available.   
The inspection intervals were allowed to vary between three months and twelve months, in 3-monthly 
intervals. An objective function was defined for the optimisation incorporating the system life-cycle 
cost and the average risk over the system life-cycle. The Genetic Algorithm returns the best inspection 
intervals within each phase for every component in the model.  
Following this, a Genetic Algorithm is applied to optimize the inspection intervals within the optimal 
solution for the maintenance phase entry times of the system. Throughout this optimization the 
maintenance delays for each maintenance type are fixed for each component in the system. These are 
based on the estimated state of each component as in Chapter 5.  
In this application of the Genetic Algorithm an initial population is defined for each of the inspection 
intervals, for every phase of each component. Each member of the initial population has randomly 
assigned inspection intervals for each component, within each phase, with values of 3 months, 6 
months, 9 months or 12 months. The parameters governing these intervals form a vector. For each 
member of the initial population a simulation of the Petri net is completed and the risk and the cost of 
the interventions are calculated. In this application the fitness of population members is defined by a 
function combining the average risk and the cost of the system over the 40 year period. Mutations 
were included at a rate of 1 in 100.  
For this algorithm the initial population of 100 members was defined. The inspection interval for each 
component was allowed to have the values of 3 months, 6 months, 9 month or 12 months. The 
algorithm aims to minimise the risk and the cost. The objective function of this is given in Equation 




      
  
       
         (6.2) 
Where   is the objection function,     is the average risk of the system and    is the cost of the 
system over the simulation time period. 
The optimisation procedure across both the Simulated Annealing algorithm and Genetic Algorithm 
took 2,189,016.117 seconds to complete. 
Figure 6.17 gives the convergence of the average risk, over the simulation period, to the optimum 
value, found via the Genetic Algorithm. Each entry denotes the average risk of a member of the 
population in each generation. Figure 6.18 gives the life-cycle cost at each generation of the 
algorithm, where each entry denotes the total cost of the system of the population member in each 
generation. These results demonstrate an initial higher rate of general decrease in the risk predicted by 
members of the population with each generation. After generation 14 there is limited change in the 
mean of the average risk predicted by the population. The mean of the population for the life cycle 
cost shows an initial increase followed by limited change after Generation 7. This suggests that 
initially the decrease in the risk can be correlated with an increase in lifecycle cost, however after 
Generation 7 there is still a decrease in average life cycle risk of the population, despite limited 
increase in cost. This implies that the algorithm is allocating resources in a more efficient way in 
order to reduce risk at the same life cycle cost.  
 




Figure 6.18: The life-cycle cost of the system with each generation of the Genetic Algorithm 
Figure 6.19 shows the median, 25
th
 percentile and 75
th
 percentile for average life cycle risk the 





 percentile for the life cycle cost of the system at each generation of the Genetic 
Algorithm. The same patterns of results can be seen as in Figure 6.17 and Figure 6.18. There is some 
instability in the 75
th
 percentile for the average life cycle risk. This can be attributed to the 
contribution of rare events to the simulation of each member in the population. Namely, the 
contribution to risk from the rarer failure of the detection system, which also has a higher 
consequence level associated with it. For example, in some simulations of each population member, 
this rarer event may not occur, while in others it may occur. This instability could be removed with a 
higher number of simulations of each population member within the Genetic Algorithm, or with an 
improved method for rare event simulation of the model. Including a higher number of simulations in 
each population member of this Genetic Algorithm, with the current model architecture, increases the 
computational cost. With the large computational cost of this algorithm, with a reduced number of 
simulations, this suggests that more efficient methods should be developed for more accurate 





Figure 6.19: A graph showing the median, 25th percentile and 75th percentile for the average life cycle risk for each 
generation of the Genetic Algorithm
 
Figure 6.20: A graph showing the median, 25th percentile and 75th percentile for the life cycle cost for each generation of 
the Genetic Algorithm 
 
The average of the population for each inspection interval can be found for the results gained at the 
20
th




Table 6.3 gives the optimal inspection interval for each component within each phase. The mean of 
the population is given for each value in the table. The phase 3 mean inspection intervals, although 
discovered by the program, are meaningless in this specific case due to the system never reaching the 
third maintenance phase. They are discarded for this system, with the specific parameter input values 
used in this example.  
 
Component  Phase 1  Phase 2  
Mean Median Mode Mean Median Mode 
Pipework 6.78 6 3 8.04 7.5 6 
Electric pump 6.66 6 9 7.935 9 12 
Jockey pump 8.55 9 12 8.79 12 12 
Diesel pump 7.125 6 9 8.295 9 9 
Diesel tank 7.14 6 6 6.84 6 6 
Ring main 8.55 7.5 6 5.7 3 3 
Sprinkler head and strainer 9.96 12 12 5.31 3 3 
Ringmain Isolation valve  7.92 9 9 7.485 7.5 9 
Diesel pump pressure release valve  7.485 6 12 7.275 6 12 
Deluge valve 5.94 6 6 5.73 3 3 
Solenoid 6.6 6 3 8.22 9 6 
Manual start device 7.59 7.5 6 9.75 12 12 
Pressure sensors 7.28 6 6 8.58 9 12 
Heat detectors 6.96 6 6 6.645 6 3 
Call points (zone 1) 8.07 9 12 7.785 9 6 
Alarm sounders 7.815 9 9 6.495 6 6 
Control box 7.38 6 3 5.85 6 3 
Control box battery 6.39 6 3 6.33 6 9 
Smoke detectors 7.935 9 9 8.07 6 6 
Wiring (zone 1) 7.56 6 6 6.93 6 6 
Call points (zone 2) 7.53 6 12 6.69 6 3 
Wiring (zone 2) 5.91 6 6 9.84 12 12 
Diesel pump isolation valve  7.635 6 6 8.10 9 9 
Water mains isolation valve  6.375 6 3 7.455 6 6 
Diesel tank isolation valve  6.375 6 6 8.61 9 9 
Electric pump Isolation valve  8.655 9 12 6.72 6 6 
Electric pump pressure release valve  7.68 6 6 7.05 6 3 
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Table 6.3: The optimal inspection intervals for each component at each system phase 
This method allows for the complex interactions, especially in system phases where there is age-based 
maintenance at a variety of intervals, to be modelled and optimised. Some components show an 
increase in inspection frequency on entry to the second system level maintenance phase, suggesting 
that failures are more likely as the component ages, despite the addition of age-based maintenance. 
Alternatively, some components show a decrease in inspection frequency on entry to the second 
system level maintenance phase, suggesting that the age-based strategy implemented in that individual 
case is controlling the failure probability such that inspection frequency can be reduced.  
 
This program written to complete this method is generic and the input values to both the model and 
the optimisation can be easily varied to apply the method with real world data. 
 
Stage 6: Result Interpretation 
The results for this optimisation can be used to suggest an optimal asset management strategy with the 
aim of minimising the risk of fatality over the system life cycle, within a constrained life cycle budget. 
In this example the modal values found in the inspection optimisation for each component were used 
to define the inspection intervals. A summary of the following strategy, found for this example is: 
 
1. Between installation and the 12th year following the system installation, components in the 
system components in the system should not be to subject to age-based maintenance. 
Components should be maintained on a revealed failure or degraded condition. System testing 
by opening the test valve should be completed every 9 months.  
 The following component should be inspected every 3 months:  
Component  Phase 1  Phase 2  
Mean Median Mode Mean Median Mode 
Pipework 6.78 6 3 8.04 7.5 6 
Electric pump 6.66 6 9 7.935 9 12 
Jockey pump 8.55 9 12 8.79 12 12 
Diesel pump 7.125 6 9 8.295 9 9 
Diesel tank 7.14 6 6 6.84 6 6 
Ring main 8.55 7.5 6 5.7 3 3 
Sprinkler head and strainer 9.96 12 12 5.31 3 3 
Ringmain Isolation valve  7.92 9 9 7.485 7.5 9 
Diesel pump pressure release valve  7.485 6 12 7.275 6 12 
Deluge valve 5.94 6 6 5.73 3 3 
Solenoid 6.6 6 3 8.22 9 6 
Manual start device 7.59 7.5 6 9.75 12 12 
Pressure sensors 7.28 6 6 8.58 9 12 
Heat detectors 6.96 6 6 6.645 6 3 
Call points (zone 1) 8.07 9 12 7.785 9 6 
Alarm sounders 7.815 9 9 6.495 6 6 
Control box 7.38 6 3 5.85 6 3 
Control box battery 6.39 6 3 6.33 6 9 
Smoke detectors 7.935 9 9 8.07 6 6 
Wiring (zone 1) 7.56 6 6 6.93 6 6 
Call points (zone 2) 7.53 6 12 6.69 6 3 
Wiring (zone 2) 5.91 6 6 9.84 12 12 
Diesel pump isolation valve  7.635 6 6 8.10 9 9 
Water mains isolation valve  6.375 6 3 7.455 6 6 
Diesel tank isolation valve  6.375 6 6 8.61 9 9 
Electric pump Isolation valve  8.655 9 12 6.72 6 6 
Electric pump pressure release valve  7.68 6 6 7.05 6 3 
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i. The pipework 
ii. The solenoid 
iii. The control box 
iv. The control box battery 
v. The water mains isolation valve 
 The following components should be inspected every 6 months:  
i. The diesel tank 
ii. The ringmain 
iii. The ringmain isolation valve 
iv. The deluge valve 
v. The manual start device 
vi. The pressure sensors 
vii. The heat detectors 
viii. The alarm wiring in zone 1 and zone 2 
ix. The diesel pump isolation valve 
x. The diesel tank isolation valve 
xi. The electric pump pressure release valve 
 The following components should be inspected every 9 months:  
i. The electric pump 
ii. The diesel pump 
iii. The alarm sounders 
iv. The smoke detectors  
 The following components should be inspected every 12 months: 
i. The jockey pump 
ii. The sprinkler heads and strainers 
iii. The diesel pump pressure release valve 
iv. The call points in zone 1 and zone 2 
v. The electric pump isolation valve  
2. From the 12th year following system installation until the 40th year following system 
installation components should be subject to age-based maintenance when it is assumed that 
they have reached the end of their useful life. They should also be maintained when it is 
revealed that they are in a failed or degraded state. System testing by opening the test valve 
should be completed every 6 months.  
 The following components should be inspected every 3 months: 
i. The ringmain 
ii. The sprinkler head and strainer 
iii. The deluge valve 
iv. The heat detectors 
v. The control box 
vi. The call points in zone 2 
vii. The electric pump pressure release valve 
 The following components should be inspected every 6 months: 
i. The pipework 
ii. The diesel tank 
iii. The solenoid 
iv. The call points in zone 1 
v. The alarm sounders 
vi. The smoke detectors 
vii. The wiring in zone 1 
viii. The water mains isolation valve 
ix. The electric pump isolation valve 
 The following components should be inspected every 9 months: 
i. The diesel pump 
ii. The ringmain isolation valve 
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iii. The control box battery 
iv. The diesel pump isolation valve 
v. The diesel tank isolation valve 
 The following components should be inspected every 12 months: 
i. The electric pump 
ii. The jockey pump 
iii. The diesel pump pressure release valve 
iv. The manual start device 
v. The pressure sensors 
vi. The zone 2 wiring 
vii.  
The optimal maintenance phase entry times and inspection strategy for component, as given above, 
was simulated to give the risk of the system and to demonstrate how this risk changes over time. A 
simulation with 1000 runs was carried out. Figure 6.21 gives the risk of the system found in this 
simulation, following the sample parameters assigned in this chapter. The risk is given as the expected 
number of fatalities per year. The bars show the average risk predicted by the model within each year. 
The range bars show the maximum and minimum risk observed within the year as a result of the 
simulation. As the system ages a general increase in risk can be seen, however a reduction in the risk 
can be seen after 12 years, corresponding to the entry into the second system maintenance phase. 
Figure 6.22 gives the probability that each system is in the failed state at each time, also taken from 
the same simulation. 
 
 
Figure 6.21: The yearly risk, measured in the expected number of fatalities per year, for a simulation of the model with the 





Figure 6.22: The probability of each system failure at evert point in time, gained from a simulation of the model with the 
optimised parameters found in the previous section 
Figure 6.22 shows that the optimisation particularly controls the risk of the control box failure, 
detection failure and alarm failure. The detection failure has the highest number of fatalities 
associated with it, in the sample inputs to this optimisation procedure, and causes a total system 
failure. A failure in the alarm system also has a high level of fatalities associated with in, in the 
sample inputs to this optimisation procedure. In addition, the control box failure causes a total system 
failure and has no back-up system in this application. Conversely, the deluge system is allowed to fail 
more frequently, this is expected as the deluge system failure has less fatalities associated with it in 
this application of the methodology. There is an increase in the fire detection failure towards the end 
of the time period under consideration, there is also a periodic pattern displayed. This can be 
attributed to the Zone 2 wiring failures that where inspection only occurs every 12 months, and hence 
if there is a failure it can remain undetected for a period of time. Since this failure happens 
infrequently, a higher number of simulations of the model is expected to reduce the periodic behavior.  
 
6.3.5: Summary 
In summary, a methodology has been presented to optimise over a phased system level asset 
management strategy and a component level asset management strategy, given the optimised system 
level phases, within a Petri net modelling framework. The optimisation takes place over two levels 
combining a Simulated Annealing algorithm with a Genetic Algorithm.  
The model developed in Chapter 5 and Section 6.2 of this chapter was used for demonstration of the 
approach. It is assumed here that a failed component is always repaired, on discovery. With the focus 
on reducing the number of failure occurrences, the first stage of the optimization finds the most 
effective strategy, within the defined structure of the model, to minimise the risk of the system by 
considering the phase entry times. With each phase the inspection frequency increases along with the 
rate of preventative maintenance. A Simulated Annealing algorithm is applied at this stage. Following 
this, the inspection interval of the components, within each phase is also optimized to find the 
minimum risk represented by the model given the phase entry times of the system. A Genetic 
Algorithm is applied in this stage. 
203 
 
The first stage of the optimisation is set to reduce the risk given a constraint on the budget. This was 
done to ensure the minimization of the risk, for the resources available. The second stage of the 
optimisation aims to reduce the cost and risk within an objective function.  
An alternative option to this approach is to optimize the whole model in one stage, with varying 
phases and inspection strategies at each proposed solution. This increases the number of options that 
must be tested at each point in the optimization. In this approach, due to the main requirement to 
minimise the risk and the expensive cost of maintenance, the combined two-stage Simulated 
Annealing algorithm and Genetic Algorithm was chosen to save computational cost.  
6.4: Convergence and Uncertainty in Petri net models 
Modelling uncertainty can arise in a Petri net model due to a lack of knowledge of a system [170]. 
Uncertainly analysis uses probabilistic methods to find bounds around a predicted value to a certain 
level of confidence; there is a set probability that another value will occur within that range.  
In a Petri net, uncertainty arises from uncertain input data, the assumptions made in the Petri net 
structure and imperfect convergence due to a finite number of simulations. This is applicable to any 
modelling approach [171]. The uncertainty in the data input to the model can arise due to the random 
nature of failures and differences between the ‘same’ components. This results in an imperfect 
prediction for each individual component behaviour based on the best population data available. 
Uncertainty is also introduced into the data through lack of knowledge, measurement error, subjective 
judgement, lack of specific descriptions and ambiguity. These uncertainties are difficult to quantify. 
The second reason for uncertainty in the Petri net model outputs is due to the imperfect nature of the 
Petri net model structure used in any scenario. With every application of the Petri net modelling 
technique different approximations will be made by the modeller, these can result in inaccuracies in 
the model outputs. Finally, uncertainty is introduced through the simulation of the Petri net model via 
Monte Carlo Simulation; in this case the higher the number of simulations the lower the uncertainty.  
The section considers the uncertainty inherent to the model due to a non-infinite number of runs of a 
Monte Carlo simulation. With a number of runs of a Monte Carlo simulation of the Petri net model 
there should be convergence to a mean value for the key outputs of the system. However, there is 
some distribution in the expected outputs for each run of the model. It is expected that with an 
increase in the number of simulations the confidence intervals of the mean values obtained will 
reduce. It is also possible to gain a measure of the order of the convergence for the model outputs, 
with an increasing number of model simulations. The optimal values found in the previous section are 
used as input to the full system Petri net model for this analysis. 
6.4.1: Example Analysis  
The uncertainty in the risk value generated with the optimal solution found in Section 3.6.4 of this 
chapter is used for a sample analysis in this section. This was selected as a candidate for analysis as 
the contribution of rare event failures can result in a slow convergence of the risk value from the 
simulation and the risk encompasses the threat to human life by the system. This increases the 
importance of gaining the knowledge of the level of convergence of the system and hence the 
accuracy in the model outputs.  
Figure 6.23 gives the life-cycle average risk output from the model, which is obtained from each run 
of a simulation containing 1000 runs. The average risk is displayed on the x-axis with the proportion 
of the runs that resulted in each average given on the y-axis. This shows the distribution of the values 




Figure 6.23: A normalised histogram showing the distribution of the average risk values that are output for each run of the 
simulation 
The distribution of the risk values for each run shows a fairly symmetric curve that is similar to a 
normal distribution for risk values before 1 fatality per year. The modal risk value occurs in the region 
surrounding 0.5 fatalities per year. The distribution is positively skewed with risk values seen over the 
level of 2 fatalities per year. The mean value of the risk is 0.88 fatalities per year. This skew can be 
attributed to the contribution of the different system failures on the total risk, especially the 
contribution on rare events with a high level of fatalities. There is a spread in the values predicted by 
each run of the simulation which can result in slow convergence in the model.  
The convergence of the average risk value was also analysed. It was assumed that the average risk 
outputs from the simulation will converge to the true value, with an increasing number of runs. It is 
also expected that this convergence, in the mean, will follow a normal distribution in accordance to 
the Central Limit Theorem. Under this assumption, the 95% confidence intervals on the mean value 
for the average risk, for each number of runs, was calculated. To do this, the distribution of the mean 
values, for each number of runs, was approximated as a normal distribution and by fitting a normal 
curve the standard deviation was found. This standard deviation was used to give the 95% confidence 
interval for each number of runs of the simulation. The mean risk for each number of runs, along with 
the 95% confidence interval is given in Figure 6.24. 
It is important to note the difference between this analysis and the distribution of risk values per run 
shown in Figure 6.23. In the earlier analysis, the distribution of each value, output by each run, was 
independently considered. This was done to give an idea of the distribution of model outputs. These 
model outputs are not assumed to follow a normal distribution. On the contrary, this current analysis 
section considers the distribution of the mean values, where the mean value for each number of runs is 
the mean of the outputs for the number of runs at that point. For example, the mean at 50 runs, is the 
mean of the model outputs for 50 runs of the model. The distribution of the mean values is expected 




Figure 6.24: A graph showing the convergence of the mean of the average risk value of the system under simulation, with an 
increase in the number of runs of the simulation. The 95% confidence intervals in the mean value are also displayed. 
Figure 6.24 shows the convergence of the mean value of the risk, taken from simulation of the model, 
with an increasing number of runs of the simulation. There is initially a high level of instability in the 
mean value. This emphasises the need for a high number of runs, resulting in a level of convergence 
in the model, for a more stable optimisation process, this has been partially compensated for in this 
chapter by taking the modal values of the population to improve the stability.  
The order of convergence of the average risk value with the number of runs can be analysed to give a 
better idea of the number of runs required to reach a confidence interval of a defined threshold. The 
range of the 95% confidence interval for the risk was used as a measure of convergence in this 
analysis. It is expected that the convergence of the range of the 95% confidence interval, with the 
number of runs of the simulation, will follow the relationship given in Equation 6.1:  
              (6.1) 
Where   is a measure of the error on the mean values, where the 95% confidence interval is used in 
this case.   is the number of runs of the simulation and   and    are constants, where   is the order of 
convergence.  
To find the order of convergence the natural logarithm of both sides of the equation can be taken to 
give:  
                             (6.2) 
If the previous assumption is correct, this takes the form of a straight line, where the gradient of the 
line,  , is the order of convergence.  
The average risk values for each number of runs of the simulation were used as input to this analysis. 
The confidence interval found for a number of runs that were less than 200 were discarded at this 
stage. This was done as the initial region of high instability is such that there are insufficient values 
for the Central Limit Theorem to allow the distribution of the mean values to be approximated as a 
normal distribution, hence resulting in unstable confidence intervals. The log-log graph for this 




Figure 6.25: A graph showing the logarithm of the 95% confidence interval in comparison to the logarithm of the number of 
runs, for the risk of the system. 
Fitting a straight line to the log-log graph given in Figure 6.25 gives the following equation:  
                                 (6.3) 
Hence, the order of convergence,         , where to decrease the confidence interval by a factor 
of  , the number of simulations must increase with the relationship   
 
  . 
This approach can be extended to consider the uncertainty on the risk values obtained within each 
year time period of the simulation. This analysis has assumed that there is no uncertainty in the input 
values in the model, and has discussed the convergence and a measure of how the uncertainty of the 
model can be expressed using the Central Limit Theorem. The next section of this model considers a 
case where there is a Petri net model with uncertain parameter inputs.  
6.5: A Petri net with uncertain inputs  
There is difficulty in finding a measure of the uncertainty introduced through Petri net modelling, 
especially in the case where there are uncertain input values for the model. Analytical methods cannot 
be used as there is no explicit formula for the output of the Petri net models, used in this chapter, as a 
function of the model inputs. This section presents a method to consider an uncertainty in the values 
output from a Petri net model, where there are uncertain inputs. In this application it is assumed that 
the uncertainty introduced by a poor Petri net modelling approach is negligible, and the uncertainty 
arises from the imperfect and random nature of the data used as input for the model and from the 
Monte Carlo simulation of the model.   
In this chapter, we assume probabilistic uncertainty in model parameters with application to a Petri 
net model. The method aims to include uncertainty introduced though the simulation of the Petri net 
and through the uncertainty in the input parameters. The method can be extended further to include a 
probabilistic fuzzy representation of some input values. The following short exploratory analysis 
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considers the use of an optimisation algorithm within a framework for considering probabilistic 
uncertainty, in order to improve the computational efficiency required by a double loop methodology.  
6.5.1: Method 
In this thesis, a methodology is proposed to find the impact on Petri net model outputs given uncertain 
input values. This methodology uses a Simulated Annealing algorithm, to find a measure of the 
uncertainty in the model outputs where there is an uncertainty on inputs to the models. The 
methodology is applied to a simple Petri net and for demonstration, inputs governing the ageing of a 
component are considered to have the largest uncertainty. In real terms this corresponds to a lack of 
certain knowledge about the input parameters for the model. For instance, there may be an expected 
mean time to failure for an aged component of 50 years, however, due to non-ideal data or large data 
variance, there may be a 95% confidence interval of 20-80 years. In an ideal data set, there may be an 
expected mean time to failure of 50 years but with a 95% confidence interval of 45-55 years. 
However, in the outputs of a Petri net model, the average result on convergence gives the same 
solution for each of these cases; if there is no measure of the confidence in the model outputs even 
though there are clear differences in the input data.  
To combat this, the methodology has been developed to carry through uncertainty in Petri net input 
parameters and incorporate the uncertainty introduced through Monte Carlo simulation of the model. 
Uncertain parameters are highlighted in the model and the 95% confidence interval for each is 
assigned. The uncertain parameters are allowed to vary within this interval. For each variation of the 
uncertain parameters, a Monte Carlo simulation of the Petri net model is completed. The aim of the 
method is to find the maximum and minimum average value for the Petri net output at each time, 
given the 95% confidence interval in the input parameters.  
A Simulated Annealing algorithm is repeated twice within the framework: once to find the maximum 
boundary and once to find the minimum boundary for the averages, given a set number of runs of the 
simulation, where the input parameters vary between each complete simulation. The objective 
function of the Simulated Annealing algorithm is defined as, the sum of the output vector in each case 
with the algorithm seeking to maximise or minimise this sum. It is assumed that the relationship 
between the uncertain input parameters and the output vector is roughly monotonic. For instance, if 
the input parameter (time to failure of a component) in the sample simulation is close to the upper 
95% confidence interval for that simulation, the failure will occur less frequently. This assumption 
allows the algorithm to focus on areas where the solution at each time is likely to be near a boundary. 
However, the end boundary is not found by using the ‘best’ parameters found by this algorithm. For 
each parameter that is tested, the average value at each time of the simulation output is compared to 
the current ‘best’ upper or lower bound. If the value at any time is found to be more extreme than the 
current upper or lower bound at this time, it is accepted.  
The approach enables the algorithm to incorporate the simulation uncertainty and the uncertainty due 
to the uncertain input parameters at the same time. For instance, any possible solution variances that 
are due to a non-infinite number of simulations are also collected into the upper or lower bound and 
the algorithm makes no distinction between these two types of uncertainty.  
To clarify, the lowest value stored in this algorithm is not the lowest value within a run of the 
simulation, but the lowest average value for a full simulation, taken from a defined number of runs. 
This average value can change by simulation due to the varying behaviour of the input parameters and 




6.5.2: Sample Application 
This methodology is applied to a component model from Chapter 5, to demonstrate its capability. The 
process can be applied to the whole model discussed in this chapter and Chapter 5, however is highly 
computationally expensive and intractable for the software developed in this thesis. Further work can 
be completed into methodologies to apply this approach to large system models. The Petri net for the 
pipework used in Chapter 5 and the Petri nets governing the inspection and maintenance at each phase 
was extracted from the models used previously. The methodology for finding the uncertainty on the 
outputs, given uncertain model inputs, was applied to this model section.   
It is reasonable to assume that in a real world application of the Petri net based model, the data present 
for the ageing of the components, will not give rise to parameter values governing the failure 
distribution with 100% accuracy. For instance, if the data follows a Weibull distribution, every data 
point will not lie directly on the Weibull Distribution. Hence, there is some uncertainty in the 
parameters governing the distributions used in the model that are based on this data. In the case of the 
Weibull distribution, there could be uncertainty on the shape parameter   and the scale parameter η. 
Assume that a transition is governed by two parameters,      , although the transition may be 
governed by any number of parameters depending on the patterns shown in the data. Instead of 
representing a transition,           , this method aims to include uncertainty in the model 
parameters such that,                   , where     is the uncertainty on   . 
The results for the small Petri net are given in this section. In this example a Weibull distribution is 
assigned to the transition governing the ageing of the component and a uniform distribution is 
assigned to the random failure rate of the component. It is assumed that there is a lack of knowledge 
about the parameters governing these transitions. For illustration, the parameters and their associated 
uncertainties are set at: 
 Transition t1 (ageing):                     
 Transition t2 (random failure):                    
In this example the parameters governing these transitions are allowed to vary between the specified 
ranges. The Simulated Annealing algorithm looks for the values that correspond to the maximum or 
minimum value for the probability of failure over a number of simulations. This algorithm stores the 
maximum or minimum at each point in time at the end of each simulation; this maximum or minimum 
can arise through error introduced by the simulation of the model or through the uncertain model 
inputs. The Simulated Annealing algorithm requires repeated simulation of the Petri net.  
Figure 6.26 shows the results of this algorithm, applied in this case. Here, the algorithm has been 
applied four distinct times, with a different number of simulations of the Petri net in each case. It can 
be seen here that for a small number of simulations, the range of possible average outcomes is large 
and the average is more unstable in time. The histogram bars show the average unavailability for the 
component over each year, where the model input values are the mean value of each parameter. The 
range bars show the maximum and minimum average unavailability for the component over each year 
for a full simulation, where the input values can range in the confidence intervals. As the number of 






Figure 6.26: A figure showing the probability that the component is in the failed state, with the range bars, for 500 
simulations (top left hand side), 1000 simulations (top right hand side), 1500 simulations (bottom left side) and 2000 
simulations (bottom right side). 
Figure 6.27 gives the range on the average probability of failure at each time for different numbers of 
simulations. This shows, as with the previous figure, that an increase in the number of simulations 
reduces the error on the final outcome. However, the reduction is not linear and does not tend towards 
zero in this case. This is due to the uncertainty introduced in the input parameters leading to an 
inherent level of uncertainty in the outputs of the model.  
 
Figure 6.27: A figure showing the average uncertainty on each probability for different numbers of simulations 
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This demonstration has shown the capability of this approach in dealing with uncertain input 
parameters and the uncertainty introduced through simulation of the Petri net model. This method 
enables knowledge about uncertain data to be carried through the analysis in order to give an 
informed estimate of the outputs of a Petri net model. This also demonstrates the necessity for 
sufficient convergence of the model outputs due to the Monte Carlo simulation, and if there are 
insufficient simulations then this is demonstrated by the uncertainty in the results.  
This methodology can be applied to a larger Petri net with a number of uncertain input values to give 
a measure of the uncertainty on the solution. This can be incorporated into the final model outputs, 
such as an estimate for the risk.   
6.6: Discussion  
The aim of this chapter has been to further extend the models presented in the previous chapter. The 
method presented initially in this chapter demonstrated that the logic used to give the system failure 
probability in Chapter 5 can be represented with Petri net logic. However, this conversion of the Fault 
Tree structure increases the computational cost of the simulation of the model.  
Also, the optimisation method in this chapter has the potential to optimise over a number of system 
phases. However, due to computational constraints the number of simulations of the model had to be 
reduced in order to allow the optimisation of the system to be completed in a reasonable timeframe. 
This resulted in an optimisation based on approximate simulation values that are taken from the model 
before full convergence is reached. In order to provide optimised results with more confidence, the 
method can be exactly replicated but with a higher number of model simulations for each trial of the 
model within the optimisation. This issue has been partially overcome by considering the modal 
values of the population following the optimisation of the model with a Genetic Algorithm. This was 
done under the assumption that by considering the average behaviour of the population, as opposed to 
the behaviour of a single population member, that the approximate optimal solution will more closely 
approximate the true optimal solution.  
A deeper study into model convergence, and the confidence intervals of the risk values predicted by 
the model, demonstrates that there is a slow convergence of the model. Uncertainty measures can be 
assigned to the mean values that are output from the model to encompass this. In addition, the method 
for considering the impact of uncertain parameters on the model outputs has been presented. Again, 
this method comes at a high computational cost. Further study can be completed into assigning the 
95% confidence bands to each time of the simulation, in cases where there can be uncertain inputs.  
This chapter has explored potential methods to use traditional Petri net models, commonly seen in 
literature, in order to expand their usefulness. In each case there has been a limit reached for the 
applicability of the model due to the computational cost of the Monte Carlo simulation of the Petri 
net. This is especially visible in methods, such as optimisation or analysis of uncertain inputs, where 
repeated simulations of the model are required. There are several developments to the modelling 
approach that can address this issue including: an improvement of hardware for model simulation, an 
improvement of software for model simulation and an improvement in the simulation approach, such 
as using a more efficient algorithm to seek convergence than the Monte Carlo Simulation.   
6.7: Parameter Assumptions and Use of Data 
For the example application of the optimisation approach, given in this chapter, parameters are 
assumed for the costs of each maintenance, inspection and testing action. Altering these costs will 
impact the optimised solution of the model. If a component maintenance or inspection cost is 
increased, the optimisation may find that it is more beneficial to maintain or inspect an alternative 
component more frequently, if this does not have a large impact on the risk. Attention should be given 
to the methodology to ensure that the penalty for increased risk is sufficient, so that the optimisation 
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does not recommend a cheaper system strategy that allows the risk to increase. Hence, the 
optimisation method is sensitive to the parameters that govern the balance between cost and risk.  
Despite the assumptions of the parameters in order to demonstrate the method, the optimization 
approach can be taken from this chapter, and applied with real data. Data should be collected on the 
cost of different maintenance actions; this can then improve the results given by the optimizations, if 
combined with real data for the system as discussed in Chapter 5. The results from the optimisation 
can be used to inform maintenance decisions. Care should be taken with parameters that balance cost 
with risk, due to ethical implications. 
6.8: Contributions 
There are a number of novel aspects of this chapter. Firstly, the chapter combines new Petri net 
models for the deluge, detection and alarm systems to give the risk, using an Event Tree approach. 
The Fault Tree containing the failure logic of the system is replaced with Petri net logic. This extends 
the current Fault Tree and Event Tree implementations available in industry, allowing a more detailed 
analysis of the indirect factors that can impact system failure, such as the applied maintenance actions. 
Secondly, a novel optimisation approach for Petri nets is presented. The approach uses a combined 
Simulated Annealing and Genetic Algorithm optimization, for a phased system asset management 
strategy. This improves the Genetic Algorithm method as it allows the reduction of the number of 
parameters required for Genetic Algorithm optimization, hence improving efficiency. The main 
contribution of this part of the thesis is the use of this approach to optimize a phased system model. 
The optimization of a phased system shows improvement on current modelling capabilities as it 
allows optimal choice of when different strategies should be applied over a systems lifecycle. This 
may be particularly useful for improving maintenance strategies as a system moves past the useful life 
phase and is still in operation. This optimisation procedure is applied to the combined fire protection 
system model. It is beneficial to optimise across the three systems, in a combined model, as they share 
some components.  
Secondly, the rate of convergence of the Petri Net model is analysed using a log-log approach. This 
shows improvements when compared to plotting convergence on a linear scale as it allows the 
convergence of the Monte Carlo simulation of the model to be quantified. Finally, an area of novelty 
in this chapter is the use of a Simulated Annealing algorithm to gain an estimate of the uncertainty of 
the model, given an uncertainty in the input parameters. This improves the state of the art for Petri net 
modelling and risk models present in industry, by considering the uncertainty introduced through 
imperfect input parameters. This method gives an uncertainty measure for the final risk value that 
encompasses both uncertainty in the model input parameters and uncertainty introduced through 
simulation of the model. This method addresses issues discussed throughout this thesis surrounding 
the assumptions in model parameters and their impact on the model outputs, by allowing the 
quantification of uncertainty on input parameters to be specified and carried through to the model 
outputs. This gives more information to the decision maker and can highlight areas where more data 
should be collected. 
6.9: Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a number of aspects covering the analysis and use of models such as those 
developed in Chapter 5. The aim of this chapter has been to provide methods for a further analysis of 
Petri net based models.  
In the first part of this chapter, the Fault Tree used to combine component models in Chapter 5 was 
converted to a Petri net structure. This demonstrated results agreeable to those presented in the 
previous chapter. This methodology can be implemented to convert a model based on a Fault Tree 
structure to one which can incorporate dependencies between component failures.  
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Following this, the model developed formed the basis of an optimisation approach for the phase based 
maintenance of the system over its life-cycle. This approach used a Simulated Annealing algorithm to 
find the optimal phase entry times, followed by a Genetic Algorithm to assign the inspection intervals 
for components, given the phased maintenance strategy. 
In the penultimate section, a discussion of the convergence of the model with the number of 
simulations was made. This discussion focused on the rare nature of some failures within the system 
and how this impacts the number of simulations required to reach a fully convergent answer. A 
measure of the uncertainty in the model outputs, caused by the Monte Carlo simulation, given a 
number of simulations was also presented.  
Finally, an approach was presented to carry through uncertain model inputs within a Petri net 
framework. This approach also incorporates the impact of a non-infinite number of simulations of the 
model on the uncertainty in the outputs. This approach was then applied to a component model used 
in Chapter 5 of the thesis.  
A common issue found through these examples is the computational cost of simulating the Petri net in 
order to obtain a convergent answer. This is especially highlighted in cases where optimisation of the 
model is required, or the methodology for incorporating uncertain inputs is implemented, as both 
methods require many convergent simulations to reach a solution. The next chapter of this thesis 
presents a methodology for the reduction of Petri net models, to decrease the computational cost of 




Chapter 7 Petri net reduction  
7.1 Introduction  
As demonstrated in the earlier chapters of this thesis, for large and complex stochastic Petri nets with 
a variety of transition types, finding an exact analytical solution to the Petri net is practically 
impossible [125]. Simulation tools, such as a Monte Carlo simulation, can be employed to find the 
average marking sequences based on the probability model associated with the transitions. This type 
of analysis has been shown to be effective in literature and throughout this thesis [172][173][64][158]. 
However, this method is computationally expensive due to the requirement of a large number of runs 
of a simulation to obtain convergence for the marking sequences of the Petri net. Large Petri net 
models are difficult to simulate via this method, especially in cases where an optimisation of the Petri 
net model inputs is required. This is because optimization techniques may require repeated convergent 
simulation of the Petri net, exasperating the already lengthy time of the simulation. 
 
There have been several studies to develop methods to allow very large Petri net based models to be 
simulated efficiently including the use of parallel computing [174] [175] [176]. These methods, 
though effective, require specialist hardware or software. In the previous chapter methodologies were 
introduced to find optimal solutions to a problem, and a measure of the uncertainty, using a Stochastic 
Petri net model as the system modelling framework. These methods require repeated analysis of the 
already costly simulation of the Petri net model. For example, take one additional place in a Petri net 
model that fires twice in the period of interest. If the Petri net requires 2000 Monte Carlo runs to reach 
a convergent answer, this transition must fire 4000 times in one convergent run of the Petri net. If then 
during optimization of the Petri net, or a simulation of the uncertainty, 500 variables require testing 
then this one additional transition must fire 2,000,000 times during the course of the whole analysis. It 
is clear to see that the reduction of a small number of transitions can impact the computational 
efficiency greatly.   
 
This chapter presents a technique that can be used when reducing the structural size of Stochastic 
Petri net models. Simple reduction rules and decomposition techniques can be used to reduce a large 
Petri net model into a simpler one whilst retaining its properties. These rules include the fusion of 
places, and transitions, in either parallel or series arrangements as well as removing self-loop 
transitions, but are limited in application due to the need for existence of specific structures within 
each Petri net. Hence, these techniques can often only provide a limited reduction to Petri net 
complexity [177]. The methodology presented in this chapter gives an approach for the reduction of 
Petri net size that is not limited to specific structures. The methodology aligns with the Monte Carlo 
simulation method, used throughout this thesis, to allow numerical analysis of varied Petri net 
structures. In this methodology, a reduced structure is found that can mimic the behaviour of a larger 
Petri net model, but with a reduced computational cost.  
 
This chapter presents a methodology to produce a reduced Petri net to approximate the outputs of a 
reference Petri net. This reduced Petri net can then be used to replace the reference Petri net for 
analysis with a lower computational time. 
 
7.2 Concepts 
This section introduces three concepts employed in the methodology presented in this chapter that are 
incorporated into the parameter updating stage of the methodology. These are: Bayesian Model 
Updating, Approximate Bayesian Computation (ABC) and Sub-Set Simulation. Finally the ABC-
SubSim Algorithm is presented.  
 
7.2.1 Bayesian Model Updating 
Bayesian Model Updating provides a methodology to make inferences about parameters of a model 
based on experimental data [178]. Where there are multiple candidate models, this methodology can 
also provide a framework to assess the plausibility of each model. Bayesian methods also provide a 
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quantification of the uncertainty in the model parameters introduced by measurement error or the 
choice of model.  
 
For a stochastic model class, , Bayes theorem provides a methodology whereby prior knowledge of 
the parameters of interest,        , of a system can be updated based on information gained from 
a set of data,        ,  where   is the observation space and the region in    contains all possible 
observational outcomes according to the model class. A prior distribution,       , represents the 
initial knowledge about the parameters of interest and a likelihood function,         , represents the 
probability of obtaining data values,  , for the model class, . This theory allows the calculation of a 
posterior distribution for the model class resulting in an updated probability distribution for the 
parameters of interest given the observed data. For parameter updating, Bayes theorem is given in 
Equation 7.1 for a posterior PDF,         , of the model specified by  . 
 
         
              
                 
                      (7.1) 
 
 
In many cases the denominator is intractable but it can be absorbed and replaced by a normalization 
factor. 
 
In the case of a set of   competing model classes,           ,  the posterior probability of 
each model class can be found by Bayes theorem at the model-class level:  
 
                                (7.1) 
 
There are some model classes where the likelihood function is difficult or impossible to calculate. For 
these models the model updating and model class selection given in Equation 7.1 and Equation 7.2 are 
not directly applicable however performing parameter updating or model class selection may still be 
of interest. Approximate Bayesian Computation (ABC) methods can be used to remove the need for 
computation of the likelihood function while providing a framework for parameter inference and 
model selection. 
 
7.2.2 Approximate Bayesian Computation (ABC) 
Approximate Bayesian Computation (ABC) is a simulation based approach that can evaluate a 
posterior density whilst avoiding the need for exact knowledge of the likelihood function. ABC also 
avoids the need to evaluate the intractable integral in the denominator of Equation 7.1. In ABC, a 
rejection algorithm is used to sample from the posterior in order to find a region, within a set 
tolerance, that is close to the true posterior values or alternatively, to find the best posterior estimate 
and give a measure of how close it is to the true posterior [179]. 
 
Let        , denote a simulated dataset from          the forward model of model class, . An 
ABC algorithm aims at evaluating the posterior,                         by applying Bayes' 
Theorem to the pair         
 
In Equation 7.3 the model class, , has been omitted under the assumption that the theory is valid for 
any specific model class, the equation is arrived at by using the law of total probability.  
 
                                  (7.3) 
 
Higher weights are given to regions where   is close to   by         , representing values where 
simulated parameter values are closer to the true posterior. In a basic ABC algorithm a sample is 
taken from the posterior in Equation 7.3 and the sample is accepted or rejected based on the equality 
   . In practice, since equality is impractical to obtain the ABC algorithm results in a region in    




To find a region where    ,  a tolerance parameter   is introduced that represents closeness of the 
parameters judged by a metric value   gained by a summary statistic     . Through this approach, the 
posterior          in Equation 7.3 is approximated by          , which assigns higher probability 
density to those values of       that satisfy the condition               . 
 
From Bayes' Theorem, the approximate posterior          , is given by Equation 7.4. 
 
                                       (7.4) 
 
Where                        is an indicator function that assigns a value of 1 if  
               and 0 otherwise. The output of the ABC algorithm corresponds to samples from 
the joint probability density function: 
 
                                    (7.5) 
 
The end interest is typically the marginal approximate posterior: 
 
                                       (7.6) 
 
An algorithm to generate   posterior sample values by ABC is given below:  
 
Algorithm 1 Standard ABC 
for     to  do 
repeat 
1. Simulate  ’ from      
2. Generate         ’) 
until                
Accept         
 end for 
 
The success of the ABC algorithm is dependent on a good choice of the summary statistic     , metric 
choice   and tolerance parameter  . For small posterior regions ABC can be computationally heavy as 
a large quantity of simulations are required to reach a significant number of parameter values within 
the required tolerance. There have been several algorithms developed to decrease the computational 
time for the ABC algorithm, several of these can be found in literature [179] [180] [181] [182] [183]. 
For the reduction methodology presented here the ABC-SubSim algorithm has been chosen as a 
sufficiently good algorithm to reduce the computational effort of ABC. This algorithm combine’s sub-
set simulation with ABC, both subset simulation and the ABC-SubSim algorithm are explained in the 
next sections.  
 
7.2.3 Subset Simulation 
Subset simulation is a method presented in [184] to avoid the need for costly or inaccurate rare event 
simulation that arises due to the existence of a very small failure region. The need for rare event 
simulation is avoided by the introduction of several smaller intermediary regions between the initial 
region and the failure region by generating conditional samples.  
 
This corresponds to levels of a performance function       , which results in a sequence of more 
frequent events equivalent to the single, low probability, rare event. 
 
Let   be the failure region in the  -space,        , corresponding to exceedance of the 




                     (7.7) 
 
For simpler notation, we use             Let us now assume that   is defined as the 
intersection  regions      
 
   , such that they are arranged as a nested sequence: 
 
                 ,      (7.8) 
 
where                 , with         .       
 
When the event    holds then             also hold, and hence: 
 
                               (7.9) 
 
And it follows that: 
 
          
 
                    
 
         (7.10) 
 
where                          , is the conditional failure probability at the      
   level. 
 
The failure region, which corresponds to the occurrence of the rare event, can be expressed by the 
intersection of several larger intermediate regions arranged in a nested sequence. In Equation 7.10 the 
intermediate regions can be chosen so that the conditional probabilities are large despite the failure 
region being small.  
 
To perform a Subset simulation at the first level a Monte Carlo simulation is made to cover the region 
of interest and estimate      . 
 
      
 
 
       
              (7.11) 
 
Where   
          and       
     is the indicator function for the region    that assigns a value of 1 
when     
       , and 0 otherwise. 
 
Conditional sampling is used for the intermediate regions. At each level, particle ‘seeds’ from the 
previous level are selected to generate more samples via Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling to 
generate  dependent samples.  
 
These seeds are chosen by taking the best values from the set simulated at the previous level. The 
Metropolis Hasting algorithm is used to generate successive chain values for each seed, here the value 
in each chain starts with the seed value and successive chain values are sampled from a symmetric 
proposal pdf centered on the previous value. This demonstrates perfect sampling: if the value in the 
chain produces a weaker output than the previous value, it is discarded and the previous value is 
repeated. At each level this process is repeated, again choosing the best values from the previous level 
to act as seeds. Equation 7.12 gives the method for conditional sampling for the intermediate regions. 
 
           
 
 
         
              (7.12) 
 
Where     
                 and         
     is the indicator function for the region    that assigns a 
value of 1 when       
       , and 0 otherwise.  
 
Figure 7.1 shows the initial stages of SubSet Simulation, where the best seed values from the first 






Figure 7.1: A diagram representing the evolution of 'seed' values in Subset Simulation 
This method requires a good selection of the proposal pdf used to evolve values in each Markov 
Chain, and the proportion of values to take through from the previous level as seeds. These values 
must be chosen so that the intermediate regions are large enough to not result in a rare event 
simulation yet small enough to avoid the need for many simulation levels. Hence, there is a trade-off 
between the need to explore the entire region and the computational efficiency of the method. It is 
recommended that the proportion of values chosen at each level should lie between 0.1 and 0.3.  
 
The ABC-SubSim algorithm presented in the next section combines ABC with Subset simulation to 
decrease the computational effort of ABC.  
 
7.2.4 ABC-SubSim Algorithm  
The ABC-SubSim algorithm is presented in [185], and combines Subset Simulation with ABC to 
improve the efficiency of simple ABC. The combination of these methods results in an algorithm that 
gives a stepwise improvement to a posterior region over several different levels, until the desired 
posterior region is found. In effect, the whole region is broadly sampled at a low resolution followed 
by focused sampling in promising regions at increasingly higher resolutions. This is opposed to a 
simple ABC methodology where the whole possible region is sampled uniformly resulting in repeated 
sampling of unnecessary areas.  
 
As with ABC, the ABC-SubSim Algorithm relies the selection of an informative summary statistic. 
The benefit of this algorithm is an improvement in the computational cost, however, care must be 
taken to sample sufficiently from the space such that the true posterior region is not passed over and 
discarded in the early levels. Because of this the algorithm works well where the solution space is 
‘smooth’, for example a change in a parameter value does not cause a spike in the metric value. A 
sufficient summary statistic and metric value must be chosen to facilitate this.  
 
In this algorithm   is defined as           , so that                  .    in the subset 








                                           
   (7.13) 
 
Where   is a metric based on the summary statistic      and the sequence of tolerances           is 
such that         is chosen adaptively and the number of levels, , is chosen such that    is within 
a specified tolerance.  
 
In this algorithm, the small probability,       is expressed as a sequence of larger conditional 
probabilities,       which forms the basis for a Subset Simulation to achieve a faster convergence to 
a posterior of the desired tolerance. A pseudocode of the algorithm is given below: 
 
Algorithm 2: Pseudocode implementation for ABC-SubSim 
Inputs 
        , {governs the percentage of seeds selected and so that     and      are integers}  
 , {the number of samples at each level) 
 , {the maximum number of simulation levels allowed} 
 , {the desired tolerance} 
Algorithm 
Sample     
    
      
    
       
    
       
    
     where                  
for         do 
 for         do 
  Evaluate   
   
         
         
 end for 
 Renumber [   
    
            so that   
   
   
   
     
   
 
 Fix    
 
 
   
        
         
 for           do 
  Select a seed    
     
   
     
       
   
     
   
  
  Run Modified Metropolis Algorithm to generate      states of a Markov Chain lying  
  in   : [   
        
            
            
          ] 
 end for 
 Renumber     
        
                       
 
  
  as     
    
        
    
    
 if       then  
  End algorithm 




A natural outcome of this algorithm is a measure of the acceptability of the model class, this is given 
in Equation 7.14. This enables the testing of multiple models   in order to test the ABC evidence 
          of each model class.  
 
                                       
  
     (7.14) 
 
7.3 Proposed Reduction methodology  
This section presents the novel Petri net reduction methodology, proposed in this thesis. The aim of 
this methodology is to develop a technique for a very large Petri net, referred to in this chapter as the 
Reference Petri net,  , to be represented by a smaller Petri net,   referred to as a Reduced Petri 
net. This methodology also provides a comparative measure of the goodness of representation of a 
variety of reduced Petri nets to the reference Petri net to allow an informed decision on the model 




This methodology uses Bayesian parameter updating to allow the reduced Petri net to approximate the 
behaviour of the Reference Petri net. The place, or places, representing the key outputs of the 
reference Petri net are identified. The corresponding place, or places, in the reduced Petri net are also 
identified. The marking sequence of these comparison places forms the basis for which the reference 
Petri net and reduced Petri net can be compared. It is important to choose effective comparison places 
that hold the same meaning in each Petri net and contain the required information from the reference 
Petri net.  
 
The similarity of the marking sequence of the comparison places is measured by a summary statistic, 
    .The summary statistic should be chosen depending on the application to give as much 
information as possible for each individual problem.  
 
Initially the reference Petri net is defined, along with the comparison places,    . The reference signal 
is gained by tracking the marking of the comparison place, or places, and this is found via Monte 
Carlo simulation of the reference Petri net. Following this the reduced model is proposed. In this stage 
the places,      in the reduced Petri net that correspond to the comparison places in the reference Petri 
net must be defined. 
 
The firing of the   transitions in the reduced Petri net are governed by distributions    
           each distribution,    is governed by a set of  parameters,                . 
Hence, the reduced Petri net with   transitions is governed by a set of parameters, 
               . The aim of this method it to update the parameters governing the reduced Petri 
net in order to approximate the output of the reference Petri net. For ease of fitting, a subset of these 
parameters can be selected for updating, known hereafter as the fitting parameters,     . Various 
fitting parameters can be tested to consider their impact on the final approximation made by the 
reduced model.  
 
For any proposed set of parameters,   , a response signal for the reduced Petri net can be obtained by 
tracking the marking pattern of the comparison places in the reduced Petri net,    . Again, this is 
done via Monte Carlo simulation of the reduced Petri net. 
 
A sufficient metric,  ,  based on the summary statistic,     , is defined to compare the response signal 
from the reference Petri net and the reduced Petri net. This metric quantifies the similarity between 
the reference Petri net and the reduced Petri net for the parameters used and allows for the 
implementation of the ABC-SubSim algorithm to update the parameters.  
 
Initially, a prior region in the parameter space is defined and  sets of parameter values are sampled 
uniformly from this space and used as the prior parameter set,              for the reduced Petri 
net model. For each parameter set,   , the reduced Petri net is simulated via Monte Carlo simulation 
and the corresponding metric value calculated by comparison of the response signal from the reduced 
Petri net with the response signal of the reference Petri net. The prior parameter sets corresponding to 
the metric values representing a close approximation to the reference Petri net are selected as the seed 
values for the first level of the ABC-SubSim algorithm. The number of parameter sets selected 
depends on the size of   , with        representing a selection of the top 20% of values that 
correspond to the closest response signals of the two Petri nets.  
 
Similarly, at each level of the ABC-SubSim algorithm, parameter seed values are chosen from the 
previous level that resulted in the lowest values for the metric,  .  Within each level of the ABC-
SubSim algorithm, seed values are evolved in a Markov Chain by a proposal pdf within a range 
      , where    is a defined upper limit for parameter   . Each evolved parameter is accepted or 
rejected to form the next entry in the Markov Chain. If the evolved parameter results in a metric value 
that is within the tolerance for that level of the algorithm then the evolved parameter is accepted, 
otherwise the previous parameter is repeated. Each new evolved parameter is found from the previous 
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entry in the Markov Chain and not from the initial seed value. The sets of proposed parameters at each 
level of the ABC-SubSim algorithm condenses sequentially to a posterior region. 
 
The required accuracy of the approximation of the reduced Petri net to the reference Petri net must be 
considered. An increase in the number of parameters selected from the reduced Petri net for parameter 
fitting improves the ability of the reduced Petri net to approximate the reference Petri net. However, 
for large Petri nets there is a trade-off between the choice of the number of parameters updated and 
the computational effort. In the examples in this chapter it has been sufficient to update two 
parameters in the reduced Petri nets, corresponding to the mean values for two transitions, in order to 
obtain a reasonable approximation to the reference Petri net.  
 
A natural outcome of this algorithm is a measure of the acceptability of the model class, this is given 
in Equation 7.14. This enables the testing of multiple models,   , in order to obtain the relative 
evidence          , of each model. The paper “Approximate Bayesian Computation by Subset 
Simulation” suggests setting       , which represents the proportion of the values to be retained as 
seeds through each level, this was applied in the examples in this chapter[185]. 
 
There are several choices when applying this methodology that are dependent on the modelling 
situation: 
 A reduced Petri net must be chosen that retains the capability to sufficiently model the 
situation. A relative measure of the success of the approximation made by the reduced Petri 
net is given in Equation 7.14. 
 The comparison places must be chosen so that they contain the same meaning across both the 
reduced Petri net and reference Petri net.  
 A sufficient summary statistic must be chosen in order to compare the signals from the 
reference Petri net and reduced Petri net. With changes in the parameter values, the resulting 
metric should not contain singularities. If there is a lack of convergence to a good posterior 
then the summary statistic may not contain sufficient information.  
 A decision must be made on which parameters to vary within the reduced Petri net; it is 
possible to fit multiple parameters but at increased computational effort. The impact of fitting 
different parameters can be tested.  
 A prior parameter region should be chosen to sample a sufficient space, sampling uniformly 
from a prior region is suggested to evenly cover the potential region of the posterior.  
 The proposal pdf used to evolve the seed values in the Markov Chains must be chosen to 
acceptably cover the parameter region. The success of this choice can be tested by 
considering the acceptance rate of each value generated from the seeds in the Markov Chains. 
The Proposal pdf can change at each level of the ABC-SubSim algorithm to optimize 
convergence to the posterior region.  
 




Figure 7.2: A schematic of the reduction methodology 
This method can be used to update several parameters for the reduced Petri net so that the signal 
outputs over time of the reference Petri net can be closely replicated. The next section gives a 
discussion of the metric choice followed by two applications of the method.  
 
7.4 Discussion of metric choice 
A suitable metric value must be chosen for implementation of the ABC-SubSim algorithm to the 
comparison of two Petri nets. A review of metric options was completed to identify potential metric 
choices. Several different metric choices are presented in this section. These were then tested with a 
sample signal to observe their behaviour. The metrics and distance measures given in this section are 
given for two signals    . 
The paper “A Framework for Comparing Models of Computation” [186] aims to create a ‘meta 
model’ that allows some properties of different computational models to be compared. The systems 
considered include: discrete event systems, dataflow, rendezvous-based systems, Petri nets, and 
process Petri networks. The concept of assigning a ‘Tag’ to each event in a system is introduced. 
These tags contain information about the sequence of occurrence of events and can either represent 
the abstract ordering of events or the time order at which events occur depending on the physicality of 
the system. The events in the system can be grouped into signals and each of these signals contained 
in a set of signals specific to that model. In a Petri net a signal can be gained from each place or 
transition. A distance measure is presented for the comparison of two models based on the signals that 
are generated by each.  
       
 
  
       (7.15) 
Where   is: 
a. The smallest tag at which there is a difference between the signals generated by the models. 
b. Infinity if the two signals are identical 
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c. Minus infinity otherwise 
This metric allows the comparison of two models with a focus on the time at which the events begin 
to occur in a different order between the models. This approach is useful for comparing models of 
different types to ensure that the logic of the system is preserved when changing the modelling tool. 
For the application of a metric for this problem it is less applicable as there has to be a consideration 
of the degree of difference between the models, not solely the time at which a difference occurs.  For 
instance, signals of the two models that greatly diverge at a point and never return to similar results 
would receive the same metric value as signals of a different model pairing that has a slight deviation 
at the same tag point.  
There was limited literature directly related to comparison of signals generated between two separate 
Petri net models, however a wider review of metric spaces and signal comparison was carried out. 
The book, “Encyclopaedia of Distances” [187], gives an extensive description of different measures 
of distance and their applications. These includes the Power Distance, given in Equation 7.16. 
                   
  
    
 
      (7.16) 
When             this corresponds to the Euclidian Distance, when             this gives the 
Manhattan distance. 
Several measures given include the Natural Metric for real numbers, the M-relative Metric and the 
Janous-Hametner Metric. The latter two distance measures are weighted versions of the first. These 
are given below: 
                       (7.17) 
              
       
    
      (7.18) 
            
       
       
                          (7.19) 
A further measure is the Sierpinski Metric, which is similar to a weighted Hamming Distance. Both 
the Hamming Distance and this distance measure are given below: 
             
          
          
      (7.20) 
 
            
  
 
     
         
          
     (7.21) 
The Hamming distance represents the number of changes required to convert one sequence into 
another. These distances can be combined in the following ways to form a metric for the sequence 
overall: 
                   
 
      (7.22) 
                     
  
      (7.23) 
The intersection distance is given in Equation 7.24 for signals    . 
          
            
             
     (7.24) 
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The Symmetric Chi-Distance is defined by Equation 7.25. 
          
     







      
     
        
           
     
 
  (7.25) 
A metric known as Centroid Linkage is also presented. This metric clusters values in sequences 
around the point of interest and takes their average. These averages are then compared for each point 
in the sequences. The Euclidean distance of these averages can then be found. This method may be 
especially useful as it filers small time differences. For two signals   and  , where there are sliding 
regions of length  and midpoint  , for which   
  and   
 , which are subsections of the full signal, 
are members and where   
  and   
  are the mean values of each region, the Centroid Linkage for each 
midpoint is given by : 
 
      
    
        (7.26) 
 








    
 
 








    
 
 
 for members    and    of   and    These 
midpoints can be then combined as in Equation 7.22 or Equation 7.23 to give a metric for the whole 
signal. 
 
The paper “Alignment-free sequence comparison-a review” [188] considers different methods for 
comparing discreet sequences. The methods of measuring similarity are grouped into two types: 
methods that are based on word frequency and methods that do not require splitting the sequence into 
fixed length sections. The first type includes metrics such as the Euclidean distance, weighted 
Euclidean distance, correlation coefficient, covariance and the relative entropy. These are found based 
on vectors for the frequency of word occurrence. These methods require a finite ‘alphabet’ from 
which different ‘L-tuples’ (similar to words) can be extracted, the frequency of each of these L-tuples 
is then found in both sequences and stored in vectors. These vectors then form the basis for the 
comparison of the two sequences. For the application to this problem these ‘word’ based methods 
may not be ideal. Firstly, there may not be a finite alphabet as the values in the sequence could range 
anywhere over the real numbers. Secondly, the distance between individual elements in the sequence 
is not considered. This is of value when comparing sequences of letters as it is not necessary to have a 
measure of how close one letter is to another, however when considering a sequence of discreet 
numbers then the ‘closeness’ of numbers should be considered.  
The second group of methods are based around Kolmogorov complexity theory and scale-independent 
representation of sequences by iterative maps. The metrics here do not require a specific length of the 
L-tuples to be defined. Universal Sequence Maps (USM) are founded on Chaos theory and splits the 
sequence into regions, the difference in the values in these regions is then compared. For instance 
consider two regions,                        , each belonging to a sequence then the USM 
co-ordinates are: 
                                 (7.27) 
          
 
            
                           (7.28) 
Kolmogorov complexity theory considers the relative decrease in complexity or conditional 
complexity as a measure of similarity of sequences. These two methods have more potential for 
adaptation for application to a discreet numerical sequence of positive numbers instead of collections 
of symbols. 
The mutual information between two discreet random variables    m that are jointly distributed 
according to        is given by Equation 7.29 [189] 
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    (7.29) 
The mutual information that is in common to both   and  . The marginal for the mutual information 
for a discreet signal can be found via normalising a 2d histogram and summing over the other 
variable. A distance measure can be formed via:  
         
 
      
                            (7.30) 
A sample signal was generated at random to aid in the metric decision making process for this case. 
For the Petri nets in the examples presented in the latter parts of this chapter, the signal from each 
Petri net is expected to follow a behaviour with some variation and a maximum value of one. To 
mimic this, the sample reference used in this analysis were formed of uniform random numbers 
between zero and one. This signal is referred to as ref in Figure 7.3. 
To test the metric choice in a controlled manner the following sample signals were generated for 
comparison with the reference signal: 
 Signal cp1: An exact copy of the reference signal 
 Signal cp2: An exact copy of the reference signal with one value altered 
 Signal cp3: An exact copy of the reference signal with three values altered 
 Signal cp4: A copy of the reference signal with a 1 unit time lag 
 Signal cp5: A copy of the reference signal for 0 to 20 time units followed by a randomly 
generated signal from 20 to 40 time units.  
 Signal cp6: A randomly generated signal 
Figure 7.3 gives a plot of these signals, cp1 through to cp6, in comparison to the reference signal.  
Following this eleven different metric choices were used to compare the signals. The metric value for 
each of the signals is given in Figure 7.4  and Figure 7.5, with the Euclidian distance provided as a 
comparison measure in each case. There are some differences that can be seen in the results. Firstly, 
there is a difference in the way that the metrics judge the similarity of signal cp4 to the reference 
signal. In most cases signal cp4 is judged to be further from the reference signal than signal cp5 and 
for some of these cases the difference is large. For this application, a large bias against signals with a 
time lag is detrimental to the parameter fitting. This is because in the Petri net application, with a 
small interval between signal entries, a lag of a low number of steps causes minimal change to the 
output. The metric choice should reflect this. Secondly, for some of the metrics there is some 
difficulty distinguishing between the similarity of Signals cp1, cp2 and cp3 to the reference signal. 
And, for some of these metrics the distance between signal cp1 and the reference signal does not 
become zero. For the application in this chapter the metric must be able to distinguish between the 
closer signals to enable accurate parameter fitting in the latter stages. From this analysis a metric 













Figure 7.5: Metric test for sample signals (part II) 
There is a wide choice of measures that can be used in this methodology in order to update the 
parameters of a reduced Petri net model. For the specific models a sample signal can be generated in 
order to form this sort of high level analysis of the possible distance measures in order to narrow 
down the range of options. Once a metric has been identified as a possibility the algorithm must be 
completed to test the feasibility of that metric choice. If the metric is unsuitable resulting in a poor 







7.5.1 Example 1 
A simple application of the reduction method is given in this section. For this first example, Figure 
7.6 gives the reference Petri net,   on the left hand side and the reduced Petri net,   on the right 
hand side. 
 
The reference Petri net represents the failure of a repairable component with three states: the working 
state represented by   , an intermediate poor state that is repaired if inspection of the component 
reveals the state, represented by   , and a third revealed failed state, represented by   . Ageing of the 
component resulting in these states is represented by transitions    and   , repair of the components is 
represented by transitions    and   , and inspection of the component by transitions    and   . This 
resembles a simplified model in comparison to models in previous chapters of this thesis. More 
complex examples follow this one. 
 
Figure 7.6: The reference Petri net (left hand side) and the reduced Petri net (right had side) for the first example 
 
In the reduced Petri net model, the inspection loop is incorporated into the transition     , with     
representing the working state,    , representing the intermediate poor state and     representing the 
revealed failed state. The reduced model comes with a compromise of loss of information but more 
efficient simulation. Transitions     and     represent the repair of the component from the 
intermediate and failed states respectively. The transitions in both Petri nets are governed by normal 
distributions with the parameters           . The parameters governing the transition times in the 
reference Petri net are given in Table 7.1. 
 
Transition Distribution       
t1 Normal 20 2 
t2 Normal 10 2 
t3 Normal 2 0.5 
t4 Normal 1 0.5 
t5 Normal 0.5 0.0001 
t6 Normal 2 0.5 
Table 7.1: The initial distributions for the reference Petri net in Figure 7.5 
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Places    and     were chosen as the comparison places in this example. They contain the 
corresponding information on the intermediate state of the system. The Centroid Linkage was chosen 
as the basis of a summary statistic, as it provides a good reduction in the prior distribution with each 
level of the ABC-SubSim algorithm. The Centroid Linkage is given in Equation 7.26.  
 
The metric used in the ABC-SubSim algorithm is chosen to minimise the a function based on the 
Centroid Linkage, the metric,  , is given in Equation 7.31 where    is the Centroid Linkage found 
with Equation 7.26. 
 
      
 
        (7.31) 
 
In this example, the mean of the distributions for     and    ,    and    , in the reduced Petri net, 
were chosen for the parameter fitting. Multiple parameter combinations were tested, with these values 
giving demonstrating the highest impact on the model outputs. During the parameter fitting process, 
the remaining parameters in the reduced model were kept consistent with the parameters in the 
reference model: the parameters governing transitions      and    , were the same as those governing 
transitions     and   , and the standard deviations of transitions     and     were kept consistent with 
those of transitions    and   . The methodology can be extended to update all parameters in the 
reduced model, at an increased computational complexity. This was deemed unnecessary for this 
example, due to the strong approximation obtained when updating two parameters only. 
 
A prior region was defined for each of the parameters that were updated,    and    , as a uniform 
distribution in two dimensions varying from zero, non-inclusive, to twice the mean value of the 
normal distribution assigned to the corresponding transition in the reference Petri net. For example, 
for the parameter    , the prior region existed in the range        , where    is the mean of transition 
t1. For the parameter    , the prior region existed in the range        , where    is the mean of 
transition t3. Within this prior region 2000 seed values were generated. Within each level of the ABC-
SubSim algorithm, each seed values is evolved via a proposal pdf. This proposal pdf can be chosen 
adaptively for each level of the algorithm in order to gain a suitable acceptance rate.   
 





In order to evolve parameters within this method, two proposal pdfs are required. One of these 
evolves the solution in the direction of the first parameter and one evolves the solution in the direction 
of the second parameter. A Gaussian distribution, with a mean of zero, was chosen for each proposal 
pdf. This allows new solutions to be generated at varying distances from the current solution, in two 
parameter dimensions. In order to achieve an acceptable level of convergence, it is expected that the 
standard deviation of each of these Gaussians will be somewhat proportional to the magnitude of the 
parameter direction it is associated with. For example, in the direction of a parameter with a larger 
value and hence a larger prior region, a larger variation in the step size used to explore the region will 
be required. Under this assumption, various proposal pdfs were tested. Here, each proposed standard 
deviation for both Gaussians was defined relative to the central point of the prior region for each 
parameter. The proportion of this central point was varied and the impact of this on the acceptance 
rate of proposed solutions was tested.  
 
Figure 7.7 gives the graph used to inform the choice of the standard deviation of the Gaussian 
distribution used for the proposal pdfs at each level of the ABC-SubSim algorithm. In this graph,    is 
the acceptance rate of evolved parameters, for Gaussian distributions, centred on zero, with different 
standard deviations,   . At each level of the algorithm, an acceptance rate of approximately 0.2, and 
above 0.1, should give optimal convergence to the posterior region.   
 
It can be seen that for the proposal pdfs in this example, the acceptance rate reduces as the ABC-
SubSim level increases. This corresponds to the condensing of the parameter space to the posterior 
region. If the standard deviation of the proposal pdf is too large, many of the evolved parameters in 
the Markov Chain are rejected, resulting in a low acceptance rate, a lack of exploration of the 
parameter space and a poor convergence to the posterior region. Likewise, if the standard deviation is 
too small, too many of the evolved parameters are accepted resulting in a high acceptance rate, but the 
evolved parameters are close to the seed values, again resulting in a lack of exploration of the 
parameter space and a poor convergence to the posterior region. 
 
From the analysis presented in Figure 7.7, with the view of adaptively choosing the posterior pdf in 
order to give a reasonable acceptance rate for each level of the algorithm, the following proposal pdfs 
were chosen to evolve the parameters at each level of the ABC-SubSim algorithm: 
 At level 1 of the ABC-SubSim algorithm Gaussian distributions with parameters       
      were selected. 
 At level 2 of the ABC-SubSim algorithm Gaussian distributions with parameters       
       were selected. 
 At level 3 of the ABC-SubSim algorithm Gaussian distributions with parameters       
      were selected. 
 At level 4 of the ABC-SubSim algorithm Gaussian distributions with parameters       
      were selected. 
 
Where   is the midpoint of the prior region for each parameter, which is the mean of transition t1 in 
the reference Petri net,   , for the first updated parameter and the mean of transition t3 in the 
reference Petri net,   , for the second updated parameter. These Gaussian pdfs evolve each parameter 
within each Markov chain, allowing each evolved parameter to step away from the current location. 
This adaptive choice of the proposal pdfs allows larger steps to be taken at the initial stages for more 
effective exploration of the solution space, with smaller steps taken as the region condenses to the 
posterior region.   
 
Figure 7.8 shows the step-wise reduction in the two-dimensional parameter space to give the posterior 
region at each level of the ABC-SubSim algorithm, from the prior region which is enclosed by the 
dotted lines. Here,    is the parameter corresponding to the mean of the distribution assigned to 
transition t’1 in the reduced Petri net and    is the mean of the distribution assigned to transition t’3 in 
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the reduced Petri net. This results in a posterior region from which the value of both parameters can 
be selected such that the output of the reduced Petri net most closely matches the output of the 
reference Petri net.  
 
In this figure, each of the seed values used in the ABC-SubSim algorithm, at any of the levels, is 
represented by a circular mark. Initially, these seeds are spread evenly through the region enclosed by 
the dotted lines. This prior distribution is not shown here, to improve clarity in the figure. At each 
level of the parameter updating ABC-SubSim algorithm, the parameters that allow the reduced Petri 
net to most closely recreate the behaviour of the reference Petri net are discovered, and form seed 
values for the next level of the algorithm. The figure shows each updated seed value at each level of 
the algorithm. After Level 4 there was limited reduction in the region that held the seed values, 
suggesting that the seed values at the 4
th
 level of the algorithm lie within the most accurate posterior 
region discoverable by this approach. The figure shows the reduction of the region that contains the 
most suitable parameter values, to a condensed region containing the updated parameter values. These 




Figure 7.8: Stepwise posterior reduction 
Figure 7.9 shows a plot of the signal output from the reference Petri net along with the average signal 
output generated from the reduced Petri net, with pairwise parameter values found in the posterior 
region of the 4th level of the ABC-SubSim algorithm. These pairs of parameter values correspond to 
the darkest circular marks taken from Figure 7.8, and are used to complete the set of input parameters 
for simulation of the reduced Petri net. This figure shows how the marking of Place P2 for the 
reference model changes with time, where the time period of interest for simulation of the model is on 
the x-axis and the probability that Place P2 is marked is on the y-axis. The figure also shows how the 
marking of Place P’2 of the reduced Petri net model changes, with the time period of interest for 
simulation of the model, where the input parameters used for the reduced model are those in the 
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discovered posterior region and the fixed values described at the beginning of this example. All 
parameter pairs from the discovered posterior region are used as input to the reduced model, a 
simulation in each case is completed, and the average output was taken. This was done to give a 
robust representation of the discovered posterior region. The figure demonstrates a close 
approximation of the outputs gained by the reduced model, with updated parameters, to the outputs 




Figure 7.9: A signal plot for the reference Model and the reduced model 
The above figure suggests that, in this simple case, the reduced model could be used to replace the 
reference model, with limited impact on the model outputs. The reference Petri net completed 2000 
simulations in 64.432s and the reduced Petri net completed 2000 simulations in 6.603s. If the reduced 
model were to be used instead of the reference model, this gives a reduction in computational time of 
just under 90%. The signal outputs from the reduced Petri net, with input parameters in the discovered 
posterior region, are all within a tolerance of 0.168 in comparison the output from the reference Petri 
net, when measured via the metric, based on the Centroid Linkage, given in Equation 7.31. This 
demonstrates the ability of this methodology to reduce the computational time of Petri net models 
whilst reproducing the desired signal outputs.  
 
7.5.2: Example 2 
For the second example application, a larger Petri net model was chosen as the reference model. This 
is given in Figure 7.10. This reference Petri net model represents a component with states moving 
from the working state, through two intermediate states, and finally resulting in a failure. The failure 
can be revealed or unrevealed and there is a probability associated with each. There is an inspection 
loop to identify any unrevealed failures of the component and once a failure has occurred then repair 
of the component is scheduled immediately. When the component is in an intermediate state, repair is 
scheduled following a delay which incorporates the time taken for the state to be identified and the 
usual wait time for intervention for the component in that condition. For repairs of the component in 
the first intermediate state, the maintenance action can be enabled if early replacement of the 
component is activated. In this Petri net, maintenance returns the component to the working state. 




Figure 7.10: The reference Petri net for the second application 
In the reference Petri net, Place    represents the working state of the component, place    represents 
the first intermediate state of the component, place    represents the second, and more severe, 
intermediate state of the component and place    represents a failed state of the component. Place    
represents an unrevealed failed state of the component and place    represents a revealed state of the 
component. Places   ,    and    represent an active inspection action, the delay between inspections 
and the number of completed inspection actions respectively. Place    represents a scheduled 
maintenance action and place    counts the number of competed maintenance actions. Place     
represents the availability of resources for the maintenance action and place     allows early 
replacement to occur if it is marked by a token. The distributions governing the transition firing times 
and any associated parameter values used in this illustrative model are given in Table 7.2. 
Transition Distribution       p1 1-p1 
t1 Normal 40 10   
t2 Normal 10 2   
t3 Normal  2 0.5   
t4 Probability   0.5 0.5 
t5 Immediate     
t6 Normal 1 0.25   
t7 Normal 5 0.5   
t8 Normal 5 0.5   
t9 Normal 1 0.001   
t10 Immediate     
t11 Normal 1 0.5   
Table 7.2: A table giving the distribution of firing times for each transition in the reference Petri net in Figure 7.9, and any 
associated parameter values 
The reduced model is given in Figure 7.12. Different model structures of the reduced model were 
tested prior to the selection of this reduced structure, reduced Petri nets of a smaller size resulted in 
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weaker approximations of the reference Petri net. The methodology presented in this chapter is a 
trade-off between higher levels of reductions in model structure, which results in a weaker 
approximation of the reference Petri net, and the improved computational time that comes with the 
reduction of the model size. In order to test different model structures the initial requirements of the 
reduced Petri net were first defined as follows:  
 The reduced model must contain a working state 
 The reduced model must contain an unrevealed failed and an associated repair action  
 The reduced model must have some maintenance preventing an unrevealed failure 
 
In order to arrive at a suitable structure, a highly reduced structure was tested first. The structure of 
this model is given in Figure 7.11 and is the same reduced structure as that in Example 1 of this 
chapter. The Petri net given here has three places, corresponding to a working state, P’1, a state 
encompassing any revealed failures or revealed degraded states, P’2, and an unrevealed failed state, 
P’3. There are two transitions governing the degradation and failure, t’1 and t’2, and two transitions 
representing repair, t’3 and t’4. Even for updated parameters, this model structure showed a poor 
approximation to the reference model structure.  
 
Figure 7.11: The most reduced Petri net structure, to fit defined initial requirements 
 
As an improvement to the smallest model structure, given in Figure 7.11, a failed state encompassing 
both the revealed failed and unrevealed failed states was added to the Petri net structure, along with a 
transition to split this state into revealed and unrevealed failed sates, each with an associated 
maintenance action. This improved structure is given in Figure 7.12. The parameter updating 
methodology was applied to this structure, and with updated parameters, showed a comparatively 
better approximation to the reference Petri net model than the smallest model structure. This structure 
was chosen in this case as it gives a better approximation to the reference model, and the results are 
presented here. A further option is to add additional places and transitions to the reduced model, to 
give a more accurate approximation, however this increases the computational cost. Further work is 
presented in later examples on the comparison of different model structures. 
 
 
Figure 7.12: The reduced Petri net for the second application 
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In the reduced Petri net, in Figure 7.12, one of the intermediate states has been absorbed. Here,     
represents a working state of the component,     represents and intermediate state of the component 
and     represents a failed state of the component.     represents an unrevealed failed state of the 
component and in the reduced Petri net the inspection of this state is incorporated into transition    , 
which represents maintenance of a component following an unrevealed failure. Similarly, 
    represents a revealed state of the component with the transition     relating to repair of the 
component following a revealed failure. All maintenance of the component prior to failure is 
incorporated into transition      As with the reference Petri net, the maintenance of the component 
returns it to the working state. 
 
The response signal chosen as the basis for the reduction methodology was the marking sequence of 
place    in the reference Petri net and the corresponding place,    , in the reduced Petri net. This 
state, in both Petri nets, corresponds to an unrevealed failure of the component. In order to gain the 
response signal of the reduced Petri net for each proposed parameter set, a Monte Carlo simulation of 
the reduced Petri net was completed, 1000 time-steps were taken and 1000 runs of the Monte Carlo 
simulation were completed. The average marking of the place    , was then found for each time-step.  
 
Various parameters were tested for updating in the reduced model, to consider their impact on the 
accuracy of the reduced model to approximate the reference model. The standard deviations of the 
distributions governing each transition had limited impact on the model outputs. In addition, the 
transitions with shorter mean values, t’5 and t’6, had limited impact on the model outputs. Since 
transition t’1 and transition t’3 encompass much of the reduced structure from the reference Petri net, 
the mean values of the parameters governing these transitions,     and     , were selected for 
parameter updating. The standard deviations of the distributions governing these transitions was set to 
            and             , such that the parameters that are not updated in the reduced 
Petri net reflect those of places with a similar logic in the reference Petri net. The parameters in 
transitions t’5 and t’6 were fixed to the same value as those governing transition t11 in the reference 
model. The parameters in transition t’2 were set to the same value as those governing transition t3 in 
the reference model. The parameters governing transition t’4 were set to the same value as those 
governing transition t4 in the reference model. 
 
It is possible to update more parameters for transitions in the reduced Petri net, however this increases 
the computational cost required to find the posterior region in the parameter space. There is a trade-off 
between the increased computational cost to find the posterior region and the improvement in the 
approximation made by the reduced Petri net with a higher number of updated parameters. This is 
explored further in later examples in this Chapter. 
 
As in the first example, the metric based on the Centroid Linkage, given in Equation 7.31, was used as 
the summary statistic in the ABC-SubSim algorithm, as it demonstrated that it enabled a good 
convergence of the proposed parameters to the posterior region. The prior region was defined in the 
parameter space as zero, non-inclusive, to twice the largest mean of a similar transition in the 
reference Petri net,   . In this example the mean of the transition    was used for     
  and the mean 
of transition    was used for     
 . Hence the prior region was defined as:               
      
       
  . Similarly to the first example, 2000 seed values were used in the methodology and 
initially these values were sampled uniformly from the prior parameter space. Each seed value 
consists of a pair of parameters, which are then evolved through the ABC-SubSim algorithm, to 
explore the parameter space, in order to discover the parameters that allow the reduced Petri net to 






Figure 7.13: Testing different proposal pdfs for each of the ABC-SubSim levels 
As with the first example, Gaussian distributions, with a mean of zero, were selected as the proposal 
pdfs for the evolution of the seed values in the Markov Chains in the ABC-SubSim algorithm. A 
Gaussian with a mean of zero is a valid choice for parameter proposal within the Markov chains, as it 
is a symmetric function that allows solutions to be proposed with varying closeness to the current 
accepted solution. The updating of two parameters was completed, and hence two proposal pdf were 
required, one to evolve each entry in the Markov chain in the direction of the first parameter and one 
to evolve each entry in the direction of the second parameter. The standard deviations of each 
Gaussian can be optimised to improve convergence to the posterior parameter region.  
 
In this example, various standard deviations of these Gaussian distributions were tested. This allowed 
the adaptive selection of the proposal pdf with each level of the ABC-SubSim algorithm. The standard 
deviations were varied for each proposal pdf such that each standard deviation tested was proportional 
to the magnitude of the parameter in the direction that it evolves the seed values. In the same way as 
the analysis was completed in the first example, Figure 7.13 shows the changes in the acceptance 
rates,   , of proposed parameters with the ABC-SubSim level, for Gaussian distributions with 
different standard deviations,   .  
 
Looking for proposal pdfs that result in an acceptance rate of approximately 0.2, resulted in the 
following selection of the proposal pdfs for each level of the ABC-SubSim algorithm: 
 At level 1 of the ABC-SubSim algorithm Gaussian distribution were selected to evolve each 
of the two parameters, with              . 
 At level 2 of the ABC-SubSim algorithm Gaussian distribution were selected to evolve each 
of the two parameters, with              . 
 At level 3 of the ABC-SubSim algorithm Gaussian distribution were selected to evolve each 
of the two parameters with              . 
 At level 4 of the ABC-SubSim algorithm Gaussian distribution were selected to evolve each 
of the two parameters with               . 
Where      is the midpoint of the prior region for each parameter: the mean of the distribution 
governing transition    was used for     
  and the mean of the distribution governing transition    was 





Figure 7.14 shows the step-wise reduction of the seed values at each level of the ABC-SubSim 
algorithm, until they condense to the posterior region. The axis show the parameter space in two 
dimensions, with the x-axis showing the parameter space for the mean of transition t’1 and the y-axis 
showing the parameter space for the mean of transition t’3. The prior region in the parameter space is 
outlined with a dotted line. With each level of the algorithm it can be seen that the seed values evolve 
towards a region in the bottom left of the figure. After Level 4 of the algorithm there was limited 
change to the seed values, with almost all of the proposed parameters rejected. This suggests that the 
region has condensed to the true posterior region, with the applied framework, and no further 
improvements can be found via the parameter updating process.  
 
Figure 7.14: The stepwise reduction of the posterior parameter region with each level of the ABC-SubSim algorithm 
 
Figure 7.15 shows the average signal response of the parameters in the posterior region for the 
reduced Petri net in comparison to the signal response from the reference Petri net. This is the 
evolution of the marking of the place in both Petri nets that represents an unrevealed failure of the 
component. For the summary statistic used, the tolerance of the posterior region at the 4th level of the 
ABC-SubSim algorithm was 0.083. This means that every pairwise parameter solution within the 
posterior region results in a reduced model output that is within a metric value of 0.083 of the 
reference model output, when measured by the metric value given in Equation 7.31. Initially there is 
some deviation of the reduced Petri net response signal from the reference Petri net response signal. 
However, following this initial period of instability the approximation made by the reduced Petri net 
levels to a position that is a small margin above the signal from the reference Petri net. A notable 
difference between this example and the first is that the marking of the place used to generate the 
response signals in this case is far less frequent. This results in a larger number of Monte Carlo runs 
required to gain convergence for the response signal. Consequently, there is a poorer matching of 
response signals across the reference Petri net and reduced Petri net as a limited number of runs were 
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carried out. In addition to this, there is an increased level of model simplification in this example 
resulting in a higher level of approximation made with the reduced Petri net.  
 
 
Figure 7.15: The signal response of the reduced Petri net model in comparison to the reference Petri net model 
In this example, the reference Petri net has a simulation time of 66.482s for a Monte Carlo simulation 
with 2000 runs, the reduced Petri net has a simulation time of 20.984s for 2000 runs. This represents a 
68% reduction in the computational time. 
 
7.5.3: Example 3 
This example implements the reduction methodology to improve the efficiency of optimisation of the 
reference Petri net model. This is done to demonstrate a use-case of the methodology, whereby a 
reduced model structure can replace the full model structure, in order to approximate the solution. In 
this approach, the reduced model structure is used to approximate the solution space in the early 
stages of the optimisation, followed by an optimisation of the reference model in the final stages. In 
the latter, the approximate solution space is used as a basis of the optimisation; this reduces the 
computational effort of the optimisation of the larger reference model since a smaller solution space is 
explored. This example also applies the updating procedure to parameters governing a Weibull 
distribution in the reduced Petri net structure, to demonstrate the flexibility of the approach whereby 
different distributions can be used within the reduced and reference model structures. 
The optimisation methodology implemented here uses the following steps, as set out in the conference 
paper related to this work [190]:  
 
1. Define the key outputs of the reference Petri net for comparison with a proposed reduced 
structure, 
2. Define the reduced model structure, 
3. Identify parameters in the reduced model structure for updating, 
4. Update parameters, 
5. Validate the reduced structure by comparing the reduced model outputs to the outputs for the 
reference Petri net, 
6. Find the approximate optimal solution space using the reduced model structure, 
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7. Find the optimal solution space for the reference Petri net by searching a reduced solution 
space based on the approximate optimal solution found in the previous step. 
Central to this reduction method is the definition of key model outputs that are present in both the 
reference and reduced model structures. For this methodology to be applied, the reduced Petri net 
must have at least: 
 
 The capacity to reproduce the key output, or outputs, of the reference Petri net; 
 The capacity to incorporate the behaviours requiring optimisation. 
A Genetic Algorithm was implemented to find the optimal solutions for the maintenance and 
inspection intervals of a component in order to reduce the probability that the component is in the 
unrevealed failed state. This follows the Genetic Algorithm methodology detailed in Chapter 6. A 
Genetic Algorithm was selected to demonstrate this approach as it allows an initial definition of the 
search space, through the assignment of the first parents in the algorithm.  
In this optimisation approach, the reduced model forms part of an intermediate step when finding the 
optimal solution. Initially, an optimal solution space is found for the reduced Petri net, by completing 
a number of generations of a Genetic Algorithm. The second step of the optimisation approach is to 
define a region encompassing these solutions to give an approximate solution space for the reference 
model. The third step is to use the approximate solution space as the initial population of a Genetic 
Algorithm, and to apply a low number of generations of the algorithm to the reference Petri net to 
gain the optimal solution space. In summary, the optimisation process is mostly performed on a 
smaller, more efficient model, with the larger model reintroduced in the latter stages to fine-tune the 
solutions.  
 
There are two further decisions to be made when implementing this approach, in addition to those 
required when applying a Genetic Algorithm: 
 Firstly, the number of generations that are applied to the reduced Petri net before re-
introducing the reference Petri net must be decided; 
 Secondly, the definition of the approximate solution space, given the population obtained 
from the reduced Petri net optimisation, must be defined.  
These decisions are problem-dependent and more research should be completed to produce an 
automated approach for this. It is recommended that the number of generations applied to the reduced 
Petri net is sufficient to see a good level of convergence in the solutions, so that the search space can 
be adequately reduced. It is also recommended that the optimal solution space uniformly covers all 
values gained from the reduced Petri net optimisation, with some values outside of this range. This is 
recommended to allow the algorithm to explore the approximate space and to check for values 
outside, but close to, the values found from the reduced Petri net optimisation.  
Within this methodology, the assumption is made that the optimal solutions from the reduced Petri net 
will approximate the optimal solutions for the reference Petri net. 
Figure 7.16 gives the reference Petri net used in this example. In this Petri net, place P1 corresponds to 
the working state of the component and place P4 corresponds to the failed state of the component. 
There are two pathways that can result in a failure, firstly through the age of the component modelled 
by transitions t1, t2 and t3, and secondly through a randomly occurring failure modelled by transitions 
t1 and t5. Place P6 corresponds to a revealed failure and place P7 corresponds to a scheduled 
maintenance action, either due to a revealed failure, or the age of the component, represented by 
transitions t6 and t8 respectively. Place P8 counts the number of maintenance actions. 
 
The shaded regions cover the areas of the model that were reduced, and place P4 is emphasised as its 




Figure 7.16: The reference Petri net to illustrate a combined reduction and optimisation approach 
The optimisation problem for this Petri net aims to reduce the time that the component is in the 
unrevealed failed state by finding the optimal inspection and age-based maintenance intervals for the 
component, within a given cost constraint. This corresponds to reducing the time that place P4 is 
marked, representing the unrevealed failed state, by altering the parameter values of the distributions 
governing transitions t4 for the inspection interval and t8 for the age-based maintenance.  
Figure 7.17 gives the reduced Petri net structure implemented in this example. Here, place P'1 
corresponds to the working state of the component and place P'2 corresponds to the unrevealed failed 
state of the component. Place P'3 corresponds to the revealed failed state of the component and place 
P'4 counts the number of maintenance actions, either due to a revealed failure or the age of the 
component. Transition t'4 represents periodic age-based maintenance. Place P'2 corresponds to the 
unrevealed failed state of the component represented by place P4 in the reference Petri net model. 
The shaded areas in the reduced Petri net correspond to the shaded areas in the reference Petri net and 
highlight the following reductions: 
 
 The intermediate states of the component that lie between the working and failed states are 
absorbed into the single transition t'1; 
 The maintenance scheduling delay on failure is assumed to be much less than the inspection 
interval and so this delay, and the state corresponding to scheduled maintenance, are absorbed 
into the place P'3 to represent a state where failure is revealed and maintenance is scheduled.  
 
 
Figure 7.17: The reduced Petri net used to show the combined reduction and optimisation methodology 
The parameters governing the transition t'1 were updated. A 2-parameter Weibull distribution was 
assigned to this transition. As with the other examples in this chapter, the ABC-SubSim algorithm was 
implemented to find the region in the parameter space where the parameters governing this Weibull 
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distribution resulted in the most similar reduced model output to that of the reference Petri net. The 
following parameter values were used as input to the reference model in this example: 
 
Transition Distribution Parameters 
t1 Normal        7 
t2 Normal          
t3 Normal         
t4 Interval (Global)     
t5 Uniform          
t6 Normal           
t7 Normal         0.01 
t8 Normal           
 
In addition, the following parameters were assumed in the reduced model, where the updating of the 
two parameters that govern the firing rate of  transition t'1 was completed under these assumed values, 
for the rest of the parameters in the model: 
 
Transition Distribution Parameters 
t’1 2-Parameter Weibull           
t’2 Interval (Global)     
t’3 Normal            
t’4 Normal           
 
The output used here for governing the similarity of the models was the marking of the place 
corresponding to an unrevealed failure in both Petri nets. In this case, the centroid linkage was used as 
the summary statistic, as with the previous examples in this chapter. The metric value used for 
updating the parameters was the squared sum of the centroid linkage, for the marking of this place at 
each time. Four levels of the ABC-SubSim algorithm were applied to update the parameters from a 
uniform prior region.  
 
Figure 7.18 shows the reduction of the posterior parameter region with each level of the parameter 
updating process, where the prior region is enclosed in the dotted lines and each of the circles 
represents the pair of parameter values within the estimated posterior region. The evolution of the 
parameters within each level was chosen adaptively to maximise convergence to the posterior region, 
as with the previous examples in this chapter. With repeated further levels of the algorithm, there was 
limited reduction in the posterior region, showing that after a point the approximation made by the 




Figure 7.18: The reduction of the parameters in the population to the posterior region 
The updated parameter values, which resulted in the lowest metric value and hence the closest 
approximation, were           and        , where transition t’1 follows a 2-Parameter Weibull 
distribution with          . Figure 7.19 gives the average marking over time of place P4 for the 
reference Petri net and place P’2 for the reduced Petri net, with the updated parameter values supplied 
to the reduced Petri net. Across the two nets, these places have the same representation: when marked, 
the component is in the unrevealed failed state. This signal can be interpreted as the probability that 
the component is in the unrevealed failed state as time progresses. The models show a good level of 
agreement.  
 
Figure 7.19: The model output, representing the probability that the component is in the unrevealed failed state, over time,  
for the reference and reduced Petri net models. 
A Genetic Algorithm was applied to the Petri nets presented in this example. For comparison, the 
algorithm was applied to both the reference Petri net and the reduced Petri net in isolation. Finally, the 
Genetic Algorithm was applied across both Petri nets using the two-stage approach.  
 
In this example, the Genetic Algorithm had a population of 100 vectors and a mutation rate of 1 in 
100. The initial population of 100 vectors was defined for parameter values where entries ranged from 
1 to 100. For example, the first member of the population was a vector where all entries had the value 
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1 and for the last population member, all entries had the value of 100. For the reference Petri net in 
isolation and the reduced Petri net in isolation, eight generations of the Genetic Algorithm were 
completed. For the two-stage approach, five levels of the Genetic Algorithm were completed for the 
reduced Petri net to find the approximate solution space. Following this, three levels of the Genetic 
Algorithm were applied to the reference Petri net using the approximate solution space as the initial 
population. The selection operator was weighted such that the fittest individuals in each population 
had a higher probability of selection. 
 
An arbitrary cost was assigned to each of the inspection and maintenance actions and this was 
constrained to within 1000 units over the time period in question. The time that the component was in 
an unrevealed failed state was minimised subject to this constraint. 
 
The approximate solution space was found by taking the maximum and minimum value of each 
variable in the population that resulted at the 5th generation of the Genetic Algorithm for the reduced 
Petri net. The maximum and minimum values for each variable were found along with the difference 
between these. The approximate solution space, for this case, is defined by the region given by 
Equation 7.32 and Equation 7.33 for the two variables    and   . 
 
      
      
           (7.32) 
 
  
             
             (7.33) 
where   
    is the maximum value for parameter  , and   
    is the minimum value for 
parameter  , as found in the 5th generation of the Genetic Algorithm optimisation of the 
reduced Petri net, for values of             
 
The results for this two-level optimisation are given in Figure 7.20 for the optimal inspection interval 
and age-based maintenance interval. Each mark within the generation represents the parameter value 
of the individual population member, with the horizontal bar representing the mean value of the 
population for the variable in question. The mean of the population for the optimisation applied to the 
reference Petri net in isolation was 9.21 time units and 9.03 time units for the inspection and 
maintenance intervals, respectively. The mean of the population for the optimisation applied to the 
reduced Petri net in isolation was 11.00 time units for the inspection interval and 11.00 time units for 
the maintenance interval. The mean of the population for the two-level approach was 8.87 time units 





Figure 7.20: Results from the two-level optimisation where the reduced Petri net is used for the first 5 generations, and then 
substituted to the reference Petri net in the final three generations. 
It is notable that the reduced Petri net gives solutions that are close to the reference Petri net, and that 
for some modelling scenarios it may be suitable to solely take the optimal values from the reduced 
Petri net. However, the reduced Petri net may not closely reproduce the time that the component is in 
the failed state given the parameter changes to the system. This is due to dependencies within the 
model that are absorbed during the parameter fitting process. To clarify, the reduced Petri net may be 
sufficient to mimic trends in the behaviour of the reference Petri net for different parameter values, to 
enable an approximation to be made in an optimisation process, but may not be able to reproduce 
exactly the key model outputs when parameters are changed within the model.  
Figure 7.21 gives the time for the optimisation procedure for both the reference model in isolation, the 
reduced model in isolation and the two-level optimisation combining both the reduced and reference 
models. In this example, a reduction in the computational cost of the optimisation procedure can be 
seen, however this is offset in practical application by the time required to update the model 






Figure 7.21: The time for the optimisation of the reduced model in isolation, the reference model in isolation and for the 
two-level optimisation combining both the reference and reduced models. 
This example has demonstrated a potential application of the reduction methodology, in order to 
extend the Genetic Algorithm approach by implementing a reduced model structure as an intermediate 
step. This demonstrates a benefit of the methodology, where a reduced structure can be used as an 
approximation of the full structure, in order to reduce the computational cost of optimisation of the 
model. There are three drawbacks of this method, though. Firstly, the computational cost of fitting the 
parameters in the reduced model is high. Secondly, the success of the method is highly dependent on 
the assumption that the reduced structure closely approximates the reference model structure. Thirdly, 
a choice must be made on the number and location of parameters to be updated in the reduced model 
structure. The computational cost of fitting and simulation, with a variety of model structures and 
updated parameter choices, is explored more fully in the following example. 
7.5.4: Example 4 
In this example, a larger reference model is considered. The reference model has two components, 
with one component operating as a backup to the other. The model considers the condition, inspection 
and maintenance of each component, and the overall system state. This example further explores the 
benefits and limitations of the reduction methodology. To accomplish this, four different reduced 
model structures are implemented to explore their suitability and demonstrate the capability of the 
modelling approach to rank reduced model structures. In addition, the example explores the impact of 
different choices of which parameters to update. In this example, the reference model is presented 
first. Following this, a description of each of the reduced model structures, and their corresponding 
results, are presented. Next, a comparison of the reduced model structures is presented. Finally, an 
example is presented where different model parameters have been updated. The method proposed in 
this chapter is discussed throughout. 
Figure 7.22 gives the reference model for this example. The reference Petri net represents a system 
with two repairable components, one of which is in back-up. The system fails if both components are 
in the failed state. The area at the top of the figure, shaded in light grey, governs the overall system 
state. Here, place P1 corresponds to the working state of the system. Place P2 corresponds to the 
failed state of the system. 
In this reference model, the first component is modelled by the dark-grey shaded region on the left-
hand side. This is a repairable component that has an unrevealed failure. Inspection of the component 
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is modelled, and it is assumed that this can discover a failure, or a degraded component state. 
Maintenance is modelled for each of these states. In this part of the model, place P3 represents a good 
working state of the component, place P4 represents a degraded state and place P5 represents a failed 
state. When place P9 is marked then inspection is enabled, and when place P8 is marked, inspection 
of the component is underway. Place P7 is marked when a degraded component state is discovered, 
and maintenance is requested.  When Place P6 is marked then there is a discovered failure of the 
component and maintenance is requested. 
The second component is modelled by the region shaded in mid-grey on the right-hand side. This is a 
repairable component that has a revealed failure. Inspection is also modelled for this component and it 
can reveal a degraded state of the component. Maintenance of the component is scheduled if there is a 
revealed failure, or inspection identifies a degraded state of the component. In this part of the model, 
place P10 corresponds to a working state of the component. Place P11 corresponds to a degraded state 
of the component. Place P12 corresponds to a failed state of the component. When place P15 is 
marked then inspection is enabled for this component, and when place P14 is marked then inspection 
is underway. Place P13 is marked when there is a discovered degraded state, and here  maintenance is 
requested for the component.  
The remaining parts of the model govern the maintenance scheduling for the components. For both 
components, maintenance is requested if there is a known failure, or if there is an identified degraded 
state. It is assumed for both components that the maintenance for a degraded state will occur before 
there is a failure of the component. Place P18 and transition t25 model the availability of maintenance 
resources and when place P19 is marked then maintenance is possible. When place P17 is marked 
then maintenance is requested for a component in the system, due to an identified failure in one of the 
components. When P23 is marked then maintenance is available to either, or both, of the components 
to repair a failure. If neither component is in the failed state, then the available maintenance resources 
can be assigned to repair a degraded state; this is modelled by the marking of place P21. When place 
P22 is marked then maintenance to improve a degraded state of either component is enabled. Initially, 




Figure 7.22: The reference model for the fourth example in Chapter 7 
In the remaining work given in this example, different reduced model structures are implemented to 
demonstrate their capability to approximate this reference model. To compare the model outputs, the 
probability that the system is in the failed state was selected as the key model output for model 
comparison. This can be found from this reference model by considering the average marking of place 
P2, for a simulation of the model. The parameters used for each of the models in this example can be 
found in Appendix 6. 
For each proposed reduced model structure, the parameters to update are discussed. This includes a 
definition of the prior region and details which parameters were updated in each case. In each case, a 
uniform prior region is used and 2000 seed values are used in the parameter updating process. 
Varying proposal pdfs were tested for their impact on the acceptance rate and convergence of the 
parameters. A Gaussian distribution with a varying standard deviation at each ABC-SubSim level was 
chosen as it provided a good reduction from the prior region. 
Reduced Model 1 
The first proposed reduced model structure simply considers the overall system behaviour. The Petri 
net in Figure 7.23 gives this reduced model. This is the smallest reduced model structure tested in this 
example. In this model there are two places, one representing the working state of the system, P1, and 
one representing the failed state of the system, P2. Transition t1 governs the time to total system 




Figure 7.23: The first reduced model structure, in example 4 of Chapter 7 
In this reduced model, the output marking of place P2 was used to compare the reduced model output 
to the output of the reference model. This place corresponds to the failed state of the system, which 
holds the same representation as place P2 in the reference model. 
This reduced model structure combines the total behaviour of both components in the system, and 
their maintenance and inspection strategies, to solely provide an estimate of the system state. For this 
model, a normal distribution was assigned to each of the transitions, and the mean of each of the 
distributions was discovered through the parameter inference process. This was completed to gain the 
closest approximation of the output of this reduced model structure to the output of the reference 
model structure. Full parameters used in the models can be found in Appendix 6. 
The values for the mean of each of transition t1 and t2 were updated, from a prior region. The prior 
region varied between [0, 14] for the mean of transition t2, and [0, 200] for the mean of transition t1, 
where the unit of the values is given in months. These prior regions were defined by considering the 
physical interpretation in the reference model, to ensure that the prior region was suitably large to 
contain the parameters governing the system model. For instance, inspection is expected every 6 
months in the reference model, with an approximate delay of 1 month on maintenance, and hence the 
prior was defined as twice this interval. Within each level of the ABC-SubSim algorithm, seed values 
were varied by a Gaussian distribution, such that the acceptance rate for each level remained within 
the optimal range of [0.1, 0.2]. Figure 7.24 shows the seed values at each level of the ABC-SubSim 
algorithm, demonstrating the condensing to a posterior region. Here, the prior region is shown with 
dashed lines. 
 
Figure 7.24: Parameter updating process for the first reduced model in example 4 of Chapter 7 
The values within the posterior region which resulted in the lowest errors were selected. These values 
were 59.2 months for transition t1 and 0.213 months for transition t2. This demonstrates a slow time 
to failure, and a short time between failure and repair, for the system. Since this model summarises 
the behaviour of both components into a single cycle of transitions, the fitting processes assign this 
fast repair time, encompassing the behaviour of the components wherein it is very unlikely for both to 
be in the failed state at the same time.  
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The reduced model was simulated with the updated parameters, and the marking of place P2 was 
recorded. In addition, the reference model was simulated, with the marking of corresponding place P2 
recorded. Figure 7.25 gives the marking of these places, for both the reference and reduced models. 
This corresponds to the probability that the system is in the failed state at each time. For this reduced 
model, the data follows a similar trend. However, on average, the output data from the reduced model 
is lower than the output data from the reference model. There is some fluctuation in the results, which 
is on a similar level for both models.  
 
Figure 7.25: Model outputs for the first reduced model and the reference model, in example 4 of Chapter 7 
At the end of this example, numeric measures of the model fit and simulation time are presented, 
along with the hyperparameters for the updating process. This is provided for each reduced model 
structure. Also, comparisons between different reduced model structures are made.  
Reduced Model 2 
The second reduced model structure tested in this example is given in Figure 7.26. This model 
consists of a separate simple model for each component in the system, combined with three transitions 
that govern the system state. Here, the system state is dependent on the component state. The 
components in the system are in parallel, such that both must be in the failed state for a failure of the 
system to occur. 
In this reduced model structure, place P1 corresponds to the working state of the system. Place P2 
corresponds to the failed state of the system. Transition t1 immediately marks place P2 if both the 
components are in the failed state. Then, if one of the components returns to the working state, the 
marking of place P2 is immediately removed and place P1 is marked. This represents the return of the 
system to the working state and occurs by firing either transition t2 or t3. 
In this reduced structure, each of the component models contains only the working and failed state. 
For each component, there is a transition that governs the time to failure and a transition that governs 
the time to repair.  
The first component is modelled by the places P3 and P4, and transitions t4 and t5. Here, place P3 
corresponds to the working state of the first component and place P4 corresponds to the failed state of 
the first component. The second component is modelled by places P5 and P6, and transitions t6 and 
t7. Here, place P5 corresponds to the working state of the second component and place P6 




Figure 7.26: The second reduced model structure in example 4 of Chapter 7 
In this model, the marking sequence of place P2 over time was selected for comparison between the 
reduced model and the reference model. This place holds the same interpretation as place P2 in the 
reference model, which is the probability that the system is in the failed state. 
In this reduced model structure, it is assumed that repair times for each component are largely 
governed by inspection and testing times. The parameters governing the time to each component 
failure are updated according to this assumption. This is discussed further, with different parameters 
updated, in a further example at the end of this chapter. Normal distributions are assigned to 
transitions t4, t5, t6, and t7, with the mean of transitions t4 and t6 decided within the parameter 
updating process. For transition t5, it is assumed that the repair time of the first component is largely 
dominated by the 6-month inspection interval, combined with the 1-month maintenance scheduling 
interval. For transition t7, it is assumed that the repair time for the second component, with a revealed 
failure, is largely governed by the 1-month maintenance scheduling delay. Transitions t1, t2 and t3 
fire instantaneously if enabled. Full parameter values can be found in Appendix 6. 
A prior region was defined for the mean values of transition t4 and transition t6. The prior region was 
defined to include approximate time to failure for each component. The prior region for transition t4 
was defined uniformly in the range [0, 100]. The prior region for transition t6 was defined uniformly 
in the range [0, 80]. This reflects the failure rates assigned to the reference model. The ABC-SubSim 
algorithm was used to update these parameters, with condensation to a posterior region, following 
four levels of the algorithm. Figure 7.27 demonstrates this. Hyperparameters of the algorithm were 
tuned to improve convergence of the algorithm. Details of this can be found in Table 7.4. The 
posterior region for this reduced structure has some discontinuities, suggesting that certain small 
changes in parameter values give rise to cases that greatly change the output signal. This implies less 




Figure 7.27: The parameter updating process for the second reduced model in example 4 of Chapter 7 
The optimal fitted parameters were extracted from the updated posterior region. For the mean of 
transition t4, this value was 26 months, and for the mean of transition t6, this value was 16 months. 
These values reflect the faster failure rates assigned to the second component in the reference model. 
The reduced model was simulated with the updated parameter values. The probability of system 
failure, for the reference and reduced model, is given in Figure 7.28. Here it can be seen that, on 
average magnitude, the reference model approximates the reference model. However, there are 
periodic peaks in the results of the reduced model, which cannot be seen in the results of the reference 
model. This demonstrates that this reduced model has limited capacity to recreate the behaviour of the 
reference model, under the assumptions applied. 
 
Figure 7.28: The output signals for the second reduced model and the reference model in the fourth example in Chapter 7 
A comparison of the different reduced model structures is provided at the end of this example. Also, a 
further parameter updating process for this model structure is presented, where different assumptions 





Reduced Model 3 
The third reduced model structure is given in Figure 7.29. In this example, the inspection and 
maintenance loops are removed, so that there is intermediate repair of each component and repair 
upon failure. This reduced model has a similar structure to the reduced model structure in Figure 7.26, 
with the transitions and places that govern the overall system state at the top, the transitions and 
places that govern the first component on the lower left hand side and the transitions and places that 
govern the second component on the lower right hand side. In this model, places P1 and P2, and 
transitions t1, t2 and t3, represent the system condition. These places have the same meaning as 
described for the model in Figure 7.26, with place P1 representing the working state of the system and 
place P2 representing the failed state of the system. 
 
Figure 7.29: The third reduced model structure in example 4 of Chapter 7 
In this reduced model, each of the components is modelled with three states: the working state, an 
intermediate degraded state and the failed state. There is a repair action assigned to the intermediate 
degraded state and to the failed state. The working state is modelled by place P3 for the first 
component, and place P6 for the second component. The intermediate degraded state is modelled by 
place P4 for the first component, and place P7 for the second component. The failed state is modelled 
by place P5 for the first component, and place P8 for the second component. Transitions t4 and t5 
model the degradation and failure of the first component. Transitions t6 and t7 model the maintenance 
of the first component, for the degraded and failed state, respectively.  Transitions t8 and t9 model the 
degradation and failure of the second component. Transitions t10 and t11 model the maintenance of 
the second component, for the degraded and failed state, respectively. 
During the parameter updating process, the marking pattern of place P2 in this reduced model was 
compared to the marking pattern of place P2 in the reference model. In both the reference model and 
this reduced model, this marking pattern corresponds to the probability of system failure, at each time. 
In this reduced model, the reduction removes the maintenance and inspection modelling. For this 
reason, the parameters governing the maintenance transitions were selected for updating. Normal 
distributions were assigned to each of t6, t7, t10 and t11, and the mean of each of these distributions 
was discovered through the parameter updating procedure. Transitions t1, t2 and t3 have no associated 
delay time. The distributions that govern firing times for transitions t4, t5, t8 and t9 were set to the 
parameters taken from the reference model, which had the corresponding component state changes. 
Full details of the parameters used can be found in Appendix 6. 
A prior region was defined that contained a dimension for each of the four parameters that were 
selected for the updating process. This prior region was defined uniformly in [0, 20] for the mean of 
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transition t6, uniformly in [0, 40] for the mean of transition t7, [0, 40] for transition t10 and [0, 4] for 
transition t11. Here it is expected that the distribution governing transition t11 will lead to shorter 
repair times, since this part of the reduced model considers the behaviour of the component with the 
revealed failure. 
Figure 7.30 shows the seed values within each level of the ABC-SubSim algorithm, which was used 
to update the parameters. Since all four parameters governing the maintenance transitions were 
updated, an interesting result is seen for the distributions governing the first component maintenance 
transitions, t6 and t7. Here the parameter values condense to a curved posterior region for pairwise 
values in each set of the updated parameters. This shows that where the intermediate repair action 
occurs less frequently (every few months), then the repair on failure occurs quickly. Conversely if the 
intermediate repair occurs within a short time-frame, meaning that the component rarely fails, this 
allows the repair time on a revealed failure to increase. These times may not reflect reality. The 
parameters governing the maintenance transitions for the second component, t10 and t11, largely 
show the reduction of the parameter value governing transition t11. This corresponds to the time to 
repair on failure of the second component. This is in line with expectations: since the failure is 
revealed, maintenance is expected shortly after the failure. 
In this example, we have an extra degree of freedom for each of the component models, where the 
updated parameters can interact to show some dependence in the posterior region. This can be a 
limitation of the methodology, since unrealistic values may be arrived at. To address this, the use of 
another metric for the parameter updating process can be explored further. For example, the failure 
probability of the system at each time, and the number of maintenance actions at each time can be 
combined to give a summary statistic for each proposed set of parameter values. As we have some 
understanding of the system in the reference model, in this case we can select the parameter values 
that are in line with reality. 
 
Figure 7.30: Parameter updating procedure for the third reduced model of the fourth example of Chapter 7 
The parameters that resulted in the lowest errors were selected from the posterior region. For each of 
the transitions, the values were 11.39 for the mean of transition t6, 13.57 for the mean of transition t7, 
36.90 for the mean of transition t10 and 0.136 for the mean of transition t11. The reduced model was 
simulated with these parameters and the marking of place P2 was recorded, corresponding to the 
probability of system failure at each time. Figure 7.31 shows this and the probability of system failure, 
taken from the reference model. The output from the reduced model follows similar average values, 
and has a similar level of fluctuation to the output from the reference model. This model therefore 
more closely matches the reference model than the outputs of the two previous model structures. The 
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model also does not show a large increase in simulation time in comparison to the previous reduced 
structures, and hence is likely a better choice of reduced model structure. This is discussed further at 
the end of this example. 
 
Figure 7.31: Model outputs for the third reduced model and the reference model in example 4 of Chapter 7 
There are some interesting results in this reduced model. For the first component there is a 
relationship between the intermediate maintenance and the maintenance on failure. This shows how 
the different maintenance actions can compensate for each other. This could be an interesting method 
for optimising a system, so as to keep the failure to a similar level but discover the optimal 
maintenance strategy. A faster maintenance before failure can allow a slower maintenance on failure, 
and vica verca, to still give the same model output. For the parameters on the second component, the 
behaviour is largely dominated by reducing the time to repair on failure. This short time allows the 
time governing the maintenance prior to failure to move more freely.  
Reduced Model 4 
The fourth reduced model structure in this example is given in Figure 7.32. This model differs from 
the reference model as it does not include the maintenance scheduling logic. In this reduced model, 
place P1 corresponds to the working state of the system and place P2 corresponds to the failed state of 
the system. The system state is determined by the state of each of the two components.  
The first component is modelled by the places and transitions on the lower left-hand side. Place P3 
corresponds to the working state of the first component, place P4 corresponds to a degraded state of 
the first component and place P5 corresponds to the failed state of the first component. This failure is 
unrevealed. Inspection of the component is modelled by places P8 and P9. The maintenance of the 
component, on a discovered failure, is modelled by transition t17. The maintenance of the first 
component, when a degraded state is discovered, is modelled by transition t7.  
The second component is modelled by the places and transitions on the lower right-hand side. Place 
P10 corresponds to the working state of the second component, place P11 corresponds to a degraded 
state of the second component and place P12 corresponds to the failed state of the second component. 
This failure is revealed. Inspection of the component is modelled by places P14 and P15. The 
maintenance of the component, on failure, is modelled by transition t16. The maintenance of the 





Figure 7.32: The fourth reduced model structure in the fourth example in Chapter 7 
The marking of place P2 in this reduced model was used as the output signal for comparison to the 
output signal of the reference model. The marking of this place represents the probability of system 
failure at each time. Parameters in this reduced model were updated based on the similarity of the 
output signals from both the reduced and reference model. 
The transitions t1, t2 and t3 have no associated delay times. Here the mean values of transitions t7, 
t13, t16 and t17 were updated in this example. These transitions relate to the maintenance scheduling 
times, which are adjusted with this reduction. The remaining transitions in this reduced model were 
assigned distributions so that they mirror the corresponding transitions in the reference model. For 
instance, transitions t8 and t9, which govern the inspection of the first component, were given the 
same distributions as the first component inspection loop transitions in the reference model. 
A prior region was defined for each of the parameters for updating. For the mean of each transition, 
the prior region was defined uniformly in the range [0, 10]. The procedure for updating the parameters 
can be seen in Figure 7.33. Here, we can see that the updating is largely dominated by reducing the 
value for the parameter corresponding to the mean of transition t16 to a low level. This represents a 
short time to repair for the component with revealed failures. The parameter for the mean of transition 
t13 can vary without much impact on the final system failure, in this case. This parameter corresponds 
to preventative maintenance of a component with a revealed failure. Likewise, the parameters 
governing the component with unrevealed failures do not show a strong convergence to a fixed set of 
values. This suggests that, across the system, failures can be dominated by the repair time of the 
component with the revealed failure. This makes some sense, since both components need to be in the 
failed state for a system failure, and the repair of the second component is not dependent on an 





Figure 7.33: The parameter updating process for the fourth reduced model of example 4 in Chapter 7 
The parameter values that resulted in the closest recreation of the output signal of the reference model 
were selected from the posterior region. For the mean of transition t7 this value was 11.18 months, 
while for the mean of transition t17 this value was 10.36 months. These values both suggest a slow 
maintenance rate of the component with the non-revealed failure. In contrast, the updated parameter 
value for the mean of transition t13 was 0.45 months and the updated parameter for the mean of 
transition t16 was 0.64 months. Both imply that the updated model has almost immediate maintenance 
for the component with the revealed failure.  
This reduced model was simulated for 1000 runs with the updated parameter values. The output 
showing the probability of failure of the system, taken from this reduced model and the reference 
model, is shown in Figure 7.34. It is notable that both the third and fourth reduced models have a 
similar approximation to the reference model, however this model comes at a higher computational 
cost for fitting and running in general, due to its increased size and the looping behaviour.  
 
Figure 7.34: The signal comparison for the fourth reduced model in example 4 of Chapter 7 
A limitation of this method seems to be that the larger and more complex models cannot have their 
behaviour succinctly described by a single output parameter of the model. This is demonstrated in this 
example, where the updated parameters contribute to a large reduction in maintenance times for the 
second component, allowing larger maintenance times for the first component. The parameter 
updating process applied here can be extended to incorporate several model outputs, to gain more 






Reduced model summary and comparison metrics 
This section gives summary information for the different reduced model structures and compares their 
suitability. As a baseline, for 1000 runs, simulation of the reference model took 544.223 seconds to 
complete. In this example, the reference model had an average probability of system failure of 0.0147, 
when averaged over 500 months for the simulation time period. Table 7.3 gives a summary of the data 
for each of the results, for each reference model.  
This table includes some information on the model and updating procedure: the number of transitions 
in the reduced model, the number of updated parameters, the percentages that govern the variation of 
the seed values in each level of the ABC-SubSim algorithm and the acceptance rates at each level of 
the ABC-SubSim algorithm. These data give a summary of the model size, the complexity of the 
updating procedure and detail on the hyperparameter tuning of the algorithm. 
In addition, the table includes several measures of the suitability of the model. Firstly, the error 
tolerance is given for each model. This quantifies the associated error in the approximation made by 
the posterior region, for the final level of the ABC-SubSim algorithm. A lower tolerance indicates a 
better approximation to the reference model. Here, reduced model 3 has the lowest error tolerance. 
The time to fit the parameters is also given here. The time to fit parameters increases in a non-linear 
manner with increasing model size. This lengthy time is a major limitation of the current 
implementation of the approach, especially when considering larger and more complex models. The 
simulation time for 1000 runs of each model is also presented. This increases in a non-linear manner 
with the number of transitions. There is a large difference between the simulation time for reduced 
model 3 and reduced model 4. Finally, the average probability of system failure, for each model is 
given. This can be compared to the same average for the reference model: reduced model 3 shows the 
best approximation in this case. 
By considering the data within this table, and the plots given already in this example, a user can make 
an informed decision on which model to choose. This depends on the modelling requirements, as 
there is a trade-off between the level of reduction and the time to simulate the model. For these data, 
reduced model 3 seems a reasonable choice, since it has the lowest tolerance, the closest 
approximation to the average probability of system failure  and reduces the simulation time of the 














  Reduced Model 1 Reduced Model 2 Reduced Model 3 Reduced Model 4 
Number of 
transitions 
2 7 11 18 
Error 
Tolerance  
0.233 0.492 0.191 0.197 
Time to Fit 
parameters 
(seconds) 




2 (mean of both 
transitions) 
2 (mean of 
degradation 
transitions) 
4 (mean of each 
maintenance transition) 






2.434 16.622 28.048 127.408 
Average 
probability of 
system failure  









0.30,0.22,0.13,0.19 0.11, 0.12, 0.17, 0.08 0.13,0.11,0.14,0.10 
Table 7.3: Summary information for the reduced models in example 4 of Chapter 7 
This section has provided a summary of the analysis completed on the different reduced model 
structures presented in this example. It demonstrates how this procedure can be used to rank reduced 
model structures, to aid in decision making. A couple of limitations were discussed. Firstly, updating 
the parameters is a lengthy process, and alternative approaches for this should be considered. 
Secondly, unfeasible solutions can arise when looking at more complex models with multiple 
interacting behaviours. Use of a more comprehensive summary statistic to address this has been 
discussed, as a potential further step of this work. This summary statistic could include both the 
system state and the maintenance history, for example. The next and final section of this example 
explores this limitation further. 
A further discussion on parameter fitting selection  
In addition to the analysis presented so far in this example, different model parameter fitting choices 
were explored. This section presents an aside to the main part of Example 4 in this chapter, where 
results are given for a different parameter updating choice. This is applied to the second reduced 
model structure, given earlier in this example in Figure 7.26. In this model, there are two components 
and each component is modelled by one failure transition and one repair transition. The system state is 
determined by the state of each of the components. This example highlights limitations already 
discussed for more complex models, whereby a summary statistic, based on a single model output, 
may be insufficient for parameter choice. 
In the earlier parameter updating attempt for the second reduced model, the means of the transitions 
relating to the repair of the components were updated. The transitions for the failure of each 
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component were assigned fixed values, which somewhat constrained the possible parameter values 
governing the repair of the component. Here, an attempt was made to fit distributions to parameters 
governing the failure rates and repair rates of both of the components. Hence, probability of failure of 
each component can be decreased by either increasing the time to failure or reducing the time to 
repair. The system failure can be determined by a balance of parameters in all four of the 
distributions. This allows more freedom for the parameter updating algorithm to find a closer match to 
the desired output signal but has a greater possibility of returning values that are not in-line with 
reality. 
The ABC-SubSim algorithm was run with a uniform prior region for the mean of each of the 
transitions governing each component state. This was done to find the optimal parameter solution in 
order to minimise the difference in the output signals of this reduced model and the reference model. 
However, in this case it resulted in a scenario where the optimal matching is found outside of the 
physical thresholds of the system. Here, the algorithm returned parameters that resulted in fast 
degradation rates for each component, which were counteracted by a short repair time.  
In this case, the optimal parameter value for the mean of the transition governing component failure 
was 11 months for the first component and 4 months for the second component. The mean of the 
parameter governing the repair rate was 0.1 months for the first component and 1 month for the 
second component. For both components in the reference model, the inspection interval was set to 6 
months, hence, the parameter fitting has given solutions that are not physically reasonable, in an 
attempt to most closely recreate the output signal of the reference model. 
The reduced model was simulated with these updated parameters. Figure 7.35 gives the result of this 
simulation, and the result of the simulation of the reference model. These parameters, although 
unfeasible, result in a close approximation to the reference model. However, this is only considering a 
single output of the model. Table 7.4 gives a summary of the metrics for this example. This parameter 
selection gives a closer approximation to the output signal than the parameter updating process 
demonstrated earlier for the same reduced structure. However, the resulting parameter values are 
unreasonable. Hence, care should be taken when applying this method, since a closer approximation 
of a single output signal may not necessarily mean a better representation by the reduced model 
structure. 
 






  Reduced Model 2 
Number of transitions 7 
Error Tolerance  0.290 
Time to Fit parameters (seconds) 193260.177 
Number of parameters updated 4 (mean of failure and repair transitions) 
Simulation time-1000 runs (seconds) 18.048 
Average probability of system failure 0.01329 
Gaussian variance percentages  60, 30, 20, 10 
Acceptance rates 0.17, 0.14,0.16, 0.11 
Table 7.4: Summary results for updating all timed transitions in example 4 of Chapter 7 
To address limitations seen in this example, a summary statistic can be based on multiple outputs of 
the model, instead of a single output. This should be explored further with the aim of avoiding cases 
where there is a high number of degrees of freedom and a single model output used for quantifying 
model similarity. For example, the fitting of the model parameters can be adjusted to include the 
expected number of intervention actions, in addition to the predicted probability of failure.  
7.6: Discussion  
There are several benefits to applying the method proposed in this chapter. Firstly, there can be a 
reduction in the computational time taken for Monte Carlo simulation of the reduced Petri net, in 
comparison to the reference Petri net. Secondly, the methodology provides a framework to reduce 
complexity in Petri net models. Thirdly, the methodology can be used to justify model selections, 
especially when justifying assumptions made by the modeller to keep the model at a reasonable size. 
The method provides a framework to test different model structures, and to give a comparative 
measure of their suitability. The method has also been implemented within a two-stage optimisation 
procedure, to decrease the computational cost of the optimisation. 
 
There are several challenges faced by this methodology. The reduced Petri net approximates the 
reference Petri net and so does not exactly recreate the results. The higher the level of simplification 
in the reduced model the greater the level of approximation. It is possible to fit every parameter in the 
reduced Petri net, to gain as close as possible approximation to the output, however, the 
computational effort to fit many parameters counteracts the gain made by reducing the model size in 
the first place. Also, updating multiple parameters can result in a scenario whereby the output is 
closely approximated but the parameters are not in line with reality. Hence, careful consideration of 
the choice of summary statistic for the model comparison must be undertaken. Also, with the reduced 
model, there may be dependencies that are contained in the reference model that are not carried 
through during the reduction process. This could be problematic if the reduced Petri net alone is used 
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to find the optimal solutions of the system. In addition, it is time-consuming to manually create and 
test different model structures. Finally, it is computationally expensive to perform the parameter 
updating process.  
 
Central to the method is a suitable choice of a summary statistic and subsequent metric for the 
comparison of signals from the reduced model to the reference model. A high-level framework for the 
assessment of a suitable metric has been presented in this chapter. However, further work can be 
completed to develop a methodology within the ABC field where the suitable metric choice by the 
user is less crucial to the success of the approach. In addition, summary statistics based on multiple 
model outputs, or behaviours can be explored. This should further constrain allowed parameter values 
to those that have a reasonable physical interpretation. 
 
The method presented in this chapter could be particularly useful in situations where there are large 
Petri nets simulations with multiple repeated similar units. This is because one reduced Petri net 
structure could be found for each unit and then this reduced structure could be repeated to improve 
computational efficiency. As demonstrated, this method can also be incorporated into an optimisation 
strategy. The optimisation carried out earlier in this thesis was computationally expensive due to the 
need for repeated convergent simulations of the Petri net, for different input values. As demonstrated 
in this chapter, a reduced Petri net model could be used to find the approximate region that the 
optimal solutions lie in. This approximate region could then be used as input to the reference Petri net 
model for a second level of optimisation to find the exact optimal solution. This would reduce 
computation time as most of the simulations would be carried out on the reduced Petri net with only 
the latter stages carried out on the larger reference Petri net. 
 
7.7: Contributions 
A novel reduction method for Petri nets, within a parameter updating framework, was developed, and 
is presented in this chapter. It is demonstrated in some detail in the first two examples in this chapter. 
This improves the state of the art for Petri net reduction methods, which contain specific rule-based 
reductions, as it is more flexible. The method also provides a way of quantifying the reduced model 
suitability. Included in the development of this approach is new research into comparison metrics for 
Petri Net model outputs. This contributes to the wider body of literature by applying signal processing 
techniques to quantify the similarity of model outputs in a time-dependent manner.  
In addition, the reduction approach is implemented in a new way, demonstrating its use within an 
optimization procedure that uses both the reduced and full model structures. This improves on the 
state of the art by providing an approach for reducing the computational cost of optimisation of 
system models. Finally, this chapter presents an application of the reduction methodology exploring 
the implications for a larger model, and the use of the method for informing the choice of reduced 
model structure and parameter fitting. This adds to the state of the art by giving a novel methodology 
for quantitatively informing the choice of one model structure over another.  
7.8: Conclusion 
The review of reduction methodologies in Chapter 2 highlights that there are commonly restrictions 
on Petri net reduction methodologies to specific structures within the model. With a view to 
developing a flexible methodology that is not limited to specific structures or transition types, the 
methodology proposed in this chapter was presented, along with a description of the concepts used.  
 
This chapter has presented a new methodology to reduce the complexity of Petri net models to retain 
key outputs, while reducing computational time for simulation. This methodology can be applied to a 
complex Petri net with large size or various transition types. This methodology could be especially 
useful in situations where a process contains many multi-state components resulting in a Petri net that 
is timely to simulate, especially if there are no structures within the Petri net that can be reduced with 
rules currently available in literature. This method provides a framework for the reduction of models 




Central to the methodology applied in this chapter is the choice of the metric value used to compare 
across a reference and reduced Petri net model. An example comparison of metric is presented and 
this gives a framework for the selection of metric that are most likely to result in a reasonable 
application of the methodology. A metric based on the Centroid Linkage is proposed for application 
of the methodology, based on the analysis.  
 
For illustration, the methodology proposed in this chapter was applied in four separate examples. The 
first two examples demonstrate the methodology for small models. These applications demonstrate 
the potential of the methodology to allow a reference Petri net model to be replaced with a smaller 
model, such that the smaller model approximates the outputs of the larger model. In the third example, 
the use of the method in an optimisation approach is explored. Here, the methodology presented in 
this chapter allows an approximate optimal solution to be found using a reduced model, followed by a 
final optimal solution found using the reference model and a reduced search space, based on the 
approximate optimal region. The fourth example explores the use of the methodology in determining 
model structure and parameter fitting choice. In this example, multiple reduced model structures are 
tested for their suitability to approximate a larger reference model structure. 
 
There are three main limitations of the approach proposed in this chapter. Firstly, the time taken to 
update the parameters is large, this can reduce any benefit of improved speed of computation gained 
by implementing a reduced model structure. Secondly, the choice of reduced model structure is an 
iterative process, where several structures can be required for testing. This is time consuming for a 
user. Finally, if the summary statistic is chosen such that it does not contain sufficient information for 
the updating, then a number of solutions can arise, that well recreate the desired output across the 
models, but that have nonsensical meanings. This is especially the case for larger reference, or 
reduced, models with several degrees of freedom. This has been explored in the fourth example in the 
chapter. A suggestion is made to further research different summary statistics, which may represent 
the flow of tokens across different parts of the model or contain multiple model outputs.  
In conclusion, the proposed method has been implemented with some success but to apply the 
methodology presented in this chapter, an in-depth knowledge of the technique and the problem is 
required for successful application of this method. This is inherent to the nature of the decisions 
needed to perform any sort of ABC analysis. This is a trade-off of this sort of approximate analysis 
which avoids the need for a likelihood function. There is further work to be done on how to best 
choose summary statistics, model class and how to select output signals from the models. Further 
work is suggested to tie in existing methods for optimally suggesting the structure of a reduced Petri 




Chapter 8 Conclusion and Further Work  
This thesis has intended to address the aim set out at the start of the project. The aim of this thesis 
was:  
To develop a method that can be used to accurately model risk on an underground railway especially 
as the network ages and utilisation increases.  
To complete this, the objectives have been addressed with a proposed modelling approach, applied to 
two real world systems to highlight different capabilities. Increasing failure rates as the system ages 
has been incorporated into the models developed in Chapter 4, where imperfect maintenance is 
employed along with dependencies introduced through system level maintenance strategies. In 
addition, the work presented in Chapter 5 has developed methods for complex asset management 
strategies whereby the component is replaced on its individual age, condition and the system phase, 
and the component is inspected and tested at a frequency dependent on the system phase.  
A methodology for the optimisation of asset management strategies is given in Chapter 6, including 
an optimisation of the system phases presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 also presents a measure of 
uncertainty for a predicted value of risk, and gives a new methodology for incorporating uncertain 
input parameters into the modelling framework. Finally, the computational efficiency of Petri net 
models has been discussed in Chapter 7 and a new methodology for the reduction of such models in 
order to improve this efficiency has been presented.  
This chapter provides a summary of each chapter presented within this thesis, following this a 
discussion of the work is presented. The next section presents recommendations for future work. 
Then, the key findings of the thesis are presented. Finally, an overall conclusion of the thesis is 
presented.  
8.1: Chapter Summary  
Chapter 1 provides a background on world-wide underground railways and presents research on 
historical accidents that have occurred on these systems. This highlights the importance of managing 
risk for these safety critical networks. The chapter also provides a brief introduction to concepts such 
as risks, hazards and ageing systems and summarises the key hazards on the London Underground as 
identified by current risk assessment methods within London Underground. The aims and objectives 
of the project are outlined.  
Chapter 2 gives a literature review of risk modelling methodologies, along with a review of asset 
management methodologies. A review of the UK industry underground and over ground railway risk 
modelling methods is presented. Following this, a review of risk modelling methods in other 
industries is given. This provides the justification for the selection of the Petri net, Monte Carlo 
simulation, Fault Tree and Event Tree methods that are implemented in the remainder of this thesis. In 
addition, the chapter gives a review of the application specific models available in literature, for S&C 
and fire protection systems. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, models are presented for these systems. The 
review provides justification for modelling choices made when creating these models. In addition, 
Chapter 2 gives a review of optimisation methods, which forms the bases of the work in Chapter 6. 
Also included in Chapter 2, is a review of methods to reduce the complexity of Petri net models, to 
address identified issues with computational time and the incorporation of uncertainty in model 
outputs. This part of the review informs the development of methodologies proposed at the end of 
Chapter 6 and in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 3 introduces the methodologies implemented in this thesis and is provided as an aid to the 
reader. The Fault Tree method, Event Tree method, Petri net method and Monte Carlo simulation 
method are introduced. A discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of each method is given along 
with simple illustrative examples. This chapter also presents the proposed modelling approach applied 
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to system models in this thesis, which implements the methodologies described in the earlier parts of 
the chapter. In addition, a description of the custom software developed during this project, for the 
analysis of the models developed, is given.  
Chapter 4 presents a model for a railway S&C using the methodology presented in Chapter 3. There is 
a focus in this chapter on imperfect maintenance actions and system level opportunistic maintenance 
strategies. Sample input values are used to demonstrate the potential of the modelling approach for 
quantitative analysis. Different maintenance strategies are applied in the chapter to validate the 
capability of the methodology, developed in this thesis, to test the impact of different management 
strategies on the system state and derailment occurrence.  
Chapter 5 presents a model for underground station fire protection systems. The model includes a fire 
detection, alarm and deluge system. The condition and management of each component within the 
systems is modelled, in order to assess the unavailability of each system over time. In this chapter, 
there is also consideration of how human actions can interact with a system with the potential to cause 
a system failure. In addition, there is a focus on a phased asset management strategy where 
components are inspected, tested or maintained at a time dependent on their age and the system age, 
or their condition.  
Chapter 6 presents several further analysis methods for the methodologies proposed in this thesis, 
applied to the model developed in Chapter 5. Initially a modelling approach for changing a Fault Tree 
structure into a Petri net is presented, showing a good agreement of results. Secondly, a methodology 
is proposed for the risk based asset management optimisation of ageing systems, with a phased asset 
management strategy. An application of this is given, using the structure developed in the first part of 
the chapter. Following this, a discussion on the convergence and uncertainty of the model is given. 
Also, a novel methodology is presented and applied for incorporating uncertain model inputs in a 
Petri net framework. Finally, a discussion of the challenges faced when implementing these 
approaches is given, namely the computational cost of repeated convergent simulation of a large Petri 
net model, and the potential instability of the modelling approach when considering uncertain model 
inputs.  
Chapter 7 presents a novel Petri net reduction methodology to combat the potentially large 
computational cost of Monte Carlo simulation of Petri net models. Here, a parameter inference 
method is employed to allow updating of parameters within a proposed reduced model, such that the 
output of the reduced model approximates that of the original larger model. The methodology is 
applied in four examples. The first two examples demonstrate the methodology, the third example 
combines the reduction with a two-stage optimisation procedure and the final example explores the 
use of the method for reduced model selection. Any limitations and benefits of the methodology are 
discussed throughout the chapter. 
8.2: Parameter Assumptions and Use of Data 
The parameters within the model applications in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 have been 
assumed, in order to demonstrate the capability of the models. These assumptions affect the sample 
results for the model outputs. The outcomes that are most sensitive to these assumptions are those that 
relate to the rare event occurrences, such as a system failure, as a change in one of the parameters, can 
lead to a large increase in these system level outputs. For instance, if there is not a component in 
backup and the component fails regularly, this can largely impact the model outputs on a system level. 
In comparison, more common events, such as the total number of maintenance actions, are less 
sensitive to such assumptions. Despite the assumed parameters in the model demonstrations, the 
modelling approach can be easily adapted when data becomes available. It is simply a case of varying 
the parameters in the excel spreadsheet that contains each model logic in order to use real data values. 
In addition, typical trends were extracted from the sample model runs, to give a generalize 
commentary on the trends of each model example. To address the issue of inherent assumptions or 
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inaccuracies associated with model input parameters, an uncertainty propagation approach is given in 
Chapter 6. Hence, where there is higher uncertainty on a parameter value this can be propagated 
through the model simulation to the model outputs, giving decision makers more information. 
To apply the models developed in this thesis, data should be collected for the degradation rate of each 
component within each model, this can be from extended life testing or data gathered in the field. The 
data would be used to find the parameters and distributions for the transitions governing the 
degradation transitions within each component level model. Collection of this data can improve the 
model allowing assumptions made within each component model to be either justified or adjusted, 
based on the available evidence. In addition, data can be collected for the maintenance and inspection 
strategies currently applied in each modeled system, such as the time interval between identifying a 
failure in each component and the components repair. This data can be used to determine the 
parameters for the transitions governing repair and inspection within the model. Hence, improving the 
model by allowing the removal of assumptions about the maintenance actions applied to each of the 
components. However, these parameters are less crucial to the model success as they can be varied in 
order to test different strategies. Data should also be collected on the overall system state for each 
modeled system, which can be used to validate the current model predictions and make any required 
amendments to the model structure to bring the model more in line with reality, hence improving any 
future predictions. Finally, data should be collected on the cost of different maintenance actions, this 
can then improve the results given by the optimizations of the model, these results can then be used to 
inform maintenance decisions. 
 
In addition, the parameters governing the examples in Chapter 7 are assumed. These examples are 
present to demonstrate and explore the methodology, rather than represent a real-world system. 
8.3: Key Contributions 
The key contributions of this work are: 
1. A risk modelling approach that can be used to evaluate the impact of complex asset 
management strategies. A novel aspect of this approach is that it extends existing 
methodologies applied in industry; this improves on the state of the art as it allows more in 
depth modelling of components with complex degradation, maintenance and inspection 
strategies. 
2. An asset management model for a railway S&C that considers derailment frequency and 
system state. This model goes into further depth than S&C models available in literature, 
including the modelling of imperfect maintenance and inspection with the application of a 
Petri net approach to the problem. A range of maintenance actions, including opportunistic 
maintenance, are modelled. The model improves on the state of the art as it removes 
assumptions of perfect maintenance and inspection and allows dependencies to be introduced 
through maintenance actions. In addition, system level restrictions or closures due to the 
combined condition of components across the system are modelled, hence, the model can be 
used to predict derailment occurrence and the total cost of maintaining the system. 
3. An asset management model for an automatic fire protection system that predicts the 
probability that each of the deluge, detection and alarm system is in a failed state. This model 
includes areas of novelty in comparison to models available in literature by implementing a 
Petri net approach. This allows the model to feature: a phased asset management strategy, a 
probability model for system failure and modelling of false activations of each system. The 
introduction of the phased asset management improves the state of the art as it allows 
exploration of strategies that can change throughout a system lifecycle. Also, since the model 
considers the system in a higher level of detail, it can be used to estimate the cost of the 
system due to maintenance, inspection, testing and any penalties for false activation of the 
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system. This contributes to the state of the art for risk modelling of fire protection systems, as 
other factors contributing to failure and cost are considered. The modelling also allows 
dependencies between the systems to be modelled, such as combined testing. 
4. A novel approach for optimisation of a phased asset management strategy, such that different 
maintenance strategies are applied at different times. This improves the state of the art for 
modelling the management of the system over time, where strategies are applied based on 
component condition, as it allows different strategies to be applied at different phases as a 
system ages. The method used combines a Simulated Annealing and Genetic Algorithm 
optimization approach, to improve on the Genetic Algorithm approach by reducing the 
number of search parameters, hence improving efficiency.  
5. A new approach for incorporating uncertain inputs in a Petri net model, and evaluating the 
impact on the model outputs. This improves cases of Petri net modelling, where the 
uncertainty in the output of the Petri net model is unstated, and model parameters are assumed 
true. Inclusion of uncertainty can give decision makers a higher level of knowledge when 
using the predictions of such models to make decisions. A method for studying the 
convergence of the model is also applied; this improves on current convergence checks used 
for Petri net models where the convergence is viewed on a linear scale, which does not clearly 
demonstrate the rate of convergence. 
6. A novel reduction methodology for Petri net models. As part of this work, research was 
conducted into comparison metrics between Petri net model outputs, to quantify the 
difference in outputs of such models over time, as opposed to comparing point estimates of 
the model. This can give a wider picture of the difference in the predictions of two models. 
The developed reduction methodology is a flexible tool which improves on current Petri net 
reduction methods that are highly rule based. Research exploring this method is also 
presented, including the use of the method to improve current optimization methods using a 
approximate solutions space approach. Also, the use of the approach to choose model 
structure is explored. This improves on the state of the art for model selection, as Petri Net 
models are usually user defined, and this approach provides a quantitative measure to support 
model structure choice. 
8.4: Further Work 
There are several areas where future work can be completed in this area of study. Firstly, the 
methodology demonstrated in this thesis can be applied to further real-world applications. Also, data 
can be collected from these systems to validate the outputs of the specific models developed in this 
thesis.  
Secondly, a lack of convergence of the simulation of Petri net models can result in unreliable 
predictions, especially when considering rare events. The rare event may not occur in the defined 
number of simulations giving the user the idea that the model has fully converged. With more 
simulations, the rare event may occur and impact the risk predicted by the model, however this 
contribution can be overlooked, by analysing the convergence of the model with insufficient 
simulations. Further work can be completed on the efficient simulation of rare events using a Petri net 
methodology. This could include simulation tools that use more intelligent methods for sampling from 
input distributions, to improve the rate of convergence to a solution for a Petri net model. This could 
also be used to reduce the computational cost of simulation of Petri net models.  
Thirdly, future work can be completed on the new methodology presented in this thesis for Petri net 
model reduction. Further work can be completed on an optimal method for the simplification of the 
Petri net model, along with the optimal number of parameters for reduction. This reduction 
methodology can also be applied to a large real-world system model and research can be completed 
into reducing the computational time of the parameter updating methodology. 
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Finally, the combined optimisation technique incorporating a reduced model structure and the full 
model structure can be explored further and attempted with different model structures or optimisation 
approaches.  
8.5: Conclusion  
This thesis has presented work to improve the existing methodologies to model risk for ageing 
systems on an underground railway. An approach centred on Petri net modelling and Monte Carlo 
simulation has been proposed.  
The first contribution of this thesis is a risk modelling approach that incorporates the impact of 
complex asset management strategies. The approach allows detailed modelling of component 
condition, maintenance, and inspection. The approach was applied to two systems, with a model 
created for each. Firstly, a new model was presented for a railway S&C. This model allows the 
prediction of derailment occurrence, along with the different interventions required across the system 
life cycle. The model is beneficial as it allows component condition dependencies that are introduced 
through maintenance actions to be modelled, introduces opportunistic maintenance, and allows 
imperfect maintenance and inspection to be modelled. Secondly, a new model is presented for an 
automatic fire protection system. The system modelled includes a detection, deluge, and alarm sub-
systems. Main benefits of this model are the incorporation of a phased asset management strategy, 
modelling false system activation and modelling component condition dependencies introduced 
through system-level maintenance strategies. In addition, the model also considers interactions 
between the sub-systems, such as system level testing and their combined function on activation. In 
both cases data collection is required, for a real-world system, to validate the results of the model. A 
disadvantage of the models is the computational cost for simulation, to gain numerical results.  
Several further novel approaches were also proposed in the thesis. Firstly, an optimisation approach 
for a phased asset management strategy was presented. This allows different strategies to be applied at 
different times, where the optimisation procedure considers where the strategy should change phase, 
and what the optimal values within each phase should be. The approach was applied to the fire 
protection system model. Secondly, an approach was proposed for quantifying the uncertainty of Petri 
net model outputs, given uncertain model inputs. The approach encapsulates uncertainty introduced 
through the simulation of the model and the uncertainty in the input parameters. The approach was 
applied to a sub-section of the fire protection system model. Finally, a novel Petri net reduction 
methodology was proposed. This gives a flexible method for reducing the complexity of Petri net 
models and gives a numerical quantification for the level of approximation of the reduction. This 
method was applied in several scenarios, including as part of a two-step optimisation procedure and to 
demonstrate its suitability for model structure selection.  
In conclusion, the work presented in this thesis expands current quantitative methods and models that 
consider risk for ageing systems, and how management of the system can be optimised to reduce the 
risk. The methodologies can enable a more rigorous analysis process, given the current constrains on 
the data available for modelling railway processes. There are also several approaches that develop 
current methodology within the Petri net modelling field.  
Focus should be put on collecting a larger base of reliable data, as this is one of the major limiting 
factors discovered throughout this thesis. This is especially the case for development of intelligent risk 
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This appendix details the categories used for different rail defects in the model prediction derailment due to a rail break or 
excessive wear, used in Chapter 4. 
Category 1: Subsurface Cracking 
Defect Deep Seated 
Shelling 
Bolt Hole Crack Split Head defect Base Defect Web Defect 
Description Loss of rail 
material due to 
collapse of the 
rail gauge corner. 
Due to excessive 
loading and sheer 
failure. 
A crack across 
the rail web that 
originates from a 




A split on the 
inside of the rail 
head initiated by 
shells and 
weaknesses in the 
metal or by RCF. 




Any defect or 
break in the base 
of the rail. 
Any internal or 
external 
fracture or 
defect in the 
rail web. For 
instance, piped 
rail or head and 
web separation.  
Measurement Ultrasonic and 
visual (late stage 













Quantification Area of rail 
affected.  
Length of crack. Length of crack.  The length of the 
crack or break. 





Replacement  Replacement Replacement Replacement Replacement 
Table A1.1: Rail subsurface cracking defects 
Category 2: Loss of Rail head Material 
Defect Vertical Wear Plastic Flow Corrosion 
Description A misshape of the 
rail head due to 
wheel rail interaction 
and grinding 
processes. 
Deformation of the 
rail due to wheel rail 
contact stresses.  
The decaying of 
metal within the rail 
due to wet or damp 
areas. Results in 
cavities in the rail. 
Measurement Manual testing via a 
measurement gauge. 
Manual testing via 
measurement gauge. 
Visual inspection. 
Quantification Extent of profile 
change. 
Extent of profile 
change. 




Replacement Replacement Replacement 








Category 3: Surface Cracking, Rolling Contact Fatigue and Wear  
Defect Rail Gauge Corner 
Cracking 
Surface Shelling Squats Lateral Wear 
Description Thin cracks on the 
gauge corner of the 
rails, result of high 
contact and sheer 
stresses. 
Loss of lumps of rail 
due to combinations 
of surface and 
subsurface cracks. 
A depression in the 
rail caused by the 
combination of sub-
surface cracking and 
deposits of debris in 
the depression. 
Occurs on the gauge 
face due to high 
wheel flange force.  
Measurement Visual or ultrasonic 
testing 
Visual or ultrasonic 
testing 
Visual or ultrasonic 
testing 
Visual or ultrasonic 
testing. 
Quantification The quantity and 
depth of the cracks 
present. 
Length and depth of 
the shell. 
Depth of Squat 
depression. 





Replacement or rail 
grinding. 
Replacement or rail 
grinding. 
Replacement or rail 
grinding. 
Replacement or rail 
grinding. 
Table A1.3:Rail surface defects 
Appendix 2 
Data used in the sample application of the models in Chapter 4, where normal distribution parameters are given in order of 
      , Weibull distribution parameters are given in order of         and Lognormal distribution parameters are given in 
order of                .  
Part A: Component degradation, inspection and maintenance models 
Label  Description Distribution Parameters 
(months) 
 Ballast   
T3 Ballast condition moves from State I to II. This conditional on 
number of previous tamps. (5 distributions, distribution changes 








T6 Ballast condition moves from State II to III. This is conditional on 
the number of previous tamps. (3 distributions, distributions 






T9 Ballast condition moves from State III to IV. This is conditional 
on the number of tamps. (2 distributions, distribution changes 





T12 Ballast condition moves from State IV to State V.  Weibull 8,3 
Ta1 Early tamping (Resets the condition of the ballast) Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
Ta2 Routine tamping (Resets the condition of the ballast) Normal 0.0175,0.001 
Ta3 Priority tamping (Resets the condition of the ballast) Normal 0.035,0.001 
Ta4 Emergency tamping (Resets the condition of the ballast) Normal 0.035,0.001 
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U1 Early undercutting (Resets the condition of the ballast) Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
U2 Routine undercutting (Resets the condition of the ballast) Normal 0.0175,0.001 
U3 Priority undercutting (Resets the condition of the ballast) Normal 0.035,0.001 
U4 Emergency undercutting (Resets the condition of the ballast) Normal 0.035,0.001 
q1 Inspection is successful Probability 0.9,0.1 
q2 Inspection is successful Probability 0.95,0.05 
 Sleepers and Clips   
T1 Sleeper condition moves from working to failed state. Weibull 450,10 
T2 Clip condition moves from working to failed state Weibull 360,4 
I1  Sleeper and clip inspection interval Global transition 3 
D1 Sleeper and replacement delay Normal 0.5,0.05 
D2 Clip replacement delay Normal 0.5,0.05 
R1 Sleeper unit replacement Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
R2 Clip unit replacement Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
D3 Sleeper and clip population scheduling interval Normal 0.01,0.001 
RA Sleeper and clip population replacement time Normal 0.015,0.01 
 Rail components    
q1 Driver detects a rail break Probability 0.7,0.3 
q2,q3 Inspection is successful Probability 0.95,0.5 
T1 Sub-surface cracking of the fixed rails (State I to II) Weibull 150,5 
T2 Wear of the fixed rails (State I to II) Weibull 80,4 
T3 RCF and surface cracking of the fixed rails (State I to II) Weibull 
(3 distributions) 
80,3,18,4,12,6 
T4 Sub-surface cracking of the fixed rails (State II to III) Weibull 30,8 
T5 Wear of the fixed rails (State II to III) Weibull 24,7 
T6 RCF and surface cracking of fixed rails (State II to III) Weibull 
(3 distributions) 
24,6,18,9,12,10 
T7 Sub-surface cracking of the fixed rails (State III to IV) Weibull 6,3 
T8 Wear of the fixed rails (State III to IV) Weibull 12,4 
T9 RCF and surface cracking of the fixed rails (State III to IV) Weibull 
(2 distributions) 
12,4,9,3 
T10 Sub-surface cracking of the fixed rails (State IV to V) Weibull 5,3 
T11 Wear of the fixed rails (State IV to I) Weibull 6,3 
T12 RCF and surface cracking of the fixed rails (State IV to V) Weibull 5,3 
R1 Early replacement of the fixed rails Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
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R2 Routine replacement of the fixed rails Normal 0.0175,0.001 
R3 Priority replacement of the fixed rails Normal 0.035,0.001 
R4 Emergency replacement of the fixed rails Normal 0.035,0.001 
G1 Early grinding of the fixed rails. Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
G2 Routine grinding of the fixed rails  Normal 0.0175,0.001 
G3 Priority grinding of the fixed rails Normal 0.035,0.001 
q7 Driver detects a rail break Probability 0.8,0.2 
q8,q9 Inspection is successful Probability 0.95,0.5 
T13 Internal cracking of switch rails (State I to II) Weibull 60,8 
T14 Wear of switch rails (State I to II) Weibull 48,6 
T15 RCF and surface cracking of switch rails (State I to II) Weibull 
(3 distributions) 
24,6,18,8,12,6 
T16 Misalignment of switch rail (State I to II) Weibull 12,4 
T17 Internal cracking of switch rails (State II to III) Weibull 30,5 
T18 Wear of switch rails (State II to III) Weibull 24,6 
T19 RCF and surface cracking of switch rails (State II to III) Weibull  
(3 distributions) 
24,6,18,7,12,8 
T20 Misalignment of switch rail (State II to III) Weibull 6,3 
T21 Internal cracking of switch rails (State III to IV) Weibull 6,3 
T22 Wear of switch rails (State III to IV) Weibull 12,4 
T23 RCF and surface cracking of switch rails (State III to IV) Weibull  
(3 distributions) 
12,4,9,3 
T24 Misalignment of switch rail (State III to IV) Weibull 4,6 
T25 Internal cracking of switch rails (State IV to V) Weibull 3,7 
T26 Wear of switch rails (State IV to V) Weibull 6,6 
T27 RCF and surface cracking of switch rails (State IV to V) Weibull 4,8 
T28 Misalignment of switch rail (State IV to V) Weibull 4,9 
R1 Early replacement of the switch rails Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
R2 Routine replacement of the switch rails Normal 0.0175,0.001 
R3 Priority replacement of the switch rails Normal 0.035,0.001 
R4 Emergency replacement of the switch rails Normal 0.035,0.001 
G1 Early grinding of the switch rails. Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
G2 Routine grinding of the switch rails  Normal 0.0175,0.001 
G3 Priority grinding of the switch rails Normal 0.035,0.001 
A1 Early replacement of the switch rails. Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
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A2 Routine replacement of the switch rails  Normal 0.0175,0.001 
A3 Priority replacement of the switch rails Normal 0.035,0.001 
A4 Emergency replacement of the switch rails. Normal 0.035,0.001 
q15,q16 Inspection is successful Probability 0.95,0.5 
T29 Surface cracking of nose (State I to II) Weibull 
(3 distributions) 
24,6,18,7,12,8 
T30 Sub-surface cracking of nose (State I to II) Weibull 42,7 
T31 Plastic deformation of nose (State I to II) Weibull 
(3 distributions) 
48,4,12,5,6,7 
T32 Surface cracking of nose (State II to III) Weibull 
(2 distributions) 
12,4,6,7 
T33 Sub-surface cracking of nose (State II to III) Weibull 12,3 
T34 Plastic deformation of nose (State II to III) Weibull 
(2 distributions) 
24,4,12,5 
T35 Surface cracking of nose (State III to IV) Weibull 6,4 
T36 Sub-surface cracking of nose (State III to IV) Weibull 6,3 
T37 Plastic deformation of nose (State III to IV) Weibull 6,5 
T38 Surface cracking of nose (State IV to V) Weibull 5,7 
T39 Sub-surface cracking of nose (State IV to V) Weibull 5,6 
T40 Plastic deformation of nose (State IV to V) Weibull 4,3 
R1 Early replacement of the crossing nose Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
R2 Routine replacement of the crossing nose Normal 0.0175,0.001 
R3 Priority replacement of the crossing nose Normal 0.035,0.001 
R4 Emergency replacement of the crossing nose Normal 0.035,0.001 
G1 Early grinding of the crossing nose. Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
G2 Routine grinding of the crossing nose Normal 0.0175,0.001 
G3 Priority grinding of the crossing nose Normal 0.035,0.001 
W1 Early welding of the crossing nose. Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
W2 Routine welding of the crossing nose Normal 0.0175,0.001 
W3 Priority welding of the crossing nose Normal 0.035,0.001 
q22,q23 Inspection is successful Probability 0.95,0.5 
T41 Plastic deformation of check rails (State I to II) Weibull 
(2 distributions) 
36,8,28,4 
T42 Longitudinal cracking of check rails (State I to II) Weibull 24,6 




T44 Longitudinal cracking of check rails (State II to III) Weibull 18,6 
T45 Plastic deformation of check rails (State III to IV) Weibull 6,3 
T46 Longitudinal cracking of check rails (State III to IV) Weibull 6,3 
T47 Plastic deformation of check rails (State IV to V) Weibull 5,3 
T48 Longitudinal cracking of check rails (State IV to V) Weibull 5,4 
R1 Early replacement of the check rails Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
R2 Routine replacement of the check rails Normal 0.0175,0.001 
R3 Priority replacement of the check rails Normal 0.035,0.001 
R4 Emergency replacement of the check rails Normal 0.035,0.001 
G1 Early grinding of the check rails Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
G2 Routine grinding of the check rails Normal 0.0175,0.001 
G3 Priority grinding of the check rails Normal 0.035,0.001 
I1-I6 Inspection interval  Normal  2,0.05 
 Stretcher bars   
T1 Stretcher bar condition moves from State I to II Weibull 36,9 
T2 Stretcher bar condition moves from State II to III Weibull 9,3 
T3 Stretcher bar condition moves from State III to IV Weibull 6,4 
T4 Stretcher bar condition moves from State IV to V Weibull 3,4 
R1 Early replacement of the stretcher bars Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
R2 Routine replacement of the stretcher bars Normal 0.0175,0.001 
R3 Priority replacement of the stretcher bars Normal 0.035,0.001 
R4 Emergency replacement of the stretcher bars Normal 0.035,0.001 
q1 Probability that inspection is successful  0.85,0.15 
 Slide Chairs   
T1 Slide chair condition moves from State I to II (ageing) Weibull 60,4 
T4 Slide chair condition moves from State II to III (ageing) Weibull 20,3 
T6 Slide chair condition moves from State III to IV (ageing) Weibull 4,3 
T8 Slide chair condition moves from State IV to V (ageing) Weibull 3,3 
T2 Slide chair condition moves from State I to II (lubrication and 
debris build up) 
Weibull 9,5 
T5 Slide chair condition moves from State II to III (lubrication and 
debris build up) 
Weibull 3,3 
T7 Slide chair condition moves from State III to IV (lubrication and 
debris build up) 
Weibull 2,4 
T9 Slide chair condition moves from State IV to V (lubrication and 




T3 External debris falls into slide chairs  Uniform 0.0016 
R1 Early replacement of the slide chairs Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
R2 Routine replacement of the slide chairs Normal 0.0175,0.001 
R3 Priority replacement of the slide chairs Normal 0.035,0.001 
R4 Emergency replacement of the slide chairs Normal 0.035,0.001 
L1 Early clearing and lubrication of the slide chairs Normal 0.0175,0.001 
L2 Routine clearing and lubrication of the slide chairs Normal 0.0175,0.001 
L3 Priority clearing and lubrication of the slide chairs Normal 0.0175,0.001 
L4 Emergency clearing and lubrication of the slide chairs Normal 0.0175,0.001 
q1 Probability that inspection is successful  0.05,0.95 
D1 The time taken for an inspection to be completed  Normal  0.01,0.001 
 POE and Locking device   
T1 POE condition moves from State I to II  Weibull 80,6 
T2 Locking device condition moves from State I to V Weibull 95,6 
T3 POE condition moves from State II to III  Weibull 60,7 
T4 POE condition moves from State III to IV  Weibull 40,6 
T5 POE condition moves from State IV to V  Weibull 20,6 
T8 Aged based early maintenance interval for the locking device Lognormal 3.5,0.1 
Rp1 Aged based routine maintenance interval for the locking device Lognormal 3.9,0.05 
Rp2 Aged based priority maintenance interval for the locking device Lognormal 4.1,0.05 
Rl1 Time taken for an inspection to be completed Normal 0.01,0.001 
Rl2 Probability that an inspection is unsuccessful  0.1,0.9 
Rl3 Early replacement of the POE Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
I1 Routine replacement of the POE Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
D1 Priority replacement of the POE Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
q1 Emergency replacement of the POE Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
R1 Early replacement of the locking device Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
R2 Routine replacement of the locking device Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
R3 Priority replacement of the locking device Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
R4 Emergency replacement of the locking device  Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
 Switch position detector   
T1 Switch position detector condition moves from State I to V Weibull 48,10 
Rs1 Aged based early maintenance interval for the switch position 
detector 
Lognormal 2.5,0.3 





Rs3 Aged based priority maintenance interval for the switch position 
detector 
Lognormal 3.5,0.3 
q1 Probability that the inspection is unsuccessful  0.1,0.9 
D1 Time taken for an inspection to be completed Normal 0.01,0.001 
R1 Early replacement of the switch position detector Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
R2 Routine replacement of the switch position detector Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
R3 Priority replacement of the switch position detector Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
R4 Emergency replacement of the switch position detector Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
  
External signal failure 
  
T1 Time taken for an external signal failure to occur Weibull 60,10 
D1 Time taken for the external signal failure to be corrected Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
q1 Probability that the external signal failure results in the switch rails 
lying in a hazardous position 
 0.1,0.9 
Table A2.1: Sample data values for the component degradation, maintenance and inspection transitions used in the 
application in Chapter 4 
Part B: Maintenance scheduling models 
Label  Description Distribution Parameters 
 Maintenance scheduling models   
T1 The time interval between full replacement of the S&C Normal 96,1 
D1 The time for a full replacement to be completed  Normal 0.5,0.05 
D2 The delay between a derailment occurring and full S&C 
replacement scheduling. 
Normal 0.0001,0.00001 
W1 The time between an identified need for routine ballast 
maintenance and the maintenance being carried out 
Normal 3,1 
D3 The time between the identified need for priority ballast 
maintenance and the maintenance being carried out 
Normal 0.5,0.25 
D4 The time between the identified need for emergency ballast 
maintenance and the maintenance being carried out  
Normal 0.125,0.001 
D5 The time taken for the maintenance to be de-activated  Normal 0.01,0.001 
q1 The probability of undercutting the ballast as opposed to tamping  0.25,0.75 
W2 The time between an identified need for routine component 
replacement or manual intervention and the maintenance being 
carried out 
Normal 2,1 
D6 The time between the identified need for priority component 
replacement or manual intervention and the maintenance being 
carried out 
Normal 0.5,0.25 
D7 The time between the identified need for emergency component 
replacement or manual intervention and the maintenance being 
carried out  
Normal 0.01,0.001 
D8 The time taken for the maintenance to be deactivated Normal 0.125,0.001 
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W3 The time between the identified need for routine track grinding and 
the maintenance being carried out 
Normal 3,1 
D9 The time between the identified need for priority track grinding and 
the maintenance being carried out 
Normal 1,0.5 
D10 The time taken for the maintenance to be deactivated  Normal 0.01,0.001 
 Over speeding   
T1 The arrival rate of an over speeding train (conditional on any 
applied speed restrictions) 
Normal 240,60 (X1=0) 
120,40 (X1=1) 
q1 The probability that an over speeding train causes a derailment  0.1,0.9 
I1 Inspection interval for visual inspection Normal 1,0.5 
I2 Inspection interval for specialist inspection  Normal 3,1 
I3 Inspection interval for the POE testing Normal 3,1 
Table A2.2: Sample data values used in the maintenance scheduling models in the application in Chapter 4 
Part C: Derailment models 
Label  Description Distribution Parameters 
 Failure models   
T1 Time taken for a derailment to occur, if no restrictions are applied, 
due to a failed switch rail position 
Normal 0.01,0.001 
T2 Time taken for a derailment to occur, if only speed restrictions are 
applied, due to a failed switch rail position 
Normal 0.02,0.001 
T3 Time taken for a derailment to occur, if no restrictions are applied, 
due to a geometry failure 
Normal 0.3,0.01 
T4 Time taken for a derailment to occur, if only speed restrictions are 
applied, due to a geometry failure 
Normal 0.4,0.01 
D1 Delay assigned for less likely derailment, due to geometry error 
caused by the first failed state of the sleeper and clip population. 
Normal 3,2 
T5 Time taken for a derailment to occur, if no restrictions are applied, 
due to wear on the rail causing wheel climb 
Normal 0.5,0.01 
T6 Time taken for a derailment to occur, if only speed restrictions are 
applied, due to wear on the rail causing wheel climb 
Normal 1,0.01 
T7 Time taken for a derailment to occur, if no restrictions are applied, 
due to a rail break 
Normal 0.01,0.001 
T8 Time taken for a derailment to occur, if only speed restrictions are 
applied, due to a rail break 
Normal 0.02,0.001 
D1 The time for the failed state to be identified if it is revealed that the 
switch rail is in the incorrect position 
Normal 0.01,0.001 





Appendix 3:  
Sample data used in the Petri net models in Chapter 5, where normal distribution parameters are given in order of       , 
Weibull distribution parameters are given in order of         and Lognormal distribution parameters are given in order of 
               .  
Net Transition  Description Distribution  Parameters 
A T1 Pipework fails due to age Weibull 600,1.5 
A T2 Random useful life pipework failure Uniform 0.000139 
A R1 Early maintenance scheduling of pipework. Lognormal 5.5,0.04 
A R2 Routine maintenance scheduling of pipework.  Lognormal 6,0.02 
A R3 Maintenance scheduling of pipework on failure.  Lognormal -5,0.5 
A I1 Inspection interval of pipework.  Global (3 
intervals) 
12,6,3 
A D1 Maintenance of pipework.  Lognormal -2,0.5 
B T1 Electric pump moves from good state to degraded state due to 
age 
Weibull 80,2 
B T2 Electric pump moves from degraded state to failed state due to 
age 
Weibull 40,3.5 
B T3 Random useful life electric pump failure Uniform 0.00104 
B R1 Early maintenance scheduling of pump. Lognormal 3.5,0.03 
B R2 Routine maintenance scheduling of pump. Lognormal 4,0.02 
B R3 Maintenance scheduling of pump on failure.  Lognormal -5,0.5 
B R4 Maintenance scheduling of pump on partial failure.  Lognormal -3,0.6 
B I1 Inspection interval of pump. Global (3 
intervals) 
12,6,3 
B D1 Maintenance of pump. Lognormal -2,0.5 
U T1 Jockey pump moves from good state to degraded state due to 
age 
Weibull 40,3 
U T2 Jockey pump moves from degraded state to failed state due to 
age 
Weibull 20,6 
U T3 Random useful life pump failure Uniform 0.0042 
U R1 Early maintenance scheduling of pump. Lognormal 2.75,0.01 
U R2 Routine maintenance scheduling of pump. Lognormal 3.5,0.02 
U R3 Maintenance scheduling of pump on failure.  Lognormal -5,0.05 
U R4 Maintenance scheduling of pump on partial failure.  Lognormal -3,0.6 
U I1 Inspection interval of pump. Global (3 
intervals) 
12,6,3 
U D1 Maintenance of pump. Lognormal  -2,0.5 





V T2 Diesel pump moves from degraded state to failed state due to 
age 
Weibull 56,3 
V T4 Random useful life pump failure Uniform 0.000834 
V R1 Early maintenance scheduling of pump. Lognormal 4,0.02 
V R2 Routine maintenance scheduling of pump. Lognormal 4.5,0.01 
V R3 Maintenance scheduling of pump on failure.  Lognormal -5,0.5 
V R4 Maintenance scheduling of pump on partial failure.  Lognormal -3,0.6 
V I1 Inspection interval of pump. Global (3 
intervals) 
12,6,3 
V D1 Maintenance of pump. Lognormal -2,0.5 
C T1 Diesel tank failure due to age Weibull 240,1.25 
C T2 Random useful-life diesel tank failures  Uniform 0.000556 
C R1 Early maintenance scheduling of the diesel tank. Lognormal 4.25,0.01 
C R2 Routine maintenance scheduling of the diesel tank. Lognormal 4.8,0.05 
C R3 Maintenance scheduling of the diesel tank on failure.  Lognormal -5,0.5 
C I1 Inspection of the diesel tank. Global (3 
intervals) 
12,6,3 
C D1 Maintenance of the diesel tank. Lognormal -2,0.5 
D T1 Ring main failure due to age Weibull 500,1.75 
D T2 Useful life ringmain failure  Uniform 0.00021 
D R1 Early maintenance scheduling of ringmain.  Lognormal 5.1,0.05 
D R2 Routine maintenance scheduling of ringmain.  Lognormal 5.7,0.05 
D R3 Maintenance scheduling of ringmain on failure.  Lognormal -5,0.5 
D I1 Inspection of ringmain.  Global (3 
intervals) 
12,6,3 
D D1 Maintenance of ringmain.  Lognormal -2,0.5 
E T1 Head and strainer failure due to age Weibull 72,2 
E T2 Useful life head and strainer failure Uniform 0.00081 
E R1 Early maintenance scheduling of the head and strainers.  Lognormal 3.4,0.05 
E R2 Routine maintenance scheduling of the head and strainers.  Lognormal 3.8,0.025 
E R3 Replacement of the head and strainers on failure.  Lognormal -5,0.5 
E I1 Inspection interval of the head and strainers.  Global (3 
intervals) 
12,6,3 
E D1 Replacement of the head and strainers.  Lognormal -2,0.5 
F T1 Isolation valve failure due to age Weibull 84,3 
F T2 Useful life isolation valve failures Uniform 0.0021 
F R1 Early maintenance scheduling of the isolation valve.  Lognormal 2.6,0.15 
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F R2 Routine maintenance scheduling of the isolation valve. Lognormal 3.1,0.1 
F R3 Maintenance of the isolation valve on failure. Lognormal -5,0.5 
F I1 Inspection interval of the isolation valve. Global (3 
intervals) 
12,6,3 
F D1 Repair time of the isolation valve. Lognormal -2,0.5 
F p1 Probability that the isolation valve fails in a closed position.   0.1,0.9 
G T1 Pressure release valve failure due to age Weibull 48,4 
G T2 Useful life pressure valve failure Uniform 0.00279 
G R1 Early maintenance scheduling of the pressure release valve.  Lognormal 2.9,0.01 
G R2 Routine maintenance scheduling of the pressure release valve. Lognormal 3.25,0.01 
G R3 Maintenance of the pressure release valve on failure. Lognormal -5,0.5 
G I1 Inspection interval of the pressure release valve. Global (3 
intervals) 
12,6,3 
G D1 Repair time of the pressure release valve. Lognormal -2,0.5 
G p1 Probability that the pressure release valve fails in a closed 
position.  
 0.5,0.5 
H T1 Deluge valve failure due to age Weibull 110,3.5 
H T2 Useful life deluge valve failures Uniform 0.00139 
H R1 Early maintenance scheduling of the deluge valve.  Lognormal 3.5,0.05 
H R2 Routine maintenance scheduling of the deluge valve. Lognormal 4,0.02 
H R3 Maintenance of the deluge valve on failure. Lognormal -5,0.5 
H I1 Inspection interval of the deluge valve. Global (3 
intervals) 
12,6,3 
H D1 Repair time of the deluge valve. Lognormal -2,0.5 
H p1 Probability that the deluge valve fails in a closed position.   0.5,0.5 
I T1 Solenoid failure due to age Weibull 56,4 
I T4 Useful life solenoid failure Uniform 0.00218 
I R1 Early maintenance scheduling of the solenoid.  Lognormal 2.6,0.1 
I R2 Routine maintenance scheduling of the solenoid. Lognormal 3.1,0.05 
I R3 Maintenance of the solenoid on failure. Lognormal -5,0.5 
I I1 Inspection interval of the solenoid. Global (3 
intervals) 
12,6,3 
I D1 Repair time of the solenoid. Lognormal -2,0.5 
I p1 Probability that the solenoid fails triggering a failure.   0.5,0.5 
J T1 Manual initiation device fails due to age Weibull 72,3.75 
J T4 Random manual initiation device failure. Uniform 0.00083 
J R1 Early maintenance of the manual initiation valve.  Lognormal 3.2,0.05 
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J R2 Routine maintenance of manual initiation valve. Lognormal 3.7,0.02 
J R3 Maintenance of manual initiation valve on failure.  Lognormal -5,0.5 
J I1 Inspection of manual initiation valve. Global (3 
intervals) 
12,6,3 
J D1 Maintenance of manual initiation valve.  Lognormal -2,0.5 
K T1 Pressure sensor failure due to age  Weibull 120,5 
K T4 Useful life pressure sensor failure Uniform 0.000834 
K R1 Early maintenance scheduling of pressure sensor.  Lognormal 4.24,0.02 
K R2 Routine maintenance scheduling of pressure sensor.  Lognormal 4.61,0.02 
K R3 Pressure sensor maintenance scheduling on failure.  Lognormal -5,0.5 
K I1 Inspection interval of the pressure sensors.  Global (3 
intervals) 
12,6,3 
K D1 Maintenance of pressure sensors Lognormal -2,0.5 
K p1 Probability that pressure sensor failure gives no reading   0.5,0.5 
K p2 Probability that pressure sensor failure gives a reading higher 
than true  
 0.2,0.8 
L T1 A smoke detector in the population fails due to age  Weibull 144,3 
 
L T2 Useful life smoke detector failure Uniform 0.000583 
L T3 A second smoke detector in the population fails due to age, 





L R1 Early maintenance scheduling of the smoke detector. Lognormal 4.1,0.01 
L R2 Routine maintenance scheduling of the smoke detector. Lognormal 4.6,0.02 
L R3 Maintenance scheduling of the smoke detector on failure. Lognormal -5,0.5 
L I1 Inspection interval of the smoke detectors.  Global (3 
intervals) 
12,6,3 
L D1 Maintenance of the smoke detectors.  Lognormal -2,0.5 
L p1 Probability that the smoke detector failure is sufficient to cause 
a system failure (random) 
 0.1,0.9 
L p2 Probability that the smoke detector failure is sufficient to cause 
a system failure (age) 
 0.3,0.7 
L p3 Probability that the smoke detector failure is unrevealed  0.2,0.8 
P T1 A heat detector in the population fails due to age  Weibull 180,2.5 
 
P T2 Useful life heat detector failure Uniform 0.000347 
P T3 A second heat detector in the population fails due to age, given 







P R1 Early maintenance scheduling of the heat detector. Lognormal 4.2,0.02 
P R2 Routine maintenance scheduling of the heat detector. Lognormal 4.67,0.01 
P R3 Maintenance scheduling of the heat detector on failure. Lognormal -5,0.5 
P I1 Inspection interval of the heat detectors.  Global (3 
intervals) 
12,6,3 
P D1 Maintenance of the heat detectors.  Lognormal -2,0.5 
P p1 Probability that the heat detector failure is sufficient to cause a 
system failure (random) 
 0.1,0.9 
P p2 Probability that the heat detector failure is sufficient to cause a 
system failure (age) 
 0.1,0.7 
P p3 Probability that the heat detector failure is unrevealed  0.2,0.8 
M T1 A call point in the population fails due to age  Weibull 96,3.5 
 
M T2 Useful life call point failure Uniform 0.0159 
M T3 A second call point in the population fails due to age, given 





M R1 Early maintenance scheduling of the call point. Lognormal 3.2,0.03 
M R2 Routine maintenance scheduling of the call point. Lognormal 3.7,0.02 
M R3 Maintenance scheduling of the call point on failure. Lognormal -5,0.5 
M I1 Inspection interval of the call point.  Global (3 
intervals) 
12,6,3 
M D1 Maintenance of the call point.  Lognormal -2,0.5 
M p1 Probability that the call point failure is sufficient to cause a 
system failure (random) 
 0.1,0.9 
M p2 Probability that the call point failure is sufficient to cause a 
system failure (age) 
 0.1,0.7 
M p3 Probability that the call point failure is unrevealed  0.2,0.8 
N T1 The alarm sounders fail due to age Weibull 300,2 
N T2 Useful life sounder failures Uniform 0.000463 
N T3 The alarm wiring fails due to age Weibull 480,2 
N T4 Useful life wiring failures Uniform 0.000119 
N R1 Early maintenance scheduling of the alarm system. Lognormal 4.38,0.02 
N R2 Routine maintenance scheduling of the alarm system. Lognormal 4.82,0.01 
N R3 Maintenance scheduling of the alarm system on failure. Lognormal  -5,0.5 
N I1 Inspection interval of the alarm system Global (3 
intervals) 
12,6,3 
N D1 Maintenance of the alarm system  Lognormal -2,0.5 
N p1 Probability that the failure of the alarm sounder leads to Normal 0.1,0.9 
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complete alarm system failure.  
O T1 The control box fails due to age Weibull 144,2.5 
O T3 The control box battery fails due to age  Weibull 60,7 
O T7 Useful life control box failure Uniform 0.00054 
O T8 Useful life battery failure Uniform 0.00836 
O R1 Early maintenance scheduling of the control box.  Lognormal 3.8,0.02 
O R2 Routine maintenance scheduling of the control box.  Lognormal 4.25,0.01 
O R3 Maintenance of the control box on failure. Lognormal -5,0.5 
O R4 Early maintenance scheduling of the control box battery.  Lognormal 3,0.01 
O R5 Routine maintenance scheduling of the control box battery. Lognormal 3.55,0.02 
O R6 Maintenance of the control box battery on failure.  Lognormal -5,0.5 
O D1 Control box maintenance.  Lognormal -2,0.5 
O D2 Control box battery maintenance.  Lognormal -2,0.5 
O I1 Inspection interval of the control box.  Global (3 
intervals) 
12,6,3 
O p1 Probability that the control box failure is unrevealed.  0.5,0.5 
O E1 Random power failure.  Uniform 0.0041 
O D4 End of power failure.  Normal 0.001,0.0001 
Q T1 Wiring fails due to age Weibull 480,2 
Q T4 Random useful life wiring failure Uniform 0.000119 
Q R1 Early maintenance scheduling of wiring. Lognormal 5.52,0.005 
Q R2 Routine maintenance scheduling of wiring.  Lognormal 6.05,0.005 
Q R3 Maintenance scheduling of wiring on failure.  Lognormal -5,0.5 
Q I1 Inspection interval of wiring.  Global (3 
intervals) 
12,6,3 
Q D1 Maintenance of wiring.   Lognormal -2,0.5 
X St1 Full system testing interval Normal (3 
distributions) 
9,1,6,1,3,1 
X Sd1 Full system testing time Lognormal -10,0.8 
X Ph1 System enters Phase 1 from Phase 0 Normal 36,1 
X Ph2 System enters Phase 2 from Phase 1 Normal 120,1 





A summary of the components modelled in Chapter 5.  
Components Failure modes Inspection and 
testing modelled 
Maintenance modelled 
Control box Unrevealed and revealed  Periodic inspection 
and testing, and 
testing when 





maintenance on discovered 
failure. 





maintenance on discovered 
failure. 
Pressure Sensors Each sensor can either fail to give a reading, 
give a reading that is higher than true or give a 
reading that is lower than true. Failures are 
unrevealed, unless they cause a false activation 
of the deluge system. The system is assumed 
to be in a dangerous state if 2 or more sensors 
give a reading that is higher than true. 
Periodic inspection 




maintenance of all sensors, 
routine age-based 
maintenance of all sensors, 
maintenance of all sensors 
on discovered failure. 
Alarm Single and multiple unrevealed alarm sounder 











(Type A models) 






maintenance on discovered 
failure. 
Diesel pump, 
Electric pump,  
Jockey pump 
(Type B models) 
Unrevealed failed state (in addition an 
unrevealed degraded state) 
Periodic inspection 





maintenance on discovered 
degraded state maintenance 
on discovered failure. 
Sprinkler head, 
wiring 
(Type C models) 










(Type D models) 
Unrevealed open failure and unrevealed closed 
failure 
Periodic inspection 









start device (Type E 
models) 









manual call points 
(Type F 
components) 
Unrevealed non-hazardous failure of member 







maintenance on discovered 
failure. 
Table A4.1: A table summarising the components modelled in Chapter 5 






For components modelled in Chapter 5, sample results for each component model are presented here. 
In these sample results a Weibull distribution governs the time that it takes for each component to fail. 
The mean of the Weibull distributions used in each of the models, has been used to discuss the results 
in relation to the input data. This is calculated as in Equation A1 for a 2-Parameter Weibull 
distribution, with shape parameter   and scale parameter  .  
                      (A1) 
Where      is the Gamma Function. 
Where a log-normal distribution has been used to specify intervals between maintenance actions the 
arithmetic mean of the distribution can be calculated as in Equation A2, where   and   are the 
location and shape parameters respectivley. 




          (A2) 
Control Box Model 
To demonstrate the control box model in Chapter 5, sample model inputs were assigned. These are 
given in Appendix 3. The system level maintenance strategy defined at the beginning of the Chapter 
5, was also applied. Figure A5.1 gives the probability that the control box is in a failed state with each 
year. Figure A5.2 gives the probability that the control box battery is in a failed state each year. Figure 
A5.4 gives the probability that there is a complete control box power failure and Figure A5.3 gives the 
probability that there is a mains power failure over time. The number of maintenance actions at each 




Figure A5.1: The probability that the control box is in the failed state over time 
Figure A5.1 gives the probability of control box failure for each year, these results include both 
revealed and unrevealed failures. The bars show the average probability of failure over the year with 
the range bars showing the maximum and minimum average simulated value within each year. From 
the Weibull input data it is expected that a failure due to age will occur with a mean time of 
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approximately 11 years. The routine age-based maintenance scheduling interval is with a mean value 
of approximately 6 years and early age-based maintenance scheduling interval is set with a mean 
value of approximately 4 years. With the maintenance strategy applied in this simulation, these results 
show a low level of control box failure suggesting that the age-based maintenance included in the 
model prevents an increase in failures as the component ages.  
 
Figure A5.2: The probability that the control box battery is in the failed state over time 
Figure A5.2 gives the probability that the control box battery is in the failed state at each year, with 
the bars showing the average value across the year and the range bars showing the maximum and 
minimum value within the year. From the input data it is expected that failures will occur with a mean 
time of approximately 5 years. A mean value of approximately 3 years was assigned to the routine 
maintenance scheduling interval and a mean value of approximately 2 years was assigned to the early 
maintenance scheduling interval. These results show a higher level of control box battery failure in 
comparison to that of the control box. This can be attributed to the shorter time to failure assigned to 
the battery ageing transition in this demonstration of the model and a higher assigned rate of random 
failures. 
Figure A5.3 gives the probability that there is a mains power failure over time, this is approximately 
constant which is expected from the input data for this case. Figure A5.4 shows that the combination 




Figure A5.3: The probability that there is a mains power failure over time 
 
Figure A5.4: The probability that there is a complete control box power failure over time 
Pressure Sensors Model 
To demonstrate the model for the pressure sensors, given in Chapter 5, sample values were used as 
input to the model. The values used in this demonstration can be found in Appendix 3. Figure A5.5 
gives the probability that there is a combined pressure sensor failure that can result in the system not 
functioning when it is required, each bar gives the average probability of failure for the year with the 
upper and lower values within the year represented by the range bars. From the input data it is 
expected that the pressure sensors will fail due to age with a mean time of approximately 9 years. The 
routine maintenance scheduling interval was set with a mean value of approximately 8 years and the 
early replacement scheduling interval was set with a mean value of approximately 6 years. Despite the 
faster ageing assigned to this component in comparison to other components in the model, there is still 
a low probability of failure. This can be attributed to the redundancy in the pressure sensors and the 




Figure A5.5: The results for the probability of a combined pressure sensor failure 
Alarm Sounder Model 
To demonstrate the model given in Chapter 5 for the alarm sounder failure, sample input values were 
used. These can be found in Appendix 3. The results of this Petri net model for this input data can be 
found in Figure A5.6, which gives the probability that there is a total failure in the alarm sounder 
circuit. The bars give the average probability of failure over each year, with range bars showing the 
maximum and minimum simulated value within each year. From the input results it is expected that 
there will be failures due to the age of the wiring with a mean value of approximately 35 years and 
failures due to the age of the sounders with a mean value of approximately 22 years. The routine 
maintenance scheduling interval is set with a mean value of approximately 10 years for the sounders 
and the early maintenance scheduling interval is set with a mean value of approximately 7 years. The 
routine maintenance scheduling interval is set with a mean value of approximately 35 years for the 
wiring and the early maintenance scheduling interval is set with a mean value of approximately 20 
years. From the long ageing times assigned in this application of the model, a low probability of 




Figure A5.6: The probability that the alarm sounder circuit is in the failed state at each time 
Type A Component Model 
To demonstrate the model given in Chapter 5 for Type A components, the sample data, given in 
Appendix 3, was used as input to the pipework model and results were obtained via simulation of the 
model. The results for the probability of pipework failure in this case are given in Figure A5.7. The 
time since system installation in years is shown along the x-axis, with the average probability of 
failure in that year shown on the y-axis. The range bars show the maximum and minimum average 
probability found by the simulation within that year. The bars show the average probability across that 
year.  
When this model is applied to the pipework or pressurised ringmain, all the pipework, or pressurised 
ringmain, in the system is modelled as a unit with this Petri net. If maintenance occurs then it is 
assumed that all the pipework, or all of the ringmain, in the deluge system is returned to a good state.  
The results for the module when applied to the sample pipework data, given in Appendix 3, are given 
in Figure A5.7. In these results the average probability that the pipework is in the failed state across 
the year is represented by the bars and the maximum and minimum average value within the year is 
represented by the range bars. Age related failures of the pipework include those such as scale build-
up, corrosion and crack development [191] [192]. Random failure of the pipework includes those due 
to accidental damage to the pipework. From the input data used to demonstrate this model it is 
expected that failures due to the age of the pipework will occur with a mean time of approximately 45 
years. Routine age-based maintenance is scheduled with a mean value of approximately 33 years and 
early age-based maintenance is scheduled with a mean value of approximately 20 years. A low 





Figure A5.7: The probability that the pipework is in a failed state at each time 
The results for the module when applied to the pressurised ringmain data, given in Appendix 3, are 
given in Figure A5.8. Similarly, to the pipework, aging failures for this component include those such 
as corrosion, scale build up and crack development. Random failure includes those due to accidental 
damage or overpressure of the ringmain. From the sample data used to demonstrate this model, 
failures due to the age of the ringmain are expected with a mean value of approximately 37 years. 
Routine age-based maintenance is scheduled with a mean value of approximately 24 years and early 
age-based maintenance is scheduled with a mean value of approximately 14 years. There is also a 
higher rate of random failures assigned to the ringmain model than the pipework model. From these 
input values it is expected that there will be a higher probability of failure of the ringmain than the 
pipework. In the results for the ringmain it is notable that there is a reduction in the probability of 
failure after the 6-year and 12-year point, these times correspond to the changes in system level 
maintenance phases. At this point the inspection frequency and system level testing increases and 
preventative maintenance is enabled, as expected this causes a reduction in the probability that the 




Figure A5.8: The probability that the ringmain is in a failed state at each time 
The results for the module when applied to the sample diesel tank data, given in Appendix 3, are 
given in Figure A5.9. The diesel tank is used to supply diesel to the diesel pump. Here, the bars show 
the average probability of failure for each year and the range bars show the maximum and minimum 
average value within each year. A failure of the diesel tank corresponds to any state where the tank 
failure results in an insufficient supply of diesel from the tank to the diesel water pump. It is assumed 
in this model that if the diesel tank is functioning correctly then there will be enough diesel to enable 
the correct functioning of the deluge system, namely, there are no system-level failures due to design 
flaws such as a diesel tank size that is too small. Random failures include those due to accidental 
damage leading to a tank leak or insufficient supply of diesel to the tank. Ageing failure include 
leakage of the tank due to corrosion or cracking.  
From the sample input data used in this model, ageing failures of the diesel tank are expected with a 
mean value of approximately 19 years. The routine age-based maintenance is scheduled with a mean 
interval of approximately 10 years and the early age-based maintenance is scheduled with a mean 
interval of approximately 6 years. It is expected from the sample model inputs that there will be a low 
probability of failure due to the slow ageing time assigned to this part of the model. In these results a 
reduction can be seen at approximately 13 years, corresponding to entry into the third system 




Figure A5.9: The probability that the diesel tank is in a failed state at each time 
Type B Component Model 
To demonstrate the Type B component model, given in Chapter 5, sample data, given in Appendix 3, 
has been used to demonstrate the possible results that can be gained from the model. Different data is 
used for each of the diesel pump, electric pump and jockey pump. The results for the probability of 
total pump failure are given in Figure A5.10, Figure A5.11 and Figure A5.12 for the electric pump, 
jockey pump and diesel pump respectively. In the application of this model in Chapter 5, it is assumed 
that only total pump failures can contribute to a system-level failure. For the models of pump failures, 
replacement is enabled upon the discovery of a partial failure. Because of this, it is expected that there 
will be a lower number of pump failures, resulting in a lower probability of failure than if partial 
failures were not included. Also, a delay in the time that pump failures begin to occur is expected due 
to this preventative maintenance. It can also be expected that there will be less impact seen across the 
three maintenance phases on the probability of pump failure due to this constant repair of the pumps 
before they reach the fully failed state.  
From the sample data used as input to the model, it is expected that ageing failures of the electric 
pump will occur with a mean value of approximately 9 years. Also, routine age-based maintenance is 
scheduled with a mean interval of approximately 5 years and early age-based maintenance is 
scheduled with a mean interval of approximately 3 years. Since there is maintenance on partial failure, 
it is expected that there will be a low level of failure, especially at the earlier stages of the 




Figure A5.10: The probability that the electric pump is in a failed state at each time 
From the sample data used in this model it is expected that the jockey pump will fail due to age with a 
mean value of approximately 5 years. Routine age-based maintenance is scheduled with a mean 
interval of approximately 3 years and early age-based maintenance is scheduled with a mean interval 
of approximately 1 year. There is also a higher rate of random failures assigned to the jockey pump in 
comparison to the electric pump. From this, it is expected that there will be a higher probability of 
failure, and that failure will begin to occur at a shorter time.  
From the sample data it is expected that the diesel pump will fail due to age with a mean value of 
approximately 12 years. Routine age-based maintenance is scheduled with a mean interval of 
approximately 8 years and early age-based maintenance is scheduled with a mean interval of 
approximately 5 years. There is also a lower rate of random failures assigned to the diesel pump in 
comparison to the jockey pump, but a similar rate assigned in comparison to the electric pump. From 
this it is expected that the diesel pump will have the lowest probability of failure in the time period for 
these results, but that the probability of failure will follow a similar trend to that of the electric pump 




Figure A5.11: The probability that the jockey pump is in a failed state at each time 
 
Figure A5.12: The probability that the diesel pump is in a failed state at each time 
Type C Component Model 
To demonstrate the application of the Type C component model, given in Chapter 5, sample data 
given in Appendix 3 was used and the model was simulated via Monte Carlo simulation.  
Figure A5.13 gives the results of this model applied to the sprinkler head. Here, the bars give the 
average probability of failure over each year and the range bars give the maximum and minimum 
average values from the simulation within each year. Random failure of the sprinkler head includes 
those such as blockages of the strainer or sprinkler head, or accidental damage to the sprinkler head. 
Sprinkler head failures due to age include failures as a result of corrosion, rusting and mineral build 
up [192] [191]. Failures due to the ageing of the sprinkler head and strainer are expected with a mean 
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value of approximately 5 years, from the sample input data used in this chapter. Routine age-based 
maintenance is scheduled with an mean value of approximately 4 years and early age-based 
maintenance is scheduled with a mean value of approximately 3 years. There is also a relatively high 
level of random failures assigned to the model. Due to this shorter ageing rate, the high level of 
failures and the unrevealed nature of a failure it is expected that there will be a higher probability of 
failure of this component in comparison to other components in the model. Notable in these results is 
the reduction in the probability of failure at approximately 13 years. This corresponds to the entry of 
the third maintenance phase, where there is an increase in inspection frequency of the sprinkler head 
and strainer and in the age-based maintenance of the component.  
 
Figure A5.13: The probability that the sprinkler head is in a failed state at each time 
Figure A5.14 gives the results of this model when applied to the wiring data given in Appendix 3. 
Failures of the wiring due to ageing include those such as failures due to corrosion, water ingress or 
deterioration of the casing. Random failures include those due to accidental damage. From the input 
data it is expected that failures due to the age of the wiring will occur with a mean value of 
approximately 35 years, however failures are unrevealed and hence can be present in this model until 
an inspection is carried out. Routine age-based maintenance is scheduled with a mean value of 
approximately 35 years and early age-based maintenance is scheduled with a mean value of 
approximately 21 years. In these results there is an increase in the probability of failure towards 35 
years followed by a decrease after 35 years. The increase corresponds to the increase in failures due to 




Figure A5.14: The probability that the wiring is in a failed state at each time 
Type D Component Model 
To demonstrate the model given for Type D components in Chapter 5, sample data was used. This 
data can be found in Appendix 3.  
Figure A5.15 gives the results for the sample isolation valve data, given in Appendix 3. In these 
results the bars give the average probability of failure over each year and the range bars give the 
maximum and minimum probability of failure taken from the simulation within each year. This model 
can be repeated for each isolation valve in the system if required. For the isolation valve, the random 
failures include those due to human error causing a valve to reside in an incorrect state, for example 
where the isolation valve has been closed at a previous time and not reopened, and those where the 
isolation valve has been damaged. Failures due to the age of the components include mechanical 
failures where the valve is not tight or has failed completely, such as a broken valve stem or rounded 
operating nut [193] [194]. There are two failure options for the isolation valve. The first is that the 
isolation valve has failed in the open position and will not contribute to a system-level failure. The 
second is that the isolation valve has failed in the closed position which can contribute to a system-
level failure. In this model, a threshold can be given to classify whether a valve failure is an ‘open’ or 
‘closed’ failure. An open failure is defined as a case whereby the failure is insufficient to contribute to 
the failure of the whole deluge system as it does not inhibit the fluid flow enough. A closed failure is a 
failure whereby the failure inhibits sufficient fluid flow to contribute to a system failure. Inspection of 
the valve looks at: the valve operation, reduced flow through the valve when it is in the supposedly 
open condition, and flow through the valve when it is in the closed position. 
From the input parameters used in this sample application of the model it is expected that an isolation 
valve will fail due to age with a mean time of approximately 6 years. Routine age-based maintenance 
is scheduled with an interval of approximately 2 years and early age-based maintenance is scheduled 
with an interval of approximately 1 year. The results show a general increase in the probability of 





these correspond to the entry times of system maintenance phases, and an increase in inspection, 





Figure A5.15: The probability that the isolation valve is in a failed state at each time 
Figure A5.16 gives the result of this model applied to the sample pressure release valve data, given in 
Appendix 3. The pressure release valve is used to prevent overpressure in the pipework and ringmain. 
The valve is held closed until the pressure in the ringmain exceeds a certain threshold, whereupon it 
opens to reduce the pressure. In this model, a false opening of the pressure release valve can result in 
a system failure by reducing the pressure of the ringmain below the required level.  A failure in the 
ringmain due to overpressure is included in the ringmain component model. Commonly, pressure 
release valves have a sprung mechanism that allows the valve to open in overpressure situations 
before returning to the closed position when the pressure drops again. Random failures of the pressure 
release valve can be due to a jamming of the valve flap or an incorrect recalibration following 
intervention. Ageing failure can also occur due to the age of the pressure release valve such as a build-
up of sediment between the valve flap and the sealing surface, loss of elasticity or rusting of the spring 
and bending of the valve stem. Inspections check that the valve does not flutter or clatter and that it 
returns to its original position after overpressure causes it to open. This can be done by a verification 
device that simulates overpressure without interfering with normal operation [195].  
From the distribution governing ageing of the pressure release valve, used in this application of the 
model, it is expected that failures due to the age of the component will occur with a mean value of 
approximately 4 years. Routine age-based maintenance is scheduled following an interval with a 
mean value of approximately 2 years and early age-based maintenance is scheduled following an 
interval with a mean value of approximately 1.5 years. In comparison to the isolation valve, from the 
input data, there is also a lower probability that the pressure release valve will fail safe. The results 
show a higher probability of a hazardous failure for the pressure release valve in comparison to the 
isolation valve, this can be attributed to the lower probability that the valve will fail safe and a faster 
ageing rate. These results show a decrease after the 13-year point that corresponds to the increased 
inspection, testing and preventative maintenance that is associated with entry into the third system 




Figure A5.16: The probability that the pressure release valve is in a failed state at each time 
Type E Component Model 
To demonstrate the model, for Type E components, given in Chapter 5, data given in Appendix 3 was 
used as input for the model. Figure A5.17 gives the results for the application of this model to the 
sample data for the deluge valve, found in Appendix 3. The deluge valve separates the pipework 
containing the pressurized water in the system from the dry pipework leading to the sprinkler heads. 
The diaphragm of the deluge valve is held in place by a pressure balance between the water closing 
circuit and the water pressure in the ringmain system. This prevents water from entering the dry 
pipework. If water leaves the water closing circuit, a pressure difference is created across the 
diaphragm of the deluge valve which causes the valve to enter the open position, thus allowing water 
to flow through the system [83]. A false opening of the deluge valve triggers the system to respond as 
if there is a fire. This can cause costly damage to infrastructure and closure of the station. If the deluge 
valve fails to open on demand, water cannot flow through the deluge system to the sprinkler heads.  
Random failures of the deluge valve include those where the valve becomes stuck and does not return 
to the closed position following opening, or there is a blockage in the valve. Ageing failures of the 
deluge valve include those such as damage to the diaphragm or a build-up of sediment within the 
valve. On failure of the deluge valve, there is a probability associated with it residing in the open or 
closed position.  
From the input data it is expected that failures due to the age of the deluge valve will occur at a mean 
time of approximately 8 years. Routine age-based maintenance is scheduled at an interval with a mean 
value of approximately 5 years. Early age-based maintenance is scheduled with an interval with a 
mean value of approximately 3 years. The results show an increase in the probability of failure as the 
component age increases, however there is a decrease after the 13-year point. This can be attributed to 
the increase in inspection, testing and preventative maintenance when the system enters the third 




Figure A5.17: The probability that the deluge valve is in a failed state at each time 
Figure A5.18 gives the results for the application of this model to the sample data for the solenoid and 
closing circuit, found in Appendix 3. The deluge system can be automatically initiated. In this case the 
control box gives a signal to the solenoid valve causing it to de-energize and open. This releases air 
from a control air circuit reducing the pressure in this circuit. This in turn causes a valmatic release 
valve to open, draining water from the water closing circuit [196].  
Random failures of the solenoid and closing circuits can include: damage to the closing circuits 
leading to a leak, a false recalibration of the pressure in the circuits following activation, and the 
solenoid valve not returning to the fully closed position after testing. Failures due to the age of the 
solenoid and closing circuits can include: a build-up of dirt in the solenoid valve such that it cannot 
fully close, or the development of cracks in the closing circuit. There are two failure modes for the 
solenoid and closing circuit in this model. The first is that a failure causes water to leave the water 
closing circuit, which opens the deluge valve and immediately reveals the failure by falsely activating 
the deluge system. The second failure mode is that the solenoid does not de-energize, or the valmatic 
release valve remains closed, on receiving a signal from the control box, which prevents water from 
flowing through the deluge system when it is needed.  
For the sample data used in this application of the model, failures due to the age of the solenoid and 
water closing circuit are expected with a mean time of approximately 4 years. Routine age-based 
maintenance is scheduled with a mean interval of approximately 2 years. Early age-based 
maintenance is scheduled with a mean interval of approximately 1 year. The results show an increase 
in the probability of component failure up to the 9-year point, followed by a decrease. This decrease 
corresponds to the routine age-based preventative maintenance, scheduled during the second 
maintenance phase, followed by the increase in inspection and system testing at the entry of the third 




Figure A5.18: The probability that the solenoid is in a failed state at each time 
Figure A5.19 gives the results for the application of this model to the sample data for the manual start 
device, found in Appendix 3. The manual start device is an emergency release valve that can be 
operated manually to allow water to flow from the water closing circuit to open the deluge valve. 
Random failures of the emergency release valve include: an accidental operation of the manual start 
device or a misalignment of the valve following testing. Failure due to ageing of the manual release 
mechanism include the build-up of debris under the valve or mechanical damage. There are two 
failure modes for the manual release mechanism. The first occurs when false activation of the system 
arises due to the surplus opening of the release valve. The second failure mode includes scenarios 
where the manual release mechanism does not work when required. 
From the input data it is expected that there will be failures due to the age of the manual start device 
with a mean time of approximately 5 years. Routine age-based maintenance is scheduled with a mean 
time of approximately 3 years and early age-based maintenance is scheduled with a mean time of 
approximately 2 years. In the results a decrease in the probability of failure can be seen at 13 years, 
corresponding to an increase in the inspection and testing frequency at this point. In addition, a further 
decrease can be seen at the 16-year point, corresponding to the preventative maintenance actions 




Figure A5.19: The probability that the manual start device is in a failed state at each time 
Type F Component Model 
To demonstrate the model, for Type F components, given in Chapter 5, data given in Appendix 3 was 
used as input. The results for each type of population of components is modelled by a repeated unit of 
this model. In this application of the model, there are two zones in the station, each with a different 
detection circuit. The first is a public zone where heat detectors are present. The second is a non-
public zone where smoke detectors are present. It is assumed that the detectors are spaced such that if 
there is a failure of one detection unit then the fire can be detected by a second unit in a nearby 
location. Random failures in the detectors can occur at any point due to accidental damage and age-
related failures, include those due to increased sensitivity and dust or dirt accumulation [192]. Figure 
A5.20 gives the results for this model with the smoke detector sample data, as given in Appendix 3. 
Figure A5.21 gives the results for this model with the heat detector sample data, as given in Appendix 
3.  
From the input data used in this model it is expected that the smoke detector will fail due to age with a 
mean time of approximately 10 years. Routine age-based maintenance is scheduled with a mean time 
of approximately 8 years. Early age-based maintenance is scheduled with a mean time of 
approximately 5 years. From the input data used in this model it is expected that the heat detector will 
fail due to age with a mean time of approximately 13 years. Routine age-based maintenance is 
scheduled with a mean time of approximately 9 years. Early age-based maintenance is scheduled with 
a mean time of approximately 6 years. The results for the heat and smoke detectors both show a 
decrease in the probability of failure at the 3-year point corresponding to entry to the second 
maintenance phase, and the corresponding increase in inspection frequency. Preventative 
maintenance, scheduled in the second system level maintenance phase can occur at approximately 8 
years for the smoke detector, and at approximately 9 years for the heat detector. Further second phase 
and third phase preventative maintenance is scheduled from this point onwards. The results show a 
levelling of the probability of failure at these points followed by a decrease towards a lower more 
consistent probability of failure, despite the ageing of the system. This can be attributed to the 




Figure A5.20: Probability that there is a smoke detector failure at each time 
 
Figure A5.21: The probability that there is a heat detector failure at each time 
Figure A5.22 gives the results for this model when applied to the sample call point data, given in 
Appendix 3. In this application of the model there is one set of call points in the first zone and one set 
of call points in the second zone. This Petri net models the group of call points in one zone and is 
repeated for each zone. It is assumed here that there is no difference between the probabilities of 
failure in each zone and so the results of the simulation are simply duplicated when combined via a 
Fault Tree structure. However, if data is available then this Petri net can be simulated with different 
data for each zone. 
Random failures of the call point can include those caused by accidental damage or vandalism. 
Failures can also occur due to the age of the call points, such as those due to water ingress or dust and 
dirt accumulation [197]. From the input data it is expected that there will be failures due to the age of 
the call points with a mean time of approximately 7 years. Routine age-based maintenance of the call 
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points is scheduled following an interval with a mean time of approximately 3 years and early age-
based maintenance of the call points is scheduled with a mean time of approximately 2 years. There is 
also a higher rate of random failures assigned to the call points, when compared to the rate assigned to 
the smoke and heat detectors. The results show a decrease at the 3-year point, following the entry to 
the second system level maintenance phase and the associated increase in inspection frequency. The 
results also show a decrease following the 6-year point, this corresponds to the initialisation of the 
age-based preventative maintenance scheduled in the second system level maintenance phase. The 
higher and more consistent probability of failure of the call points can be attributed to the higher 
random failure rate of the component.  
 
Figure A5.22: The probability that there is a call point failure at each time 
Appendix 6 
This appendix gives the distributions and parameters for each of the models in the fourth example in Chapter 7. Here, normal 
distribution parameters are given in order of       , Weibull distribution parameters are given in order of         Where 
a question mark is given for a parameter, this denotes a parameter that is updated within the example.  
Reference Petri Net 
Transition Distribution Parameters 
t1 None Fires Instantaneously 
t2 None Fires Instantaneously 
t3 None Fires Instantaneously 
t4 2-Parameter Weibull 30,2 
t5 2-Parameter Weibull 5,1 
t6 None Fires Instantaneously 
t7 None  Fires Instantaneously 
t8 Normal 0.001,0.0001 
t9 Normal 6,0.5 
t10 2-Parameter Weibull 12,1 
t11 2-Parameter Weibull 3,1 
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t12 None Fires Instantaneously 
t13 None Fires Instantaneously 
t14 Normal 0.001,0.0001 
t15 Normal 6,0.5 
t16 None Fires Instantaneously 
t17 None Fires Instantaneously 
t18 Normal 0.001,0.0001 
t19 Normal 0.001,0.0001 
  Normal 0.001,0.0001 
t20 Normal 0.001,0.0001 
t21 Normal 0.001,0.0001 
t22 Normal 0.001,0.0001 
t23 None Fires Instantaneously 
t24 None Fires Instantaneously 
t25 Normal 1, 0.25 
t26 Normal 0.001,0.0001 
t27 Probability p=0.2 
t28 Normal 0.001,0.0001 
t29 Normal 0.001,0.0001 
Reduced Petri net 1  
t1 Normal ?,20 
t2 Normal ?,1 
Reduced Petri net 2 
t1 None Fires Instantaneously 
t2 None Fires Instantaneously 
t3 None Fires Instantaneously 
t4 Normal 50,2 
t5 Normal ?,1 
t6 Normal 40,1 
t7 Normal ?,1 
Reduced Petri net 3 
t1 None Fires Instantaneously 
t2 None Fires Instantaneously 
t3 None Fires Instantaneously 
t4 2-Parameter Weibull 30,2 
t5 2-Parameter Weibull 5,1 
t6 Normal ?, 1 
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t7 Normal ?, 1 
t8 2-Parameter Weibull 12,1 
t9 2-Parameter Weibull 3,1 
t10 Normal ?, 1 
t11 Normal ?, 1 
Reduced Petri net 4 
t1 None Fires Instantaneously 
t2 None Fires Instantaneously 
t3 None Fires Instantaneously 
t4 2-Parameter Weibull 30,2 
t5 2-Parameter Weibull 5,1 
t6 None Fires Instantaneously 
t7 Normal ?,1 
t8 Normal 0.001,0.0001 
t9 Normal 6,0.5 
t10 2-Parameter Weibull 12,1 
t11 2-Parameter Weibull 3,1 
t12 None Fires Instantaneously 
t13 Normal ?,1 
t14 Normal 0.001,0.0001 
t15 Normal 6,0.5 
t16 Normal ?,1 
t17 Normal ?,1 
t18 None Fires Instantaneously 
Table A6.1: Data for each of the Petri net models in the fourth example of Chapter 7.  
